Vol. XXVII
No. 1
Winter 2008-09 Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Regional Studies,
Islamabad, Pakistan.
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INDO-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA DR SHAHEEN AKHTAR |
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THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM: RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSES MUHAMMAD ZUBAIR IQBAL |
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ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: FOCUS ON WATER SCARCITY IN SOUTH ASIA MARYAM MASTOOR |
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EU-SAARC: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK SIDRA TARIQ |
INDO-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA
On 18 July
2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush signed a joint
statement in Washington that laid the foundation for a comprehensive strategic
partnership between India and the US. The two leaders declared their resolve to
[T]ransform the relationship
between their countries and establish a global partnership. As leaders of
nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the
new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability,
democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world. It will enhance our
ability to work together to provide global leadership in areas of mutual concern
and interest.(1) On 2 March
2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed a joint statement in New
Delhi expressing:
[S]atisfaction with the great
progress the US and India have made in advancing our strategic partnership to
meet the global challenges of the 21st century. Both our countries are linked by
a deep commitment to freedom and democracy; a celebration of national diversity,
human creativity and innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic
opportunity worldwide; and a desire to increase mutual security against the
common threats posed by intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. The successful transformation of the US-India relationship
will have a decisive and positive influence on the future international system
as it evolves in this new century.(2) The two Joint
Statements clearly establish that the main thrust of the fast growing Indo-US
strategic partnership is to forge a ‘global partnership’ based on ‘shared
values’ and ‘common interests’ that would challenge them in the 21st
century. This shared vision and objectives are often referred to in the
statements of senior US and Indian officials as well as their top political
leadership. President Bush’s commitment to work on ‘achieving full civilian
nuclear energy cooperation with India’ envisaged in Indo-US nuclear deal and the
10-year Indo-US Defence Framework Agreement signed in June 2005 not only
represent the recognition of India’s status as a nuclear-weapon state but also
demonstrate an all-out effort by the US to build India into a global power, to
play the role of a ‘swing power’ in the emerging balance of power in Asia. Many
observers view this move as an attempt by the US to “counter balance” the rise
of China as a major power and its growing influence in Asia. The study would
explore the nature of the Indo-US strategic partnership and its implications for
China at the regional and global levels. It would analyze the implications of
Indo-US partnership for China within the parameters of the evolving strategic
culture in India and China’s perception and response to the strategic shift in
US policy towards India.
The questions raised are:
·
What are the dynamics
and the nature of this strategic partnership?
·
How the emerging
strategic culture in India would play out in the wake of Indo-US strategic
partnership?
·
How China perceives
this strategic partnership impacting its relationship with global actors,
especially the US and Russia?
·
What are the likely
implications of the Indo-US strategic partnership for China’s interests in Asia
in general and South Asia, South East Asia, Central Asia in particular? The nuclear
agreement with India stemmed from the Bush administration’s desire to transform
the bilateral relations and develop a strong strategic partnership. The
relationship began to transform by the early 1990s. The end of Cold War and
disintegration of the Soviet Union freed India from the constraints of the
superpower rivalry which was a main hurdle in the growth of US-India relations.
India started distancing itself from traditional foreign policy platforms and
initiated the process of building closer strategic ties with the US and its
allies, especially Israel. The nuclear tests of 1998 and the ensuing sanctions
on India only signalled a temporary pause in their growing strategic
relationship. Within days of the nuclear tests the Clinton administration
started lifting the sanctions. The events of 9/11 and India’s swift support for
the US-led counter-terrorism operations brought the two countries much closer.
In October 2001, the new US president, George Bush waived almost all sanctions.
President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States
stated that “US interests require a strong relationship with India.”(3) In 2002, India
and the US set up the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), which gave
approval to 90 per cent of Indian applications for dual-use technology.(4) In
January 2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee launched the “Next
Steps in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP) initiative which outlined bilateral
cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programme and
high-technology trade in ‘dual use’ technologies, besides expanding dialogue on
missile defence.(5) The
“strategic partnership” forwarded by the NSSP involved progress through a series
of reciprocal steps in which both countries took action designed to expand
engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues, enhanced cooperation in
missile defence, peaceful uses of space technology, and creation of an
appropriate environment for increased commerce in high-technology.(6) The
initiative was a precursor to move towards future strategic partnership in
defence and nuclear technology cooperation. On 28 June
2005, Indian Defence Minister and US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld signed
a 10-year Defence Framework Agreement which formalized the rapidly
growing defence relationship between the two countries. The new parameters of
the defence relationship included cooperation in defense technology, continued
joint and combined exercises and exchanges, expansion of trade in
defence-related items, increased opportunities for technology transfer,
collaboration, co-production and research and development.(7) The
agreement reflected a major turnaround in US strategic perception of India as “a
potential partner in providing peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region
and in shaping a new Asian balance of power.”(8) The
agreement underscored that the “defence relationship will support, and will be
an element of the broader US-India strategic partnership.”(9)
18 July 2005 Agreement:
The next major step in forging strategic partnership was the 18 July 2005
agreement that included provisions for moving forward in civil nuclear
cooperation, civilian space cooperation and high technology trade. The US
accommodated India in two significant ways. One, it implicitly recognised India
as a nuclear weapon-state by describing it as a “responsible state with advanced
nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as
other such states”. Two, more significantly, the Bush administration made a
commitment to assist India in getting civil nuclear technology by seeking
“agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies” to help facilitate
technology transfers and cooperation. In addition, the US gave a commitment to
India that it would work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes
to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.”(10) In
return, India agreed to ‘separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities
and programmes in a phased manner’, to file a declaration regarding its civilian
facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to place
voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and sign and
abide by an Additional Protocol relating to civilian nuclear facilities. India
also agreed to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing and work with the US for
the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Finally,
India agreed to adhere to international guidelines controlling the export of
nuclear and missile technology through ‘comprehensive export control legislation
and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.(11) The
joint statement signified a major reversal in US non-proliferation policy which
allowed full-steam nuclear energy cooperation with a nuclear-armed India outside
NPT framework. It also indicated marginalization of Congress and
non-proliferation interest groups especially Non-proliferation Arms Control
Bureau that sought ‘greater nuclear restraints from India.’(12)
On 2 March 2006,
during President Bush’s visit to India, New Delhi announced a ‘separation plan’
and reaffirmed the July 2005 agreement. A working group headed by Indian foreign
secretary Shayam Saran and US under secretary of state Nicholas Burns finalized
the separation plan. Initially India placed less than 50 per cent of its
reactors under safeguards and excluded its fast-breeder reactor from
inspections. Finally it agreed to place 14 of its 22 thermal reactors in
operation or under construction under safeguards by 2014. Six of these were
already under safeguards — two US-supplied reactors at Tarapur, two Canadian
–supplied reactors, and two Russian-built LWRs under construction. Moreover,
India secured a seven-year exemption from safeguards for its breeder reactor.
India kept eight reactors outside safeguards. Shielding these reactors allowed
it to keep an entire fuel cycle for the breeder reactor outside safeguards.
These reactors are/could be a source of plutonium for nuclear weapons during the
time that India’s existing plutonium inventory is depleted for use in the
breeder reactor.”(13)
123 Agreement, 26 July 2007:
After India announced the separation plan, the US moved fast on various fronts —
with Congress, the NSG and India. India also started discussing a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). After two years of
protracted discussions the US and India finalised “123 Agreement” in July 2007.
The bilateral cooperation agreement specifies the terms for US civilian nuclear
exports to India. Such an agreement was required by Section 123 of the 1954
Atomic Energy Act. The agreement provided legal basis for the two countries to
cooperate in the civil nuclear field. It was a major step in the process that
allowed the nuclear deal to move forward paving the way for India’s negotiations
on a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The 123
Agreement committed the US to full nuclear cooperation with India. Article 2
specified the scope of cooperation in areas that included: a) advanced nuclear
energy research and development; b) development of an Indian strategic reserve
of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the life of
India’s reactors; c) full civil nuclear cooperation (commercial trade) covering
nuclear reactors, technology and nuclear fuel cycle; d) reprocessing of spent
fuel; e) nuclear safety; f) exchange of scientists and collaborative research;
g) controlled thermonuclear fusion including multilateral projects; h) transfer
of nuclear material supplied to third countries.(14) The
agreement was “not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities” of India and
will not hinder or interfere with any nuclear or non-nuclear material,
technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by
India independent of the Agreement. (Art.2(4). The agreement also provided for
corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its
civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuels supplies.
(Art.5 (c). India in return
made a commitment that all civil nuclear material and equipment transferred
under the agreement shall be subject to ‘safeguards in perpetuity’ in accordance
with the India-specific IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocol.(Art.10) It also
committed itself to using the nuclear material and equipment transferred under
this agreement for peaceful purposes only (Art.9). Nicholas Burns described the
123 Agreement as a “symbolic centrepiece of a growing global partnership between
the two countries.”(15) The
deal went through the next stage of India-specific IAEA safeguards, after a lot
of debate in India for and against the agreement. It is pertinent here to see
the domestic dimension of the bilateral nuclear agreement in the US and India as
it will continue to exert pressures on both governments in finalization and
operationalization of the deal. The July 2005
nuclear deal was concluded between the two leaders and their close set of high
officials on each side. The agreement touched off a heated domestic debate in
both countries. In the US, consultations at the domestic level were generally
absent in the run-up to the deal. Domestic debate/consultations started as both
governments sought, and in the case of the Bush administration required,
legislative support to implement the agreement. In India, however, the
government was not legally required to get legislative approval for the
agreement though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh briefed the parliament about the
deal on 27 July 2005, immediately after the 18 July agreement, on 27 February
before President Bush’s visit to Indian, and 7-8 March after announcing India’s
separation plan. The United
States: The Bush
administration briefed congressional leaders immediately after the
agreement was announced. Congress held hearings and heard the testimony of
non-proliferation and South Asia experts on 26 October and 2 November, while the
administration officials briefed Congress on 8 September and 2 November. In
these briefings, the administration underscored the strategic,
non-proliferation, and environmental benefits of nuclear cooperation with India.
Significantly, they argued that “strategically, such cooperation would both
strengthen India and also strengthen US ties with India.... [T]his would further
US interests in promoting a stable power balance in Asia.” However, the Congress
and the non-proliferation lobby expressed concerns over the agreement. They
strongly felt that ‘bending full-scope safeguards rule for India would weaken
the international non-proliferation regime.’ The non-proliferation lobby
stressed that India should end its production of fissile material, shut down the
Cirus reactor, put all the thermal power reactors and the breeder reactor under
safeguards, and accept full-scope and permanent safeguards at all its nuclear
facilities. Some of these concerns were accommodated in the Hyde Act. Soon after the
Indo-US joint statement of 18 July 2005, Washington geared up to get Congress
permission to go ahead with the deal. The US House of Representatives passed an
Act called Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act of 2006. The Hyde Act, passed by both houses of Congress on 12
December 2006, was a landmark event in bilateral relations, as it enabled
President Bush to sign it into law on 18 December 2006. The Act revised the law
so as to enable the US to extend full civil nuclear cooperation to India. The
Hyde Act has two broad parts — the first deals with the US Executive’s role
until the agreement becomes effective. The second part obliges the US president
to continuously, periodically or year after year take certain steps during the
whole of the long life of the treaty. The Act authorises the US president to
exempt India from the requirement of Section 123 a (2) of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 that imposes a condition that the US will not export nuclear material to
non-nuclear-weapon states, unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to
all peaceful nuclear activities.(16) The
Hyde Act established conditions for US nuclear commerce with India, including
clear penalties in the event of a resumption of Indian nuclear testing,
constraints against selling equipment used to make bomb-grade material, and
limits on the refuelling of the Indian power plants to make the decision to
resume testing more difficult for New Delhi.(17) India:
In India the
political parties especially the Leftist parties, the non-proliferation lobby
and a section of scientists, strategic community and the media criticised the
nuclear deal on various grounds. The government set up two committees dealing
with strategic and nuclear matters to draft its nuclear separation plan. These
committees included representatives from India’s National Security Council
Secretariat, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Department of Atomic
Energy (DEA), the armed forces, and the Prime Minister Office (PMO). In these
committees’ discussions, the MEA and the PMO generally favoured nuclear
concessions as they gave high priority to accommodating and furthering ties with
the US. The DAE, however, objected to the considerations on safeguarding their
reactors. They doubted that US would sell nuclear reactors to India and mainly
sought nuclear fuel for India’s reactors. The proponents
of the nuclear deal in India argued: One, the deal would enable India to build
nuclear reactors with access to nuclear technology and uranium from Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). Two, it would ensure India’s energy security that cannot
depend alone on imports. Three, it would render the implicit knowledge of
India’s nuclear capacity as a nuclear-weapon state into an explicit recognition
of its nuclear status. Finally, the deal did not incapacitate India’s nuclear
programmes and if required, India could go for computer simulation tests or
could break the deal as there was no binding clause, and go for testing, while
facing the sanctions as it did after the 1998 tests.(18) The
opponents of the deal argued: One, the signing of the deal meant bowing before
the US hegemony and surrendering national sovereignty. Two, it would cap India’s
nuclear capabilities, especially enforce moratorium on India’s nuclear testing.
Three, the use of nuclear energy was not cheap as its initial Costs were heavy
with a long gestation period. Finally, India should explore the
Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline for its energy security than for opting for the
long and tedious nuclear deal.(19) India’s nuclear
scientists wanted to keep all nuclear facilities that were indigenously built
and did not have imported components outside the scope of safeguards. They were
also strongly opposed to opening the breeder reactor to safeguards. The Indian
government eventually accepted their position and kept its breeder reactor
located at Kalpakkam as well as other facilities at Kalpakkam and the Bhaba
Atomic Research Centre that has the Cirus and Dhruva reactors, outside
safeguards. (Dinshaw. pp.686-688) Within this
context, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a weak coalition,
faced strong opposition against the deal from the Left parties whose support was
crucial for the survival of the Manmohan Singh government.(20) As
soon as the text of the 123 Agreement was released the Left parties opposed it
tooth and nail. Their opposition was based more on principles than any other
consideration. They argued that the deal was not a stand-alone agreement but was
intimately linked to a wide-ranging alliance with the US that would undermine
and compromise India’s sovereignty in foreign policy, national security and
economic matters.(21) They threatened
to pull out of the coalition if the government went ahead with it. This
stalemated the negotiations for more than a year and a half. When Manmohan Singh
decided to go ahead with the deal and proposed that it would be placed before
Parliament after the safeguards agreement was approved by the Board of IAEA and
waiver obtained from the NSG, it infuriated the Leftist allies and they pulled
out of the coalition on 7 July 2008. The UPA government, however, survived
because it managed to get support from the smaller parties through horse-trading
which cast a shadow on the democratic traditions of India. The right-wing
BJP, India’s main opposition party, was not basically opposed to the nuclear
deal but its senior leaders such as L. K. Advani “wanted the 123 Agreement to be
redrafted to insulate India from the Hyde Act…Our reservation is only on the
written word that there should not be any further nuclear tests.”(22) BJP
asserted that the nuclear deal would undermine the “strategic autonomy” of
India. In an interview with The Hindu, on 11 July 2008, Advani said: “We
are opposed to the 123 Agreement because it is also preceded by the Hyde Act… in
the name of energy autonomy, you are surrendering our strategic autonomy.”(23) On 1st
August 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved by consensus the agreement to
apply safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities in India. It marked a decisive
step closer to implementing the Indo-US nuclear deal. The text of the safeguards
agreement was finalized after several rounds of consultations between India and
IAEA which began in November 2007 and the draft agreement was circulated to the
Board members in July 2007. China, one of the leading members of the both the
IAEA board and the NSG, did not oppose the IAEA approval, though it kept its
policy vague until the end. China is the only member of the P-5 club that has
not explicitly supported the nuclear deal. Some Chinese academics, but not
officials, have expressed reservations about the deal in the past. Russia,
France and Britain backed the Indo-US initiative while Germany had expressed
some reservations. Pakistan, one of the 35 members of the IAEA Board, was,
however, more vocal in its opposition to the safeguards deal. It submitted a
note of dissent describing the draft of the safeguards agreement as
“discriminatory and dangerous” and called for its amendment. Pakistan’s
principled position on the issue is that a non-discriminatory approach based on
objective criteria on access to civilian nuclear technology should be adopted,
offering equal opportunity to both Pakistan and India by meeting the relevant
benchmarks.(24) However,
it also did not oppose the safeguards agreement. The approval of the Board came
amidst criticism that ambiguous wording could limit international oversight of
India’s reactors, undermine the international non-proliferation treaty and
possibly help supply India’s arms programmes with fissile material. Austria,
Ireland and Switzerland voiced their concerns. However, India succeeded in
securing a tight linkage between continuity of nuclear fuel supplies and
continuity of safeguards which it had asserted in the separation plan in 2006. The safeguards
agreement, called Agreement Between the Government of India and the IAEA for
the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, will allow
IAEA to verify that certain declared Indian nuclear material and facilities are
used only for peaceful purposes. It is an umbrella arrangement that will allow
India to add facilities over time to be placed under the IAEA safeguards. The
IAEA Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, emphasized that under the agreement,
“India [has] committed itself to harmonize its laws on export controls with
those of the supplier group. That’s very important because one of our main goals
continues to be that nuclear material will not fall into the wrong hands.”(25) ElBaradei,
described the agreement as: “It’s good for India; it’s good for the world, is
good for non-proliferation.”(26) He
expressed hope that it would revive debate on nuclear disarmament. The agreement
is set to enter into force once the IAEA receives notification that India’s
statutory and/or constitutional requirements have been met. In his address to
the Board, Dr. ElBaradei stated that the IAEA would begin to implement the new
Safeguards Agreement in 2009, with the aim of bringing a total of 14 Indian
reactors under Agency safeguards by 2014.(27) The
IAEA currently applies safeguards to six Indian nuclear reactors under
safeguards agreements concluded between 1971 and 1994. IAEA is currently
discussing an Additional Protocol Agreement. Both the US and
India hailed the adoption of the IAEA safeguards agreement. A State Department
spokesman, Gonzalo Gallegos, told reporters: “We believe this is important, not
for us and our bilateral relationship with India, but also rest of the world”.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described it “an important day for India,
and for our civil nuclear initiatives for the resumption of cooperation with our
friends abroad.”(28) The next step
was waiver from the NSG that exports nuclear material. The NSG bans exports to
nuclear weapons states that have not signed the NPT and do not have full
safeguards agreements allowing the IAEA to inspect their facilities. India had
been embargoed by the NSG for having not signed the NPT and testing nuclear
devices in 1974 and 1998. New Delhi repeatedly asserted that it was looking for
a “clean and unconditional” waiver and lobbied hard to get the support of the
NSG members for it. On 21-22 August the 45-member NSG met to discuss a US waiver
draft for nuclear cooperation with India but could not develop consensus as
several group members expressed concerns regarding nonproliferation aspect of
the deal. The US draft took note of all the commitments India had made in July
2005 and stated that in the light of these, the full-scope safeguards
requirement was being waived. To allay concerns of the NSG countries, the draft
provided for members to “maintain contact and consult through regular channels
on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines, taking into
account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India.”(29) The draft
however failed to allay the apprehensions of a large number of members of the
NSG, especially New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland,
Sweden and the Netherlands, all of whom demanded substantive amendments. There
are at least four areas where concerns have been raised: these relate to India’s
nuclear testing, adherence to NPT full-scope safeguards, the need for a review
mechanism to assess Indian compliance, as well as restrictions on enrichment and
reprocessing technology.(30) According
to Indian officials, the US has been saying for some months now that the NSG
waiver could include “reasonable conditionalities” and that the Europeans were
insisting on these.(31) India
has resisted full-scope safeguards and wants only those plants identified by it
to go under IAEA safeguards. The draft was
revised and came before NSG’s second meeting that was held on 4-5 September
2008. After hard lobbying by India and the US the group granted a waiver to
India. The waiver has been criticized by those who support a strong
international non-proliferation regime. Michael Krepon observed: “The deal
struck in the NSG is… likely to have slow motion, far reaching, negative
repercussions because the Indian waiver was not accompanied by compensatory
steps to shore up international controls against proliferation. The most obvious
compensatory step — India’s signature on a treaty banning further nuclear
testing — was strenuously resisted by New Delhi, Washington, and other capitals
that stood to make financial gains from civil nuclear commerce with India. At
the Bush administration’s insistence, the NSG even declined to clarify penalties
in the event of a resumption of nuclear testing by India.”(32) The deal will
now go back to US congressional approval in its session that is expected to be
held on 26 September 2008. On 29 September
2008, the US Congress approved the Indo-US nuclear deal with 289 votes in favour
and 117 against, crossing the most crucial hurdle in finalising the deal. On 10
October 2008, president Bush signed the bill into law. He assured New Delhi that
the new law made no changes in fuel supply commitments or the terms of the “123
agreement.” He said, “the bill I sign ... approves the 123 Agreement I submitted
to Congress and establishes the legal framework for that agreement to come into
effect.”(33) This pacified
Indian concerns over president Bush’s assertions in the transmittal document to
the Congress that the 123 agreement contains “political commitments” which are
not legally binding on the US. The emerging
Indo-US strategic partnership has a wider political context. This is reflected
in various statements made by President Bush and key officials in his
administration who are architects of the Indo-US strategic partnership such as
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretary for South and Central
Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas
Burns. In addition, strategic analysts in US such as George Perkovitch, Ashely
Tellis,(34) Stephen
Cohen,(35) and
Sumit Ganguly(36) have
been urging the US to build strategic partnership with India, an emerging power
in the world affairs. The main argument is that a “rising India” would help
counter a “rising China” and stabilise Asian balance of power in the 21st
century. The Indo-US joint statements of 18 July 2005 and 2 March 2006 strongly
emphasised forging of global partnership with India to fight the challenges of
the 21st century. On 17 May 2006, Richard Boucher in his statement
before the House International Relations Committee on Asia and Pacific said:
“India is on a trajectory to be a leading nation of the 21st Century.
By any measures — its economic growth, its growing intellectual capital, even
its ability to project culture and art through its dynamic film industry — India
is on the way to achieving the rank of global power.”(37) Ashley
J. Tellis, a staunch architect of US-India strategic partnership, contends: “A
friendly India would not only be an important balancing partner vis-a-vis a
rising China, but it could also assist the US in managing proliferation,
enhancing security in the region, and spreading democracy in the developing
world.”(38) In the policy
report for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
titled
India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (2005),
Ashley Tellis urged the Bush administration to consider “India an Asian
superpower” which can be “counterfoil to China” and “prevent China’s dominance.”(39) Further,
the US strategic
assessment of India articulated both in its National Security Strategy of March
2006 and the Quadrennial Defence Review Report of February 2006 called for
closer strategic ties with India. The NSS speaks of India as a major power
shouldering global obligations. Similarly, the QDR referred to India, along with
China and Russia, as key factors in determining the international security
environment for the 21st Century. This signified that US policymakers as well as
strategic community viewed India as a key player in the future balance of power
in Asia. The basis of this comprehensive strategic partnership stems from common
values and common interests. When president
Bush and prime minister Vajpayee launched strategic partnership on 12 January
2004, the joint statement declared: “That relationship is based increasingly on
common values and common interests. We are working together to promote
global peace and prosperity. We are partners in the war on terrorism and we are
partners in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them.”(40) On
July 18, 2005, president Bush announced the creation of a global partnership
between the United States and India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity
and peace throughout the world which was reaffirmed in 2 March 2006 joint
statement. The concept of
shared values and shared interests has become a hallmark of the new US-India
relationship. On 5 April 2006, Condoleezza Rice in her statement at the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
stated: The partnership is “founded on common interests and shared values”
which she identified as democracy, security and prosperity.(41) Regarding
Indian democracy, she said, it was a “positive model in the international
community.” Significantly, in terms of security, she regarded “India as a rising
global power and a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia. India will
continue to possess sophisticated military forces… and will in the future help
promote peace in Asia and across the world.” In terms of prosperity, she
observed that “India is committed to economic liberty and strong growth. It has
immense skilled and youthful workforce and the world’s fastest growing middle
class. By 2025, India will most likely rank among the world’s five largest
economies.”(42) R. Nicholas
Burns, under secretary for political affairs, in an article “America's Strategic
Opportunity with India” reinforced the politico-strategic nature of the
partnership. He observed:
The rise of a democratic and
increasingly powerful India is a positive development for US interests. Rarely
has the United States shared so many interests and values with a growing power
as we do today with India. By reaching out to India, we have made the bet that
the future lies in pluralism, democracy, and market economics.(43) He strongly
felt:
As we Americans consider our future
role in the world, the rise of a democratic and increasingly powerful India
represents a singularly positive opportunity to advance our global interests.
There is a tremendous strategic upside to our growing engagement with India.
