IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA

DR SHAHEEN AKHTAR

Introduction

On 18 July 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush signed a joint statement in Washington that laid the foundation for a comprehensive strategic partnership between India and the US. The two leaders declared their resolve to

[T]ransform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership. As leaders of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world. It will enhance our ability to work together to provide global leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest.(1)

On 2 March 2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed a joint statement in New Delhi expressing:

[S]atisfaction with the great progress the US and India have made in advancing our strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. Both our countries are linked by a deep commitment to freedom and democracy; a celebration of national diversity, human creativity and innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide; and a desire to increase mutual security against the common threats posed by intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The successful transformation of the US-India relationship will have a decisive and positive influence on the future international system as it evolves in this new century.(2)

The two Joint Statements clearly establish that the main thrust of the fast growing Indo-US strategic partnership is to forge a ‘global partnership’ based on ‘shared values’ and ‘common interests’ that would challenge them in the 21^st century. This shared vision and objectives are often referred to in the statements of senior US and Indian officials as well as their top political leadership. President Bush’s commitment to work on ‘achieving full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India’ envisaged in Indo-US nuclear deal and the 10-year Indo-US Defence Framework Agreement signed in June 2005 not only represent the recognition of India’s status as a nuclear-weapon state but also demonstrate an all-out effort by the US to build India into a global power, to play the role of a ‘swing power’ in the emerging balance of power in Asia. Many observers view this move as an attempt by the US to “counter balance” the rise of China as a major power and its growing influence in Asia. The study would explore the nature of the Indo-US strategic partnership and its implications for China at the regional and global levels. It would analyze the implications of Indo-US partnership for China within the parameters of the evolving strategic culture in India and China’s perception and response to the strategic shift in US policy towards India.

The questions raised are:

·               What are the dynamics and the nature of this strategic partnership?

·               How the emerging strategic culture in India would play out in the wake of Indo-US strategic partnership?

·               How China perceives this strategic partnership impacting its relationship with global actors, especially the US and Russia?

·               What are the likely implications of the Indo-US strategic partnership for China’s interests in Asia in general and South Asia, South East Asia, Central Asia in particular?

The nature of Indo-US strategic partnership

Brief history of strategic relationship

The nuclear agreement with India stemmed from the Bush administration’s desire to transform the bilateral relations and develop a strong strategic partnership. The relationship began to transform by the early 1990s. The end of Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union freed India from the constraints of the superpower rivalry which was a main hurdle in the growth of US-India relations. India started distancing itself from traditional foreign policy platforms and initiated the process of building closer strategic ties with the US and its allies, especially Israel. The nuclear tests of 1998 and the ensuing sanctions on India only signalled a temporary pause in their growing strategic relationship. Within days of the nuclear tests the Clinton administration started lifting the sanctions. The events of 9/11 and India’s swift support for the US-led counter-terrorism operations brought the two countries much closer. In October 2001, the new US president, George Bush waived almost all sanctions. President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that “US interests require a strong relationship with India.”(3)

In 2002, India and the US set up the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), which gave approval to 90 per cent of Indian applications for dual-use technology.(4) In January 2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee launched the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP) initiative which outlined bilateral cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programme and high-technology trade in ‘dual use’ technologies, besides expanding dialogue on missile defence.(5) The “strategic partnership” forwarded by the NSSP involved progress through a series of reciprocal steps in which both countries took action designed to expand engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues, enhanced cooperation in missile defence, peaceful uses of space technology, and creation of an appropriate environment for increased commerce in high-technology.(6) The initiative was a precursor to move towards future strategic partnership in defence and nuclear technology cooperation.

On 28 June 2005, Indian Defence Minister and US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year Defence Framework Agreement which formalized the rapidly growing defence relationship between the two countries. The new parameters of the defence relationship included cooperation in defense technology, continued joint and combined exercises and exchanges, expansion of trade in defence-related items, increased opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production and research and development.(7) The agreement reflected a major turnaround in US strategic perception of India as “a potential partner in providing peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region and in shaping a new Asian balance of power.”(8) The agreement underscored that the “defence relationship will support, and will be an element of the broader US-India strategic partnership.”(9)

18 July 2005 Agreement: The next major step in forging strategic partnership was the 18 July 2005 agreement that included provisions for moving forward in civil nuclear cooperation, civilian space cooperation and high technology trade. The US accommodated India in two significant ways. One, it implicitly recognised India as a nuclear weapon-state by describing it as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states”. Two, more significantly, the Bush administration made a commitment to assist India in getting civil nuclear technology by seeking “agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies” to help facilitate technology transfers and cooperation. In addition, the US gave a commitment to India that it would work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.”(10) In return, India agreed to ‘separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner’, to file a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and sign and abide by an Additional Protocol relating to civilian nuclear facilities. India also agreed to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing and work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Finally, India agreed to adhere to international guidelines controlling the export of nuclear and missile technology through ‘comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.(11) The joint statement signified a major reversal in US non-proliferation policy which allowed full-steam nuclear energy cooperation with a nuclear-armed India outside NPT framework. It also indicated marginalization of Congress and non-proliferation interest groups especially Non-proliferation Arms Control Bureau that sought ‘greater nuclear restraints from India.’(12)

On 2 March 2006, during President Bush’s visit to India, New Delhi announced a ‘separation plan’ and reaffirmed the July 2005 agreement. A working group headed by Indian foreign secretary Shayam Saran and US under secretary of state Nicholas Burns finalized the separation plan. Initially India placed less than 50 per cent of its reactors under safeguards and excluded its fast-breeder reactor from inspections. Finally it agreed to place 14 of its 22 thermal reactors in operation or under construction under safeguards by 2014. Six of these were already under safeguards — two US-supplied reactors at Tarapur, two Canadian –supplied reactors, and two Russian-built LWRs under construction. Moreover, India secured a seven-year exemption from safeguards for its breeder reactor. India kept eight reactors outside safeguards. Shielding these reactors allowed it to keep an entire fuel cycle for the breeder reactor outside safeguards. These reactors are/could be a source of plutonium for nuclear weapons during the time that India’s existing plutonium inventory is depleted for use in the breeder reactor.”(13)

123 Agreement, 26 July 2007: After India announced the separation plan, the US moved fast on various fronts — with Congress, the NSG and India. India also started discussing a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). After two years of protracted discussions the US and India finalised “123 Agreement” in July 2007. The bilateral cooperation agreement specifies the terms for US civilian nuclear exports to India. Such an agreement was required by Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. The agreement provided legal basis for the two countries to cooperate in the civil nuclear field. It was a major step in the process that allowed the nuclear deal to move forward paving the way for India’s negotiations on a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The 123 Agreement committed the US to full nuclear cooperation with India. Article 2 specified the scope of cooperation in areas that included: a) advanced nuclear energy research and development; b) development of an Indian strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the life of India’s reactors; c) full civil nuclear cooperation (commercial trade) covering nuclear reactors, technology and nuclear fuel cycle; d) reprocessing of spent fuel; e) nuclear safety; f) exchange of scientists and collaborative research; g) controlled thermonuclear fusion including multilateral projects; h) transfer of nuclear material supplied to third countries.(14) The agreement was “not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities” of India and will not hinder or interfere with any nuclear or non-nuclear material, technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by India independent of the Agreement. (Art.2(4). The agreement also provided for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuels supplies. (Art.5 (c).

India in return made a commitment that all civil nuclear material and equipment transferred under the agreement shall be subject to ‘safeguards in perpetuity’ in accordance with the India-specific IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocol.(Art.10) It also committed itself to using the nuclear material and equipment transferred under this agreement for peaceful purposes only (Art.9). Nicholas Burns described the 123 Agreement as a “symbolic centrepiece of a growing global partnership between the two countries.”(15) The deal went through the next stage of India-specific IAEA safeguards, after a lot of debate in India for and against the agreement. It is pertinent here to see the domestic dimension of the bilateral nuclear agreement in the US and India as it will continue to exert pressures on both governments in finalization and operationalization of the deal.