That is why building a close US-India partnership should be one of the United
States' highest priorities for the future. It is a unique opportunity with real
promise for the global balance of power.(44)
Elaborating on common interests he
said:
We share an abundance of political,
economic, and military interests with India today. Our open societies face
similar threats from terrorism and organized crime. Our market-based economies
embrace trade and commerce as engines of prosperity. Our peoples value education
and a strong work ethic. We share an attachment to democracy and individual
rights founded on an instinctive mistrust of authoritarianism. And in an age of
anti-Americanism, according to the most recent Pew Global Attitudes survey,
nearly six in ten Indians view the United States favourably.(45) He underscored
“remarkable growth in trust between the leaderships of the two countries” an
explosion in private sector ties,” “historic agreement on civil nuclear energy,
closer collaboration on scientific and technological innovation, burgeoning
trade and commercial links, common efforts to stabilize South Asia, and a
growing US-India campaign to promote stable, well-governed democracies around
the world. And the United States is only just beginning to realize the benefits
of this relationship for its interests in South and East Asia.”(46) “Rising India”
figures as a key element with which the US shares common values and common
interests. In the domestic debates in the Congress US administration argued that
strategic partnership with India would further US interests in promoting a
stable balance of power in Asia.(47) As
a presidential candidate Senator Obama in an interview to daily Hindu, on
24 October 2008, observed that he believed “India is a natural strategic partner
for America in the 21st century and that the U.S. should be working with India
on a range of critical issues from preventing terrorism to promoting peace and
stability in Asia.” (Ashok Easwaran, “Obama says India will be top priority.”(48) India was quite
enthusiastic about forging closer strategic ties with the US for its own
reasons. Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran underscored six key developments
that created the basis for the 18 July agreement that envisaged establishment of
a global partnership with the US. First and foremost, an India growing at the
rate of 8% per annum changed US attitude towards India. India is now a fast
growing export market for the US. An India of high growth rates creates new
demands for goods, services and technologies that a global trading nation like
US cannot ignore. “India is today being invariably equated with China in terms
of potential and possibilities.”(49) Second,
a nuclear India like a nuclear China in the 1960s has “made a compelling case
for greater engagement with India.” Third, the larger strategic canvas favours
raising the quality of Indo-US ties. “As a pluralistic and secular democracy in
a world where fundamentalist violence is on the rise, India’s emergence as a
model of stability, modernization and predictability, has begun to impact on
international consciousness.” Fourth element in the US approach to India has
been its “awareness of the potential that our partnership holds in respect of
the knowledge economy.” Fifth, India’s opening up to the world and impact of its
integration into the global economy cannot be underestimated, least of all by
the US. Sixth, as an open society and open economy, the growth in India’s
capabilities has been welcomed by the world. This shows that it was the rising
India with its economic, political and strategic wherewithal that changed US
attitude towards the country. Elaborating on
the objectives of partnership with the US, Saran stated:
The US is clearly the preeminent
power of our times. There can be no argument that better relations with the US
are in our national interest. It is our largest trade partner, investor and
technology source. Equally important, as the preeminent power, the US helps
shape global sentiment. From the economic perspective, initiatives with the US
can advance our development processes and accelerate our growth rate.
Technologically, a partnership with the US would enormously benefit a country
like India whose future is so tied to the knowledge and service industries.
There are strong security convergences between us, be it on terrorism, maritime
security or other threats from non-state actors. From the political perspective,
stronger ties make themselves positively felt on our relations with third
countries. Domestically, India is seeking to leapfrog in its development
process. In foreign policy, we require adjustments in the international order so
that our aspirations are accommodated. A stronger relationship with the US can
offer benefits on both fronts.(50) This signified
that India embarked on a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US with
ambitious objectives that not only fulfilled its domestic national development
agenda but also served as a leverage to advance its security and foreign policy
goals at the global level. The nuclear
dimension of the Indo-US strategic partnership is the most important aspect of
the new relationship between the two countries as it provides foundation to the
rising India in the 21st century. With the deal going through, it
will be the first time a nuclear state outside NPT would be allowed to engage in
civilian nuclear trade. In fact, the nuclear deal marks a fundamental shift in
US nuclear policy towards India from preventive and restrictive
non-proliferation benchmarks to a proactive and collaborative nuclear policy
entailing nuclear trade in nuclear material, technology and fuel cycle. After
India’s nuclear tests the US had set five benchmarks for India: i.e. sign CTBT;
freeze production of nuclear material and cooperate in FMCT talks banning
production of nuclear material; accept a strategic restraint regime that would
limit the types of ballistic missiles that India had in its arsenal; adopt
stringent controls on the export of dangerous material and know-how and resume
dialogue with Pakistan to address the root causes of the tension, including
Kashmir.(51) In a remarkable
reversal the thrust of the nuclear deal is energy security for India which will
ensure clean energy for it and will reduce the burden on world energy resources.
In fact the Indo-US nuclear deal has opened up comprehensive civil nuclear
cooperation between the two countries that encompasses transfer of nuclear
reactors, technology and fuel cycle. While the US wants civil nuclear trade with
India, the latter is also seeking access to the US as well as world nuclear
trade market. American
officials’ statements indicate that the US is aiming at India’s growing civil
nuclear energy market. Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee: “At the core of our initiative with India is not simply a government
to government effort. It was crafted with the private sector firmly in mind.
Because it will fully open the door to civil nuclear trade and cooperation, this
initiative is good for American business.”(52) She
pointed out that India intended to increase the number of nuclear power plants
significantly to meet its nuclear energy demands. Thus there will be demand for
nuclear technology, fuel, and support services [which] holds the promise of
opening new business opportunities for American firms, which translate into new
jobs, new incomes, and new markets for the US.(53) Indian
officials indicate that they plan to import at least eight new 1000-megawatt
power plants by 2012, as well as additional reactors in the years ahead. She
underscored that preliminary studies suggested that if American vendors won just
two of these reactor contracts, American industry estimates it might add
3,000-5,000 new direct jobs and about 10,000-15,000 indirect jobs in the US.(54) In
addition, participation in India’s market will help make the American nuclear
industry globally competitive, thereby benefiting US domestic power sector. The
nuclear deal will allow US companies to enter the lucrative and growing Indian
market. Immediately after the NSG waiver, David Bohigian, assistant secretary of
state in the Department of Commerce, said: “We will ensure that US companies
play a big role in the Indian nuclear energy market estimated to be $100
billion.”(55) India also has
similar objectives. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Lok Sabha that
nuclear agreement would end India’s nuclear isolation , nuclear apartheid and
enable it to take advantage of international trade in nuclear materials,
technologies and equipment. It will open trade in dual technologies opening up
new pathways to accelerate industrialization of the country. “Given the
excellent quality of our nuclear scientists and technologists, I have reasons to
believe that in a reasonably short period of time, India will emerge as an
important exporter of nuclear technologies, and equipment for civilian
purposes.”(56) External
Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee also told the Lok Sabha that the clearance of
the agreement by the NSG and the IAEA was a “passport” for the country to enter
into civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with the international community.(57) In
fact the nuclear deal paves the way for nuclear trade with Russia and France.
India is already negotiating nuclear reactors deals from both. Additionally, it
provides India an opportunity to go into nuclear exports. Immediately after the
NSG waiver, S.K. Jain, Chairman and Managing Director of Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), said the NSG decision provided India a
great opportunity to become a major exporter of critical and non-critical
nuclear components to both the developed and developing countries.(58) “There
is limited manufacturing capacity in the world today,” he added. The main
rationale extended by the Indian and the US governments to formalize the nuclear
deal is energy security for India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has used all
available opportunities to dwell on the role of nuclear power in ensuring energy
security and the necessity of the India-US nuclear deal to realise that role.
President Bush extended similar argument. India’s Minister of State for Power
Jairam Ramesh said once the deal got through, the country would be able to
produce 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 2020. He contended at present the nuclear
plants are operating at 48 per cent of their capacity due to shortage of
uranium.(59) India’s total
installed power capacity at the end of May 2008 was 144,565 MW, of which nuclear
power, with 4,120 MWe of installed capacity from 17 reactors, constitutes a mere
2.9 per cent. Thermal power accounts for the largest share, 64.6 per cent, with
coal accounting for 53.3 per cent and the rest being largely gas.(60) Five
projects are under various stages of construction. These include three
indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) of 220 MWe each and 2 x
1,000 MWe Light Water Reactor (LWR) system being built under Russian cooperation
at Koodankulam, Tamil Nadu. These were to add 2,660 MWe to the installed
capacity by 2008 end. The nuclear component of energy is likely to increase to
3.7% by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2012) and to 5% by the end of the 12th
Plan (1217). The fact is that the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was not the
driving force behind the India-US nuclear deal. R. Ramachandran observes: While
nuclear power will be critical for the country’s long-term energy security, and
our indigenous three-stage nuclear power programme(61) has
been evolved from that perspective, it is important to understand that the
nuclear deal cannot be central to achieving that.(62) Indeed,
Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), has always
maintained that any import of nuclear power that may become possible following
the agreement with the US will only be an “additionality” to the long-term
projections for the installed nuclear capacity under the indigenous programme.(63) The nuclear
deal will in no way obstruct India’s strategic nuclear programme which is clear
from the statements made by the Indian leadership, US officials, India-specific
IAEA safeguards and the NSG waiver. On 22 July 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh told Lok Sabha:
The strategic programme will
continue to be developed at an autonomous pace determined solely by our own
security perceptions. We have not and will not accept any outside interference
or monitoring or supervision of our strategic programme. Our strategic autonomy
will never be compromised. …I confirm that there is nothing in these agreements
which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national
security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on
further testing. Thus the nuclear agreements will not in any way affect our
strategic autonomy. The cooperation that the international community is now
willing to extend to us for trade in nuclear material, technologies and
equipment for civilian use will be available to us without signing the NPT or
the CTBT.(64) The statement
made it quite clear that India has only accepted limited safeguards for its
civilian nuclear installations which it will submit voluntarily to IAEA
safeguards while its strategic nuclear programme will continue unchecked.
Despite claims of bringing India into non-proliferation fold, the US is also
quite clear on the continuation of India’s nuclear weapons programme.
Condoleezza Rice conceded: “The initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons
production, but noting under this initiative will directly enhance its military
capability or add to its military stockpile.”(65) India’s
nonproliferation commitments under the deal as specified in the 18 July joint
statement and the 123 Agreement are: a) place current and future civil reactors
under permanent IAEA safeguards, b) negotiate and sign an Additional Protocol
with the IAEA; c) work with the US to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty; d) create a robust national export control system that includes
harmonization with and adherence the MTCR and NSG guidelines; e) Continue its
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; and f) refrain from transferring
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not possess them.
While India’s non-proliferation commitments were found quite satisfactory by the
Bush administration, Russia, France and UK, tough opposition was voiced by the
non-proliferation lobbies inside the US, Europe and reservations by China and
Pakistan that are directly going to be affected by the Indo-US nuclear deal. The Indo-US
nuclear deal is going to have profound impact on the international
non-proliferation regime. Supporters of the agreement, especially the Bush
administration, strongly argued that the deal would bring India into
international non-proliferation system and thereby would strengthen the global
non-proliferation regime. On 5 April 2006, Condoleezza Rice in her statement at
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative argued, “past non-proliferation policies
towards India had not achieved their purposes. They had no effect on India’s
development of nuclear weapons. Nor did they prevent India and Pakistan from
testing weapons in 1998. They had contributed little to lessening regional
tensions, which brought India and Pakistan repeatedly to the brink of war.”
Against this backdrop, she strongly felt that the deal would promote
non-proliferation objectives in at least four ways. First, it obtained India’s
commitment to work towards a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Second, the initiative would “align India more closely with the international
nuclear non-proliferation standards.” It would not amend NPT and India “is not
going to become, a member of the NPT as a nuclear weapons state.” Nothing we are
proposing would violate our NPT obligations that we would not in any way assist
India’s nuclear weapons programme.” Third, the initiative does not cap Indian
nuclear weapons production, but nothing in this “will directly enhance its
military capability or add to its military stockpile. Fourth, it “will not lead
to an arms race in South Asia” which is “determined by bilateral relations
between India and Pakistan, not civil nuclear cooperation initiative.” Fifth,
the deal “will not create double standards or undermine efforts to curb Iran and
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions as there is no comparison between India and
North Korea and Iran. India is a democracy, transparent and accountable to its
people, works within the international system to promote peace and stability and
has a responsible nuclear proliferation record while Iran and North Koran
regimes are not transparent and credible and are violating IAEA obligations.”(66) Another
architect of the Indo-US deal, Ashley Tellis, in his report, Atoms for War?
US-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, contends
that India is going for a modest nuclear weapons programme. This is because
India is currently separating far less weapons grade plutonium annually than it
has the capability to produce. Further, India's capacity to produce a huge
nuclear arsenal is not affected by prospective US-Indian civilian nuclear
cooperation.(67) The
Manmohan Singh government strongly feels that it needs nuclear energy for the
economic growth of India and it is voluntarily submitting its civil nuclear
programme to international safeguards. The critics
are, however, not satisfied with the nature and scope of safeguards envisaged in
the nuclear deal and strongly feel that it would undermine the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime. Conversely, the deal would enable India to rapidly
expand its nuclear arsenal. The critics comprise staunch non-proliferation
activists inside the US, such as US Congressmen and non-proliferation lobby and
outside US such as European countries that strongly support non-proliferation
regime and various groups that are actively supporting non-proliferation.
Finally, countries that perceive this deal as against their strategic interest
such as China and Pakistan have expressed strong reservations over the deal. Howard L.
Berman, Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, of US Congress who supports
US-India nuclear deal, in a letter to secretary Condoleezza Rice on 5 August
2008, asked president Bush to reject any NSG
waiver not consistent with the conditions stipulated in the Hyde Act of 2006
because this would have serious implications for global non-proliferation
standards. He urged on the president to reject an NSG exemption for India which
did not incorporate: a) Immediate termination of all nuclear commerce by NSG
member states if India detonated a nuclear explosive device or if IAEA
determined that India had violated the safeguards commitments; b) a prohibition
on the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy-water production
technology by any NSG member to India; and c) a stipulation that did not allow
India to reprocess nuclear fuel in a facility outside permanent and
unconditional safeguards.(68) Democrats
Edward Markey and Ellen Tauscher(69) also
expressed non-proliferation concerns in a commentary in The New York Times.
The suppliers group “can say yes to nuclear trade with India if two simple
conditions are met.” First, India must sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, a step already taken by 178 other countries and every member state of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Second, “India must agree to halt production of
nuclear material for weapons.” Such a ban would not require India to give up the
atomic weapons it has or prevent it from building more weapons with nuclear
material previously produced. By shutting down the manufacture of new plutonium
and highly enriched uranium, India “would prove to the international community
that opening up nuclear commerce would not assist, either directly or
indirectly, its nuclear weapons program.”(70) The Hyde Act
2006, the 123 Agreement 2006, the separation plan 2006 and the India-specific
IAEA safeguards 2008 have come under heavy attack for the technical, legal or
political loopholes that will encourage India’s nuclear weapons programme.
·
India has made a
commitment that it would support FMCT that would end production of plutonium and
highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In the interim period, India has
refused to join the fissile material production moratorium as part of a proposed
US-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation deal. Rather, India will continue to
produce fissile material for weapons purposes until agreement on an FMCT is
reached. Further, under the India-specific safeguards it has only allowed
facility-specific safeguards on its foreign supplied nuclear facilities and
nuclear materials leaving its unsafeguarded military nuclear reactor sector to
free to produce fissile material and nuclear weapons, and to design and produce
nuclear warheads.
·
According to an
International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) report published in September
2006, New Delhi has approximately 500 kilograms of plutonium available for
nuclear weapons and up to another 11.5 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium in
spent fuel, which could be reprocessed for weapons use.(71) Some
analysts estimate that India could increase its production of fissile material
for weapons if it succeeds in securing foreign nuclear fuel shipments because
such a move would free up more Indian domestic resources currently divided
between the military and civilian sector for building bombs.(72) According
to a report by the Arms Control Association, released in July 2008, India is
estimated to possess enough separated fissile material for 60-100 nuclear
warheads and potentially far more if foreign nuclear fuels supplies allow it to
devote its limited domestic fuel supplies exclusively for weapons purposes.(73)
·
The problem
of diversion of nuclear material from civilian to military facilities has not
been fully taken care of in the IAEA safeguards agreement. The provisions of the
agreement have substantially deviated from standardized drafts of IAEA
safeguards agreements. For instance, under the cross-references, the safeguarded
material can be transferred to non-notified locations. This provision has
created a safe corridor for India to exploit the agreement for military
purposes.(74)
·
India has
inserted “corrective measures” in the 123 Agreement and India-specific IAEA
safeguards to ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies to its civil nuclear reactors
covered by the IAEA safeguards. India contends that in the preamble and combined
with certain sections of the operative portion of the agreement, the agreement
allows it to withdraw certain reactors from safeguards if fuel supplies are
interrupted, even if the fuel supplies are interrupted because India has
conducted a nuclear test explosion. This interpretation is “inconsistent with
the principle of permanent safeguards.”
·
The
provisions of the India-specific Agreement have substantially deviated from
standardized drafts of IAEA safeguards agreements. For instance, under the
cross-references, the safeguarded material can be transferred to non-notified
locations. This provision has created a safe corridor for India to exploit the
agreement for military purposes.(75) The
analysts from Arms Control Association argue that the agreement contained
loopholes that would allow India “to legally and unilaterally withdraw
safeguarded nuclear materials or facilities from safeguards.”(76) Thereby,
Daryl Kimball, at the Washington-based Arms Control Association, has urged the
NSG to get India sign a legally binding ban on nuclear weapons testing as well
as the transfer of its uranium enrichment and plutonium processing technology,
which could be used for making atomic bombs.(77) It should be
noted that most international nuclear cooperation with India had ceased after
India tested a nuclear weapon in 1974 using plutonium produced from nuclear
reactors in contravention of understandings with the US and Canada. The Indian
test in fact had led to the formation of the NSG. The most
visible manifestation of a strategic relationship between two countries is
cooperation in the defence sphere. The June 2005 Indo-US Defence Framework
Agreement stipulated wide-ranging “shared security interests”: a) maintaining
security and stability; b) defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism;
c) preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated
materials, data, and technologies; and d) protecting the free flow of commerce
via land, air and sea lanes.(78) This
indicated that the US wanted a broader security alliance relationship with India
without saying so. This was quite evident in the 13 areas of defence-related
cooperation which included:
i.
Conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges;
ii.
Collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest;
iii.
Strengthen the capabilities of their militaries to promote security and
defeat terrorism;
iv.
Expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote regional and global
peace and stability;
v.
Enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
vi.
Expand two-way defence trade, not viewing defence transactions as ends in and of
themselves, but as a means to strengthen security, reinforce strategic
partnership, achieve greater interaction between armed forces, and build greater
understanding between defence establishments;
vii.
In the context of defence trade and a framework of technology security
safeguards, increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration,
co-production, and research and development;
viii.
Expand collaboration relating to missile defence;
ix.
Strengthen the abilities of their militaries to respond quickly to disaster
situations, including in combined operations;
x.
Assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping
operations, with a focus on enabling other countries to field trained, capable
forces for these operations;
xi.
Conduct exchanges on defence strategy and defence transformation;
xii.
Increase exchanges of intelligence, and
xiii.
Continue strategic-level discussions by senior leadership from the US
Department of Defence and India's Ministry of Defence, in which the two sides
exchange perspectives on international security issues of common interest, with
the aim of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared objectives, and
developing common approaches.(79) The Defence
Framework Agreement has helped further cement the increasingly close defence
cooperation between the US and India, including joint patrolling of the sea
lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the northern Indian Ocean up to the mouth of
the Malacca Strait. Under the agreement, the Defense Policy Group shall continue
to serve as the primary mechanism to guide the US-India strategic defence
relationship. The two countries revived a bilateral Defence Policy Group in
December 2001. DPG is led by Defence Secretary on the Indian side and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy on the US side. There are four sub-groups such
as Defence Production and Procurement Group, the Military Cooperation Group, the
Joint Technology Group and the Senior Technology Security Group that report to
and provide inputs to the DPG. A Defence Joint Working Group has been
established to discuss policy issues. The DPG is engaged in an “intensive
exchange of views on the international strategic and security situation and on
the further development of bilateral defence cooperation as envisaged under the
“Defense Framework”. Joint military
exercises involving the armies of the two countries have intensified in scope
and magnitude since they began in the early 1990s. The ruling NDA government of
that time even offered basing facilities to the American military before US
launched its attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. Under the NDA
rule in 2002, the Indian navy escorted American ships through the Strait of
Malacca. Malabar
Exercises: In
anticipation of a nuclear deal being approved, large-scale quadrilateral naval
exercises were held in the Bay of Bengal in early September 2007. The navies of
the US, Japan, Australia and India conducted war games in the Andaman Sea, near
the strategic Strait of Malacca. Singapore joined in, sending one of its ships.
The US dispatched two aircraft carriers, the Nimitz and the Kitty Hawk,
each capable of carrying more than 170 aircraft on board along with guided
missile destroyers and nuclear submarines for the Malabar Exercises. India
dispatched 15 ships, including its lone functioning aircraft carrier INS Viraat,
to take part in the exercises.(80) Japan
sent two destroyers. Indian Defence minister A. K. Antony told the parliament in
August 2007 that the exercises were in “national interest.” The next round of
Malabar exercises was held in October 2008, in the Arabian Sea, in which
frontline units from both the navies participated. The scope of the exercises
included diverse activities, ranging from gun-firing and fighter combat
operations from aircraft carriers, to combating the scourge of terror, through
Maritime Interdiction Operations exercises. The USS Ronald Reagan, a
nuclear weapon equipped aircraft carrier, led the US naval contingent.
(81) In August 2007, the
nuclear-powered USS Nimitz docked in the Chennai port. The ‘Red
Flag’ exercise: ‘Red
Flag’ war games over the Nevada desert in the US mark India’s debut in the
“world’s most advanced and coveted air combat exercise.” “Red Flag” is a
multinational air exercise in the US with a complement of Sukhoi-30 frontline
fighter aircraft and mid-air refuellers. Originally a cold war ‘war game’ in
which the U.S. Air Force (USAF) defended its territory against a ‘hostile enemy’
comprising its military allies, the ambit of ‘Red Flag’ was widened to include
Washington’s recent partners in the ‘war against terrorism.’(82)
Counter-insurgency exercises:
The Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) of India in Mizoram is
training US army troops in this field. Joint exercises form part of the training
and the latest, fifth in the series, was held in 2008. A total of 133 US
personnel have been trained so far. “Faced with terror attacks in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, the US Army is keen to learn from Indian Army’s experience in
combating insurgency for the last 50 years.”(83) The US is
looking at defence deals with India worth over $30 billion in the next few
years.(84) According
to US consul-general in India Michael Owen, American companies were responding
to Indian competitive tenders for military hardware and fighter aircraft like
F-16 and F-18. American producers are going for co-production with the Indian
companies.(85) In
the last three years, the US has struck three major arms deals with India. These
include ANTPQ37 weapon-locating radars, six Hercules C-130J transport aircraft,
and eight maritime P-8 reconnaissance aircraft. Immediately after the NSG
waiver, US announced selling India two dozen Harpoon II anti-ship missiles. The
deal, worth over $170 million, is the first sale of American missiles to India
which would arm squadrons of the maritime-role version of Jaguar warplanes of
the Indian Air Force.(86) India
has also asked for supply/technical support, support equipment, personnel
training and training equipment, technical data and publications. In January
2009, India quietly went ahead and signed the biggest-ever $2.1 billion defence
deal with the US for purchase of eight Boeing P-8I long-range maritime
reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft for Navy. The Indian
government is fast-tracking three key military pacts with the US, including one
under which armies can refuel ships and aircraft in cashless transactions that
are balanced at the end of the year. Apart from the Logistics Support Agreement
(LSA), the other pacts pending are the Communication Interoperability and
Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that will enable the two countries on
a common platform, and an end-user agreement governing the sale of military
hardware to India. According to an Indian official, “The LSA would require both
countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kind of logistics support to
each other’s fighter jets and naval warships.”(87) The
end-user agreement is still under discussion as it does not require the US to
verify the equipment and it is rather for India to certify where the equipment
is located. In addition, as part of the collaboration in space technology, four
American satellites are to be launched by India in the next two years. The
implications of Indo-US deal would be analyzed in view of changing strategic
culture of India in the wake of emergence of India as a nuclear weapon power and
US recognition of India’s nuclear status by forging a long-term strategic
partnership with that country. Two, how China perceives growing Indo-US
strategic partnership? Three, how does Chinese factor in the implications in its
evolving conception of “peaceful rise of China”, “harmonious world and new
diplomacy.” How India’s
strategic culture is likely to be influenced by the growing strategic
partnership with the US and what would be its implications for China. What would
be the importance of India’s strategic culture in shaping the security policies
of India in the wake of strategic partnership with the US. Strategic
culture is a complex phenomenon both in terms of its definition and application.
Alan Macmillan and Ken Booth define the concept of strategic culture as
referring to “a nation’s traditions, values, patterns of behaviour, habits,
symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and
solving problems with respect to the threat and use of force.”(88) The
basic assumption is that strategic cultural inputs have a relationship with
strategic policy outputs. Macmillan and Booth provide a framework of analysis
which is based on three broad sources of strategic culture that are : a)
geography and resources; b) history and experience; and c) political structure
and defence organisation.(89) The
argument is that beliefs, values and habits constitute a strategic culture which
persists over time, and exerts influence on the formation and execution of
strategy. What had been
India’s traditional strategic culture; what is India’s contemporary strategic
policy and what are sources of change? Indian strategic culture has manifold
influences, ranging from its ancient thinker Kautilya’s political realism to
post-independence Nehruvian combine based on Kautilya’s realism and idealism
mainly derived from Ghandian non-violence, hard realism — often referred to as
militant Nehruvian paradigm as practiced by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi,
pragmatism incorporated in the Gujaral doctrine and Hindutva nationalism
propounded by the right-wing BJP that greatly influenced India’s going nuclear.
With nuclearization of India, its strategic culture has undergone a fundamental
change which has been followed by the Congress-led UPA government and is likely
to continue for foreseeable future. The Indo-US partnership is manifestation of
this big shift in India’s strategic culture and the big question mark would be
how a nuclear India in strategic partnership with the most powerful state in the
international system embodies the precepts of idealism, realism, pragmatism and
Hindu nationalism while shaping its security policies. In terms of its
geo-political setting, India is a large country which always nurtured
aspirations to emerge as a regional power and an Asian power. Being a neighbour
of China, another rising power in the Asia-Pacific region, the elements of
rivalry always existed. From Nehru down to the present, Indian political
leadership and strategic community always felt that India could play a key role
in the world politics in general and Asia in particular.(90) In terms of
resources, it is endowed with big size of 3,287,590 sq km, and a population of
1.1 billion which is characterized by ethnic, religious and social diversity and
substantial natural and human resources. It has registered remarkable
scientific, technological and industrial development, especially after the
liberalization of its economy starting in 1991. Currently, it is considered one
of the fastest growing economies of the world and offers a large market to the
US. The economy has witnessed an average growth rate of more than 7% in the
decade since 1997. India achieved 8.5% GDP growth in 2006, and again in 2007,
significantly expanding production of manufactures. It is expected
that the Indian economy could grow at a rate of 7-8 percent for the next two
decades. All current analysis indicates that India is likely to be among the
five major economies in the first half of this century and will overtake Japan,
Germany, Britain, and France at some point in the next 25 to 50 years.(91) According
to CIA assessment, by 2015, India will have the fourth most ‘capable
concentration of power , after the US, EU and China.(92) India shares
3,380 km border with China which remains almost undemarcated. It dominates the
South Asian region and is strategically placed near Indian Ocean trade routes.
On the flip side, the huge and growing population may become a fundamental
social, economic, and environmental challenge for the country. India’s
strategic culture is also influenced by its historical experience. Its political
leadership and security establishment always refers to the border conflict with
China in 1962, three wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971) and several warlike crises with
Pakistan and multiple frictions with smaller states of the region such as Sri
Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. While with China, a sense of defeat dominated the
Indian mindset, with Pakistan it has been the ideological conflict that shaped
India’s security policies. The smaller states were always seen as pawns in the
big powers politics; Nepal in the context of China and Pakistan and Sri Lanka as
soliciting support from extra-regional powers against India. In the case of
Pakistan, India always cited Pak-China nexus as being against Indian interests.
In contrast, the smaller states always complained about Indian domination and
hegemonic attitude towards them as India tried to assert its regional
aspirations. It should be noted that when India went nuclear in 1998, its
foreign minister George Fernandes cited China as the main enemy or source of
threat. In terms of
political structure, India is considered the largest democracy in the world
which has unbroken tradition of civilian rule since independence in 1947,
although facing “constant challenge of social inequalities as well as violent
centrifugal movements.”(93) The
democracy aspect of India has been much appreciated by the US as one of the most
important “shared values’ in strengthening its strategic partnership. In fact
the “shapers of India’s strategic culture are primarily nationally recognized
political party leaders, senior bureaucratic officials, and notables in the
leading universities, think tanks and the press.”(94) Although,
the defence organization, the armed forces have not been involved in politics,
yet their input on important security issues has always been valued by the
civilian establishment. How India’s
strategic culture is going to be shaped by its nuclear weapons? Is India’s
nuclear doctrine part of India’s new emerging strategic culture? As India went
nuclear in 1998, it emphasized on the nuclear minimalism or a policy of credible
minimum deterrence. “This involves the conviction that it does not take large
numbers or a high degree of sophistication to deter an adversary. … Moreover,
from this standpoint, nuclear balances are of no consequence. Hence India need
not worry about China’s far larger nuclear arsenal. This precludes arms racing,
which is both costly and risky.”(95) When
India’s National Security Advisory Board constituted by the BJP government
announced the draft nuclear doctrine on 17 August 1999, it stated: “The
fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of
use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces.
India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with
punitive retaliation should a deterrence fail.”(96) The
draft doctrine however envisaged the development and maintenance of a credible
minimum deterrence, based upon a strategic triad of nuclear forces — land-based,
air-based, and sea-based; a second-strike capability, and punitive retaliation
with nuclear weapons if deterrence were to fail.(97) This
went well beyond India’s stated doctrine and demonstrated India’s ambitious
nuclear weapons programme in the future.
In January
2003, Indian Cabinet Committee on Security came out with its official nuclear
doctrine which also emphasized on building and maintaining a “credible minimum
nuclear deterrence.” However, it should be noted that the 2002-2003 annual
report of the Ministry of External Affairs dropped the word “minimum.”(98) Moreover,
the official version of the doctrine states that India reserves the right to
retaliate if its forces are attacked with biological or chemical weapons which
clearly undermines the “no-first-use” policy that it had declared in the first
draft. A strategic
debate is going on inside and outside India about India’s strategic posture —
the nuclear arsenal that India is likely to develop. Ashley Tellis, a prominent
strategic analyst, observes that Indian policy makers have decided that “Indian
nuclear force will be configured neither as a recessed deterrent nor as a ready
arsenal but as a force-in-being, that is a deterrent consisting of
available, but dispersed, components that are capable of being constituted into
usable weapon systems during a supreme emergency.”(99) This
posture, he argues would eventually be replaced either by a robust
force-in-being that “is not limited in size’ before India is “constrained
either by bilateral agreements or by multilateral treaties” or “a modest ready
arsenal that is, a force defined by highly integrated weapons ready for prompt
operations”, yet small in numbers and types of nuclear weapons that it involves.
Beyond these two sub-alternatives, he feels “lies a true and robust ready
arsenal, which may be described as a large nuclear force that is fully
integrated in disposition, with centralized but rapidly devolving command and
control arrangements.”(100) This
implies an inevitable transformation in India’s nuclear posture and strategic
culture. Tellis argues
that the transformation of the force-in-being depends on India’s
strategic environment: a) “if China emerges as a true superpower in the future
and, as a result of its changed status, dramatically expands its strategic
nuclear capabilities and transforms the current conventional balance vis-à-vis
India to New Delhi’s disadvantage”; b) If Sino-Indian competition intensified
over time as a result of growing national capabilities in both states and if the
resulting struggle for power were to generate a high-intensity contest of
influence in the Middle Eastern and southeastern rimlands of Asian continent.”(101) This
implies that India considers China a rival in Asian balance of power and the
inevitable emergence of China as a “superpower” would intensify this rivalry and
warrant a change in India’s nuclear posture. Rodney Jones shares this perception
and argues that “China did not figure prominently as a classical enemy, but a
sense of Indian rivalry with China has emerged.”(102) However,
he contends that “concerns about China are not overplayed in Indian strategic
culture; rather, India’s sense of civilization and antiquity is seen as at least
equal… to China’s, and India has been prudent in seeking a non-confrontational
relationship with China in which trade channels and other forms of exchange are
growing and are being used to limit China’s reliance on Pakistan.”(103) It
seems that both elements, rivalry and cooperation, are most likely to dominate
India’s strategic posture towards China. The cooperation
proposition also derives strength from another element in Indian strategic
culture — which is India’s strong belief in a multipolar world, each dominant in
its own region with pledges to avoid interference across regions.(104) This
supports Chinese perception that India will not become a junior partner of the
US. Skeptics in the US also point out that Indian strategic culture is rooted in
the concepts of non-alignment and multipolarity and thereby “a true strategic
partnership will be difficult to develop in the security realm.”(105) The
divergent worldviews are demonstrated in India’s differing policy towards Iraq,
Iran and Myanmar. India’s stance on the Doha Round of WTO and Climate Change
reinforces this proposition. This, however, does not prevent India from having a
close partnership with a lone superpower in shaping the global order, especially
acquiring greater influence in Asia. India is also desperately seeking a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The US policy makers are also quite
mindful of India’s ambitions to play a greater role in Asia and the world at
large. China is
described as a “rising great power”, “a major power”, “the dominant regional
power”, or the “next great power.” The Chinese government itself refers to
“China’s peaceful rise to the great power status.” With a population of 1.3
billion and an area of 9.6 million sqkm, China is the third largest and the
fastest growing economy of the world. It has sustained a GDP growth rate of over
9% over the last two decades with $ 1.5 trillion foreign exchange reserves in
2007. China, world’s biggest producer and consumer of coal, has become importer
of oil since 1993 and is now seeking secure access to global energy resources.(106) It
is a formidable military and nuclear power. There is a great debate going on in
the US concerning the “rising China” and various strategies ranging from
engagement to containment to deal with it. Many strategic analysts in the West
and India see the newly emerging strategic Indo-US relationship in that light.
The perception is also shared by most Chinese scholars. China is
closely watching the evolving Indo-US strategic partnership, especially the
negotiation process of the nuclear deal since 2005. The issue has been
downplayed at the official level with strong reservations expressed at the
unofficial level by the Chinese media and strategic community. Initially China
expressed some reservation over the deal and took a principled stand that the
deal was going to violate the NPT. The first major Chinese comment on the matter
appeared on 27 October 2005, in People’s Daily titled: “Who’s pushing
nuclear proliferation”. It was quite critical of the US for “making an
exception” for India that would “bring about a series of negative impacts”
particularly on the Iranian and North Korean issues.(107) The
finalization of the deal in March 2006, however, brought a call from Beijing for
New Delhi to sign the NPT and also dismantle its nuclear weapons, saying “as a
signatory country, China hopes non-signatory countries will join it [the NPT] as
soon as possible as non-nuclear weapon states, thereby contributing to
strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.”(108) China, a key
member of the IAEA Board and NSG, has adopted a principled position on the
Indo-US nuclear deal arguing that it backed “peaceful” use of atomic energy by
all nations. A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Qin Gang, stated: “China believes all
countries, while adhering to their international obligations of nuclear
non-proliferation, have the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy and to carry
out international cooperation in this regard.”(109) Thus,
China remained non-committal on the Indo-US nuclear deal and did not give any
assurance to India of its support when required for the approval of the
India-specific safeguards at the Board of the IAEA and the NSG waiver. India
made several attempts to solicit such support and sent high officials to
convince China that the deal was meant entirely for energy purposes. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh tried unsuccessfully to seek such assurance when he met
Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the G-8 meeting in early July
2008. In late July 2008 as a last-ditch effort, Minister of State in the Prime
Minister’s Office, Prithviraj Chavan, visited Beijing to secure assurance from
China on the India-US civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The Chinese again
conveyed the stance that “they had no objection to peaceful international
cooperation on nuclear energy as long as any such cooperation adheres to
international non-proliferation commitments.”(110) Chavan
handed over to Dai Binguo, State Councillor in charge of foreign affairs, two
letters from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addressed to President Hu and Premier
Wen Jiabao. The letters explained India’s position on the nuclear deal and asked
for China’s support when the issue comes up before the Board of Governors of the
IAEA and the NSG. The minister explained to the Chinese that the deal was not
bilateral between India and the US, “but an international civilian nuclear
energy cooperation arrangement aimed at ending India’s nuclear isolation.” He
also tried to address Chinese concerns and explained India’s position on nuclear
energy. “I stressed India’s impeccable record… assured them of all the voluntary
measures taken by us to prevent proliferation.”(111) Nevertheless,
the Chinese government remained non-committal. After the failure of the first
round of debate at NSG on the waiver issue, China’s Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Jiang Yu observed “NSG can find a way to strike a balance between
non-proliferation and (the) peaceful uses of energy.”(112) Although China
has not given any explicit assurances to India to support its case at IAEA and
NSG, it did not oppose the approval of India-specific IAEA safeguards and stayed
neutral in the current NSG over the deal. There are five major elements in the
Chinese perception that shape its attitude and will finally determine its
response towards the Indo-US strategic partnership as it gets operationalized.
·
First: There
is a broad consensus amongst the Chinese academics that it is “rise of India”
that has prompted US to forge a strategic partnership with India and China can
do little to stop it. Zhao Gancheng Director Department of South Asian Studies
at the SIIS, observed, India is “rising rapidly” while Dr Shen Dingli Director,
Centre for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, contended that there
was only a seven-year gap between China and India in reaching the same level of
economic rise.(113) However,
Dr Wu Chunsi, Deputy Director, Department of American Studies at SIIS, argued
that the factor of democracy and India’s nuclear tests enhanced India’s
importance for the US and brought them closer.(114) However,
all of them agreed that China could not prevent the growth of Indo-US strategic
partnership which was rooted in the broad convergence of US and Indian
interests.
·
Second: most
Chinese academics agree that the Indo-US strategic partnership is in the context
of Asian balance of power and part of US “hedge” policy to contain “rising
China” and its growing influence in Asia at large. Zhao Gancheng argues that the
Indo-US nuclear deal is the “most important variables in the geo-political
landscape in Asia.”(115) In
an interview with the author, Zhao contended that the “US does not want that
China should rise alone as it does not consider it in the interest of balance of
power in Asia. So it is in the interest of Asian stability that both China and
India rise at the same time.”(116) So
it is within this context that the US is supporting India to rise. Dr Wu Chunsi
expressed concern that Indo-US strategic partnership had element of hedging
China. Yu Yingli, a research scholar at SIIS, also contended that the nuclear
deal between Indian and the US was part of US hedge policy towards China. Dr
Shen, however, regards the rise of India as a positive development for the
balance of power in Asia, but in the context of Indo-US strategic partnership
feels that India and US have a common interest in hedging China.(117)
Within this context, Shen Qiang, Director, Research Department, Chinese People’s
Institute of Foreign Affairs, contends that there are many underlying strategic
factors that have led to the emergence of the Indo-US strategic partnership and
both countries want to gain from this relationship and maximise their strategic
interests. He identifies five factors that are driving the US to get closer to
India. First by making India a “natural ally”, the US wants India and China to
“contain each other” and reduce pressure from them against US hegemony. Second,
the US wants to prevent possible emergence of strategic partnership among India,
Russia, China and Pakistan in future. Third, the US intends to bring India
gradually into the US-Japan-Australia military alliance. Fourth, the US wants to
use India to dominate developments in the Middle East and prevent India-Iran
relationship. Fifth, in the long term, “India cannot only serve as a tool to
contain the potential challenges to the US from China and Russia, but also
influence the direction of the evolving geopolitical structure in the
Asia-Pacific region in favour of US hegemony.”(118)
·
Third: A
number of Chinese strategic analysts feel that there is broad divergence of
interests between India and the US which would limit their strategic cooperation
as India would not like to follow US dictates in its foreign policy
orientations, especially regarding the containment of China. Shen Qiang, feels
that India’s strategic interests are quite different from that of the US. He
underscores four areas of India’s interest in forging partnership with the US.
First: India is seeking status of a nuclear power and hopes that by signing a
nuclear deal with the US, it would get recognition as a nuclear state, get
access to advanced nuclear technologies, equipments and strategic nuclear energy
reserve. This will not only narrow the gap between India and other nuclear
powers but also lay a solid foundation for India to rank among the nuclear
powers in future. Second: as US gets closer to India, it also pushes Russia and
China to build a friendly-cooperative relationship with India which enhances its
role in the quadrilateral US-China-Russia-India relationship. However, within
this context, he feels that “in future, India will try to raise the Indo-US
relationship above Indo-China relationship so as to contain China by playing the
US card.” At the same time India would like to maintain a trilateral strategic
cooperation with Russia and China so as to restrict US hegemony. Third: India is
“trying to pursue a great military power status.” The military cooperation with
the US will “help India build its image of a great military power.”
Significantly, “through diversified military cooperation, there will be more
sources for India to obtain advanced military technologies and equipments so
that it can rapidly increase its military strength and lay a solid foundation
for becoming a great military power.”(119)
These
perceptions are shared by other scholars interviewed by the author. Almost all
of them argued that India had its own strategic objectives to emerge as a great
power and would like to use China card to get US support.
·
Fourth: a
majority of Chinese does not feel that the Indo-US strategic partnership is
going to pose any immediate threat to China’s security, though there is an
underlying concern that in the long term the “rise of India” would pose a
challenge to Chinese interests in Asia at large. While there is a sense of
confidence that India will not be in a position to pose any military threat to
China, at least in the near future, there are apprehensions that India would be
competing with China for access to energy resources, especially in Central Asia,
Middle East and Africa, and political influence in China’s peripheral regions,
especially Central Asia, East Asia and South Asia.
·
Fifth: there
was a broad consensus within the strategic community of China that it should not
isolate itself internationally by opposing the Indo-US nuclear deal at IAEA or
NSG over safeguards or waiver, respectively. There were two main reasons behind
it. One, China knew that the US was bent on getting this deal through so Chinese
opposition would not make any difference, except spoiling its fragile relations
with both. Two, by opposing the nuclear deal, China would push India even closer
to the US which would not be in the long-term strategic interest of China.
Therefore most Chinese scholars agree that China should follow an engagement
policy both viz-a-viz India and the US though for different reasons. Chinese
attitude towards implications emanating from the operationalization of Indo-US
strategic partnership would largely depend on its own theoretical conceptions
that it is evolving to engage the major powers with a rising China in Asia and
the world at large. Chinese political leadership, strategic community and
political analysts are quite mindful that coping with the “rising China” is the
main concern of the US and its allies which look at it either as a “China
threat” or “collapse of China.” China has come up with multiple concepts to
allay such apprehensions. These include the theory of “peaceful rise of China”,
the conception of “harmonious world” professed by the current Chinese leadership
and China’s utmost effort to promote a multipolar world. Significantly, all
these responses are not devoid of an element of realpolitik. These are four main
elements that would shape Chinese response/strategy regarding realignment of
forces in the world at large and in Asia in particular. The concept of
peaceful rise of China envisages its endeavour to develop in a peaceful
environment, and at the same time to promote world peace. Under this concept of
peace and development, China wants to build socialism with Chinese
characteristics through involvement in, not isolation from, economic
globalization. According to Vice-President Li Junru of the Central Party School
of the Communist Party of China, China’s road to a “peaceful rise” refers to
“the development course of China from the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978 to the mid-21st
century, when China is expected basically to realize modernization.”(120) Li
Junru outlined five features of China’s peaceful rise. These included:
1.
China should continue putting economic construction at the centre of its
work and making development the priority of the peaceful rise. That is to say,
China would not see political confrontation as its target, nor develop its
economy through expansion or isolationism.
2.
China would participate in economic globalization and compete with others
in the world market to realize a win-win result.
3.
China would persist in independent development when participating in
economic globalization. That means China’s development would be based on its own
strength.
4.
China would deepen reform and seek coordinated development in all areas.
It would continue to build a “socialist market economy” and would handle well
the problems that crop up during the course of development.
5.
In the international arena, China should play its due role as a big
country, but it has no intention to seek domination in dealing with
international affairs. History has proved that domination would inevitably lead
to world disorder, so the Chinese leaders have pledged to the world that China
would never seek hegemony, even after it basically realizes modernization.(121) Zheng Bijian, a
prominent Chinese theorist and President of the Institute of Humane Culture for
Post-graduates of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, speaking on 22 April on the
“Development of China's Peaceful Rise” contended that China’s choice for
“peaceful rise” has broken the rule of “rising through fighting for hegemony and
[in order] to rise [it] must resort to hegemony.”(122) Li
Junru also believes that China’s rise is neither through military expansion nor
through intense Cold War confrontation but through participation in economic
globalization in a mutually beneficial way. Elaborating on
impact of China’s rise on its neighbours and the region Li Junru underscored
that it would not damage the interests of other Asian countries “because China’s
rise provides a huge market for its neighbors” and allows support to the
progress of others in the region. He also indicated that in future, “China and
other countries in the region will form various interest groups. These groups,
based on common interests, will differ from some international organizations
like NATO, which has a leader and sphere of influence. I believe we can develop
these groups using our own Eastern wisdom, so they are relevant to this part of
the world.”(123) In
fact lately China has developed another notion that talks about “peaceful
development” of China.(124) The concept of
harmonious world is forcefully advocated by the current top Chinese leadership
to define China’s diplomacy and diplomatic activities, “pushing China into a new
and powerful role in the world affairs.” Yuan Peng, Director of the Institute of
American Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary Relations, says: “Guided
by the concept of creating a ‘harmonious world’, under the principle of
promoting peace, development and cooperation, supported by increasing national
strength, and prompted by profound changes in the international arena, China is
in the process of innovating and expanding its diplomatic thinking and
behaviour.”(125) The
concept of harmonious world has entered into international sphere and evolved
into Chinese theory to define goals of China’s diplomacy and guidelines for
foreign affairs. The Chinese
concepts of “new diplomacy” and “harmonious world” reinforce each other. The
concept of a “harmonious world” was first introduced by President Hu Jintao on
22 April 2005 at the Asia-Africa summit where he proposed that Asian and African
countries should “promote friendly coexistence, equality-based dialogue, and
economic development and prosperity of different civilizations in order to
create a harmonious world.”(126) On
1 July 2005, during President Hu’s visit to Moscow, the concept was incorporated
into the joint declaration of China and Russia on world order in the 21st
century, affirming consensus between the two countries on the idea of a
harmonious world. On 15
September, President Hu elaborated on the concept in his address at the United
Nations. He said:
We should respect the right of each
country to select its own social system and path of development, encourage
exchange, rather than mutual exclusion, learn from other rather than indulge in
self-complacency, and help other countries develop on the basis of their
national conditions; we should strengthen dialogues between different
civilizations, improve our competition, seek common development amongst
differentness, and try our best to eliminate mutual suspicion and
misunderstanding, so that mankind will live in harmony and the world will become
more colourful; we should, in the spirit of equality and openness, maintain the
diversity of cultures, promote democracy in international relations, and work
together to build a harmonious world where all civilizations tolerate each other
and live peacefully together.(127) The Central
Affairs Conference held in August 2006 and the sixth plenary session of the 16th
Party Congress held in October further delved on the concept of harmonious world
and identified “five adheres-to” principles that show the intricate relationship
between the internal and external dimension of the “harmonious world.” These
are:
First: A harmonious world and
harmonious society. The latter is the foundation of the former, and the former
the guarantee of the latter.
Second: A harmonious world and
peace and development. To build a harmonious world is the goal, peace and
development are the ways and means.
Third: A harmonious world and
diplomatic practices. A harmonious world is both an abstract concept and a road
map for diplomatic practice. Its main objectives are harmonious neighbourhood,
harmonious regions and harmonious bilateral relations.
Forth: A harmonious world and
China’s diplomatic principles. Creating a harmonious world is not the pursuit
of harmony at all costs or under any circumstance, rather harmony must be
pursued “with reason, to our advantage, and with restraint,” without undermining
China’s core interests and fundamental diplomatic principles. It clearly
says that China would not sacrifice its principle of non-intervention for
constructive cooperation with the US in handling the Korean nuclear crisis and
the Darfur issue in Sudan and employ its own diplomatic style, concepts, and
roles. In addition, China would continue with its modest defence modernization.
Fifth: A harmonious world and
diplomacy for the people. This implies that the “people, as contained within the
harmony concept, are now distinctive features of the new diplomacy. That is to
say as China’s national interests expand overseas and domestic and overseas
interests intertwine, an important task of diplomacy is to ensure citizens’
safety.(128) Within this
concept of “harmonious world” China strongly advocates a multipolar world.
Thereby it firmly defends the authority of the United Nations and insists on the
reform of the current international economic and political orders. In this
sense, China aims to be a constructor and a reformer, not a destroyer (Li Junru).
China also strongly supports the development of a multipolar world in which US
influence is contained. As a rising
power in Asia, a rising India in strategic partnership with the US, the most
powerful actor in world politics, will have significant security, political and
economic implications for China. Senior US officials and leadership have made it
very clear that they have very clear intentions of strategic containment of
China. John Cherian, an Indian analyst observes: “It is no secret that one of
Washington’s primary goals in forging an alliance with India is to checkmate
China’s rising power.”(129) Former
US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill in a speech in New Delhi had observed
that both India and the US should get together to face the challenges “from the
enemy beyond the third mountain range.”(130) In
India there are strong apprehensions that “a successful conclusion of the
India-US deal will make New Delhi a junior partner in Washington’s aggressive
pursuit of its geo-political designs in Asia. India could end up supporting
Washington’s game plan to monopolise the oil and gas reserves in West and
Central Asia.”(131) It
is also argued that India’s traditional foreign policy has been noticeably
affected, as is clear from its vote against Iran in the IAEA and India’s
foot-dragging on the negotiations for the gas pipeline deal with that country.