Domestic dimension of the deal

The July 2005 nuclear deal was concluded between the two leaders and their close set of high officials on each side. The agreement touched off a heated domestic debate in both countries. In the US, consultations at the domestic level were generally absent in the run-up to the deal. Domestic debate/consultations started as both governments sought, and in the case of the Bush administration required, legislative support to implement the agreement. In India, however, the government was not legally required to get legislative approval for the agreement though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh briefed the parliament about the deal on 27 July 2005, immediately after the 18 July agreement, on 27 February before President Bush’s visit to Indian, and 7-8 March after announcing India’s separation plan.

The United States: The Bush administration briefed congressional leaders immediately after the agreement was announced. Congress held hearings and heard the testimony of non-proliferation and South Asia experts on 26 October and 2 November, while the administration officials briefed Congress on 8 September and 2 November. In these briefings, the administration underscored the strategic, non-proliferation, and environmental benefits of nuclear cooperation with India. Significantly, they argued that “strategically, such cooperation would both strengthen India and also strengthen US ties with India.... [T]his would further US interests in promoting a stable power balance in Asia.” However, the Congress and the non-proliferation lobby expressed concerns over the agreement. They strongly felt that ‘bending full-scope safeguards rule for India would weaken the international non-proliferation regime.’ The non-proliferation lobby stressed that India should end its production of fissile material, shut down the Cirus reactor, put all the thermal power reactors and the breeder reactor under safeguards, and accept full-scope and permanent safeguards at all its nuclear facilities. Some of these concerns were accommodated in the Hyde Act.

Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006

Soon after the Indo-US joint statement of 18 July 2005, Washington geared up to get Congress permission to go ahead with the deal. The US House of Representatives passed an Act called Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. The Hyde Act, passed by both houses of Congress on 12 December 2006, was a landmark event in bilateral relations, as it enabled President Bush to sign it into law on 18 December 2006. The Act revised the law so as to enable the US to extend full civil nuclear cooperation to India. The Hyde Act has two broad parts — the first deals with the US Executive’s role until the agreement becomes effective. The second part obliges the US president to continuously, periodically or year after year take certain steps during the whole of the long life of the treaty. The Act authorises the US president to exempt India from the requirement of Section 123 a (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that imposes a condition that the US will not export nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon states, unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities.(16) The Hyde Act established conditions for US nuclear commerce with India, including clear penalties in the event of a resumption of Indian nuclear testing, constraints against selling equipment used to make bomb-grade material, and limits on the refuelling of the Indian power plants to make the decision to resume testing more difficult for New Delhi.(17)

India: In India the political parties especially the Leftist parties, the non-proliferation lobby and a section of scientists, strategic community and the media criticised the nuclear deal on various grounds. The government set up two committees dealing with strategic and nuclear matters to draft its nuclear separation plan. These committees included representatives from India’s National Security Council Secretariat, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Department of Atomic Energy (DEA), the armed forces, and the Prime Minister Office (PMO). In these committees’ discussions, the MEA and the PMO generally favoured nuclear concessions as they gave high priority to accommodating and furthering ties with the US. The DAE, however, objected to the considerations on safeguarding their reactors. They doubted that US would sell nuclear reactors to India and mainly sought nuclear fuel for India’s reactors.

The proponents of the nuclear deal in India argued: One, the deal would enable India to build nuclear reactors with access to nuclear technology and uranium from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Two, it would ensure India’s energy security that cannot depend alone on imports. Three, it would render the implicit knowledge of India’s nuclear capacity as a nuclear-weapon state into an explicit recognition of its nuclear status. Finally, the deal did not incapacitate India’s nuclear programmes and if required, India could go for computer simulation tests or could break the deal as there was no binding clause, and go for testing, while facing the sanctions as it did after the 1998 tests.(18) The opponents of the deal argued: One, the signing of the deal meant bowing before the US hegemony and surrendering national sovereignty. Two, it would cap India’s nuclear capabilities, especially enforce moratorium on India’s nuclear testing. Three, the use of nuclear energy was not cheap as its initial Costs were heavy with a long gestation period. Finally, India should explore the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline for its energy security than for opting for the long and tedious nuclear deal.(19)

India’s nuclear scientists wanted to keep all nuclear facilities that were indigenously built and did not have imported components outside the scope of safeguards. They were also strongly opposed to opening the breeder reactor to safeguards. The Indian government eventually accepted their position and kept its breeder reactor located at Kalpakkam as well as other facilities at Kalpakkam and the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre that has the Cirus and Dhruva reactors, outside safeguards. (Dinshaw. pp.686-688)

Within this context, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a weak coalition, faced strong opposition against the deal from the Left parties whose support was crucial for the survival of the Manmohan Singh government.(20) As soon as the text of the 123 Agreement was released the Left parties opposed it tooth and nail. Their opposition was based more on principles than any other consideration. They argued that the deal was not a stand-alone agreement but was intimately linked to a wide-ranging alliance with the US that would undermine and compromise India’s sovereignty in foreign policy, national security and economic matters.(21)

They threatened to pull out of the coalition if the government went ahead with it. This stalemated the negotiations for more than a year and a half. When Manmohan Singh decided to go ahead with the deal and proposed that it would be placed before Parliament after the safeguards agreement was approved by the Board of IAEA and waiver obtained from the NSG, it infuriated the Leftist allies and they pulled out of the coalition on 7 July 2008. The UPA government, however, survived because it managed to get support from the smaller parties through horse-trading which cast a shadow on the democratic traditions of India.

The right-wing BJP, India’s main opposition party, was not basically opposed to the nuclear deal but its senior leaders such as L. K. Advani “wanted the 123 Agreement to be redrafted to insulate India from the Hyde Act…Our reservation is only on the written word that there should not be any further nuclear tests.”(22) BJP asserted that the nuclear deal would undermine the “strategic autonomy” of India. In an interview with The Hindu, on 11 July 2008, Advani said: “We are opposed to the 123 Agreement because it is also preceded by the Hyde Act… in the name of energy autonomy, you are surrendering our strategic autonomy.”(23)

India-specific IAEA safeguards

On 1^st August 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved by consensus the agreement to apply safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities in India. It marked a decisive step closer to implementing the Indo-US nuclear deal. The text of the safeguards agreement was finalized after several rounds of consultations between India and IAEA which began in November 2007 and the draft agreement was circulated to the Board members in July 2007. China, one of the leading members of the both the IAEA board and the NSG, did not oppose the IAEA approval, though it kept its policy vague until the end. China is the only member of the P-5 club that has not explicitly supported the nuclear deal. Some Chinese academics, but not officials, have expressed reservations about the deal in the past. Russia, France and Britain backed the Indo-US initiative while Germany had expressed some reservations. Pakistan, one of the 35 members of the IAEA Board, was, however, more vocal in its opposition to the safeguards deal. It submitted a note of dissent describing the draft of the safeguards agreement as “discriminatory and dangerous” and called for its amendment. Pakistan’s principled position on the issue is that a non-discriminatory approach based on objective criteria on access to civilian nuclear technology should be adopted, offering equal opportunity to both Pakistan and India by meeting the relevant benchmarks.(24) However, it also did not oppose the safeguards agreement. The approval of the Board came amidst criticism that ambiguous wording could limit international oversight of India’s reactors, undermine the international non-proliferation treaty and possibly help supply India’s arms programmes with fissile material. Austria, Ireland and Switzerland voiced their concerns. However, India succeeded in securing a tight linkage between continuity of nuclear fuel supplies and continuity of safeguards which it had asserted in the separation plan in 2006.

The safeguards agreement, called Agreement Between the Government of India and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, will allow IAEA to verify that certain declared Indian nuclear material and facilities are used only for peaceful purposes. It is an umbrella arrangement that will allow India to add facilities over time to be placed under the IAEA safeguards. The IAEA Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, emphasized that under the agreement, “India [has] committed itself to harmonize its laws on export controls with those of the supplier group. That’s very important because one of our main goals continues to be that nuclear material will not fall into the wrong hands.”(25) ElBaradei, described the agreement as: “It’s good for India; it’s good for the world, is good for non-proliferation.”(26) He expressed hope that it would revive debate on nuclear disarmament.

The agreement is set to enter into force once the IAEA receives notification that India’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements have been met. In his address to the Board, Dr. ElBaradei stated that the IAEA would begin to implement the new Safeguards Agreement in 2009, with the aim of bringing a total of 14 Indian reactors under Agency safeguards by 2014.(27) The IAEA currently applies safeguards to six Indian nuclear reactors under safeguards agreements concluded between 1971 and 1994. IAEA is currently discussing an Additional Protocol Agreement.

Both the US and India hailed the adoption of the IAEA safeguards agreement. A State Department spokesman, Gonzalo Gallegos, told reporters: “We believe this is important, not for us and our bilateral relationship with India, but also rest of the world”. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described it “an important day for India, and for our civil nuclear initiatives for the resumption of cooperation with our friends abroad.”(28)

Exemption for India from the NSG’s
‘full-scope safeguards’ export rule

The next step was waiver from the NSG that exports nuclear material. The NSG bans exports to nuclear weapons states that have not signed the NPT and do not have full safeguards agreements allowing the IAEA to inspect their facilities. India had been embargoed by the NSG for having not signed the NPT and testing nuclear devices in 1974 and 1998. New Delhi repeatedly asserted that it was looking for a “clean and unconditional” waiver and lobbied hard to get the support of the NSG members for it. On 21-22 August the 45-member NSG met to discuss a US waiver draft for nuclear cooperation with India but could not develop consensus as several group members expressed concerns regarding nonproliferation aspect of the deal. The US draft took note of all the commitments India had made in July 2005 and stated that in the light of these, the full-scope safeguards requirement was being waived. To allay concerns of the NSG countries, the draft provided for members to “maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India.”(29)

The draft however failed to allay the apprehensions of a large number of members of the NSG, especially New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands, all of whom demanded substantive amendments. There are at least four areas where concerns have been raised: these relate to India’s nuclear testing, adherence to NPT full-scope safeguards, the need for a review mechanism to assess Indian compliance, as well as restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technology.(30) According to Indian officials, the US has been saying for some months now that the NSG waiver could include “reasonable conditionalities” and that the Europeans were insisting on these.(31) India has resisted full-scope safeguards and wants only those plants identified by it to go under IAEA safeguards.

The draft was revised and came before NSG’s second meeting that was held on 4-5 September 2008. After hard lobbying by India and the US the group granted a waiver to India. The waiver has been criticized by those who support a strong international non-proliferation regime. Michael Krepon observed: “The deal struck in the NSG is… likely to have slow motion, far reaching, negative repercussions because the Indian waiver was not accompanied by compensatory steps to shore up international controls against proliferation. The most obvious compensatory step — India’s signature on a treaty banning further nuclear testing — was strenuously resisted by New Delhi, Washington, and other capitals that stood to make financial gains from civil nuclear commerce with India. At the Bush administration’s insistence, the NSG even declined to clarify penalties in the event of a resumption of nuclear testing by India.”(32)

The deal will now go back to US congressional approval in its session that is expected to be held on 26 September 2008.

On 29 September 2008, the US Congress approved the Indo-US nuclear deal with 289 votes in favour and 117 against, crossing the most crucial hurdle in finalising the deal. On 10 October 2008, president Bush signed the bill into law. He assured New Delhi that the new law made no changes in fuel supply commitments or the terms of the “123 agreement.” He said, “the bill I sign ... approves the 123 Agreement I submitted to Congress and establishes the legal framework for that agreement to come into effect.”(33)

This pacified Indian concerns over president Bush’s assertions in the transmittal document to the Congress that the 123 agreement contains “political commitments” which are not legally binding on the US.

Political dimension

The emerging Indo-US strategic partnership has a wider political context. This is reflected in various statements made by President Bush and key officials in his administration who are architects of the Indo-US strategic partnership such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. In addition, strategic analysts in US such as George Perkovitch, Ashely Tellis,(34) Stephen Cohen,(35) and Sumit Ganguly(36) have been urging the US to build strategic partnership with India, an emerging power in the world affairs. The main argument is that a “rising India” would help counter a “rising China” and stabilise Asian balance of power in the 21^st century. The Indo-US joint statements of 18 July 2005 and 2 March 2006 strongly emphasised forging of global partnership with India to fight the challenges of the 21^st century. On 17 May 2006, Richard Boucher in his statement before the House International Relations Committee on Asia and Pacific said: “India is on a trajectory to be a leading nation of the 21^st Century. By any measures — its economic growth, its growing intellectual capital, even its ability to project culture and art through its dynamic film industry — India is on the way to achieving the rank of global power.”(37) Ashley J. Tellis, a staunch architect of US-India strategic partnership, contends: “A friendly India would not only be an important balancing partner vis-a-vis a rising China, but it could also assist the US in managing proliferation, enhancing security in the region, and spreading democracy in the developing world.”(38)

In the policy report for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (2005), Ashley Tellis urged the Bush administration to consider “India an Asian superpower” which can be “counterfoil to China” and “prevent China’s dominance.”(39) Further, the US strategic assessment of India articulated both in its National Security Strategy of March 2006 and the Quadrennial Defence Review Report of February 2006 called for closer strategic ties with India. The NSS speaks of India as a major power shouldering global obligations. Similarly, the QDR referred to India, along with China and Russia, as key factors in determining the international security environment for the 21st Century. This signified that US policymakers as well as strategic community viewed India as a key player in the future balance of power in Asia. The basis of this comprehensive strategic partnership stems from common values and common interests.

US Perspective

Common values and common interests

When president Bush and prime minister Vajpayee launched strategic partnership on 12 January 2004, the joint statement declared: “That relationship is based increasingly on common values and common interests. We are working together to promote global peace and prosperity. We are partners in the war on terrorism and we are partners in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.”(40) On July 18, 2005, president Bush announced the creation of a global partnership between the United States and India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world which was reaffirmed in 2 March 2006 joint statement.

The concept of shared values and shared interests has become a hallmark of the new US-India relationship. On 5 April 2006, Condoleezza Rice in her statement at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative stated: The partnership is “founded on common interests and shared values” which she identified as democracy, security and prosperity.(41) Regarding Indian democracy, she said, it was a “positive model in the international community.” Significantly, in terms of security, she regarded “India as a rising global power and a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia. India will continue to possess sophisticated military forces… and will in the future help promote peace in Asia and across the world.” In terms of prosperity, she observed that “India is committed to economic liberty and strong growth. It has immense skilled and youthful workforce and the world’s fastest growing middle class. By 2025, India will most likely rank among the world’s five largest economies.”(42)

R. Nicholas Burns, under secretary for political affairs, in an article “America's Strategic Opportunity with India” reinforced the politico-strategic nature of the partnership. He observed:

The rise of a democratic and increasingly powerful India is a positive development for US interests. Rarely has the United States shared so many interests and values with a growing power as we do today with India. By reaching out to India, we have made the bet that the future lies in pluralism, democracy, and market economics.(43)

He strongly felt:

As we Americans consider our future role in the world, the rise of a democratic and increasingly powerful India represents a singularly positive opportunity to advance our global interests. There is a tremendous strategic upside to our growing engagement with India. That is why building a close US-India partnership should be one of the United States' highest priorities for the future. It is a unique opportunity with real promise for the global balance of power.(44)

Elaborating on common interests he said:

We share an abundance of political, economic, and military interests with India today. Our open societies face similar threats from terrorism and organized crime. Our market-based economies embrace trade and commerce as engines of prosperity. Our peoples value education and a strong work ethic. We share an attachment to democracy and individual rights founded on an instinctive mistrust of authoritarianism. And in an age of anti-Americanism, according to the most recent Pew Global Attitudes survey, nearly six in ten Indians view the United States favourably.(45)

He underscored “remarkable growth in trust between the leaderships of the two countries” an explosion in private sector ties,” “historic agreement on civil nuclear energy, closer collaboration on scientific and technological innovation, burgeoning trade and commercial links, common efforts to stabilize South Asia, and a growing US-India campaign to promote stable, well-governed democracies around the world. And the United States is only just beginning to realize the benefits of this relationship for its interests in South and East Asia.”(46)

“Rising India” figures as a key element with which the US shares common values and common interests. In the domestic debates in the Congress US administration argued that strategic partnership with India would further US interests in promoting a stable balance of power in Asia.(47) As a presidential candidate Senator Obama in an interview to daily Hindu, on 24 October 2008, observed that he believed “India is a natural strategic partner for America in the 21st century and that the U.S. should be working with India on a range of critical issues from preventing terrorism to promoting peace and stability in Asia.” (Ashok Easwaran, “Obama says India will be top priority.”(48)

Indian perspective

India was quite enthusiastic about forging closer strategic ties with the US for its own reasons. Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran underscored six key developments that created the basis for the 18 July agreement that envisaged establishment of a global partnership with the US. First and foremost, an India growing at the rate of 8% per annum changed US attitude towards India. India is now a fast growing export market for the US. An India of high growth rates creates new demands for goods, services and technologies that a global trading nation like US cannot ignore. “India is today being invariably equated with China in terms of potential and possibilities.”(49) Second, a nuclear India like a nuclear China in the 1960s has “made a compelling case for greater engagement with India.” Third, the larger strategic canvas favours raising the quality of Indo-US ties. “As a pluralistic and secular democracy in a world where fundamentalist violence is on the rise, India’s emergence as a model of stability, modernization and predictability, has begun to impact on international consciousness.” Fourth element in the US approach to India has been its “awareness of the potential that our partnership holds in respect of the knowledge economy.” Fifth, India’s opening up to the world and impact of its integration into the global economy cannot be underestimated, least of all by the US. Sixth, as an open society and open economy, the growth in India’s capabilities has been welcomed by the world. This shows that it was the rising India with its economic, political and strategic wherewithal that changed US attitude towards the country.