The then secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, and other senior US officials
advised New Delhi against signing the gas pipeline deal. Condoleezza Rice also
controversially questioned the relevance of India’s membership in organisations
such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).(132) To
what extent India will follow Washington’s strategic goals vis-à-vis China will
become clearer as Indo-US strategic partnership takes shape in the coming
decade. The following
section focuses on potential implications of the operationalization of the
Indo-US strategic partnership on China’s strategic, political, and economic
interests in three regions of great importance to China’s periphery security:
South Asia, Central Asia and East Asia. It should be underscored that the extent
of implications will depend on: One, how New Delhi would play out its strategic
partnership with the US and balance its relationship with China. Two, how China
and India perceive each other’s position and role in Asia and the world at
large. China’s current
South Asia policy is guided and determined by its “periphery strategy which is
based on China’s perception of the developments and trends of its environment in
its immediate neighbouring areas.”(133) The
policy was initiated by new Chinese leadership in 2002 and gives top priority to
“maintaining periphery stability and making neighbours partners.” The policy is
based on two assumptions. One, China’s rapid economic development would benefit
its neighbours. Two, China’s development also depends on its neighbours.(134) One
of the main objectives of this strategy is to “strive for sustainable stability
in South Asia without which nothing could be done and expected.” The other
Chinese interests are participation in regional integration, potential for trade
and stability of China’s southwest border areas.
Given
developments in China’s periphery, even though South Asia did not appear first
and foremost on the security and strategic agenda of China, the Indo-US
strategic partnership will push it to the forefront of Chinese security matrix
because it is going to influence China’s other peripheries either directly or
indirectly. Within the South Asian context, the nuclear deal will have profound
impact on China’s South Asia policy and its relationship with India and
Pakistan. The deal while directly impinging on the strategic and security
interests of China, also provides an opportunity to China to reinvigorate its
South Asia policy in the light of fast changing regional and global realities.
There are four areas where Chinese interests would be affected by the Indo-US
strategic partnership. First and foremost is the impact of the
operationalization of the nuclear deal on the non-proliferation regime and
deterrence stability in South Asia. Two, China will be faced with the challenge
of balancing and competing US vis-à-vis US strategic partnership with India to
protect its own security and economic interests in India. Third, China’s
strategic partnership with Pakistan that survived the vicissitude of times would
require real strategic upgradation as Pakistan would play an important role in
the long-term strategic calculations and energy security for China.
The gravest
threat that the Indo-US nuclear deal poses is that it has shattered prospects of
a non-discriminatory regime in South Asia. Concern over the matter has been
voiced by both China and Pakistan. For the sake of co-opting India as a partner
in the larger balance of power in Asia, the deal has accorded a de jure status
to civil nuclear cooperation in India in modifying IAEA safeguards and in trying
to get a similar waiver from NSG. However, the deal does not provide a de jure
nuclear weapons state status to India and India continues to be a de facto
nuclear weapons state. As a result, argues Zhao, “India would have a double
status: in the civilian nuclear field, India is likely to establish a legal
status in order to develop cooperation with other countries, especially with
members of the NSG; in the nuclear weapons field, India is likely to remain a
non-signatory state of NPT and continue to be what is known as a de facto
nuclear weapon state.” He also believes that there is a chance that this double
status is accepted by other states as well. The question is that India’s access
to such a status would nevertheless require some kind of revision of the present
regime, which has not, for the moment, made such a distinction in a
discriminative way. India wants an exclusive revision of the current regime. The
US has already succeeded in securing India-specific IAEA safeguards and also
managed to get an India-specific waiver from the NSG. Now the question is, how
this development would impact on the other states, especially Pakistan which has
been denied such status. The nuclear
deal has evoked great concern from Pakistan, and it has asked from the US the
same deal as has offered to India. In April 2006, the then prime minister,
Shaukat Aziz, observed that “nuclear non-proliferation and strategic stability
will be possible when the US fulfils the needs of both Pakistan and India for
civil nuclear technology on an equal basis” and warned that “a selective and
discriminatory approach will have serious implications for the security
environment in South Asia.”(135) Similar
observations were made by president Musharraf, Pakistan’s foreign office and
strategic community at large. It is argued that all of Pakistan’s commercial
nuclear plants unlike India have been under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan raised its
concerns at the IAEA Board meeting but did not press for a vote, largely under
US pressure. However, it continues to express “serious reservations” about the
deal due to its discriminatory nature. On 22 August 2008, Foreign Minister Shah
Mehmood Qureshi said the “deal must not be discriminatory against Pakistan,
which should also be given access to nuclear technology for generating power.
... Pakistan has the full right to use nuclear technology to meet its growing
energy needs.”(136)
China has
also highlighted the discriminatory nature of the Indo-US nuclear deal but owing
to its unique compulsions relating to its relationship with the US it has not
obstructed the deal. China has called for any exemptions for international
nuclear cooperation and trade agreed to by the NSG to be open to Pakistan as
well,(137) but
the US refused. But once the deal is finalized and its operationalization
starts, it will clear the way for China to become more active in securing
similar concessions for Pakistan ending the discriminatory practices against
Pakistan. More significantly, it will free China from US pressure to engage in
civil nuclear energy trade with Pakistan under the IAEA safeguards. China has
already set up two 300-MG power plants at Chashma; one is complete and the other
is under construction. It has also assured Pakistan of setting up another four
nuclear power plants, each of 1300 MW. Nuclear power constitutes less than one
per cent of Pakistan’s energy mix. Rising fuel cost is putting pressure on
Pakistan to diversify its energy resources, including nuclear energy.
The
operationalization of the Indo-US deal will greatly undermine deterrence
stability in South Asia. India has not compromised its nuclear weapons programme
which will be pursued independently, depending on its security needs. There is a
strong perception in Pakistan, shared by China and many others in the world,
that the nuclear deal will enhance India’s nuclear armament programme.
Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) that has the responsibility for its
nuclear weapon policies and production (chaired by then president Musharraf)
declared: “in view of the fact the [US-India] agreement would enable India to
produce a significant quality of fissile material and nuclear weapons from
unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible
minimum deterrence will be met.”(138) However,
the Pakistan ambassador to the US at the time, General Jahangir Karamat, offered
that “if bilaterally, the US can facilitate a moratorium on fissile material
production or on testing, we are happy to be part of it.” Pakistan’s
strategic community has expressed great apprehensions that the deal will
undermine strategic stability and would lead to an arms race in the
subcontinent. Adil Sultan, of Pakistan Strategic Plan Division (SPD), observes,
if nuclear agreement is implemented without limiting India’s fissile stocks and
possibility of improving its nuclear weapons it “could lead to arms competition
in the region involving Pakistan, India and China.”(139) He
strongly feels that the nuclear deal will lead to quantitative and qualitative
improvement in India’s nuclear arsenal. Most of the Chinese scholars
interviewed, like Zhao Gancheng, Wu Chunsi, Yu Yingli, and Xia Liping, felt that
the nuclear deal was very discriminatory towards Pakistan and would destabilise
stability in South Asia. However, Dr Shen Dengli observed that it would not
affect the minimum deterrence in the region as Pakistan did not need many
weapons to ensure deterrence stability. He contended that by going nuclear,
India lost its conventional superiority over Pakistan. In fact he argued that
India’s going nuclear had stabilised the strategic balance between China and
India which was a positive development. In fact there are many in the US,
including its Congressmen, that feel that the deal would initiate an arms race
in South Asia. Democrats Edward Markey and Ellen Tauscher(140) in
a commentary published in the New York Times expressed apprehension that
the nuclear deal would fuel an arms race with Pakistan unless it was amended
banning New Delhi producing new weapons-grade material and conducting nuclear
test explosions. China has deep
and abiding strategic interest in stability in South Asia and any undermining of
deterrence stability in the region would upset the Chinese. They realise the
need for peace on their borders for domestic as well as regional development. A
tense South Asia will significantly harm China’s periphery strategy.(141) Thereby,
China has strongly supported the India-Pakistan peace process and peaceful
resolution of their disputes. The declared objective of the US, too, is to
ensure peace and stability in South Asia. Condoleezza Rice in her statement on
the nuclear deal at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative observed that the US was
ready to help improve India-Pakistan relations and ensure strategic restraint on
both sides, and was prepared to intensify significantly diplomatic effort with
both India and Pakistan.(142) However,
it seems that the deal may have unintended consequences for the stability of
South Asia. The undermining
of strategic stability by giving India a favoured position in the international
system Zhao feels would “reduce Pakistan’s self-confidence” which is the
fundamental basis of the rapprochement effort with India. He points out that
deterrence works at two levels, one is the perception level, and the other
capability level. The nuclear deal has already destroyed stability of deterrence
at the perception level. Pakistan is worried about being marginalized which has
created strategic uncertainties. On the capability level, Indian utterances
regarding its sustained nuclear weapons programme have only aggravated the
damage to the deterrence stability. Zhao strongly believes that India being a
dominant state should act responsibly and maintain strategic stability. He
argues that maintaining stability requires the major players to exercise
self-restraint in their nuclear weapons programmes and also pursue a transparent
procedure without discrimination. That would make the international
non-proliferation regime work.(143) China
maintains that India should sign
the NPT, CTBT and stop producing
fissile material for weapons. Another Chinese nuclear expert, Xia Liping,
suggests that India and Pakistan should create a nuclear-free zone, a proposal
that will need more creative thinking as both countries have gone nuclear.(144) India is
China’s immediate neighbour with which it developed a lot of mistrust in the
wake of the 1962 border conflict which still remains unresolved. Although there
has been an incremental improvement in their bilateral relations in the past few
years, yet China views the growing Indo-US strategic partnership through the
prism of its complex relations with the US. Chinese scholar Zhao Gancheng
observes that the nuclear deal has made India and the US “semi strategic allies”
that would have impact on Asia, not because how powerful India suddenly becomes,
but for the real intention of the US in building up a workable security
architect in Asia.(145) On
the other hand, referring to Chinese reservations about the nuclear deal,
Gurmeet Kanwal, an Indian strategic analyst, observed: “Chinese reaction was
another attempt to keep India down, in consonance with China’s grand strategy of
dominating Asia and confining India to the backwaters of the Indian Ocean as a
subaltern state.”(146) It
appears that the Indo-US strategic partnership is going to have long-term
implications for China as it would bring the two Asian powers competing for
strategic space, political influence and economic interests, especially access
to energy resources in Asia and beyond. At present,
there exists asymmetric threat perception between China and India. While India
tends to be deeply apprehensive regarding China, China appears comparatively
unconcerned about threats from India, and finds it difficult to understand why
India might perceive China as a threat.(147) John
W. Garver gives two explanations for this asymmetry. 1) a deliberate and
systematic understatement of Chinese concerns about India, resulting from the
mobilization function of China’s public media, and 2) the greater effectiveness
of China’s application of power over the past 50 years.(148) Consequently,
Chinese government and public media systematically downplay Indian threats to
China’s security interests. Given the outright US support to India manifested in
their strategic partnership, China has crafted a two-pronged policy of strategic
engagement with India so that US should not be able to maximize its influence
over India’s policy towards China: One, China is engaging India strategically in
security dialogue and economic field that promotes trust between the two
countries. Two, China is trying to minimize the areas of divergence with India,
or isolating them so that they do not disturb the mainstream relations.
a.
Constructive
strategic engagement Despite India’s
finger pointing that it was due to the Chinese threat that it decided to go
nuclear, China has devoted much of its diplomatic energy to improving relations
with India. In June 2003, during prime minister Vajpayee’s visit to China, the
two sides signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive
Cooperation, agreed to build a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity
and signed Political Guiding Principles for Resolving Border Issues. In April
2005, Premier Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi and the two countries agreed to
establish the Strategic Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, which
marked a new era of bilateral relationship. The joint statement issued on the
occasion said: “such a partnership is based on the principle of Panchsheel,
mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’s concerns and aspirations, and
equality; provides a sound framework for an all-around and comprehensive
development of bilateral relations based on mutual and equal security,
development and prosperity of the two peoples; and contributes to jointly
addressing global challenges and threats.”(149) The
joint statement asserted that their bilateral relations had acquired a “global
and strategic character.” In 2006,
President Hu Jintao visited India and the joint declaration issued after his
talks in New Delhi proposed a 10-point strategy to develop closer Sino-Indian
strategic partnership that would “ensure the comprehensive development of
bilateral relations, strengthen institutional linkages and dialogue mechanisms,
consolidate commercial and economic exchanges, expand mutually beneficial
cooperation, instill mutual trust and confidence through defence cooperation,
seek an early settlement of outstanding issues, promote trans-border
connectivity and cooperation, boost cooperation in science and technology,
revitalize cultural ties and nurture people-to-people exchanges, and expand
cooperation on the regional and international stages.(150) An
important aspect of the rapprochement effort was that dialogue mechanisms were
improved. Now there is Special Representative Mechanism on Border Issues, the
Strategic Dialogue Mechanism and the China-India Eminent Persons Forum. The
Strategic Dialogue Mechanism focuses on concerns about major security and
strategic issues and is playing a significant role in increasing mutual
political confidence. Under this forum the two armies have interacted. The first
defence and security consultation and the first joint-anti-terrorism training
were held in 2007. In January
2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing and both countries signed a
document called A Shared Vision for the 21st Century that
emphasized the “resolve to promote the building of a harmonious world of durable
peace and common prosperity through developing the Strategic and Cooperative
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity between the two countries.” It further
underscored historical responsibility of China and India to “ensure
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable economic and social development of the
two countries and to promote peace and development in Asia and the world as a
whole.”(151) On issues
affecting China’s core interests, India has maintained consistent policies. It
recognizes the Taiwan province and the Tibet Autonomous Region as being part of
China and “does not allow on Indian soil any anti-China activity.”(152) Politically,
China and India have adopted similar positions on major international and
regional issues and both favour a multipolar world and are against unipolar
hegemony. Both are cooperating closely in the UN, WTO and G8+5. China and India
joined hands in the Doha Round of WTO talks to uphold the interests of
developing countries. Economic
co-operation has become
the driving force and the focal point of China’s ties with India. China like the
US would want to exploit the vast potential market India offers. In 2003, the
two governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Expansion of Border
Trade, agreeing to open border markets through Nathu La (Pass). More than the
trade, the decision was politically significant because with this China extended
tacit recognition to India’s sovereignty over Sikkim. In April 2005 China and
India launched a Financial Dialogue Mechanism and agreed to all-round economic
cooperation. A Joint Study Group was set up to examine the potential
complementarities between the two countries. The Group in its report identified
a series of measures related to trade in goods and services, investment and
other areas of economic cooperation. A Joint Task Force has also been appointed
to study feasibility of China-India Regional Trading Arrangement. Consequently,
there has been rapid growth in bilateral trade in the past few years. According
to China’s Consul-General in Kolkata, Mao Siwei, from $2 billion in 1999, the
figure increased by nearly 20 times to touch $38.7 billion in 2001 and the
original target of $40 billion set for 2010 was achieved in 2007 and had to be
revised to $60 billion.(153) There
are upward trends promising bright prospects for economic expansion between the
two countries. India has become China’s third largest trading partner. At
present more than 150 Indian enterprises have sub-companies or representative
offices in China. Over 60 Chinese companies are engaged in infrastructure
projects in India.(154) Bilateral
investment is also on the rise, with accumulated investment reaching $3.85
billion by 2005. India’s investment in China was $420 million in 2005.(155) There
has also been lot of emphasis on educational and cultural exchanges and
people-to-people contacts. It is important
to note that the two countries are seeking cooperation in the global oil quest.
With rapidly growing oil demand and increasing dependence on imports — in 2004
over 40 per cent of China's crude and some 70 per cent of India's came from
abroad,(156) which
shows their potential rivalry in access to energy resources.
b.
Areas of
divergence Although China
and India are trying to develop a common strategic vision regarding their
security and economic cooperation, there are certain issues that will keep them
apart for a long time. There are likely to be three major areas of divergence
that would confront the growing China-India relationship. One is a part of
historical legacy and concerns boundary demarcation. Second is lack of strategic
confidence that partly stems from the border issue and is likely to be
reinforced by the Indo-US nuclear deal. Third, the ambitions of two fast-growing
Asian powers have seeds of future rivalry. The Boundary
Issue:
China and India share 4000-km long
border which has not been formally demarcated. The two sides have divergent
perspective on the issue and in 1962 the issue led to a border conflict that
aggravated the situation. China does not recognize the MacMahon Line while India
insists on its implementation and neither is ready to make any concession. In
1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and
Tranquillity Accords, an agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity along
the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). During the visit of Chinese prime minister to
India in 2005 China recognized the territory of Sikkim and Assam as belonging to
India, while India during the visit of its prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee
to China in 2003 recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as an autonomous part of
China. In the past India had underlined China’s “suzerainty” as opposed to
sovereignty over Tibet. In April 2005, India and China signed an agreement on
Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of India-China
Boundary Question. There have been 12 rounds of talks, without much progress. C
Raja Mohan argues that India has changed its territorial diplomacy towards China
from “territorial imperative to the political imperative” that envisages soft
borders and comparative frontiers.(157) How
this new negotiating framework that India is proposing has elements of mutual
acceptability is yet to be seen. This optimism
is not shared by the Chinese academia. Chinese scholars feel that the boundary
issue is very sensitive and there is no possibility of its being resolved in the
near future. Dr Zhao feels that it would be difficult for China to compromise on
Twang area in Arunachal Pradesh which has religious significance for Tibetan
Buddhists. Dr Shen Dengli, on the other hand, feels that the significance of the
boundary dispute has decreased to a large extent in their bilateral
relationship. According to him resolution of the border dispute was only
possible in the 1960s when China became a nuclear power and India was not a
nuclear power. Now that India has also become a nuclear power both sides are not
ready to give any concessions to each other. He says the fact that China can no
longer take it militarily means that the dispute will linger on, because giving
any concession to India which is in occupation of the Chinese land would mean
that China has accepted the legality of MacMahon line which it will never do.(158) In
the interim period both countries will be focusing more on managing their
differences rather than solving the conflict itself. The second
major point of divergence is mutual distrust and suspicion that is not only fed
by the boundary dispute but also the Tibetan issue. The question of Tibetan
separatists getting support from India still lurks in the Chinese perception and
there were suspicions that India might have extended some support in the March
14 incidents in Tibet. Ma Jiali observes that “China is concerned that India
might offer protection to the separatist activities of Tibetan in exile, and
this might affect Tibet’s stability and southwest China’s security.”(159) This
distrust has been reinforced by the Indo-US nuclear deal and is likely to grow,
despite New Delhi’s clarifications that India’s strategic partnership is not
directed against China. The fact that the China factor looms large in India’s
annual Defence Reports and strategic debate deepens this distrust. The mistrust
is also rooted in the prospects of future China-India rivalry which will be
partly an outcome of the Indo-US deal itself. The third major
element of divergence stems from the long-term prospects of China-India
competition in the balance of power in Asia. Although this aspect has been
underplayed by the Chinese official circles as well as the media and academia,
the fact remains that Chinese are quite mindful of it and are factoring this in
their broad strategic policies. A big segment of the Chinese academia suggests
that “India should be regarded as a neighbouring, big power, a developing
country as well as a key player in the multilateral diplomatic arena. …China
should respect India’s interests and take appropriate steps to solve historical
problems. Should these be done, and should India be willing to do the same, it
is really possible to establish a new strategic partnership between the two
countries.”(160) Within
this context while discussing the China-India-US triangular relationship, Venu
Rajamony argues , what is more likely is the emergence of a “soft balance of
power” system among the three countries.(161) Zhang
Guihong supporting the argument observes : “Alternately, at one end, a vicious
competitive relationship among the three countries may emerge, and the “soft
balance of power” may be changed into a “hard balance of power” similar to that
in the Cold War era, if one of them regards the development of relations between
the two other countries as a challenge to its national interests, or if any two
in this triad forge a relationship as a means to contain the third country. At
the other end, it is possible for China, the US and India to establish a
relatively harmonious relationship if they can seek out common views and
interests, and push their differences aside to deal with bilateral and
unilateral relations within a strategic perspective.”(162) Whether
there is going to be eventually emergence of soft balance of power or hard
balance of power, the fact remains that the Indo-US partnership if
operationalized in the manner it is conceived would create more uncertainties in
India-China relations within the Asian balance of power. Indo-US deal is
going to impact China-Pakistan relationship in at least three ways. One: it
would increase the strategic value of Pakistan in China’s long term strategic
calculations as a potential counter-hedge to the Indo-US partnership, if the
latter starts impinging on Chinese security and strategic interests in Asia.
Two: China has a common interest in joining hands with Pakistan to ensure safe
access to energy sources, especially from the Middle East, West Asia and Central
Asia. Three: China and Pakistan as natural allies would deepen their economic
and strategic partnership in their own right which is an essential part of
China’s periphery strategy and Pakistan’s security, economic and social
development
(a)
Shared
strategic interests As discussed
above, Pakistan would be facing direct consequences of Indo-US partnership, as
it would affect the strategic environment in South Asia to the disadvantage of
Pakistan. India happens to be the dominant regional power in South Asia and has
a fragile deterrence relationship with Pakistan that is likely to be get upset
by operationalization of this deal. The implications have been discussed above.
Linked with deterrence stability is the impact of defence deal on the
conventional balance between the two countries. The deal aggravates the
imbalance in conventional sphere as India has been offered an entire range of
advanced US military technology from F-16s, F-18 F/A-22 to the P-8 multi-mission
maritime aircraft. Moreover, the anti-missile system, PAC-3, is also on the
table.(163) This
would not only undermine the deterrence stability but may also encourage “India
to undertake military operations preemptively in a crisis situation to attempt
to knock out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.”(164) Within
this context, Rodney Jones argues that “regional instability does not … rest on
nuclear balance per se, but on inequality of strategic depth and the potential
for India to employ conventional forces to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear forces.”(165) Such
fears are strengthened as India shows its interest in the Cold Start Doctrine
that implies that India can fight a conventional war under the cover of the
nuclear umbrella for a limited purpose. The fear is
also heightened as one of the shared interests underlined in the Indo-US
strategic partnership is “cooperation in counter-proliferation”. How will it
apply to Pakistan wherein the A.Q. Khan affair, political instability, and
terrorism are always cited as possible dangers of its nuclear weapons falling
into wrong hands — extremists, terrorists, non-state actors — and lately in this
connection even the mental health of Pakistan’s president was questioned?
Recently, former US ambassador Robert Blackwill had suggested that US and India
should plan together to meet such a contingency. Surely all this is not helpful
for strategic stability of South Asia. How China would
respond to such a situation where one of its strategic allies would be facing a
serious security crisis emerging out of Indo-US collusion? China has a major
stake in the regional stability in South Asia. Although it is improving its
relations with India, it has assured Pakistan at the highest level that it will
in no way be at the cost of its relationship with Pakistan. On the other hand,
China like the US wants to come out of the “balance of power” paradigm of
security relationship between India and Pakistan. Yang Jiemian, president, SIIS,
observes that China wants to “transcend Cold War paradigm of balance of power in
South Asia” and is searching for a “new strategic framework” in which it could
deepen its strategic relationship with Pakistan, independent of Sino-Indian
relations.(166) It seems
difficult to reconcile China’s interest in regional stability with threats
emerging from Indo-US partnership to the prevailing security environment. The
ground realities in South Asia do not allow it at the moment unless there is a
dramatic improvement of relations between India and Pakistan which includes
major progress on the Kashmir issue. China and the US have common interest in
the stability of South Asia which allows China to play a more effective and
proactive role in maintaining stability in the region. As underscored by Zhao
Gancheng: Chinese role in South Asia… “should be a promoter of peace and
stability by balancing position on various kinds of differences between nations
in the region, and by opposing any unilateral and proactive actions that could
make regional security more fragile and unstable.”(167) The
inclusion of China in SAARC as an observer indicates that a soft balance of
power between China, India and the US would be taking shape in the long run. In
the interim period China would be quite mindful of Pakistan’s hard security
needs especially in the area of conventional defence. China has been a major
source of defence supplies for Pakistan. Pakistan has
strongly supported China on the issues of Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Beijing
Olympics.