Elaborating on the objectives of partnership with the US, Saran stated:

The US is clearly the preeminent power of our times. There can be no argument that better relations with the US are in our national interest. It is our largest trade partner, investor and technology source. Equally important, as the preeminent power, the US helps shape global sentiment. From the economic perspective, initiatives with the US can advance our development processes and accelerate our growth rate. Technologically, a partnership with the US would enormously benefit a country like India whose future is so tied to the knowledge and service industries. There are strong security convergences between us, be it on terrorism, maritime security or other threats from non-state actors. From the political perspective, stronger ties make themselves positively felt on our relations with third countries. Domestically, India is seeking to leapfrog in its development process. In foreign policy, we require adjustments in the international order so that our aspirations are accommodated. A stronger relationship with the US can offer benefits on both fronts.(50)

This signified that India embarked on a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US with ambitious objectives that not only fulfilled its domestic national development agenda but also served as a leverage to advance its security and foreign policy goals at the global level.

Nuclear dimension

The nuclear dimension of the Indo-US strategic partnership is the most important aspect of the new relationship between the two countries as it provides foundation to the rising India in the 21^st century. With the deal going through, it will be the first time a nuclear state outside NPT would be allowed to engage in civilian nuclear trade. In fact, the nuclear deal marks a fundamental shift in US nuclear policy towards India from preventive and restrictive non-proliferation benchmarks to a proactive and collaborative nuclear policy entailing nuclear trade in nuclear material, technology and fuel cycle. After India’s nuclear tests the US had set five benchmarks for India: i.e. sign CTBT; freeze production of nuclear material and cooperate in FMCT talks banning production of nuclear material; accept a strategic restraint regime that would limit the types of ballistic missiles that India had in its arsenal; adopt stringent controls on the export of dangerous material and know-how and resume dialogue with Pakistan to address the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir.(51)

Civil nuclear trade

In a remarkable reversal the thrust of the nuclear deal is energy security for India which will ensure clean energy for it and will reduce the burden on world energy resources. In fact the Indo-US nuclear deal has opened up comprehensive civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries that encompasses transfer of nuclear reactors, technology and fuel cycle. While the US wants civil nuclear trade with India, the latter is also seeking access to the US as well as world nuclear trade market.

American officials’ statements indicate that the US is aiming at India’s growing civil nuclear energy market. Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “At the core of our initiative with India is not simply a government to government effort. It was crafted with the private sector firmly in mind. Because it will fully open the door to civil nuclear trade and cooperation, this initiative is good for American business.”(52) She pointed out that India intended to increase the number of nuclear power plants significantly to meet its nuclear energy demands. Thus there will be demand for nuclear technology, fuel, and support services [which] holds the promise of opening new business opportunities for American firms, which translate into new jobs, new incomes, and new markets for the US.(53) Indian officials indicate that they plan to import at least eight new 1000-megawatt power plants by 2012, as well as additional reactors in the years ahead. She underscored that preliminary studies suggested that if American vendors won just two of these reactor contracts, American industry estimates it might add 3,000-5,000 new direct jobs and about 10,000-15,000 indirect jobs in the US.(54) In addition, participation in India’s market will help make the American nuclear industry globally competitive, thereby benefiting US domestic power sector. The nuclear deal will allow US companies to enter the lucrative and growing Indian market. Immediately after the NSG waiver, David Bohigian, assistant secretary of state in the Department of Commerce, said: “We will ensure that US companies play a big role in the Indian nuclear energy market estimated to be $100 billion.”(55)

India also has similar objectives. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Lok Sabha that nuclear agreement would end India’s nuclear isolation , nuclear apartheid and enable it to take advantage of international trade in nuclear materials, technologies and equipment. It will open trade in dual technologies opening up new pathways to accelerate industrialization of the country. “Given the excellent quality of our nuclear scientists and technologists, I have reasons to believe that in a reasonably short period of time, India will emerge as an important exporter of nuclear technologies, and equipment for civilian purposes.”(56) External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee also told the Lok Sabha that the clearance of the agreement by the NSG and the IAEA was a “passport” for the country to enter into civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with the international community.(57) In fact the nuclear deal paves the way for nuclear trade with Russia and France. India is already negotiating nuclear reactors deals from both. Additionally, it provides India an opportunity to go into nuclear exports. Immediately after the NSG waiver, S.K. Jain, Chairman and Managing Director of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), said the NSG decision provided India a great opportunity to become a major exporter of critical and non-critical nuclear components to both the developed and developing countries.(58) “There is limited manufacturing capacity in the world today,” he added.

India’s nuclear energy sector

The main rationale extended by the Indian and the US governments to formalize the nuclear deal is energy security for India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has used all available opportunities to dwell on the role of nuclear power in ensuring energy security and the necessity of the India-US nuclear deal to realise that role. President Bush extended similar argument. India’s Minister of State for Power Jairam Ramesh said once the deal got through, the country would be able to produce 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 2020. He contended at present the nuclear plants are operating at 48 per cent of their capacity due to shortage of uranium.(59)

India’s total installed power capacity at the end of May 2008 was 144,565 MW, of which nuclear power, with 4,120 MWe of installed capacity from 17 reactors, constitutes a mere 2.9 per cent. Thermal power accounts for the largest share, 64.6 per cent, with coal accounting for 53.3 per cent and the rest being largely gas.(60) Five projects are under various stages of construction. These include three indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) of 220 MWe each and 2 x 1,000 MWe Light Water Reactor (LWR) system being built under Russian cooperation at Koodankulam, Tamil Nadu. These were to add 2,660 MWe to the installed capacity by 2008 end. The nuclear component of energy is likely to increase to 3.7% by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2012) and to 5% by the end of the 12^th Plan (1217). The fact is that the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was not the driving force behind the India-US nuclear deal. R. Ramachandran observes: While nuclear power will be critical for the country’s long-term energy security, and our indigenous three-stage nuclear power programme(61) has been evolved from that perspective, it is important to understand that the nuclear deal cannot be central to achieving that.(62) Indeed, Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), has always maintained that any import of nuclear power that may become possible following the agreement with the US will only be an “additionality” to the long-term projections for the installed nuclear capacity under the indigenous programme.(63)

India’s strategic programme

The nuclear deal will in no way obstruct India’s strategic nuclear programme which is clear from the statements made by the Indian leadership, US officials, India-specific IAEA safeguards and the NSG waiver. On 22 July 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Lok Sabha:

The strategic programme will continue to be developed at an autonomous pace determined solely by our own security perceptions. We have not and will not accept any outside interference or monitoring or supervision of our strategic programme. Our strategic autonomy will never be compromised. …I confirm that there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on further testing. Thus the nuclear agreements will not in any way affect our strategic autonomy. The cooperation that the international community is now willing to extend to us for trade in nuclear material, technologies and equipment for civilian use will be available to us without signing the NPT or the CTBT.(64)

The statement made it quite clear that India has only accepted limited safeguards for its civilian nuclear installations which it will submit voluntarily to IAEA safeguards while its strategic nuclear programme will continue unchecked. Despite claims of bringing India into non-proliferation fold, the US is also quite clear on the continuation of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Condoleezza Rice conceded: “The initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons production, but noting under this initiative will directly enhance its military capability or add to its military stockpile.”(65)