(b)
Common
interest in energy security Energy security
is emerging as one of the most important shared interests between China and
Pakistan. While Pakistan is facing its worst-ever energy crisis at the moment
where demand has outstripped supply by more than 3000 MW, China with its fast
growing economy is planning for secure access to energy resources as well as is
interested in developing fuel reserves. In 2006, China
and Pakistan signed a Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation. Pakistan is
trying to overcome its energy crisis by pursuing a two-pronged policy —
developing domestic energy resources like hydel and coal as well nuclear energy
on the one hand and working out gas pipeline deals with Iran, Turkmenistan and
Qatar. China has agreed to assist Pakistan in developing its oil and natural gas
industry, besides constructing multipurpose hydel projects such as the
Basha-Diamer dam, Neelum-Jhelum power project and Thar coal project. China has
agreed to build a 405MW integrated coal mining-cum-power project at Sinda at a
cost of $600 million.(168) On
the other hand, Pakistan has offered to serve as China’s energy corridor. The
idea was floated by president Musharraf in 2006 and it envisaged a corridor
linking Pakistan and China through road, rail, fibre optics and oil and gas
supply connectivity. Pakistan is connected through the Karakoram Highway with
China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The potential viability of this link becomes
evident when one realizes that the distance between China’s Xinjiang area and
Karachi/Gwadar ports is just about 2500 kilometres as against the distance of
4500 kilometre from China’s eastern seaboard.(169) the
proposed link described as Gwadar-Xinjiang trade and energy corridor
would boost transit trade as well as provide China opportunity to develop an
alternate safe energy route that would not only be used to transport its Middle
Eastern oil requirements but also connect gas pipelines to China. There are two
gas pipeline projects — Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) — that can pass through Pakistan to
different parts of China where energy supplies are required. China has shown
interest in the energy corridor proposal and is seriously evaluating the
economic and technical feasibility of the project. The idea was explored in the
first Pakistan-China Energy Forum held in Islamabad in April 2006. Chinese
energy experts view this project as an alternate to the Malacca Strait, the
route for main transhipment of Chinese oil imports but want it to be cost
effective as well as forming part of a comprehensive package.(170) Pakistan’s
location at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia makes it
an ideal gateway for cooperation amongst nations of three regions in energy,
trade and transportation.
(c)
China &
Pakistan as natural allies For the past
few years both China and Pakistan have been trying to deepen and diversify their
economic and trade relations as these do not match with the close political
relations between the two countries. As a result, bilateral trade between the
two countries has picked up from $ I billion in the 1990s to $6.8 billion in
2007. Pakistan and China also signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2006 that covers
goods and investment and aims to raise the two-way trade to $15 billion by 2011.
Both sides are also trying to adopt a corrective mechanism to offset the trade
imbalance which is heavily tilted in favour of China. A Joint Five-Year Economic
Plan has been worked out to promote Pakistani exports to China in a big way. To
attract investment from the private sector, a Pakistan-China Joint Investment
Company was set up in 2007. It is expected that Chinese companies will enhance
cooperation with Pakistani companies in areas including finance, telecom, energy
and transportation. China and
Pakistan are also discussing a trade in transit agreement. Under the deal, China
will be able to use KKH and the ports of Gwadar and Karachi for transporting its
goods to Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan. Trade is expected to flourish
further and turn in Pakistan’s favour as transit trade and route facilities
through the Gwadar deep-sea Port come up. Besides, in 1995 China and Pakistan
along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan entered into a quadrilateral agreement on
traffic-in-transit to promote traffic-in-transit among the four countries. In
1996, the member countries concluded a protocol on customs procedures for goods
in transit and passport visa regime and in 1998 regulations for implementation
of this agreement and a protocol on establishing the system of international
road transit permit were also signed. The agreement is in force from October
2003. Under the agreement major roads from Almaty and Bishkek would be extended
to join the KKH which links China and Pakistan. Besides the bilateral level,
both countries are expanding cooperation through multilateral forums such as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the ASEAN — Regional Forum (ARF)
covering regions from East Asia to Eurasia. China’s entry
into SAARC as observer would also boost regional economic integration as well as
promote peace and stability in the region. On 3 April 2007, Chinese Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing attended the 14th SAARC summit as an observer.
Speaking at the opening session he remarked: “As the biggest neighbour of South
Asia, China hopes that all South Asian countries will live in harmony and pursue
common development and that SAARC will grow from strength to strength and play a
bigger role in regional and world affairs.”(171) There
is a great scope for establishing an institutionalized dialogue mechanism
between SAARC and China which will greatly help build trust, cooperation and
development in the region. Another
emerging area of cooperation between Pakistan and China is joint effort in
fighting terrorism. China has fully supported Pakistan in its fight against
terrorism. A joint working group has been formed to formulate anti-terrorism
security arrangements that meets from time to time. China is facing the problem
of Muslim secessionists and religious extremists in its Xinjiang-Uighur
Autonomous Region which threatens the internal stability of the country.
Pakistan is cooperating with the Chinese government in curbing Uighur
separatism.(172) China has also
agreed to provide equipment to Pakistan to fight terrorist activity. The two
sides have also strengthened bilateral cooperation to check narcotics
trafficking, illegal border trade and money laundering and other trans-border
crimes. What would be
implications of Indo-US strategic partnership for China’s interests in Central
Asia? China is emerging as a dominant actor in Central Asia while the United
States and India also want to have strong presence in the region for energy and
trade and, more importantly, to offset the growing Chinese influence in the
region. Thereby the Indo-US strategic partnership will have far-reaching
implications for Chinese interest in Central Asia. Central Asia
comprises five states of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan that became independent with the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union at the end of the Cold War. The region is another periphery of China as it
shares borders with three of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Chinese ties with Central Asia are rooted in ancient
history and acquired greater significance in the post-Soviet era. The fact that
Xinjiang, where China faces a separatist movement, borders, the Central Asian
states makes China more sensitive about its periphery stability. Further, the
region being rich in energy resources has attracted competition of the global
actors which has made it even more important for Chinese strategic, security,
political and economic interests. Against this backdrop, the Indo-US strategic
partnership is going to have both direct and indirect bearings on Chinese
interests in Central Asia, especially in view of Indian determination to treat
Central Asia as its “extended neighbourhood” and compete for the rich energy
resources as well as political influence in the region. Central Asia is
rich in oil and gas resources. According to some Central Asian reports, the
confirmed oil deposits in the region are 13-15 billion barrels, which is 2.7 per
cent of all the confirmed deposits in the world, and around 270-360 trillion
cubic feet of confirmed gas deposits. Another view is that the actual reserves
of oil in the Central Asian region are in the range of 60 to 140 billion
barrels. The main oil and gas deposits of the Caspian region are in Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.(173) All
the major powers, the US, Russia and China, are trying to get foothold in the
energy sector in the region. India is a lateral entrant but is trying to
increase its influence in the energy market of the region both in terms of its
investment in the oil and gas industry and energy supplies through pipelines as
well as to find a transit route to enhance its trade with the region. Many analysts
observe that a “new great game” in the region is unfolding focusing on strategic
competition for transit routes. The US, China, the EU, Russia, India and
Pakistan are all vying for the right to build the huge pipelines to get the oil
and enormous natural gas reserves out of Central Asia. Russia’s interest is in
maintaining its transport monopoly and privileged access to Central Asia’s
energy sources. Europe and the US want an energy transport route towards the
west through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. China in interested is developing a
pipeline infrastructure towards the east, and India and Pakistan are keen to tap
the region’s hydrocarbon resources and draw them southward. So the pipeline
politics has led to rivalries in the region for influence. There are two
competing energy corridors that are taking shape. They are: North-South
Transport Corridor and the East-West Transport Corridor. In 2000, Russia, Iran
and India signed an agreement envisaging a North-South corridor. The corridor
stretches from ports in India across the Arabian Sea to the southern Iranian
port of Bander Abbas, where goods then transit Iran and the Caspian Sea to ports
on the Russian seacoast. From there, the route stretches along the Volga River
via Moscow to northern Europe.(174) This
would provide India access to Russian, Central Asian and Eastern European
markets for its goods and links to a variety of energy-import sources. India and
Iran are also jointly developing the Iranian port of Chahbahar to access the
Central Asian States. A road will also link the port to Afghanistan and Central
Asia; its Iran-Afghanistan section, Dilaram to Zaranj, has been constructed with
Indian assistance and opened to traffic.
The US on
the other hand is also trying to consolidate its influence over the region’s
energy resources and is behind the development of the “East-West Transportation
Corridor”. It is trying to get the support of the EU in connecting the energy
markets of the East and West with Caspian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The main
objective is to secure a strategic route for the export of Caspian energy
resources to the Western markets. Since Russia is apprehensive of expansion of
Western oil companies influence in the region it has refused to participate in
the East-West Transportation Corridor. India has preferred the North-South
Corridor as it is relatively short and cheap transit route to the Central Asian
markets. This has raised some concerns in the US both due to Iran’s nuclear
programme and its own aim of containing Russian influence in the region. As part
of the strategy, the US State Department has created the South and Central Asian
Affairs office in the department. Within this context, the US has also supported
the idea of a ‘regional energy grid’ to transport gas and electricity from
Central Asia to South Asia. Many multilateral financial institutions such as the
World Bank, IMF, ADB are offering funds for the project. This would also act as
an alternative energy route that would fit into India’s thinking.
Indian
policy makers and analysts believe that the region is important because of its
strategic location and proximity — Tajikistan is just 20 kilometres from greater
Kashmir — and its energy resources.(175) Thus,
Indian defence minister underscored that restoring traditional linkages with its
extended neighbourhood in Central Asia and beyond has become “one of the primary
strategic priorities” of his government. In the meantime, India is developing
close relations with all the CARs in fields ranging from weapon trade,
technology transfer, construction to counter-terrorism.(176) In
2006, India approved its participation in the US$5 billion
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. China is also
developing close bilateral commercial relations with the CARs, and has become a
major investor in Kazakhstan oil industry. The Kazakhs have also built an oil
pipeline that links Kekiyak in Kazakhstan to Atyrau in the Xinjiang province of
China. Although China and India have demonstrated some cooperation in joint
bidding in Syria and Sudan, yet when it comes to Central Asian energy, their
competition is fierce. This became obvious when in 2005 China outbid India to
acquire Petro-Kazakhstan, with the Chinese petroleum corporation raising its bid
to US $ 4.18 billion.(177) The strategic
competition in Central Asia among the major global players — US, China, Russia
and India — has intensified in the last few years. The US influence in Central
Asia grew in the post Cold War period, especially after 9/11. The objective was
not only to thwart Russian military doctrine of “Near Abroad”, (1993), but also
act as a counterweight to the expanding Chinese influence in the region. Hence,
after 9/11 the region witnessed an increased American military engagement with
its bases spreading from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to Tajikistan.
The war on terrorism thus provided opportunity to the US to strengthen its
military presence in the area. However, after the May 2005 uprising in Andijan
province of Uzbekistan and the so-called colour revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia
and Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbek government ended military cooperation with the US and
asked for the withdrawal of its Karshi-Khanabad air base. Since US and India
share interests in counter-terrorism and energy production, it seems that US
intends to rely on Indian cooperation in the region. Within this
context the Indo-US strategic partnership becomes more important. Gulshan
Sachdeva underscores: “In Central Asia, India will be expected to play its role
as a balancer in the backdrop of increasing Chinese dominance and declining
Russian presence”.(178) Another
Indian analyst, Kapil Kak discussing India’s growing role in Central Asia
argues: “India would need to bring to bear its rapidly increasing political,
economic and military capabilities to the table as a threshold great power with
vital stakes in the region.”(179) Consequently,
India has expanded its military contacts with Central Asia. It has set up a
military base in Tajikistan Ayani, a refurbished Soviet airbase of Farkhor. It
is India's first real military outpost in a foreign land and will give New Delhi
a 'strategic' capability in the energy-rich Central Asia. India’s immediate
plan, according to defence ministry sources, was to deploy Mi-17 helicopters as
well as some Kiran trainer aircraft to train Tajik pilots. But this is likely to
be just a prelude to establishing a larger strategic imprint that would include
deployment of MiG-29s.(180) The
establishment of the air base gives India an opportunity to increase its
influence in the region. China attaches
great importance to the SCO partnership with its Central Asian neighbours. The
organization grew out of Shanghai Five that was formed in 1996. SCO was set up
in 2001 by six countries — China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. In 2004 and 2005, the SCO admitted Mongolia, India and Pakistan and
Iran as observers. China has expressed its support to Pakistan’s full membership
of in the organization. SCO is the first intergovernmental international
organization based in China. China shares 14,799 km of borderline with SCO
members and observer countries that shows the political and strategic
significance of the organization for China and for regional stability. Originally the
organization was aimed at enhancing security, trade, cultural, military and
justice cooperation among member countries. It started with functional issues
such as demilitarization of the Sino-Russian borders, tackling drug trafficking,
and boosting intra-regional trade.(181) As
a result, China has settled its historical disputes with its Central Asian
neighbours as well as Russia through consultations. Besides, the
SCO has also focused on closer regional cooperation for economic development.
There is a cooperation programme in multilateral economic and trade fields among
SCO members that is meant to facilitate free flow of commodities, capital,
services, and technology in the region. An SCO Business Council was also formed
to forge an inter-bank agreement in the region to facilitate finance development
projects. In fact, in 2005 China extended nearly US $ 1 billion worth of loans
to Central Asian states.(182) According
to the General Administration of Customs of China, China registered US $ 40
billion trade with SCO members in 2005 which was 47 per cent up over 2004.(183) In recent
years, the SCO has focused more on fighting three forces of terrorism,
separatism and extremism to maintain regional peace, security and stability. It
has set up an anti-terrorism agency to coordinate anti-terrorist efforts. Within
this context, China is participating in anti-terrorism military exercises with
SCO members. It has also involved itself in combating drug trafficking and has
helped Afghanistan in the reconstruction process. In 2004, the organization
established Regional Anti-Terrorism Structures (RATS) to coordinate SCO members
activities in this area. Based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, it has conducted several
multilateral anti-terrorism military exercises in the region. In 2007 the SCO
held a “Peace Mission 2007” exercise, the first joint anti-terror exercise
involving military forces from all the member countries. Chinese ambassador in
Russia Liu Guchang, elaborating on the objective of the exercise, said that “it
indicated the importance attached by member countries to the drill and their
firm will to enhance cooperation, jointly crack down on the three evil forces,
and maintain regional peace, security and stability as well as determination to
promote the development of SCO”. He tried to allay Western, especially American,
fears by saying: “The SCO, which holds a defence and security principle of
fairness, openness and transparency, will not play any role as a military bloc
but will advocate a new concept of security featuring mutual trust, mutual
benefit, equality and coordination.” He added that the SCO holds “a principle of
non-alliance, non-confrontation and will not target any third country or
organization.”(184) A
Chinese scholar, Pan who heads Shanghai-based SCO Research Center Academy of
Social Sciences, observed that it was within the framework of the SCO had China
established a close, yet unaligned partnership with Russia and its Central Asian
neighbours.(185) However,
this unaligned partnership is viewed differently in Washington and, now, in New
Delhi. Since the US is not a member of the SCO, it feels that it is directed
against its interests in the region. There is a growing feeling in Washington
that it is a parallel security structure dominated by China. The fact that
Russia got crucial support “for its peace efforts in South Ossetia from China
and other allies in SCO”(186) at
the summit meeting held in August 2008, would further strengthen such
perceptions. The West, especially the US, has denounced “Russian aggression”
against Georgia and threatened even sanctions against Russia. Against this
backdrop, New Delhi is distancing itself from SCO while getting closer to the
US. Gulshan Sachdeva argues “if Chinese expansion coincides with declining
Russian influence, India will have no choice but to expand its political,
economic and military capabilities in Central Asia.” Simple realist logic would
suggest close Indo-US cooperation in Central Asia. These realities are fuelling
India’s “forward” Central Asia policy.(187) However,
India’s geopolitical ambitions in CA are constrained by its current partnership
with the US, continued strategic closeness with Russia, an important player in
Central Asia whose relations with the US are getting worse, and China’s
assertion as a dominant power in the region at the moment. What would be
the implications of Indo-US strategic partnership for China in East Asia? East
Asia, including South-East Asia, is another strategically and economically
important periphery of China. Closer strategic cooperation between the US and
India would certainly impinge on Chinese strategic, economic and political
interests in the region. East Asia is an
amalgamation of South-East Asia — the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) which includes Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines,
Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos — and North-East Asia — which
includes China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. The region holds an
important position in Chinese energy security, maritime security, economic and
trade development… China is a big power in East Asia. To promote its economic
interests and ensure regional stability, China is heavily involved in many
multilateral mechanisms in East Asia, including ASEAN, ASEAN 10+3, ASEAN 10+1
and the Six-Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue. The ASEAN,
formed in 1967 expanded over the years and now has 10 states as its members. In
1976, ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which emphasizes
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
Since it was open to non-members, China, India, Japan, Russia and South Korea
could sign in. The main objective of ASEAN was to “accelerate economic growth”
among the member states and to “promote peace and stability across the region.”(188) In
1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was set up that showed willingness of the
group to deal with security issues. ARF agenda included promotion of confidence
building, development of preventive diplomacy and adoption of peaceful
approaches to conflict resolution. ARF has 24 members including the US, Russia,
China, India, Japan and North Korea. The ARF discusses major regional security
issues such as the relationship amongst the major powers, non-proliferation,
counter-terrorism, transnational crimes, South China Sea and the Korean
Peninsula.(189) In
1997 ASEAN members signed Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. In
2003, ASEAN leaders set up the ASEAN Community with three pillars — ASEAN
Security Community; ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
Under the ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted in 1997, it would work for economic
integration of the region which would include trans-ASEAN transportation and
trans-ASEAN energy networks. India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN
in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1995. At present India’s trade with ASEAN
countries stands at US $ 38 billion and is expected to go up to US $ 50 billion
by 2010.(190) Recently,
India and ASEAN concluded a trade-in-goods agreement after six years of talks
and negotiations on investment and services would start soon. In 1999 Asean+3
was institutionalized that included China, Japan and South Korea. In regional
terms, what was significant for China was that both the United States and
Australia were not included in the forum. In 2005, China, along with Malaysia,
got East Asia Summit (EAS) of 16 regional countries off the ground. Besides the
13 Asean+3 member states, this grouping included India, Australia and New
Zealand. “The presence of India was met by “quiet resistance” from China. This
stance reflected, in part, the perception that the presence of India would act
“to lessen Chinese influence in the EAS.”(191) The region
holds very important position in the global and regional interests of the US. On
28 July 2008, deputy secretary of state John D. Negroponte, talking on the US
Policy in Asia: Meeting Opportunities and Challenges, at Brookings Institution,
noted that US was shaping its policy to meet the opportunities and challenges
posed by “Asia’s extra-ordinary rise.”(192) He
argued that the US was basically a Pacific Power and had played a stabilizing
role in maintaining balance of power in the region. Underlining the economic
importance of the region he said 21 APEC economies, including most of East and
Southeast Asia, accounted for 60 per cent of global GDP and half of global
trade. Within this context he emphasized: “Our alliances with Japan, South
Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand remain the foundation of peace
and security in Asia.” He observed that since 2001, US had modernized its
alliances with its key allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, to
“reflect the realities of the 21st century.” He said the US had
supported Japan’s efforts “to play a broader international role befitting its
status as a great power.” US had also strengthened its alliance with South Korea
“to continue promoting regional security while also helping to meet global
challenges.” In addition, US had reached out to new friends in South-East Asia
like Indonesia and Vietnam. It is against the broader perspective that the US
had entered into a strategic relationship with India which is certainly going to
have lot of impact on Chinese interests in the region. China has
significant economic, strategic and political interests in the region that are
embodied in China’s “new security concept” that was in fact evolved in the 1990s
in the context of Chinese interests in Southeast Asia. This concept expanded the
definition of security to include political, defence, diplomatic and, above all,
economic considerations. According to Wu Baiyi, Deputy Director of the Research
Department, China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, “compared
to past policies, the current concept signifies two major changes… For the first
time economic security is treated as equally important with those of ‘high
politics.’” Second, it “focuses more on the interrelationship between external
and internal security.”(193) Against this
broad perspective, China attaches great importance to its economic interests in
the region as it considers itself a regional economic power. The main challenge
for China is to convince the regional countries that “China is an economic
opportunity for them and not a threat… the worst case for China is that ASEAN
members extend their fears of Chinese economic growth to an all-round
apprehension of China.”(194)
To pursue this interest
China wants to present itself as the biggest market, and source of investment so
as to make China an engine of economic growth in the region. China has
strong strategic interests in the region which has heavy concentration of major
powers, including the US, Japan, Russia, India and China itself. The “primary
aim of the Chinese regional security is thus to avoid the formation of coalition
of regional countries against the rise of China”.(195) Within
this context China attaches great significance to the small and medium powers
such as the two Koreas in Northeast Asia and ASEAN members in South-East Asia
for Chinese security environment. It should be noted that China has serious
disputes with ASEAN members states on the South China Sea. Then there are
sensitive issues of Taiwan and Sino-Japanese relations which are viewed more
through the prism of China’s status as a rising power. The Sino-US relations are
another important element in the security of the region and evoke Chinese
sensitivities. Within this context China’s heavy reliance on the Malacca Strait
for its oil shipments makes China oversensitive to the growing military
cooperation and presence of rival powers in the region. Politically,
China wants to increase its clout in the region. It desires recognition and
appreciation as a regional power. A Chinese analyst, Zhang Tiejun, observes:
“China recognizes that in foreseeable future, China’s global influence will only
be limited, and thus the main arena on which China exerts influences would be
regional. ... The best way to achieve so is thus to promote China’s image as a
responsible regional power.”(196) China’s
role in resolving the North Korean crisis should be viewed in this light. Given
the significance that China attaches to its political, economic and strategic
interests, the operationalization of Indo-US strategic partnership will have
far-reaching implications for China. Both the US and
India have common strategic and economic interests in the East Asian region. US
being the most dominant power in the Asia–Pacific region and India pursuing a
proactive “Look East” policy since 1990s, makes it abundantly clear that there
is a politico-strategic convergence of interests to increase their influence in
the region which will certainly be at the expense of China. It seems there would
be a common interest in containing China’s growing influence in the region. India’s “Look
East” policy is also a manifestation of its aspiration for a status as a global
power which will get a boost from its close political and defence relationship
with the US. India is emerging as a soft ally of the US in its counter-terrorism
strategy in the region as well as in maritime security, especially the safety of
the Malacca Strait. India argues that its increased role would be commensurate
with its growing oil imports through the strait. This does not auger well for
Beijing. “Some Chinese strategists believe that India’s cooperation with
South-East Asian states on counter-terrorism and maritime security is part of
the larger Indian strategy to control the Indian Ocean, and that India’s Look
East Policy is, in fact, influenced to some degree by the desire to limit
China’s growing influence.”(197) In
addition, India’s growing maritime cooperation with Japan and South-East Asia is
seen as a strategy to counter China’s growing maritime clout. This is evident in
the assertion made by the India navy from time to time. The Indian navy, in
particular, has expressed concerns about China’s “string of pearls” strategy of
clinching regional defence and security agreements to enhance its military
profile in the Indian Ocean.(198) A
former Indian naval chief Adm. Arun Prakash said: India is in the middle of the
Indian Ocean, and that is where China has implemented its “strings of pearls”
strategy by creating right around us what are best described as “weapon-client
states” — “Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan”.(199) It
should be underlined that the US holds similar perception about the growth of
the Chinese navy. Moreover, India wants to station its forces around the Malacca
Strait in the Bay of Bengal.(200) India’s
Eastern Naval Command has around 50 naval ships and 55 aircraft ranging from
carrier, missile destroyers, submarines, stealth frigates, naval sea fighters
and helicopters.(201) This
indicates that the Indo-US strategic partnership would encourage a
Chinese-Indian competition over the security of the Malacca Strait and
surrounding regions. China’s
dependence on ship-borne energy supplies is growing and thereby the Malacca
Strait is gaining importance in its energy security. At present 69 per cent of
its oil is transported through this strategic sealane. Thereby the safely of the
strait, a narrow stretch of waterway between Malaysia and the Indonesian island
of Sumatra become very important for the Chinese. A Chinese scholar, You Ji,
while referring to the strait observes that the safety of the sea lane of
communication (SLOC) is “at once a nonconventional and a military one, which may
trigger maritime conflict. The difficulty in dealing with this challenge is that
it is integral to geo-politics and hence subject to complicated major power
relations. Geostrategic politics will increasingly determine Beijing’s SLOC
policy of political cooperation and military hedging.”(202) Although
safety of the Malacca Strait is in the interest of all major powers, an
exclusive control of such security by the US and India along with American
allies Japan, Australia and Indonesia would not be desirable for China. You Ji
argues “what worries President Hu is the apprehension of access denial. Only US
is capable of doing so.”(203) Such
fears arise because in 1992 the US navy forcefully inspected Chinese ship
Yinghe in the Indian Ocean. Chinese concerns are further reinforced by the
possibility of a “war in the Taiwan Strait with US involvement,” which would
lead to interdiction of Chinese shipments through the strait.(204) The
US Navy has the largest naval base in the Indian Ocean. More than 80 per cent of
Chinese oil tankers go through this dangerous lane under 100 per cent US
surveillance and control.(205) It
is against this strategic backdrop that China contends its navy is acquiring
“contingency capabilities.” These concerns have also led Beijing to seek
alternative land-based energy transportation routes. The Indo-US
partnership which has unfolded joint maritime exercises such as Malabar in 2007,
involving navies of the US, Japan, Australia and India doing war games in the
Andaman Sea, near the strategic Strait of Malacca, has raised eyebrows in
Beijing. It should be underscored that in the post-9/11 period, the US has
strengthened its alliance relationship with Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and
the Philippines, while China’s relations with Japan have taken a bad turn. The threat of
maritime terrorism, piracy, human trafficking and other transnational crimes to
the Malacca Strait would be a common interest where Beijing would not feel
threatened. Moreover, the littoral states like Malaysia and Indonesia would be
unwilling to accept any direct US role in the security of the strait which would
also impinge on their sovereignty and security. Within this context, they would
be unwilling to allow India to assume central role in the security of the
sealane. It needs to be emphasized that China is pursuing a cooperative security
approach through regional multilateral and bilateral initiatives with ASEAN and
ARF and the individual states of Southeast Asia(206) to
protect its geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in the region. Within this
context, the factor of sealane security has been added to China’s maritime
strategy. What are the
implications of the Indo-US nuclear deal for China at the global level? Indo-US
strategic partnership is in part an outgrowth of reshaping of US Asia policy
which is geared to protect American interests in the 21st century.