India’s nonproliferation commitments under the deal as specified in the 18 July joint statement and the 123 Agreement are: a) place current and future civil reactors under permanent IAEA safeguards, b) negotiate and sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA; c) work with the US to conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; d) create a robust national export control system that includes harmonization with and adherence the MTCR and NSG guidelines; e) Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; and f) refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not possess them. While India’s non-proliferation commitments were found quite satisfactory by the Bush administration, Russia, France and UK, tough opposition was voiced by the non-proliferation lobbies inside the US, Europe and reservations by China and Pakistan that are directly going to be affected by the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Impact on non-proliferation regime

The proponents

The Indo-US nuclear deal is going to have profound impact on the international non-proliferation regime. Supporters of the agreement, especially the Bush administration, strongly argued that the deal would bring India into international non-proliferation system and thereby would strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. On 5 April 2006, Condoleezza Rice in her statement at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative argued, “past non-proliferation policies towards India had not achieved their purposes. They had no effect on India’s development of nuclear weapons. Nor did they prevent India and Pakistan from testing weapons in 1998. They had contributed little to lessening regional tensions, which brought India and Pakistan repeatedly to the brink of war.” Against this backdrop, she strongly felt that the deal would promote non-proliferation objectives in at least four ways. First, it obtained India’s commitment to work towards a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Second, the initiative would “align India more closely with the international nuclear non-proliferation standards.” It would not amend NPT and India “is not going to become, a member of the NPT as a nuclear weapons state.” Nothing we are proposing would violate our NPT obligations that we would not in any way assist India’s nuclear weapons programme.” Third, the initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons production, but nothing in this “will directly enhance its military capability or add to its military stockpile. Fourth, it “will not lead to an arms race in South Asia” which is “determined by bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, not civil nuclear cooperation initiative.” Fifth, the deal “will not create double standards or undermine efforts to curb Iran and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions as there is no comparison between India and North Korea and Iran. India is a democracy, transparent and accountable to its people, works within the international system to promote peace and stability and has a responsible nuclear proliferation record while Iran and North Koran regimes are not transparent and credible and are violating IAEA obligations.”(66)

Another architect of the Indo-US deal, Ashley Tellis, in his report, Atoms for War? US-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, contends that India is going for a modest nuclear weapons programme. This is because India is currently separating far less weapons grade plutonium annually than it has the capability to produce. Further, India's capacity to produce a huge nuclear arsenal is not affected by prospective US-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation.(67) The Manmohan Singh government strongly feels that it needs nuclear energy for the economic growth of India and it is voluntarily submitting its civil nuclear programme to international safeguards.

The critics

The critics are, however, not satisfied with the nature and scope of safeguards envisaged in the nuclear deal and strongly feel that it would undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Conversely, the deal would enable India to rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal. The critics comprise staunch non-proliferation activists inside the US, such as US Congressmen and non-proliferation lobby and outside US such as European countries that strongly support non-proliferation regime and various groups that are actively supporting non-proliferation. Finally, countries that perceive this deal as against their strategic interest such as China and Pakistan have expressed strong reservations over the deal.

Howard L. Berman, Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, of US Congress who supports US-India nuclear deal, in a letter to secretary Condoleezza Rice on 5 August 2008, asked president Bush to reject any NSG waiver not consistent with the conditions stipulated in the Hyde Act of 2006 because this would have serious implications for global non-proliferation standards. He urged on the president to reject an NSG exemption for India which did not incorporate: a) Immediate termination of all nuclear commerce by NSG member states if India detonated a nuclear explosive device or if IAEA determined that India had violated the safeguards commitments; b) a prohibition on the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy-water production technology by any NSG member to India; and c) a stipulation that did not allow India to reprocess nuclear fuel in a facility outside permanent and unconditional safeguards.(68)

Democrats Edward Markey and Ellen Tauscher(69) also expressed non-proliferation concerns in a commentary in The New York Times. The suppliers group “can say yes to nuclear trade with India if two simple conditions are met.” First, India must sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a step already taken by 178 other countries and every member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Second, “India must agree to halt production of nuclear material for weapons.” Such a ban would not require India to give up the atomic weapons it has or prevent it from building more weapons with nuclear material previously produced. By shutting down the manufacture of new plutonium and highly enriched uranium, India “would prove to the international community that opening up nuclear commerce would not assist, either directly or indirectly, its nuclear weapons program.”(70)

The Hyde Act 2006, the 123 Agreement 2006, the separation plan 2006 and the India-specific IAEA safeguards 2008 have come under heavy attack for the technical, legal or political loopholes that will encourage India’s nuclear weapons programme.

Fissile material production

·               India has made a commitment that it would support FMCT that would end production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In the interim period, India has refused to join the fissile material production moratorium as part of a proposed US-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation deal. Rather, India will continue to produce fissile material for weapons purposes until agreement on an FMCT is reached. Further, under the India-specific safeguards it has only allowed facility-specific safeguards on its foreign supplied nuclear facilities and nuclear materials leaving its unsafeguarded military nuclear reactor sector to free to produce fissile material and nuclear weapons, and to design and produce nuclear warheads.

·               According to an International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) report published in September 2006, New Delhi has approximately 500 kilograms of plutonium available for nuclear weapons and up to another 11.5 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium in spent fuel, which could be reprocessed for weapons use.(71) Some analysts estimate that India could increase its production of fissile material for weapons if it succeeds in securing foreign nuclear fuel shipments because such a move would free up more Indian domestic resources currently divided between the military and civilian sector for building bombs.(72) According to a report by the Arms Control Association, released in July 2008, India is estimated to possess enough separated fissile material for 60-100 nuclear warheads and potentially far more if foreign nuclear fuels supplies allow it to devote its limited domestic fuel supplies exclusively for weapons purposes.(73)

·               The problem of diversion of nuclear material from civilian to military facilities has not been fully taken care of in the IAEA safeguards agreement. The provisions of the agreement have substantially deviated from standardized drafts of IAEA safeguards agreements. For instance, under the cross-references, the safeguarded material can be transferred to non-notified locations. This provision has created a safe corridor for India to exploit the agreement for military purposes.(74)

Corrective measures/termination of safeguards

·               India has inserted “corrective measures” in the 123 Agreement and India-specific IAEA safeguards to ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies to its civil nuclear reactors covered by the IAEA safeguards. India contends that in the preamble and combined with certain sections of the operative portion of the agreement, the agreement allows it to withdraw certain reactors from safeguards if fuel supplies are interrupted, even if the fuel supplies are interrupted because India has conducted a nuclear test explosion. This interpretation is “inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards.”

·               The provisions of the India-specific Agreement have substantially deviated from standardized drafts of IAEA safeguards agreements. For instance, under the cross-references, the safeguarded material can be transferred to non-notified locations. This provision has created a safe corridor for India to exploit the agreement for military purposes.(75) The analysts from Arms Control Association argue that the agreement contained loopholes that would allow India “to legally and unilaterally withdraw safeguarded nuclear materials or facilities from safeguards.”(76) Thereby, Daryl Kimball, at the Washington-based Arms Control Association, has urged the NSG to get India sign a legally binding ban on nuclear weapons testing as well as the transfer of its uranium enrichment and plutonium processing technology, which could be used for making atomic bombs.(77)

It should be noted that most international nuclear cooperation with India had ceased after India tested a nuclear weapon in 1974 using plutonium produced from nuclear reactors in contravention of understandings with the US and Canada. The Indian test in fact had led to the formation of the NSG.