Hence, the Indo-US partnership has wider global implications for China,
especially in terms of its relations with the US as well as Russia. Sino-US
relations are central to the emerging balance of power in Asia. They are defined
by enormous complexity which would continue to shape US Asia policy. Chen
Dongxio, Vice President SIIS, elaborating on the complexity of Sino-US
relationship observes: “on the one hand the interdependence of interest is
growing, which further exacerbate the shocks on the economy, political structure
and social psyche of each other. The shock from China is even stronger. On the
other hand, dialogues as well as frictions over conceptions and values around
building regional and global orders will … become an important aspect of
bilateral relations.”(207) The
broad convergence and divergence of strategic, economic, political as well as
societal interests of the two most important and most powerful actors in the
world politics is going to stay central to Sino-US relationship in the coming
decade. US President Barack Obama's China policy is expected to follow the
principle of continuity, with some difference appearing in their trade and
economic relations due to economic challenges that both countries will be facing
because of the global financial crisis. In the security area, many challenges
that Obama administration would be facing like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
the nuclear programmes in Iran and North Korea, require cooperation with China.
Moreover, on many global issues such as climate change, energy, environmental
protection and HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, China and the United States
have wide space to cooperate. The challenge
posed by the rise of China to the US has led to debates in the US on America’s
China policy. Ex-president Bush himself described relationship with China
“complex” and asserted to “engage China in a constructive and candid fashion.”(208) The
two competing perspective have been “a positive-sum perspective in which the US,
China, and other regional actors have strong incentives to increase mutual
trust, transparency, and economic ties, thereby minimizing the likelihood of
avoidable military conflicts that serve no nation’s long-term interests; and a
zero-sum perspective, in which the continued relative increase in Chinese power
poses the most formidable long-term danger to the national security and economic
interests of the US and its allies in the region, regardless of whether
Beijing’s relations with US or its neighbours appear cordial and constructive in
this decade.”(209) At
the same time a search for synthesis between the two perspectives is going on
that would have both elements of engagement and containment of China as is
referred to China as a “responsible stakeholder”. In September 2005, then US
deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick put forward this new proposition for
managing bilateral relations between the US and China: the US would like to work
with China as a “responsible stakeholder”, which includes collaboration in
managing regional and global affairs as well.(210) In
the same vein, in a recent article, titled “Rethinking the National Interest;
American Realism for a New World” Condoleezza Rice observes that the US is
faced with the “challenge to deal with rising Chinese influence, something we
have no reason to fear if that power is used responsibly. We have stressed on
Beijing that with China’s full membership in the international community comes
responsibilities, whether in the conduct of its economic and trade policy, its
approach to energy and the environment, or its policies in the developing
world.”(211) She
points out that Chinese leaders are increasingly realize this and are moving,
“albeit slowly, to a more cooperative approach on a range of problems.” A recent
US Independent Task Force Report by the Council on Foreign Relations,”
US-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, a Responsible Course, (2007),”
also argued: “integration is a responsible course involving a blend of engaging
China on issues of mutual concern, weaving China into a fabric of international
regimes on security, trade, and human rights, and balancing China’s growing
military power.” This conception of responsible stakeholder is now becoming
guiding principle of US policy towards China.(212) Within this new
paradigm of “responsible stakeholder” or “shared responsibility”, the US is
building partnership of shared values amongst others with India and wants to
circumspect the rise of China in its Asian peripheral regions as well as across
the globe. India is one such emerging power that can become a valuable partner
at both regional and global levels. There is a strong perception in China that
the nuclear deal is part of an American strategy to retain control of fast
changing balance of power in Asia which is drifting in China’s favour. The growing
economic interdependence between the US and China is the single most important
factor that is going to sustain the fragile Sino-US relations, though there will
be some frictions within the economic relationship. China’s foreign trade, which
constitutes a large part of its economy, is much dependent on American market.
The US is the biggest trading partner of China. In 2006 the US accounted for
19.4 per cent of China’s exports but only 7.5 per cent of its imports.(213) China’s
huge trade surplus with the US has evoked some concerns in America but the fact
remains that China has provided American market with low-price and high-quality
products that benefits American consumers. Significantly, Chinese exports are
mainly produced with foreign direct investment in which US investment accounts
for a large part. China also considers US the most important country for its
market, capital, technology and management(214) ever
since its economic reforms began in 1978. There are some
frictions within the economic relationship. For instance, much to the dislike of
Washington, China after keeping its currency pegged to the US dollar for years,
in July 2005, revalued it — by 2.1 per cent against the dollar — and moved to an
exchange rate system that is referred to as basket of currencies. The US also
wants China to further open its market to US business, and correct imbalances
within its system by relying more heavily on domestic demand to stimulate growth
and complete the transition to an open, market based economy.(215) Within
this context, however, the real issue for the US is the political impact of
China’s emergence as an economic power. China-US
relationship is very complex, especially at the regional level. At the strategic
level Beijing is cooperating with Washington to the extent that it suits China’s
strategic interests. At the regional level, although both share common interests
in a number of areas such as anti-terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD,
safeguarding international sealanes and maintaining regional stability, yet
differences remain over approaches. These include
the Korean and Iranian nuclear crisis, the double standards applied by the US in
defining and implementing international non-proliferation regime. On the Korean
nuclear crisis China’s primary objective is ensuring stability in the region as
both Koreas are China’s neighbours. Both US and China however want a
nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Thereby China has initiated six-party talks and
its role has been appreciated by the US as “constructive.” However, while China
favours settling issue through negotiations, the US does not want to accommodate
North Korea but is more interested in the security of its allies in northeast
Asia , which could be ensured only by “eliminating nuclear development of North
Korea.” In fact China is apprehensive about US policy towards Asian security
post-Cold War and post 9/11 period that has focused on bilateral treaties and
upgrading of security relationship with Japan, South Korea and India. China,
conversely, is following a multilateral approach and supporting multilateral
dialogues in the region based on common security, collective security and
cooperative security. Besides, China has also worked with the US in the UN
Security Council to achieve an international consensus to convince Iran to give
up its nuclear weapons programme, but does not share Washington’s approach of
imposing sanctions on Iran which will isolate that country. China has opposed
regime change both in the case of North Korea and Iran. Moreover, China
continues to maintain close security ties with both countries. Taiwan is
another issue that divided the two countries. Although, the US does not support
Taiwan’s independence, it continues providing arms to Taiwan which is not seen
positively by China. Chinese analyst Zhao contends that “US wants to provide
Taiwan with sufficient means to defend its de facto independence but not
supporting its de jure independence.” Consequently, “the United States One-China
policy becomes an empty statement from Chinese perspective.”(216) China
feels that the Taiwan issue is very important for peace and stability in Asia. China is also
cooperating with the US in its counter-terrorism efforts at the global and
regional levels. However, it is apprehensive that the US may use
counter-terrorism to advance its geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in
China’s periphery which is very obvious in the case of Central Asia. The US is also
apprehensive of China’s military modernization and wants it to have transparency
in this area. The Task Force report contends that China’s military modernization
has two main drivers, one with a clear operational objective (Taiwan) and the
other with a clear strategic objective (to build a modern military because China
will be a modern power). It concludes that as a consequence of its military
modernization, China is making progress towards being able to fight and win a
war with Taiwan (absent US intervention), and it is also beginning to build
capabilities to safeguard its growing global interests. The mere existence of
these capabilities — including anti-missile systems — poses challenges for the
US.(217) However,
China and the US have initiated military-to-military dialogue to improve
understanding of China’s military modernization. There are also
issues such as climate change, human rights, democratization of China and
China’s efforts to ensure access to energy resources that have added to the
complexity of relationship. On top of it there is the major issue of distrust
between the two powers as general perception in the US is whether the rise of
China would lead to decline of American power. Within this context, US cooption
of India is an attempt to balance uncertainties created by the rise of China.
Although American strategic cooperation with India will help India tremendously
in finding its place and role in shaping regional and global affairs there is a
strong perception in India that it will follow an independent course of action
in its foreign policy issues and will not serve American interest blindly.
However, by virtue of sheer rise of India that has its complex set of relations
with China there will be many areas of convergence between New Delhi and
Washington where they can cooperate. For instance, Delhi will be more than happy
to get Washington’s support in increasing its influence in China’s periphery of
Central Asia and East Asia. In the context of South Asia, Beijing’s relationship
with New Delhi is already complex as it has to overcome lot of mutual distrust
which would limit its role in the stability of the region. However, China’s
growing economic relations with the regional states including India would allow
it to play a dynamic role in regional economic integration. China-Russia
relationship is also quite a complex one. While Russia has been a close ally of
India and would also be a beneficiary of civil nuclear energy cooperation with
India, at the same time, Russia’s relations with the US nosedived under the Bush
administration which forced it to rely more on Chinese support against the US
policies that were aimed at undermining Russian influence, specifically in its
backyard. However, under Obama administration there has been thaw in relations.
This is largely due to the change in US policy and his attempt to press the
‘rest button’. The improvement is much to do with the fact that Obama has
decided to avoid confronting Russia on many thorny issues. This is reflected in
America’s weak response to the closure of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan and
avoiding support to Ukraine and Georgia for Nato membership. Meanwhile, China
and Russia have also deepened cooperation in the energy sphere which has brought
them closer than ever before. Broadly
speaking, wherever Sino-Russian interests converge they speak in one voice and
wherever their interests diverge or are competitive they follow an independent
course. Indo-US strategic partnership is one area where Sino-Russian approaches
will diverge at the strategic level but will converge at the tactical level.
Within this context, Russia’s relationship with the US, Central Asia and China
would largely shape its attitude towards the Indo-US strategic partnership. The
growing tension with the US will push Russia towards China. The deal
coincided with the intensification of a “new cold war” wherein NATO transformed
into a new grouping, and identified Russia and China as its rivals. At the
Bucharest NATO summit, president Bush announced that NATO was “now an
expeditionary alliance that is sending its forces across the world to help
secure a future for freedom and peace for millions”.(218) In
addition, the Bush administration announced plans for an anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) system aimed at neutralizing the comparatively small intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) of China and threatened Russia by putting up missile
bases on its borders. At the Bishkik summit in May 2008, Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement
condemning the American ABM plan. The two leaders were also critical of the
“double standards” in the current US foreign policy, especially on its reliance
on unilateral use of force.(219) At the
bilateral level, China is improving its relations with Russia in political,
economic and strategic spheres. Significantly, on 22 July 2008, both sides
signed an agreement that ended a decades-long territorial dispute and finally
determined their borders. It added to an existing agreement on their
4,300-kilometre boundary, implying that the entire frontier is now decided.
After the agreement Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said, “We exchanged
views about how to further promote our bilateral strategic relationship and
strengthen our cooperation at the regional and global levels.” This implied that
both countries are now in a better position to deepen their strategic
coordination over the regional and international issues. This was manifested in
Chinese support to Russia on the crisis in South Ossetia which led to
Georgia-Russia conflict with Washington warning Moscow that it had an ‘abiding’
interest in the regions once dominated by Kremlin.(220) The
competition over energy resources in Central Asia is at the heart of the
Caucasus crisis. Russian Prime Vladimir Putin has hinted at diverting Russian
oil and gas from Europe to China. This will certainly a big diplomatic coup by
the Chinese. The demarcation
of boundary has also opened avenues for bilateral economic cooperation. Chinese
foreign minister observed: “As we preserve domestic stability in our respective
societies, we have now created a very good external environment for social and
economic development, which is of huge benefit to us both,” What Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov said on the occasion also expressed an upswing in their
relationship with China: “From a legal point of view we have created the
preconditions for the border to become a link of stability, openness, mutual
benefit, friendship and cooperation.”(221) In
2001 China and Russia signed Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and
Cooperation which included ‘joint action against perceived US hegemonism.(222) The two sides
have also expanded their economic relations. During his visit to Russia in
November 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told Russian media that China
had set a target of boosting investment in Russia at a total 12 billion US
dollars by 2020. He said Chinese companies had invested in a wide range of
fields in Russia, including mining, energy, electricity, manufacturing,
infrastructure, agriculture, fishery and forestry.(223) With
improvement in China-Russia bilateral relations, both would like to have a
strategically triangular relationship with India so that it does not get closer
to the United States. China and
Russia followed an entirely different course of action on the issue of Indo-US
nuclear deal. While Russia supported the deal enthusiastically, China took a
principled stand that India should follow international regulations on
non-proliferation. Their different approaches stemmed from their divergent
political, strategic and economic interests vis-à-vis India. Russia has been a
close ally of India during the Cold War and continues to be the main source of
India’s military supplies. The Indian army has placed a $2bn order for cruise
missiles from the Russo-Indian company BrahMos. Russia is also going to be one
of the major beneficiaries from of the lifting of restrictions on international
cooperation with India in the nuclear field. Thereby the Russian Foreign
Ministry in a statement after the NSG waiver observed: “We are convinced that
the exemption made for India reflects Delhi’s impeccable record in the
non-proliferation sphere and will guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear exports
to India”.(224) The
waiver opens the way for implementing of a preliminary agreement India signed
with Russia earlier in 2008 for the construction of four additional reactors at
Kudankulam. However, a Russian expert, Dmitry Yevstafiev, of PIR-Centre think
tank, observed that the waiver would push India closer towards the US. “India is
clearly drifting towards the US. We [Russia] may have tactical gains, but the
strategic outlook for us in dim”.(225) This
implied that Russia has also apprehensions that strategically India would be
moving towards the US. China, on the
other hand, was quite concerned over an unconditional lifting of restrictions on
nuclear trade with India which in no way would be helpful to the fragile
non-proliferation regime. The Chinese representative, Cheng Jingye, reportedly
stated that China hoped that the NSG would “equally address the aspirations of
all parties for the peaceful use of nuclear power while adhering to the nuclear
non-proliferation mechanism.” He also said that the decision made by the NSG
would “stand the test of time and contribute to the goals of nuclear
non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear power.” He also underscored that
China would cooperate with all parties on the peaceful use of nuclear power “in
accordance with its international obligations and on the basis of equality and
mutual benefit.”(226) Following
the waiver, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu in a statement said:
“China believes that all countries are entitled to make peaceful use of nuclear
energy, and conduct international cooperation in this regard. Meanwhile the
relevant cooperation should be conducive to safeguarding the integrity and
efficacy of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.”(227) This
signified that China is not only concerned over the consequences of the
India-specific amendments in international proliferation regime but also feels
that it will not have positive impact in its South Asian periphery. This
divergence of perspective is likely to continue in both countries attitude
towards nuclear cooperation with India. It seems while Russia would emerge as
the largest nuclear trade partner of India, China is likely to increase its
nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. This may not affect their relations much as
such because they have been following this policy for a long time. A more serious
implication is likely to be the role that India can play in energy politics of
Central Asia after becoming a partner of the US. While Russia has gained a
foothold in the energy sources of Central Asia, the US has suffered a series of
major reverses in the past two years in the “great game” over Caspian energy.(228) Against
this backdrop, the US will like India to play a role that advances its interests
in the region. This may cause some anxiety in Russia and China, but they would
not like India posing challenges to their interests but it all depends on New
Delhi how it does the balancing act to pursue its own interests without
threatening Chinese and Russian interests. The foregoing
analysis shows that in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era US Asia policy is in
a flux as realignment of forces is taking place both at the global and regional
levels. The emergence of Indo-US strategic partnership is going to be the
central pillar of US Asia policy in the 21st century. The partnership will have
long-term security, economic and political implications for China in its
peripheries of South Asia, Central and East Asia at large. The Indo-US
partnership will also affect China’s relations with the US and Russia in
different degrees. However, the most important caveat would be how this
partnership will take shape in the coming decade. In other words what would be
the limitations on the Indo-US strategic partnership? How US foreign policy
goals and priorities can be reconciled with India’s own foreign policy goals and
traditions and its aspirations to have a greater say in global affairs in the
coming decades? More importantly, how far Indian interests would converge with
US in hedging China? Rajiv Sikri, a
former secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, underscores limits
of the Indo-US strategic partnership. There are many points of divergences.
First, whereas the US wants the current so-called “unipolar world order to
continue, India believes that the world should be multipolar, with India itself
as one of the poles.”(229) Second,
a “fundamental problem for any country in having a strategic relationship with
the US is that it can never be one of equality. No ally or partner of US is
treated as an equal by the US on issues where the US feels strongly enough or
exerts sufficient pressure; all are expected to fall in line, and they
invariably do.”(230) The
question is whether India will be ready to do that. While India is firmly
committed to pursuing an independent foreign policy and non-alignment still
resonates in its official circles, political elites and intellectuals, the US
would like India to advance its strategic policy goals. If India follows an
independent course of action, it will have to resist US pressures and if it does
not, it will always remain a stunted global player. Third, India claims that to
have some kind of strategic relationship with all the major global players, i.e.
Russia, France, UK, Germany, EU, Brazil, China, Japan, Iran and even Saudi
Arabia. it is simply not possible to have such multiplicity of “strategic”
partnerships without any contradictions.(231) Chinese
scholars also believe that major divergences in the strategic interest of India
and the US will not allow India to deepen its relations with the US. Shen Qiang
underscores that India’s commitment to multipolarity and a democratization of
international order; independent and non-aligned foreign policy, differences of
strategic interest in South Asia, Iran, Russia will not allow India to follow
the US diktat.(232) Shen
argues if India follows US strategic goals it will “not only damage its
important strategic interests in Indo-China and Indo-Russia strategic
partnerships but will also weaken India’s role in the present international
relations.” China is
shaping its strategic response to Indo-US strategic partnership keeping in view
its own dispassionate enlightened national interest.
Notes and References
1.
“Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh”, 18 July 2005. <http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>.
2.
“US-India Joint Statement”, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/03/print/20060302-5.html>.
3.
“National Security Strategy of the United States” at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>.
4.
John Cherian, “India’s Foreign Policy Shift: From NAM to ‘Strategic
partnership’ with the US,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. Vol.3, No.
January-March 2008.
5.
“Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India,” <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/28109.html>,
released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary on 12 January 2004.
6.
“Statement by the President on India”, 1 January 2004, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relrases/2004/01/20040112-1.html>
see original.
7.
“India – US Relations: A General Overview”, <http://www.
indianembassy.org/ newsite/induspolAug07.asp>.
8.
Samuel Cherian, “Indo-US Defence Cooperation and the Emerging Strategic
Partnership”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. 31. No. 2, March 2007,
p.210.
9.
Text of the “New framework for the US-India Defense Relationship”,
Washington, DC 28 June 2005. <http://www.indianembassy. org/press_release/2005/June/31.htm>.
10.
“Joint Statement,” op.cit, (ref.1).
11.
Ibid.
12.
Dinshaw Mistry, “Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the US-India Nuclear
Agreement”, Asian Survey, Vol. XLVI, No. 5, September/October 2006,
p.684.
13.
Ibid.
14.
See, Text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement) 3 August 2007, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm>.
15.
R. Nicholas Burns, US under secretary for political affairs,
“On-The-Record Briefing on the Status of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative”, 27 July 2007. Available at <http://www.state.gov./p/us/rm/2007/89559.htm>.
16.
See text,
United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, H.R. 5682 available
at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682enr.txt.pdf>.
17.
Michael Krepon, “Deal to do more harm than good for NSG, IAEA”, The
Hindu, Delhi, 10 September 2008, at <http://www.thehindu. com/2008/09/10/
stories/2008091055631100.htm>.
18.
Aurobinda Mahapatra, “India’s Nuclear Debate”, 23 July 2008. <http://en.fondsk.ru/print.php?id=1499>.
19.
Ibid.
20.
The UPA coalition held approximately 215 seats in the 545-seat Lok Sabha
(lower house of the parliament) and the leftist parties held 60 seats.
21.
R. Ramachandran, “Power & the truth”, Frontline, Chennai, 5 July
2008.
22.
“BJP not against nuclear deal,” The Hindu, 4 June 2008.
23.
“I have never seen so much despair in people: Advani”, interview with N.
Ram, The Hindu, 11 July 2008.
24.
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan undecided about seeking IAEA vote on Indian
deal”, <http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/29/top3.htm>.
25.
IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards Agreement: Agreement Would Widen
IAEA Access to Civil Nuclear Facilities”, 1 August 2008. <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter?News/2008/board01808.htm>.
26.
Ibid.
27.
Ibid.
28.
Veronika Oleksyn, “IAEA approves deal for India’s nuclear inspection”, 1
August 2008. Available at <http://ap.google.com/ article/
ALeqM5jfsmyT161jxHn8eL4VMUO9w_mu_wD929QIU00>.
29.
Siddharth Varadarajan, “Looking beyond the NSG debacle”, The Hindu,
25 August 2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/ 2008/08/25/stories/
2008082555591100.htm>.
30.
Siddharth Varadarajan, “Conditions mooted for Indian waiver”, The
Hindu, New Delhi, 23 August 2008. <http://www.thehindu.com/
2008/08/23/stories/ 20080823607360731200.htm>.
31.
Siddharth Varadarajan, “Mulford said NSG waiver would be clean, not
unconditional”, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/07/29/stories/
2008072960361000.htm>.
32.
Krepon, op.cit., (ref.17).
33.
“Bush signs India-US nuclear bill into law,”
The Hindu, 10 October 2008. <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/10/10/stories/
2008101060940100. htm>.
34.
Ashley J.
Tellis,
India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the
United States, (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2005).
35.
Stephen Philip Cohen, Emerging Power: India, (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution, 2001.)
36.
Sumit Ganguly, ed., India as an Emerging Power, (London: Frank
Cass, 2003.)
37.
The United States and South Asia: An Expanding Agenda”, 17 May 2006.
<http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/66374.htm#india>.
38.
Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of US India Ties: Missile Defence in an
Emerging Strategic Relationship”, International Security, Vol. 30. No. 4,
Spring 2006. p.127.
39.
Seema Sirohi, “US-India Relations: India, Big Time”, Outlook, New
Delhi, 11 July 2005. See,
Ashley J. Tellis,
India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf>.
40.
“Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India,” <http://www. state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/28109.htm>,
released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary.
41.
“Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on the US –India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, 5
April 2006, at <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/
2006/RiceTestimony060405.pdf>.
42.
Ibid.
43.
R. Nicholas Burns, under secretary for political affairs, “America's
Strategic Opportunity with India”, article in Nov/Dec issue of foreign affairs,
18 October 2007. <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/ 2007/93728.htm>.
44.
Ibid., <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63016/r-nicholas-burns/
americas-strategic-opportunity-with-india>.
45.
Ibid.
46.
Ibid.
47.
Mistry, op.cit. (ref 12).
48.
Date:24/10/2008 URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/10/24/stories/
2008102458770100.htm>
49.
“The India-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 - A Year Later,” address by
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, 14 July
2006.
50.
Ibid.
51.
Strobe Talbott, Emerging India, Brookings Institution, Washington
DC, 2005, p.194.
52.
“Remarks of Secretary of State Rice…,” op.cit., (ref 41).
53.
Ibid.
54.
Ibid.
55.
“US “will work to make India a full NSG partner”, The Hindu, 9
September 2008. URL <:http://www.thehindu.com/2008/09/09/stories/
2008090956131200.htm>.
56.
“PM’s reply to the debate on the Motion of Confidence in the Lok Sabha”,
22 July 2008. http://www.hindu.com/nic/pmspeech-confidencevote.pdf
57.
“Pranab hopeful of nod for draft at IAEA,” The Hindu, 27 July
2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/07/27/stories/ 2008072751810900.htm>.
58.
R. Prasad, “Waiver offers opportunity for nuclear exports” The Hindu,
10 September 2008. at URL: <http://www.thehindu.com
/2008/09/10/stories/2008091055651200.htm>.
59.
Sujay Mehdudia, “20,000 MW nuclear power by 2020 if deal gets through”,
The Hindu, 31 July 2008. There is a counter-argument offered by
Ramachandran. He observes: Exploitable uranium reserves in the country can
generate only 10,000-12,000 MWe through PHWRs but the plutonium derived from the
spent fuel of the PHWRs can be burnt in fast breeder reactors (FBRs). Besides
“breeding” more plutonium than they burn, the FBRs can also convert the fertile
thorium (Th-232), which India has in plenty, into fissile uranium-233 when used
as a blanket to the reactor core. U-233-based heavy water reactors can operate
in a self-sustaining fuel cycle of burning U-233 and converting Th-232 into
U-233. Thus nuclear power generation will be completely delinked from the
limited natural uranium availability and will form the basis for long-term
energy security. See R. Ramachandran, “Power & the truth”, Frontline,
Chennai, 5 July 2008, op.cit. (ref.21).