Expanded defence relationship

The most visible manifestation of a strategic relationship between two countries is cooperation in the defence sphere. The June 2005 Indo-US Defence Framework Agreement stipulated wide-ranging “shared security interests”: a) maintaining security and stability; b) defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism; c) preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies; and d) protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air and sea lanes.(78) This indicated that the US wanted a broader security alliance relationship with India without saying so. This was quite evident in the 13 areas of defence-related cooperation which included:

                     i.                  Conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges;

                    ii.                  Collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest;

                  iii.                  Strengthen the capabilities of their militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism;

                  iv.                  Expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote regional and global peace and stability;

                   v.                  Enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

                  vi.                  Expand two-way defence trade, not viewing defence transactions as ends in and of themselves, but as a means to strengthen security, reinforce strategic partnership, achieve greater interaction between armed forces, and build greater understanding between defence establishments;

                vii.                  In the context of defence trade and a framework of technology security safeguards, increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and development;

               viii.                  Expand collaboration relating to missile defence;

                   ix.                  Strengthen the abilities of their militaries to respond quickly to disaster situations, including in combined operations;

                    x.                  Assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other countries to field trained, capable forces for these operations;

                   xi.                  Conduct exchanges on defence strategy and defence transformation;

                 xii.                  Increase exchanges of intelligence, and

                xiii.                  Continue strategic-level discussions by senior leadership from the US Department of Defence and India's Ministry of Defence, in which the two sides exchange perspectives on international security issues of common interest, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared objectives, and developing common approaches.(79)

The Defence Framework Agreement has helped further cement the increasingly close defence cooperation between the US and India, including joint patrolling of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the northern Indian Ocean up to the mouth of the Malacca Strait. Under the agreement, the Defense Policy Group shall continue to serve as the primary mechanism to guide the US-India strategic defence relationship. The two countries revived a bilateral Defence Policy Group in December 2001. DPG is led by Defence Secretary on the Indian side and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the US side. There are four sub-groups such as Defence Production and Procurement Group, the Military Cooperation Group, the Joint Technology Group and the Senior Technology Security Group that report to and provide inputs to the DPG. A Defence Joint Working Group has been established to discuss policy issues. The DPG is engaged in an “intensive exchange of views on the international strategic and security situation and on the further development of bilateral defence cooperation as envisaged under the “Defense Framework”.

Joint military exercises

Joint military exercises involving the armies of the two countries have intensified in scope and magnitude since they began in the early 1990s. The ruling NDA government of that time even offered basing facilities to the American military before US launched its attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. Under the NDA rule in 2002, the Indian navy escorted American ships through the Strait of Malacca.

Malabar Exercises: In anticipation of a nuclear deal being approved, large-scale quadrilateral naval exercises were held in the Bay of Bengal in early September 2007. The navies of the US, Japan, Australia and India conducted war games in the Andaman Sea, near the strategic Strait of Malacca. Singapore joined in, sending one of its ships. The US dispatched two aircraft carriers, the Nimitz and the Kitty Hawk, each capable of carrying more than 170 aircraft on board along with guided missile destroyers and nuclear submarines for the Malabar Exercises. India dispatched 15 ships, including its lone functioning aircraft carrier INS Viraat, to take part in the exercises.(80) Japan sent two destroyers. Indian Defence minister A. K. Antony told the parliament in August 2007 that the exercises were in “national interest.” The next round of Malabar exercises was held in October 2008, in the Arabian Sea, in which frontline units from both the navies participated. The scope of the exercises included diverse activities, ranging from gun-firing and fighter combat operations from aircraft carriers, to combating the scourge of terror, through Maritime Interdiction Operations exercises. The USS Ronald Reagan, a nuclear weapon equipped aircraft carrier, led the US naval contingent. (81) In August 2007, the nuclear-powered USS Nimitz docked in the Chennai port.

The ‘Red Flag’ exercise: ‘Red Flag’ war games over the Nevada desert in the US mark India’s debut in the “world’s most advanced and coveted air combat exercise.” “Red Flag” is a multinational air exercise in the US with a complement of Sukhoi-30 frontline fighter aircraft and mid-air refuellers. Originally a cold war ‘war game’ in which the U.S. Air Force (USAF) defended its territory against a ‘hostile enemy’ comprising its military allies, the ambit of ‘Red Flag’ was widened to include Washington’s recent partners in the ‘war against terrorism.’(82)

Counter-insurgency exercises: The Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) of India in Mizoram is training US army troops in this field. Joint exercises form part of the training and the latest, fifth in the series, was held in 2008. A total of 133 US personnel have been trained so far. “Faced with terror attacks in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army is keen to learn from Indian Army’s experience in combating insurgency for the last 50 years.”(83)

The US is looking at defence deals with India worth over $30 billion in the next few years.(84) According to US consul-general in India Michael Owen, American companies were responding to Indian competitive tenders for military hardware and fighter aircraft like F-16 and F-18. American producers are going for co-production with the Indian companies.(85) In the last three years, the US has struck three major arms deals with India. These include ANTPQ37 weapon-locating radars, six Hercules C-130J transport aircraft, and eight maritime P-8 reconnaissance aircraft. Immediately after the NSG waiver, US announced selling India two dozen Harpoon II anti-ship missiles. The deal, worth over $170 million, is the first sale of American missiles to India which would arm squadrons of the maritime-role version of Jaguar warplanes of the Indian Air Force.(86) India has also asked for supply/technical support, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, technical data and publications. In January 2009, India quietly went ahead and signed the biggest-ever $2.1 billion defence deal with the US for purchase of eight Boeing P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft for Navy.

The Indian government is fast-tracking three key military pacts with the US, including one under which armies can refuel ships and aircraft in cashless transactions that are balanced at the end of the year. Apart from the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), the other pacts pending are the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that will enable the two countries on a common platform, and an end-user agreement governing the sale of military hardware to India. According to an Indian official, “The LSA would require both countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kind of logistics support to each other’s fighter jets and naval warships.”(87) The end-user agreement is still under discussion as it does not require the US to verify the equipment and it is rather for India to certify where the equipment is located. In addition, as part of the collaboration in space technology, four American satellites are to be launched by India in the next two years.

Indo-US strategic partnership: Implications for China

The implications of Indo-US deal would be analyzed in view of changing strategic culture of India in the wake of emergence of India as a nuclear weapon power and US recognition of India’s nuclear status by forging a long-term strategic partnership with that country. Two, how China perceives growing Indo-US strategic partnership? Three, how does Chinese factor in the implications in its evolving conception of “peaceful rise of China”, “harmonious world and new diplomacy.”

India’s strategic culture and Indo-US partnership

How India’s strategic culture is likely to be influenced by the growing strategic partnership with the US and what would be its implications for China. What would be the importance of India’s strategic culture in shaping the security policies of India in the wake of strategic partnership with the US.

Strategic culture is a complex phenomenon both in terms of its definition and application. Alan Macmillan and Ken Booth define the concept of strategic culture as referring to “a nation’s traditions, values, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat and use of force.”(88) The basic assumption is that strategic cultural inputs have a relationship with strategic policy outputs. Macmillan and Booth provide a framework of analysis which is based on three broad sources of strategic culture that are : a) geography and resources; b) history and experience; and c) political structure and defence organisation.(89) The argument is that beliefs, values and habits constitute a strategic culture which persists over time, and exerts influence on the formation and execution of strategy.

What had been India’s traditional strategic culture; what is India’s contemporary strategic policy and what are sources of change? Indian strategic culture has manifold influences, ranging from its ancient thinker Kautilya’s political realism to post-independence Nehruvian combine based on Kautilya’s realism and idealism mainly derived from Ghandian non-violence, hard realism — often referred to as militant Nehruvian paradigm as practiced by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, pragmatism incorporated in the Gujaral doctrine and Hindutva nationalism propounded by the right-wing BJP that greatly influenced India’s going nuclear. With nuclearization of India, its strategic culture has undergone a fundamental change which has been followed by the Congress-led UPA government and is likely to continue for foreseeable future. The Indo-US partnership is manifestation of this big shift in India’s strategic culture and the big question mark would be how a nuclear India in strategic partnership with the most powerful state in the international system embodies the precepts of idealism, realism, pragmatism and Hindu nationalism while shaping its security policies.

In terms of its geo-political setting, India is a large country which always nurtured aspirations to emerge as a regional power and an Asian power. Being a neighbour of China, another rising power in the Asia-Pacific region, the elements of rivalry always existed. From Nehru down to the present, Indian political leadership and strategic community always felt that India could play a key role in the world politics in general and Asia in particular.(90)

In terms of resources, it is endowed with big size of 3,287,590 sq km, and a population of 1.1 billion which is characterized by ethnic, religious and social diversity and substantial natural and human resources. It has registered remarkable scientific, technological and industrial development, especially after the liberalization of its economy starting in 1991. Currently, it is considered one of the fastest growing economies of the world and offers a large market to the US. The economy has witnessed an average growth rate of more than 7% in the decade since 1997. India achieved 8.5% GDP growth in 2006, and again in 2007, significantly expanding production of manufactures.

It is expected that the Indian economy could grow at a rate of 7-8 percent for the next two decades. All current analysis indicates that India is likely to be among the five major economies in the first half of this century and will overtake Japan, Germany, Britain, and France at some point in the next 25 to 50 years.(91) According to CIA assessment, by 2015, India will have the fourth most ‘capable concentration of power , after the US, EU and China.(92)

India shares 3,380 km border with China which remains almost undemarcated. It dominates the South Asian region and is strategically placed near Indian Ocean trade routes. On the flip side, the huge and growing population may become a fundamental social, economic, and environmental challenge for the country.

India’s strategic culture is also influenced by its historical experience. Its political leadership and security establishment always refers to the border conflict with China in 1962, three wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971) and several warlike crises with Pakistan and multiple frictions with smaller states of the region such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. While with China, a sense of defeat dominated the Indian mindset, with Pakistan it has been the ideological conflict that shaped India’s security policies. The smaller states were always seen as pawns in the big powers politics; Nepal in the context of China and Pakistan and Sri Lanka as soliciting support from extra-regional powers against India. In the case of Pakistan, India always cited Pak-China nexus as being against Indian interests. In contrast, the smaller states always complained about Indian domination and hegemonic attitude towards them as India tried to assert its regional aspirations. It should be noted that when India went nuclear in 1998, its foreign minister George Fernandes cited China as the main enemy or source of threat.

In terms of political structure, India is considered the largest democracy in the world which has unbroken tradition of civilian rule since independence in 1947, although facing “constant challenge of social inequalities as well as violent centrifugal movements.”(93) The democracy aspect of India has been much appreciated by the US as one of the most important “shared values’ in strengthening its strategic partnership. In fact the “shapers of India’s strategic culture are primarily nationally recognized political party leaders, senior bureaucratic officials, and notables in the leading universities, think tanks and the press.”(94) Although, the defence organization, the armed forces have not been involved in politics, yet their input on important security issues has always been valued by the civilian establishment.

India’s strategic culture & its nuclear posture

How India’s strategic culture is going to be shaped by its nuclear weapons? Is India’s nuclear doctrine part of India’s new emerging strategic culture? As India went nuclear in 1998, it emphasized on the nuclear minimalism or a policy of credible minimum deterrence. “This involves the conviction that it does not take large numbers or a high degree of sophistication to deter an adversary. … Moreover, from this standpoint, nuclear balances are of no consequence. Hence India need not worry about China’s far larger nuclear arsenal. This precludes arms racing, which is both costly and risky.”(95) When India’s National Security Advisory Board constituted by the BJP government announced the draft nuclear doctrine on 17 August 1999, it stated: “The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should a deterrence fail.”(96) The draft doctrine however envisaged the development and maintenance of a credible minimum deterrence, based upon a strategic triad of nuclear forces — land-based, air-based, and sea-based; a second-strike capability, and punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons if deterrence were to fail.(97) This went well beyond India’s stated doctrine and demonstrated India’s ambitious nuclear weapons programme in the future.

In January 2003, Indian Cabinet Committee on Security came out with its official nuclear doctrine which also emphasized on building and maintaining a “credible minimum nuclear deterrence.” However, it should be noted that the 2002-2003 annual report of the Ministry of External Affairs dropped the word “minimum.”(98) Moreover, the official version of the doctrine states that India reserves the right to retaliate if its forces are attacked with biological or chemical weapons which clearly undermines the “no-first-use” policy that it had declared in the first draft.

A strategic debate is going on inside and outside India about India’s strategic posture — the nuclear arsenal that India is likely to develop. Ashley Tellis, a prominent strategic analyst, observes that Indian policy makers have decided that “Indian nuclear force will be configured neither as a recessed deterrent nor as a ready arsenal but as a force-in-being, that is a deterrent consisting of available, but dispersed, components that are capable of being constituted into usable weapon systems during a supreme emergency.”(99) This posture, he argues would eventually be replaced either by a robust force-in-being that “is not limited in size’ before India is “constrained either by bilateral agreements or by multilateral treaties” or “a modest ready arsenal that is, a force defined by highly integrated weapons ready for prompt operations”, yet small in numbers and types of nuclear weapons that it involves. Beyond these two sub-alternatives, he feels “lies a true and robust ready arsenal, which may be described as a large nuclear force that is fully integrated in disposition, with centralized but rapidly devolving command and control arrangements.”(100) This implies an inevitable transformation in India’s nuclear posture and strategic culture.

Tellis argues that the transformation of the force-in-being depends on India’s strategic environment: a) “if China emerges as a true superpower in the future and, as a result of its changed status, dramatically expands its strategic nuclear capabilities and transforms the current conventional balance vis-à-vis India to New Delhi’s disadvantage”; b) If Sino-Indian competition intensified over time as a result of growing national capabilities in both states and if the resulting struggle for power were to generate a high-intensity contest of influence in the Middle Eastern and southeastern rimlands of Asian continent.”(101) This implies that India considers China a rival in Asian balance of power and the inevitable emergence of China as a “superpower” would intensify this rivalry and warrant a change in India’s nuclear posture. Rodney Jones shares this perception and argues that “China did not figure prominently as a classical enemy, but a sense of Indian rivalry with China has emerged.”(102) However, he contends that “concerns about China are not overplayed in Indian strategic culture; rather, India’s sense of civilization and antiquity is seen as at least equal… to China’s, and India has been prudent in seeking a non-confrontational relationship with China in which trade channels and other forms of exchange are growing and are being used to limit China’s reliance on Pakistan.”(103) It seems that both elements, rivalry and cooperation, are most likely to dominate India’s strategic posture towards China.

The cooperation proposition also derives strength from another element in Indian strategic culture — which is India’s strong belief in a multipolar world, each dominant in its own region with pledges to avoid interference across regions.(104) This supports Chinese perception that India will not become a junior partner of the US. Skeptics in the US also point out that Indian strategic culture is rooted in the concepts of non-alignment and multipolarity and thereby “a true strategic partnership will be difficult to develop in the security realm.”(105) The divergent worldviews are demonstrated in India’s differing policy towards Iraq, Iran and Myanmar. India’s stance on the Doha Round of WTO and Climate Change reinforces this proposition. This, however, does not prevent India from having a close partnership with a lone superpower in shaping the global order, especially acquiring greater influence in Asia. India is also desperately seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The US policy makers are also quite mindful of India’s ambitions to play a greater role in Asia and the world at large.

Chinese perception of Indo-US strategic partnership

China is described as a “rising great power”, “a major power”, “the dominant regional power”, or the “next great power.” The Chinese government itself refers to “China’s peaceful rise to the great power status.” With a population of 1.3 billion and an area of 9.6 million sqkm, China is the third largest and the fastest growing economy of the world. It has sustained a GDP growth rate of over 9% over the last two decades with $ 1.5 trillion foreign exchange reserves in 2007. China, world’s biggest producer and consumer of coal, has become importer of oil since 1993 and is now seeking secure access to global energy resources.(106) It is a formidable military and nuclear power. There is a great debate going on in the US concerning the “rising China” and various strategies ranging from engagement to containment to deal with it. Many strategic analysts in the West and India see the newly emerging strategic Indo-US relationship in that light. The perception is also shared by most Chinese scholars.