60.
Ramachandran, op.cit., (ref.21).
61.
The programme has already entered into its second stage with the upcoming
500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam, near Chennai, which
should become operational by 2011. Indigenous Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWRs)
that will use U-233 as fuel and Th-232 as blanket, which will form the third
stage, are already in an advanced phase of development. See., Ramachandran,
op.cit., (ref.21).
62.
Ramachandran, Ibid.
63.
Ibid.
64.
“PM’s reply to the debate on the Motion of Confidence in the Lok Sabha”,
22 July 2008. op.cit.
65.
“Remarks of Secretary of State Rice…” op.cit. (ref.41).
66.
Ibid.
67.
See, Ashley J. Tellis in his report Atoms for War? US-Indian Civilian
Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf>.
68.
Howard L. Berman, Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee, US House of
Representatives, 5 August 2008. Available at <www.armscontrol.org/ system/files/
20080805_Berman+NSG_letter_to_Rice.pdf>.
69.
Edward Markey, from Massachusetts, is co-chairman of the House Bipartisan
Task Force on Nonproliferation and Ellen Tauscher, from California, is chair of
the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee. See, “India N-deal may trigger arms
race, say lawmakers”, Dawn, Islamabad, 21 August 2008. <http://www.dawn.com/2008/
08/21/int1.htm>.
70.
“India N-deal may trigger arms race, say lawmakers”, <http://www.dawn.com/
2008/08/21/int1.htm>.
71.
Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M. V. Ramana, “Fissile
Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the US-Indian Nuclear Deal,”
International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006, pp.36.
72.
Ibid.
73.
Daryl G. Kimball, Fred McGoldrick and Lawrence Scheinman, “IAEA-Indian
Nuclear Safeguards Agreement: A Critical Analysis”, available at <http://www.armscontrol.org>.
74.
‘India-IAEA safeguard agreement threat to NPT regime”, Daily Times,
Lahore, 6 August 2008. <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=
2008%5C08%5C06%5Cstory_6-8-2008_pg7_21>.
75.
Ibid.
76.
Stephen Fidler and Amy Kazmin, “IAEA smooth way for US-India accord”,
The Financial Times, London, 2 August 2008. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/44b17af2-602b-11dd-805e-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1>.
77.
Oleksyn, op.cit., (ref.28).
78.
Text of the “New framework for the US-India Defense Relationship”, op.cit.,
(ref.9).
79.
Ibid.
80.
John Cherian, “India’s Foreign Policy Shift: From NAM to Strategic
partnership with the US”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 3. No.
January–March 2008. pp.58-59.
81.
Indo-US bilateral naval exercise “Malabar 08” begins”, Thaindian.com
(Web), October 19, 2008.)
82.
“India joins ‘war game’ in US” The Hindu, Delhi, 12 August 2008.
83.
Sushanta Talukdar, “US troops train at Indian jungle war school”, The
Hindu, Delhi, 12 August 2008.
84.
John Cherian, “India’s Foreign Policy Shift: From NAM to Strategic
partnership” with the US”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 3. No.
January–March 2008. p.59.
85.
Indo-US trade touches new high despite N-deal impasse”, The
Tribune, Chandigarh, 4 July 2008.
86.
“US to sell Harpoon missiles to India”, The Hindu, 11 September
2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/09/11/stories/ 2008091161041400.htm>.
87.
“With Left out, military pacts with US on fast track”, The Tribune,
29 July 2008.
88.
Alan Macmillan and Ken Booth, Appendix: “Strategic Culture — Framework
for Analysis”, in Ken Booth & Russell Trood, eds., Strategic Cultures in the
Asia-Pacific Region, (London: Macmillan, 1999.) p.363.
89.
Ibid., pp.364-65.
90.
“India: The World Factbook,” available at <https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/in/html>, accessed on 26 August
2008.
91.
Sirohi, “India, Big Time”, Outlook op.cit., (ref.39).
92.
Ibid.
93.
Rajesh M. Basrur, “India’s Nuclear Security: Strategic Culture and
Doctrine”, <www.pircenter.org/data/news/basrur.pdf>.
94.
Rodney W. Jones, “India’s Strategic Culture”, p.28, available at <www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/comparative_strategic_culture_curriculum/case%20/india20(jones)%20final%2031%20Oct.pdf>.
95.
Basrur, op.cit. (ref.93).
96.
“Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on the Indian
Nuclear Doctrine”, available at <http://www.meadev.gov.in/ govt/indnucld.htm>.
97.
Ibid.
98.
“India’s Credible Minimum Deterrence: A Report”, February 2006, available
at <http:// www.ipcs.org/ipcs-Special_Report.13pdf>.
99.
Ashely Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture”, in Sumit Ganguly, ed.,
India as an Emerging Power, op.cit. (ref.36), pp.62-63.
100.
Ibid., pp.102-103.
101.
Ibid., pp.98-99.
102.
Jones, op.cit (ref.94), p.24.
103.
Ibid.
104.
Cohen, op.cit. (ref.35), p.32.
105.
Amit Gupta, “The US-India Relationship”, Strategic Studies Institute,
February 2005. The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary
Interests? ... <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pubs/people.cfm?authorID=38>.
106.
According to EIA, China’s energy mix is: coal 69%, oil 22%,
hydroelectricity 6% natural gas, 3% and nuclear 1%. China is world’s third
largest importer of oil after the US and Japan. China: Country Analysis
Briefs, Energy Information Administration (EIA) available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/cabs/china/background.html>.
107.
Xin Benjin, “Who's pushing nuclear proliferation”, People’s Daily,
Beijing, 27 October 2005. <http://english.peopledaily. com.cn/200510/27/
eng20051027_217234.html>.
108.
Jabin T Jacob, “Indo-US nuclear deal: The China factor “, IPCS Special
Report, March 2006, available at <www.ipcs.org/ipcs-special-Report-14pdf>.
109.
“China still non-committal”, The Hindu, 27 August 2008, <http://
www.thehindu.com/2008/08/27/stories/2008082759881200.htm>.
110.
Pallavi Aiyar, “No assurance on nuclear deal”, Hindu, 30 July
2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/07/30/stories/ 2008073061131500>.
111.
Ibid.
112.
“China calls for balance of nuclear non-proliferation, energy use”,
People’s Daily, 2 September 2008. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
90001/90776/90883/6491626.htm>.
113.
Dr Shen Dengli, Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University,
Shanghai, interview with the author, 22 August 2008.
114.
Dr Wu Chunsi, Deputy Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS,
Shanghai, interview with the author 11 July 2008.
115.
Zhao Gancheng, “US-India Civilian Nuclear deal and its Impact on Regional
Stability: A Chinese Perspective”, unpublished paper.
116.
Zhao Gancheng, Director, Department of South Asian Studies, SIIS,
Shanghai. interview with the author, 30 June 2008.
117.
Shen Dengli, op.cit., (ref.113).
118.
Shen Qiang, “Strategic factors in the transformation of Indo-US
relations”, International Strategic Studies, first issue, 2008, pp.
58-59.
119.
Ibid., p.60.
120.
“China’s Peaceful Rise”, interview by Zan Jifang with Vice President Li
Junru of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China. Beijing
Review, Beijing, 22 April 2004, available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/
2004/Apr/93730.htm>.
121.
Ibid.
122.
“China to be Mainstay for Peace after Peaceful Rise”, People's Daily,
26 April 2004, available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/
international/94030.htm>.
123.
“China’s Peaceful Rise”, op.cit. (ref.120).
124.
Shi Yinhong, “China’s Peaceful Development, Harmonious World and
International Responsibility”, International Review, Spring 2008, at
<http://www.siis.org.cn/Sh_Yj_Cms/Mgz/200801/ 20086241833728PZ.PDF>.
125.
Yuan Peng, “A Harmonious World and China’s New Diplomacy,”
Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 17. No. 3 May/June 2007, p.1.
126.
Ibid.
127.
See text, “Making Great Efforts to Build a Harmonious World with
Long-lasting Peace and Common Prosperity”, President Hu Jintao’s speech at the
summit meeting marking the 60th Anniversary of the United Nations, 15
September 2005. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/ zyjh/t213091.htm> also see,
Peoples Daily 16 September 2005.
128.
Yuan op.cit., (ref.125), pp.5-8.
129.
John Cherian, “Strategic embrace”, Frontline, Chennai, Vol. 25
No.14, 5 July 2008. URL: <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2514/stories/
20080718251401800.htm>.
130.
Ibid.
131.
Ibid.
132.
Ibid.
133.
Zhao Gancheng, “China’s South Asia Policy: Balancing and Stabilising”,
Regional Studies, Vol. XXIII, No 3, Summer 2005.
134.
Ibid.
135.
“Aziz pleads for Pak-US N-Deal”, Daily Times, 6 April 2006.
136.
“We won’t obstruct Indo-US N-deal: Pakistan”, 22 August 2008. Rediff.com
at <http://www.rediff.com/cms/print.jsp?docpath=news/ 2008/aug/22ndeal5.htm>.
137.
Mark Hibbs, “China favours NSG solution on India that facilitates trade
with Pakistan”, Nuclear Fuel, 7 November 2005. Cited in Zia Mian, op.cit.
(ref.71).
138.
Shakil Sheikh, “Pakistan vows to maintain credible N-deterrence”, The
News, Islamabad, 13 April 2006.
139.
Adil Sultan Muhammad, “Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement:
Implications for South Asian Security Environment” The Henry L. Stimson Center,
July 2006, p.12.
140.
Markey, from Massachusetts, is co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task
Force on Nonproliferation and Tauscher, from California, is chair of the House
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. See, “India N-deal may trigger arms race, say
lawmakers”, Dawn, Islamabad, 21 August 2008. <http://www.dawn.com/
2008/08/21/int1.htm>.
141.
Zhao, op.cit., (ref.115).
142.
“Remarks of Secretary of State Rice …” op.cit., (ref.40).
143.
Zhao, op.cit., (ref.115)
144.
Professor Xia Liping, Deputy Dean of School of Law and Political Science,
Tongji University, General Secretary of Shanghai Institute for International
Strategic Studies. Interview with author, 21 August 2008.
145.
Zhao, op.cit., (ref.115)
146.
Gurmeet Kanwal, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for
Non-proliferation”, South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), SASSI
Research Report 10, February 2008. p.26. http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Indo-S%20Nuclear%20Deal_kanwal.pdf
147.
John W. Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions”,
Ganguly, op.cit., (ref.36), p.109.
148.
Ibid., p.227.
149.
“China, India agree on “strategic partnership”, 13 April 2005, at
<http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/zygx/t191496.htm>.
150.
Ma Jiali, “Emerging Sino-Indian Relations”, Contemporary International
Relations, Vol. 17. No. 3 May/June 2007, p.74.
151.
“A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People’s Republic
of China and the Republic of India”, 18 January 2008. Available at <http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/fwzg/t399584.htm>.
152.
Zhang Yan, “A perspective on India & China-India ties”, The Hindu,
1 July 2008.
153.
“India-China trade target likely to be achieved ahead of schedule”,
The Hindu, 7 June 2008.
154.
Zhang, op.cit., (ref. 152).
155.
Ma, op.cit. (ref.150).
156.
“China, India seek cooperation in global oil quest”, 5 April 2005.
<http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/zygx/xy/t190213.htm>.
157.
C. Rajamohan, “Soft borders and cooperative frontiers: India’s changing
territorial diplomacy towards Pakistan and China”, Strategic Analysis,
New Delhi, Vol. 31. No 1, January-February 2007.p.15.
158.
Dr Shen Dengli, Interview with the author, op.cit., (ref.113).
159.
Ma, op.cit., (ref.150), p.77.
160.
Ibid, p.79.
161.
Venu Rajamony, “India-China-US Triangle: A ‘Soft Balance of Power System’
in the Making 2002,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Report,
Washington DC, March 2002. p.8. Available at <www.csis.org/ saprog/venu.pdf>.
162.
Zhang Guihong, “US-India security relations: Implications for China”,
available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/
volume14/article2.htm>.
163.
H.U. Khan, “The US-India Nuclear Agreement in the Context of Developing
Strategic Partnership: Implications for Pakistan’s Security”, Margalla Papers,
Islamabad, 2006. p.117.
164.
Ibid, p.118.
165.
Dr. Rodney W. Jones, “Conventional Military Imbalances and Strategic
Stability”, South Asia Stability Unit (SASSU), Research Paper No.1, March 2005,
p.4. http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/conventional _imbalance_rjones.pdf
166.
Author’s discussion with Yang Jiemian, President, SIIS, Shanghai, 21
August 2008.
167.
Zhao, op.cit, (ref.133).
168.
Khalid Mustafa, “China to install 405 MW power project at Sinda-Jerruk”,
The News, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 29 February 2008.
169.
Amb (r) Khalid Mehmood, “Economic Dimension of Pakistan-China Relations”,
in Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario,
Proceedings of one-day international seminar organised by Area Study Centre, Far
East and South East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan. 29 September
2005. p.78. <http://www.fesea.org/publications/proceedings/Proceedings2.pdf>.
170.
Based on author’s interviews with Liang Xiang Jin, Research Fellow,
Department of West Asian and African Studies, SIIS, Shanghai, Wang Dehua, Senior
Fellow and Director, Institute of South and Central Asia Studies, Shanghai
Centre for International Studies, and Yu Jian Hua, Deputy Director, Institute of
Eurasian Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
171.
Mawara Inayat, “The Broadening horizon of SAARC,” Regional Studies,
Islamabad, Vol.xxv No.3, Summer 2007.
172.
Professor Dr Shang Quanyu, “China-Pakistan Friendship is coming to an
end?, in Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario,
op.cit., (ref. 169), pp.111.120.
173.
Meena Singh Roy, “India-Kazakhstan: Emerging Ties”, Strategic Analysis,
Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, January-March
2002, Vol. 26, No. 1, p.51.
174.
Mohammad Monir Alam, “Iran and Central Asia: Emerging Geopolitical and
Strategic Imperatives”, in V. Nagendrra Rao and Mohammad Monir Alam (eds),
Central Asia: Present Challenges and Future Prospects (Knowledge World, New
Delhi, 2005).
175.
Gulshan Sachdeva, “India’s attitude towards China’s growing influence in
Central Asia”, China and Eurasia Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 2006, p.23.
176.
See speech of then Indian defence minister Pranab Mukherjee at Carnegie
Endowment of International Peace, Washington, DC 27 June 2005. <www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/June/11.htm>.
177.
“India loses Kazkh oil firm to China”, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 23
August 2005. <www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050823/biz.htm#2>.
178.
Sachdeva, op.cit., (ref.175).
179.
Kapil Kak, “India’s Strategic and Security Interests in Central Asia”, in
V. Nagendra Rao and Mohammad Monir Alam (eds), Central Asia: Present
Challenges and Future Prospects (Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2005) p.208.
180.
“India’s first overseas ‘military base’ taking shape in Tajikistan”, 24
July 2007. <www.newscentralasia.net/print/137.html>.
181.
Lionel Beehner, “Backgrounder: The Rise of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization”, (US) Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2006. <www.cfr.org/publications/10883>.
182.
“SCO provides big opportunities for business”, Beijing, People’s Daily,
14 June 2006. <http://english.peoplesdaily.com.c/200606/14/
eng20060614_273872.htm>.
183.
“Shanghai witnesses China’s efforts in SCO progress”, 13 June 2006.
<http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t257656.htm>.
184.
“China says SCO military drill not targeting any country”, People’s
Daily, 11 August 2007, <http://english.peoplesdaily.com.cn/90001/
90776/6237114.htm>.
185.
“Shanghai witnesses China’s efforts …,” op.cit., (ref.183).
186.
Vladimir Radyuhin, “Support for Russia at SCO Summit”, The Hindu,
29 August 2008. <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/08/29/stories/
2008082961231600htm>, “SCO: Solve problems by dialogue”, China Daily,
Beijing, 29 August 2008. <http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-08/29/content_6979254.htm>.
187.
Sachdeva, op.cit., (ref.175), p.34.
188.
“Overview: Association of South East Asian Nations”, <http://www.aseansec.org/147.htm>.
189.
Ibid.
190.
P.S. Suryanarayana, “India, ASEAN clinch a free trade agreement”, The
Hindu, 29 August 2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/ 2008/08/29/
stories/2008082956371500.htm>.
191.
“Wikipedia:” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Asia_Summit>.
192.
US deputy secretary of state John D. Negroponte, “US Policy in Asia:
Meeting Opportunities and Challenges”, Center for Northeast Asian Policy, The
Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 28 July 2008, p.2.
193.
Wu Baiyi, “The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution”,
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10 No 27, 2001.p. 278. Cited in Prof.
Carlyle A Thayer, “China’s International Security Cooperation with Southeast
Asia”, Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue No. 172, 2007. At <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dfi/
ADFJ_172.pdf#page-18>.
194.
Zhang Tiejun, “China and East Asian Community”, International Review,
SIIS, Shanghai, Vol. 40, Autumn 2005, p.27.
195.
Ibid., p.28.
196.
Ibid.
197.
Shebonti Ray Dadwal, “China’s Search for Energy Security: Emerging
Dilemma”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31. No. 6. November 2007, p.905
198.
Ibid., p.905
199.
Arun Prakash, “China’s Naval Gazers”, The Indian Express, New
Delhi, 5 September 2007, at <http://www.indianexpress.com/story/ 214471.html>.
200.
R Suryamurthy, “Kalam outlines Navy’s Future Role”, The Tribune,
13 February 2006.
201.
Ibid.
202.
You Ji, “Dealig with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s efforts to protect its
energy supply”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31. No. 3 May 2007. p.467.
203.
Ibid., p.473.
204.
Ibid., p.473.
205.
Ibid., p.473.
206.
Prof Carlyle A Thayer, “China’s International Security Cooperation with
Southeast Asia”, Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue No. 172, 2007.
At <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dfi/ ADFJ_172.pdf#page-18>.
207.
Chen Dongxio, “Complex and Changing Structure of Sino-US Relations.”
208.
“US-China Relations”, Fact Sheet, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, 18 April, 2006. At <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ 64715.htm>.
209.
Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?: The
Rise of China and US Policy towards East Asia”, International Security,
Vol. 31 No. 1 Summer 2006, p.81.
210.
US-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A
Responsible Course, Report of an Independent Task
Force, Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, p.9, at <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/
ChinaTaskForce.pdf>.
211.
Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for
a New World”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008, available at <http://foreignaffairs,org/20080701faessay87401/condoleeza-rice/rethinking-the-national-interest,html?>.
212.
US-China Relations:…,
op.cit., (ref.210), p.9.
213.
“China: The World Factbook,” at <htp://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/print/ch.html>.
214.
Zhao Gancheng, “China-US Relations: Fragile but Sustainable”, at <http://www.siis.org.cn/sh_yj_cms//upics/2008729202844DR27.PDF>.
215.
“US-China Relations,” Fact Sheet, op.cit, (ref.208).
216.
Zhao op.cit., (ref.214).
217.
US-China Relations:
op.cit., (ref.210).
218.
John Cherian, “Strategic embrace”, Frontline, Vol. 25, No. 14. 18
July 2008 <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2514/stories/20080718251401800. htm>.
219.
Ibid.
220.
Russia sent tanks and troops into Georgia after a Georgian offensive on 7
August 2008 to retake the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Moscow withdrew
most of its forces under a French-brokered ceasefire, but thousands of Russian
troops that Moscow terms ‘peacekeepers’ remain in the two rebel regions and in a
buffer zone. “America interested in Russia’s backyard: Cheney,” Dawn,
Islamabad, 4 September 2008. <http://www.dawn.com./2008/09/04/int2.htm>.
221.
Ibid.
222.
The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in
Eurasia? by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., 18 July 2001, Backgrounder #1459, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1459.cfm>.
223.
“Chinese premier: China-Russia relations at most important stage”, at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/02/content_6995010. htm>.
224.
Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russia welcomes NSG waiver for India”, The Hindu,
9 September 2008. At URL: <http//www.thehindu.com.
/2008/09/09/stories/2008090956631800. htm>.
225.
Ibid.
226.
Jawed Naqvi, “India disappointed by China’s role”, Dawn,
Islamabad, 7 September 2008.
227.
“Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu’s remarks on NSG’s Lifting
Nuclear Trade Ban on India”, 8 September 2008. <http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t512323.htm>.
228.
Moscow’s success in getting Turkmenistan to commit its entire gas
production to Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled energy giant, for export was a
stunning blow to the US’ energy diplomacy. Moscow has now made a similar offer
to Azerbaijan to buy all its gas on highly attractive terms that the Western
companies cannot match. Similarly, the US failed to get Kazakhstan to jettison
its close ties with Russia, especially the arrangement to route its oil exports
primarily through Russian pipelines. The brilliant success of Russian energy
diplomacy puts a question mark on the viability of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline, which was commissioned in 2005 with US funding and political support.
Similarly, the progress of Russia’s South Stream project, aimed at transporting
energy to the Balkans and southern European countries, and the failure of the
US-sponsored Nabucco gas pipeline project (which broadly has the same
orientation as South Stream) are setbacks to Washington. All in all, Moscow
handed down to the George W. Bush administration, whose ties with Big Oil are
legion, a historic defeat in the struggle for energy. See, M.K. Bhadrakumar,
“Caucasus crisis”, Frontline, Vol. 25. No. 18, 30 August-12 September
2008.
229.
Rajiv Sikri, “The limits of Indo-US partnership”, <http://rediff.com/ cms/print.jps?docpath=//news/2007/jan/02guest2.
htm>.
230.
Ibid.
231.
Ibid.
232.
Shen Qiang, “Strategic factors in the transformation of Indo-US
relations,” op.cit. (ref.118), p.62.
Regional Studies, Vol. XXVII, No.1, Winter 2008-09, pp.3-80
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar is Research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies Introduction
The nature of Indo-US strategic
partnership
Brief history of strategic
relationship
Domestic dimension of the deal
Henry J. Hyde United States and
India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006India-specific IAEA safeguards
Exemption for India from the
NSG’s
‘full-scope safeguards’ export rulePolitical dimension
US Perspective
Common values and common
interests
Indian perspective
Nuclear dimension
Civil nuclear trade
India’s nuclear energy sector
India’s strategic programme
Impact on non-proliferation
regime
The proponents
The critics
Fissile material production
Corrective measures/termination
of safeguards
Expanded defence relationship
Joint military exercises
Indo-US strategic partnership:
Implications for China
India’s strategic culture and
Indo-US partnership
India’s strategic culture & its
nuclear posture
Chinese perception of Indo-US
strategic partnership
Evolving Chinese concept of
‘harmonious world’
and Indo-US strategic partnershipPeaceful rise of China (heping
jueqi)
‘Harmonious world’
Multipolar world
Indo-US strategic partnership: Regional
implications for ChinaSouth Asia
China : non-proliferation regime
and
deterrence stability in South AsiaDeterrence stability
Sino-Indian relations: Balancing
US-India partnership
Sino-Pakistan relationship:
strategic impact
Central Asia
Competition over access to energy
resources
and pipeline politicsChina’s evolving security
structure in CA
and Indo-US partnershipShanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO)
East Asia
Chinese interests in the region
Impact of Indo-US partnership on
Chinese
interests in East AsiaThe Malacca dilemma
Indo-US strategic partnership:
Global
implications for ChinaChina-US relationship
From Containment to ‘Responsible
Stakeholder’
Interdependence and convergence
of interests
Complexity and divergence of
interests
Sino-Russian
relations
Convergence of interests
Divergence of interests
Conclusion
THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM: RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSES
Scores of polities across the world today are either directly under terrorist attacks or suffering from their far-reaching impacts. The main aim of a terrorist activity could be summed up in this adage attributed to the ancient Chinese strategist, Sun Wu: “Kill one and frighten ten thousand.”(1) On the other hand, according to Marshal McLuhan (1960) “this age, since the latter half of twentieth century, can easily be… [called] an age of Globalization and mass media culture.”(2) The media and terrorism have a continuous and longstanding relationship. The media provides the terrorists with a required element, what former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher called “the oxygen of Publicity (1985).”(3)
Terrorism aims at securing mass appeal for the objectives of its perpetrators. Since it seeks to strike awe and fear in the minds of the masses, its message needs to be widely publicized at all levels. According to Birgitte L. Nacos “Getting the attention of the mass media, the public, and decision makers is the raison d’etre behind modern terrorism’s increasingly shocking violence.”(4) And what do the media require? It needs ever larger audiences. Higher circulations, increased listener-ship and escalating viewer-ship can be the most cherished dream of any media organization. Therefore, anything that can attract more audiences attracts the mass media. Sensational, striking and dramatic events have a potential of inviting the masses to take keen interest in them. And what could be more dramatic and sensational than a terrorist activity! According to Shmid and de Graaf “for the Mass Media organizations the coverage of terrorism, specially prolonged incidents such as (bombings), hijacking and hostage situations, provides an endless source of sensational and visually compelling news stories capable of boosting audience/readership figures.”(5)
The media seems to be ready to pounce upon any terrorist activity and try to utilize it as an opportunity to expand its audiences. In a Pew Research Centre survey (2004)(6) of 1,500 adults the media got better grades than in the previous survey. In this survey news organizations continue to receive good grades for covering terrorist attacks and war on terrorism.
The situation gets worse in present-day free and democratic societies. Terrorism is getting increasingly wider coverage in popular free media today. The instant and prolonged coverage of events like 7/7 and 9/11 indicates that the media follows such events very closely often leaving an impression that it wants to thrive on them for longer periods of time. The recent history of many democratic countries has vividly shown that the terrorists have manipulated and exploited the media to obtain most of their aforementioned objectives. It does not mean in any way that the media shares the values of terrorists. It, however, shows that a free and open media could be vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation, unwittingly in many cases.
In today’s world television has become the leading news medium, with newspapers only supplementary to TV’s instant, live, emotional coverage. Ramonet observes that “we are at a turning point in the history of information” in which TV news shows “have set up a kind of new equation for news, which can be summed up like this: if the emotion you feel by looking at the pictures on TV news programs is true, then the news is true.”(7)
Media’s impact on our lives and even at the decision making at the highest level can be ascertained by the words of former UN secretary general Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali. He says “We say we have 16 members in the Security Council: the 15 members, plus CNN.”(8) The proposition is that today's global media have grown so mighty as to be able to raise issues to the political agenda by their own efforts, issues which would otherwise hold little or no interest for the powers-that-be.
The mass media is an all-encompassing term that includes: print, radio, television, Internet. However, what is worth considering is the fact that the TV media has seriously threatened the very survival of all the other forms. It has captured most of the audiences from them and, perhaps, Internet might be the only other form which has some semblance of, if there is any, competition with the TV media. Due to the importance, and influence of TV media over its other counterparts, most of our discussion will focus on this media and its coverage of terrorist events.
According to Ignacio Ramonet, “television imposes its own perversions on the other information media, beginning with its fascination with pictures. And the basic idea that only what is visible deserves to be news.”(9) Television thus tends to set the agenda of all news media, focusing all other media on the spectacular events on which TV itself thrives.
What is terrorism? Scholars around the world have not always been able to answer this fundamental question. The definitions have been vague, confusing, limited in scope and ambiguous. They apply to one situation but may fail miserably when applied to a different situation or in another context. According to Hoffman, “experts have experienced difficulty in defining terrorism due to its characteristic of being politically and emotionally charged.”(10)
Take this definition, “Terrorism is the exercise of violence or the threat of violence against an unarmed and/or unsuspecting population to coerce it to meet the demands of the aggressor.”(11) The definition lacks social and political implications.
According to Jack Gibbs, “Terrorism is illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or nonhuman objects.”(12)
The United Nations Security Council offered one definition of terrorism that has apparently been deemed serviceable for most purposes:
“Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” (13)
The United Nations General Assembly has another definition to offer:
“Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”(14)
The European Union has also set out its own definition of terrorism in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002:
Certain criminal offences, that given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.(15)
In the above quoted definitions, words like “criminal” or illegal limit their applicability. Only a government can define an act as criminal/illegal or otherwise. None of these definitions account for government-sponsored terrorism. They overlook the fact that the term “terror” was used to describe the coercive policy of the French Revolutionary government in the 1790s. In the historical perspective “The Terror” invariably refers to the French government’s terrorism during the period March 1793 to July 1794.
Regarding the state terrorism, two eminent researchers, Paletz and Vinson, have tried to describe it in three distinguishable ways: state terrorism, used against a state’s own people; state-sponsored terrorism, directed against the people of another state; and insurgent terrorism, carried out by non-state entities.
There is another aspect of state terrorism called “international terrorism.” Andrew Pierre (1984) describes it as “‘acts of violence outside national boundaries, or with clear international repercussions”. Pierre adds that “international terrorism is usually by non-state actors.”(16)
There are likely scores of other definitions in the literature on the subject, but they are all deficient in one way or the other. Definitions based on political perspective fall prey to an old adage: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” The same can frequently be applied to statements about terrorist acts perpetrated by governments and represented in the mass media. Perhaps, the only general and agreed upon attribute is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence.
Both the media and terrorists use each other for the advancement of their aims. Each benefits from the other. As stated above, terrorists need the publicity provided by the media. Conversely, the media needs dramatic events to attract wider audiences and here terrorists extend their helping hand by bombings, hijacks, destruction and bloodshed. Let’s consider how this phenomenon has been looked at by various thinkers.
Brian Jenkins has oversimplified the complexity by saying “terrorism is a product of freedom, particularly freedom of the press.”(17)
Walter Laqueur says that “the media are the terrorist’s best friends. The terrorists’ act by itself is nothing, publicity is all.”(18)
Birgitte L. Nacos relates the two is not that blunt and somehow moderately: “Getting the attention of the mass media, the public, and decision makers is the raison d’etre behind modern terrorism’s increasingly shocking violence.”(19) The French sociologist Michel Wieviorka instead argues that terrorists relate to the media at four different levels: “pure indifference” to the media, through “relative indifference,” “media-oriented strategy,” and finally to “coercion of the media.”(20) He rejects any “symbiotic relationship” between terrorism and the media.
Grant Wardlaw says “there is no clear evidence that publicity (by the media) is responsible for significantly affecting the occurrence of terrorism.”(21)
Paul Wilkinson directly challenged Wieviorka’s four grades of relationship, saying that channels of communication are always used by terrorists. As for “pure indifference” to the media, he says that “if there is no aim to instill terror then the violence is not of a terrorist nature.”(22) The “instrumental relationship” between the terrorist and the media, which Wieviorka places only in his third category, is said by Wilkinson to be “intrinsic to the very activity of terrorization.”(23)
Robert G. Picard and Miquel Rodrigo are of the view that although the mass media form an important part of the environment in which terrorists operate, there is no credible scientific evidence that establishes “a cause-effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism.”(24)
According to Professor Galtung, leading professor of peace studies, while reporting the conflict, journalism often goes wrong in 12 ways including: decontextualizing violence; Armageddon: presenting violence as inevitable; focusing on individual acts of violence while avoiding structural causes; confusion: focusing only on the conflict arena; excluding and omitting the bereaved; failure to explore the causes of escalation and the impact of media coverage itself; failure to explore the goals of outside interventionists, especially big powers; failure to explore peace proposals and offer images of peaceful outcomes; confusing cease-fires and negotiations with actual peace; and omitting reconciliation. When news about attempts to resolve conflicts is absent, fatalism is reinforced. That can help engender even more violence, when people have no images or information about possible peaceful outcomes and the promise of healing.(25)
The media ever needs a new “story”. Therefore, Roxane thinks “they look for attention-drawing elements and that search forces them to stretch out a story as much as possible, making less significant events big news flashes with the purpose of slowing down events while waiting for new headlines.”(26) In another way, the constant search for novelty becomes a “fickle friend” of the terrorists.(27) As a consequence, they attempt to perform violent actions in rhythmic succession, or innovate in a way that allows them to regain the media’s “favor.”
Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori has his own views. According to him, the “media distorts the knowledge gaining exercise because it does not remind its viewers that the information that an image can ‘transmit’ is a question of framing, the use of a particular camera, the choice of one focus over another.”(28)
Peter C. Kratcoski has wryly commented that “if one of the elements of terrorism is the wish to obtain publicity for a cause and create propaganda, the media has obviously overreacted in responding to this desire.”(29) He believes that the world, at the turn of the 21st century, is on the “threshold of a new era in the relationship between terrorism and media reportage,”(30) and bases this view on H. W. Kushner’s stress on the increasing competition among the media and on their ability to broadcast live from any part of the world.
However, Rachel Neuwirth thinks drastically different: “a major segment of the global media is behaving in a manner that makes terrorism and mass killings more likely rather than less likely.”(31)
TV is a visual medium and this very fact has considerable impacts on its decision-making while selecting the stories to be covered. According to Professor Ramonet “growing in parallel with increasingly fierce competition and commercial pressures and complicated by the fact that many top media executives today come from the corporate world, and no longer from the ranks of journalists, there has been the burgeoning dominance of the visual.”(32)
Similarly, Manual R. Torres opines that “many news bulletins are extremely averse to covering and presenting a story using only narrative or audio components.”(33) He goes on to say that “The TV prioritizes violence indirectly. The broadcasting of a news program involves uncountable preparatory actions that involve the selection and discrimination of content. There is competition among the different stories that will finally be omitted; those that are victorious are more dramatic, are more spectacular in a visual sense, are more emotional, and contain other elements that are able to be assimilated by an image-oriented culture.”(34)
Following this pattern, feels Samuel Peleg, “one frequently finds information that rests on popular clichés and cinematographic imagery, when offering information on terrorists, mafias, secret agents, etc. These types of operations help to favour the appearance of ‘charismatic celebrities.’(35)
Michael Ignatieff agrees by saying “The result (of this competition) is not only the shadowing of those events that, despite their interest, lack a conflicting nature, but the establishing of a dangerous pattern for those that want to be “made public” at any price.”(36)
On a socio-lingual plane, Janny de Graaf argues that “when journalists interview sources there is a ‘good chance’ that they will also inadvertently adopt some of the source’s language. Moreover, due to terrorism’s enormous emotional impact, there is often a lack of neutral words with which to describe the incident. There are, for example, few neutral nouns for journalists to describe an insurgent terrorist, as, ‘terrorist’, ‘soldier’, ‘freedom fighter’, ‘criminal’, or ‘guerrilla’ which require moral judgment.”(37)
Similarly, TV coverage leaves fear in the minds of viewers. Boaz Ganor thinks that “in fact, televised coverage of a terrorist attack’s effects (especially if it is live) creates a paradoxical situation in which the spectators imagine more horrendous scenes that the very witnesses situated in the area.”(38)
An incisive effort has been made by Kevin G. Barnhurst to classify the media according to two different models regarding their relationship with terrorism. The culpable-media model sees “a causal link with terrorism that calls for regulation.”(39) In this model the media are an intrinsic part of a vicious cycle: “As media cover terrorism, they incite more terrorism, which produces more media coverage.”(40) But a second dilemma uncovered by this model “involves a cycle of control: If government or the media censor coverage, the controls tend to harm the credibility of the government and/or the media. The terrorists . . . may resort to even greater violence.”(41)
On the other hand, the vulnerable media model sees the media only as victims, not causes of terrorism: “Any control on coverage, even a natural one, will be ineffective because terrorists can shift to other forms of communication by striking vulnerable points in the infrastructure of liberal societies… although the mass media are involved; they present no escape from terrorism.”(42)
There is another side of the picture, too. According to Jennifer Jane Hocking, there is no centrality of relationship between the media and terrorism. She cites M. Stohl’s list of “eight myths” found in the orthodox literature on terrorism:(43)
· Terrorism is exclusively anti-governmental;
· Its purpose is chaos;
· Terrorists are madmen;
· It is criminal rather than political activity;
· All insurgent violence is terrorism
· Governments always oppose nongovernmental terrorism;
· It exclusively relates to internal political conditions; and
· Political terrorism is a strategy of futility.
Then Hocking adds a ninth myth of her own that terrorism “depends for its success on media coverage.”(44)
Possibly the most accurate description of the relationship between the mass media and terrorists is that the media have come to constitute such a major portion of modern culture that most of today’s terrorists have factored them into their tactics in one way or another. This incorporation creates the impression of a symbiosis: that terrorism requires the participation of the media, and that the media, in their turn, rely on terrorist acts to provide much of the sensationalism upon which the media thrive. This impression fails to take account of the long history of terrorism prior to the development of the mass media and of the occurrence of terrorist acts which do not seek, and may even avoid, publicity.
There is a scarcity of quality literature on the issue despite its worldwide importance. The media and terrorism have both been revolutionized but, according to David L. Paletz and John Boiney, with some exceptions, “the bulk of the literature on the relationship between the media and terrorism is dismaying… assumptions abound, terms go undefined, and arguments are untested.”(45)
“During the past two decades the literature associating media with terrorism and implicating media as a contagion of such violence has grown rapidly,”(46) according to Robert Picard. He further says that, “as one reviews the literature it becomes shockingly clear that not a single study based on accepted social science research methods has established a cause-effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism. Yet public officials, scholars, editors, reporters, and columnists continually link the two elements and present their relationship as proven.”(47)
I will quote from coverage of only one event here. The September 11 attack was a ghastly event. It needs to be condemned; however, the role of the western media was not objective, fair and devoid of propaganda. They suggested that while Osama Bin Laden's purpose was to incite hatred, convince the Muslim world of the correctness of his views and give his perspectives to the West, the western propaganda was to retaliate and correct those misleading ideas. Sure enough, Bin Laden's views can be questioned, but the assumption that the west's propaganda was in response only and in a way honest is misleading to the public in general. It, in many ways, flamed the fire of enmity and distrust which eventually led to further terrorism in the Muslim world.
George Krimsky credits such non-US media as the BBC, Pakistani journalists, and the independent Qatar-based TV station, Al Jazeera, which was first to broadcast the videotapes made by Osama bin Laden, with more journalistic objectivity and initiative than most US media have shown.(48) According to Michael Moran, “there has been little mention of a significant fact that the CIA had trained the Mujahidin and even Osama Bin Laden to fight against the Soviets. Through Pakistan's secret service, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency or ISI, the Mujahidin and Bin Laden and even the Taliban were supported.”(49)
In a panel discussion at American University, Washington, DC, on US and European media coverage of the war on terrorism, broadcast live on C-Span, 28 January 2002, it was elicited: “American media are more fastidious about attributing sources than are British media, which sometimes are accused of making up quotations from “unnamed official sources.”(50)
During the Afghanistan bombing campaign, there was military control over images and footage. At the same time, Al Jazeera, the free Middle Eastern news station, was the only station allowed to broadcast from Afghanistan, even giving time to Osama Bin Laden. Yet, because of that, they have been accused of bias, prejudice, etc. The BBC for example, often made the passing statement when mentioning Al Jazeera, that it is a station friendly to the views of the Taliban, because it aired reports from such angles, although it also aired other angles too.
The Pakistani media, which is going through its youth and exuberance, has shown rare signs of balance, educated wisdom, mindful objectivity and far-sightedness. Pakistan Television, which is a state-run network, is on one extreme by trying to hush up the crying facts and minimize the effects of terrorism in a false bid to restore government’s pride. On the other hand, the newly liberated private media is standing on the other extreme with bold shouting, sensational designs and subjective frames of many stories. Terrorism coverage by the Pakistani media can be explained by the following:
· Being constantly under pressure to be first with exciting news to their audience;
· A race for providing more sensational and compelling news stories to increase audience/readership;
· Showing images of spectacular destruction and gory scenes of corpses and human organs littering the location in an effort to be more sensational and thrilling;
· Glamourizing the terrorist and their activities through documentaries and terrorists’ interviews;
· Finding too many faults in governments’ response to terrorists’ demands and the formers’ inability to arrest the confusion and chaos; and
· Generating dialogues and debates with the terrorists and their sympathizers to create sympathy among the masses towards them.
The diagnosis Indian writer Arundhati Roy made of the Indian media is equally aptly applicable to the Pakistani media as well:
“Crisis-driven media cannot afford to hang about for too long. As a business cash turnover, the media needs crisis production that seeks to find ways of manufacturing them in easily consumable, spectator-friendly formats. We must liberate ourselves from the tyranny of crisis reportage.”(51)
It is pertinent here to get experts’ opinion on how the media should behave in present-day challenges. Let’s have a look at some of the prescriptions.
Hocking says that “the development of a detailed framework for media ‘cooperation’ or ‘voluntary restraint’ in reporting incidents of terrorism” has become “of crucial importance in contemporary counterterrorism techniques.”(52)
Brigitte Nacos closed her book with a recommendation that democratically-elected officials in a free society should do all they can to give their people as much information as possible about terrorist threats, and then trust them to make the right decisions. When terrorists strike, the president should use the bully pulpit to explain the terrorist scheme and the pros and cons of various response options at hand. Of course, such an approach will only succeed if the public is convinced that the intention is to educate, not to manipulate or to lie, as has occurred in the past.(53)
Miquel Rodrigo has likened the relationship of the media to terrorism and to the underlying social causes as that of a thermometer to a fever and to the disease of which the fever is only a symptom. The media detect the presence of the fever of terrorism and aid in diagnosing the underlying socio-political disease. “It would be an absurd prescription to break the thermometer.”(54)
In a speech to a meeting of airport security personnel, in 1987, James E. Lukaszewski, a security and crisis management expert, frankly described challenges to accurate media coverage of terrorist acts that impact business organizations. While critical of mediapersons, he recognized their legitimate complaints in trying to ensure accurate coverage of crisis events in general and terrorist events in particular.”(55)
Lukaszewski closed his talk with the following recommendation: “The best way to call your tune successfully is to be on-the-record, on-the-table, in the open and as responsive as possible.”(56)
Perhaps it would be well for today’s journalists to apply the words of the Chinese revolutionary author, artist and intellectual Lu Xun to their own situation: “The role of the writer is to criticize.”
Journalists, editors, broadcasters, and even the publishers of online newsletters clearly have obligations in their reporting of terrorism-related news, obligations that are not only “ethical,” but also moral, since what they report or do not report may make the difference between life and death for thousands of people.
The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 have once again brought the role of the media — especially TV media — under the spotlight. Many analysts think that the TV coverage of the gruesome events was far from objective. Intellectual and professional integrity was clearly at a discount. The live and continuous coverage of events in a highly sensationalized manner went out of the way to fulfil the main objective of the perpetrators of terrorist activities, as according to above cited Chinese adage “kill one and frighten ten thousand”, viz, massive publicity of terrorist acts. There was blood, fire, guns, destruction, panic, confusion on the screens of the Indian and Pakistani media. The American and Western media was no exception, too. The story attracted large audiences across the world. People remained glued to their TV screens in awe and terror for several continuous hours precisely in accordance with the wishes of the terrorists. Both sides got extracted benefit from the situation. The media got increased audiences, and the terrorists were extremely successful in gaining wider publicity.
While wrapping up this discussion, we may for a moment consider that even if no “symbiosis” between terrorists and media can be proven, David L. Paletz and Laura L. Tawney point out that… “the media are the central connection in the terrorism-government-public nexus.”(57) Which terrorist activities are reported, how prominently, how framed, with what emphases, and whose views predominate — all influence the behaviour of terrorists, the reactions and responses of government officials, and the views of the public. The media, moreover, can often become more than chroniclers of terrorists’ actions: They may contribute to or interfere with the resolution of an incident by transmitting terrorists’ communiqués; they may become a party to the negotiations; they may even jeopardize the lives of hostages by broadcasting personal information. While walking the narrow moral path delineated by these factors, the media must protect their central social role by maintaining their own credibility.
The BBC’s John Wilson is quoted as saying, “We have to be accepted as trustworthy reporters, especially in times of crisis.”(58)
The editor, as gatekeeper, dwells in the symbolic world and controls the flow of symbols that carry the terrorist’s message. If terrorists intend to create remote nervous shocks in target audiences, they have to get through the editor’s switchboard… The editor is that newsperson who, in theory, can make or break a terrorist group dependent on publicity by granting or denying it access to mass audiences and by shaping the political communication of the violent news makers, granting or withholding them a degree of legitimacy.
We may conclude here that in today’s world of free media gone are the days of official control. This freedom was gained by the western media long ago, but the media of Pakistan now is also enjoying breathing in a relatively free environment. While this freedom is welcome and brings many new opportunities, it also puts a lot of responsibilities on the media in a democratic society. A delicate balance should be struck between freedom and responsibility. Voluntary self-restraint and self-regulation are perhaps the best policy options in a democratic society. It needs to work harder for better mechanisms to be devised to fashion its response to terrorism in an appropriate and balanced manner.
Notes and References
1. Also known as Sun Tzu, Sun Wu was the first and most prominent among the ancient Chinese strategists of the Warring States period (482-221 BC). His book, The Art of War, is considered a classic on the subject.
2. Marshal McLuhan Understanding Media, (New Ed.), Taylor & Francis Ltd (United Kingdom), 2001, pp.23.
3. <http://www.milnet.com/state/1997/wilcx297.htm>.
4. Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
5. Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and Western News Media, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982, (note 5) p.3.
6. http://pewresearch.org/.
7. Ignacio Ramonet, 2002, “The Power of Television Pictures,” WebWorld: Communication and Information in the Knowledge Society: An International Gateway, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. <www.unesco.org/webworld/points_of_view. 20 February 2002>.
8. As quoted by Minear, Scott, & Weiss The news media, civil war, and humanitarian action, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p.4.
9. Ramonet, op.cit., (ref. 7).
10. Bruce Hoffman, “Change and Continuity in Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 2001, pp. 417-428.
11. William E. Biernatzki “Terrorism & Media,” Terrorism & Research Trends, Vol. 21 (2002) No. 1, p.5.
12. Jack Gibbs, “Conceptualization of terrorism" in American Sociological Review 54, 3 (June 1989): pp.329-340.
13. UN Security Council Resolution No. 1566, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4734825.html
14. UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60, http://www.un.org/gopher-data/ga/recs/49/60
15. <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jul/01terrdec.html>.
16. In Odasuo A. Alali, and Kelvin Eke, Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion, Newbury Park, Calif:Sage Publications, 1991, pp.3-11.
17. Brian Jenkins, “Research in Terrorism: Areas of Consensus, Areas of Ignorance,” in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by E. Burr, D. Soskis, and W. Reid, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1983.
18. Walter Laqueur, “The Futility of Terrorism.” Harper’s Magazine. Vol. 252, No. 1510 (March), 1976, pp.99-105.
19. Nacos, op.cit., (ref.4).
20. Michel Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
21. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures (2nd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
22. Paul Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer), 1997, pp. 51-64.
23. Ibid.
24. Robert G. Picard, and Paul D. Adams, “Characterizations of Acts and Perpetrators of Political Violence in Three Elite U.S. Daily Newspapers,” in Alali and Eke 1991, pp.12-22, as reprinted from Political Communication and Persuasion, Vol. 4 1987, 1991.
25. http://prod.bolivia.indymedia.org/en/2002/04/3270.shtml “ Twelve ways the Misreport Violence”, 2002.
26. Roxane Farmanfarmaian, “The Media an the War on Terrorism: Where Does the Truth Lie?, Cambridge Review of International Affaires 15 (1) (April 2002), pp.159-163.
27. Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism, New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 2001, p.101.
28. Giovanni Sartori, Homo videns, Televisione e post-pensiero, Roma: Laterza, 2007, as quoted by Manuel R. Torres Soriano, Terrorism and the Mass Media after Al Qaeda: A Change of Course? Athena Intelligence Journal, 2008.
29. Peter C. Kratcoski, “Research Note: Terrorist Victimization: Prevention, Control, and Recovery,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 2001, pp.467- 473.
30. Ibid.
31. Rachel Neuwirth, “How Media Enable Terrorism,” American Thinker, 2 August 2006.
32. Ramonet, op.cit., (ref. 7).
33. Manuel R. Torres Soriano, Terrorism and the Mass Media after Al Qaeda: A Change of Course? Athena Intelligence Journal, Vol. 3, No 1, (2008), pp. 1-20.
34. Ibid.
35. Samuel Peleg, “One’s Terrorist Is Another’s Blockbuster: Political Terrorism in American Versus European Films”, The New England Journal of Political Science, 1 (1) (Summer 2003), pp. 81-108.
36. Michael Ignatieff, Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1998.
37. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, op.cit., (ref. 5).
38. Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle. A Guide for Decision Makers, New Brunswick (USA): Transaction Publishers, 2005, p.239.
39. Kevin G. Barnhurst, “The Literature of Terrorism,” in Alali and Eke 1991: pp.112-137.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Jennifer Jane Hocking, 1992, “Governments’ Perspectives,” in Paletz and Schmid, Terrorism and the Media, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992, pp.86-104.
44. Ibid.
45. David L. Paletz and John Boiney, “Researchers’ Perspectives,” in Paletz and Schmid, 1992, pp.6-28.
46. Picard, Adams, op.cit., (ref. 24).
47. Ibid.
48. George A. Krimsky, “The View from Abroad: The Foreign Media Are Covering the War on Terror through Lenses That Differ Dramatically from Those Used by Their American Counterparts.” American Journalism Review, January/February 2002.
49. Michael Moran, “Bin Laden comes home to roost; His CIA ties are only the beginning of a woeful story”, NBC News, 24 August 1998, http://msnbc.com/news/190144.asp.
50. C-Span. 2002. Live broadcast of a panel discussion at American University, Washington, DC, on comparisons of US and European media coverage of the war on terrorism, 28 January 2002.
51. http://www.inthesetimes/article/1740/people_vs_empire.
52. Hocking, op.cit., (ref. 43).
53.