China is closely watching the evolving Indo-US strategic partnership, especially the negotiation process of the nuclear deal since 2005. The issue has been downplayed at the official level with strong reservations expressed at the unofficial level by the Chinese media and strategic community. Initially China expressed some reservation over the deal and took a principled stand that the deal was going to violate the NPT. The first major Chinese comment on the matter appeared on 27 October 2005, in People’s Daily titled: “Who’s pushing nuclear proliferation”. It was quite critical of the US for “making an exception” for India that would “bring about a series of negative impacts” particularly on the Iranian and North Korean issues.(107) The finalization of the deal in March 2006, however, brought a call from Beijing for New Delhi to sign the NPT and also dismantle its nuclear weapons, saying “as a signatory country, China hopes non-signatory countries will join it [the NPT] as soon as possible as non-nuclear weapon states, thereby contributing to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.”(108)

China, a key member of the IAEA Board and NSG, has adopted a principled position on the Indo-US nuclear deal arguing that it backed “peaceful” use of atomic energy by all nations. A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Qin Gang, stated: “China believes all countries, while adhering to their international obligations of nuclear non-proliferation, have the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy and to carry out international cooperation in this regard.”(109) Thus, China remained non-committal on the Indo-US nuclear deal and did not give any assurance to India of its support when required for the approval of the India-specific safeguards at the Board of the IAEA and the NSG waiver. India made several attempts to solicit such support and sent high officials to convince China that the deal was meant entirely for energy purposes. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh tried unsuccessfully to seek such assurance when he met Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the G-8 meeting in early July 2008. In late July 2008 as a last-ditch effort, Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, Prithviraj Chavan, visited Beijing to secure assurance from China on the India-US civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The Chinese again conveyed the stance that “they had no objection to peaceful international cooperation on nuclear energy as long as any such cooperation adheres to international non-proliferation commitments.”(110) Chavan handed over to Dai Binguo, State Councillor in charge of foreign affairs, two letters from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addressed to President Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao. The letters explained India’s position on the nuclear deal and asked for China’s support when the issue comes up before the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the NSG. The minister explained to the Chinese that the deal was not bilateral between India and the US, “but an international civilian nuclear energy cooperation arrangement aimed at ending India’s nuclear isolation.” He also tried to address Chinese concerns and explained India’s position on nuclear energy. “I stressed India’s impeccable record… assured them of all the voluntary measures taken by us to prevent proliferation.”(111) Nevertheless, the Chinese government remained non-committal. After the failure of the first round of debate at NSG on the waiver issue, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu observed “NSG can find a way to strike a balance between non-proliferation and (the) peaceful uses of energy.”(112)

Although China has not given any explicit assurances to India to support its case at IAEA and NSG, it did not oppose the approval of India-specific IAEA safeguards and stayed neutral in the current NSG over the deal. There are five major elements in the Chinese perception that shape its attitude and will finally determine its response towards the Indo-US strategic partnership as it gets operationalized.

·               First: There is a broad consensus amongst the Chinese academics that it is “rise of India” that has prompted US to forge a strategic partnership with India and China can do little to stop it. Zhao Gancheng Director Department of South Asian Studies at the SIIS, observed, India is “rising rapidly” while Dr Shen Dingli Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, contended that there was only a seven-year gap between China and India in reaching the same level of economic rise.(113) However, Dr Wu Chunsi, Deputy Director, Department of American Studies at SIIS, argued that the factor of democracy and India’s nuclear tests enhanced India’s importance for the US and brought them closer.(114) However, all of them agreed that China could not prevent the growth of Indo-US strategic partnership which was rooted in the broad convergence of US and Indian interests.

·               Second: most Chinese academics agree that the Indo-US strategic partnership is in the context of Asian balance of power and part of US “hedge” policy to contain “rising China” and its growing influence in Asia at large. Zhao Gancheng argues that the Indo-US nuclear deal is the “most important variables in the geo-political landscape in Asia.”(115) In an interview with the author, Zhao contended that the “US does not want that China should rise alone as it does not consider it in the interest of balance of power in Asia. So it is in the interest of Asian stability that both China and India rise at the same time.”(116) So it is within this context that the US is supporting India to rise. Dr Wu Chunsi expressed concern that Indo-US strategic partnership had element of hedging China. Yu Yingli, a research scholar at SIIS, also contended that the nuclear deal between Indian and the US was part of US hedge policy towards China. Dr Shen, however, regards the rise of India as a positive development for the balance of power in Asia, but in the context of Indo-US strategic partnership feels that India and US have a common interest in hedging China.(117)

Within this context, Shen Qiang, Director, Research Department, Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, contends that there are many underlying strategic factors that have led to the emergence of the Indo-US strategic partnership and both countries want to gain from this relationship and maximise their strategic interests. He identifies five factors that are driving the US to get closer to India. First by making India a “natural ally”, the US wants India and China to “contain each other” and reduce pressure from them against US hegemony. Second, the US wants to prevent possible emergence of strategic partnership among India, Russia, China and Pakistan in future. Third, the US intends to bring India gradually into the US-Japan-Australia military alliance. Fourth, the US wants to use India to dominate developments in the Middle East and prevent India-Iran relationship. Fifth, in the long term, “India cannot only serve as a tool to contain the potential challenges to the US from China and Russia, but also influence the direction of the evolving geopolitical structure in the Asia-Pacific region in favour of US hegemony.”(118)

·               Third: A number of Chinese strategic analysts feel that there is broad divergence of interests between India and the US which would limit their strategic cooperation as India would not like to follow US dictates in its foreign policy orientations, especially regarding the containment of China. Shen Qiang, feels that India’s strategic interests are quite different from that of the US. He underscores four areas of India’s interest in forging partnership with the US. First: India is seeking status of a nuclear power and hopes that by signing a nuclear deal with the US, it would get recognition as a nuclear state, get access to advanced nuclear technologies, equipments and strategic nuclear energy reserve. This will not only narrow the gap between India and other nuclear powers but also lay a solid foundation for India to rank among the nuclear powers in future. Second: as US gets closer to India, it also pushes Russia and China to build a friendly-cooperative relationship with India which enhances its role in the quadrilateral US-China-Russia-India relationship. However, within this context, he feels that “in future, India will try to raise the Indo-US relationship above Indo-China relationship so as to contain China by playing the US card.” At the same time India would like to maintain a trilateral strategic cooperation with Russia and China so as to restrict US hegemony. Third: India is “trying to pursue a great military power status.” The military cooperation with the US will “help India build its image of a great military power.” Significantly, “through diversified military cooperation, there will be more sources for India to obtain advanced military technologies and equipments so that it can rapidly increase its military strength and lay a solid foundation for becoming a great military power.”(119)

These perceptions are shared by other scholars interviewed by the author. Almost all of them argued that India had its own strategic objectives to emerge as a great power and would like to use China card to get US support.

·               Fourth: a majority of Chinese does not feel that the Indo-US strategic partnership is going to pose any immediate threat to China’s security, though there is an underlying concern that in the long term the “rise of India” would pose a challenge to Chinese interests in Asia at large. While there is a sense of confidence that India will not be in a position to pose any military threat to China, at least in the near future, there are apprehensions that India would be competing with China for access to energy resources, especially in Central Asia, Middle East and Africa, and political influence in China’s peripheral regions, especially Central Asia, East Asia and South Asia.

·               Fifth: there was a broad consensus within the strategic community of China that it should not isolate itself internationally by opposing the Indo-US nuclear deal at IAEA or NSG over safeguards or waiver, respectively. There were two main reasons behind it. One, China knew that the US was bent on getting this deal through so Chinese opposition would not make any difference, except spoiling its fragile relations with both. Two, by opposing the nuclear deal, China would push India even closer to the US which would not be in the long-term strategic interest of China. Therefore most Chinese scholars agree that China should follow an engagement policy both viz-a-viz India and the US though for different reasons.

Evolving Chinese concept of ‘harmonious world’
and Indo-US strategic partnership

Chinese attitude towards implications emanating from the operationalization of Indo-US strategic partnership would largely depend on its own theoretical conceptions that it is evolving to engage the major powers with a rising China in Asia and the world at large. Chinese political leadership, strategic community and political analysts are quite mindful that coping with the “rising China” is the main concern of the US and its allies which look at it either as a “China threat” or “collapse of China.” China has come up with multiple concepts to allay such apprehensions. These include the theory of “peaceful rise of China”, the conception of “harmonious world” professed by the current Chinese leadership and China’s utmost effort to promote a multipolar world. Significantly, all these responses are not devoid of an element of realpolitik. These are four main elements that would shape Chinese response/strategy regarding realignment of forces in the world at large and in Asia in particular.

Peaceful rise of China (heping jueqi)

The concept of peaceful rise of China envisages its endeavour to develop in a peaceful environment, and at the same time to promote world peace. Under this concept of peace and development, China wants to build socialism with Chinese characteristics through involvement in, not isolation from, economic globalization. According to Vice-President Li Junru of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China, China’s road to a “peaceful rise” refers to “the development course of China from the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978 to the mid-21st century, when China is expected basically to realize modernization.”(120) Li Junru outlined five features of China’s peaceful rise. These included:

1.              China should continue putting economic construction at the centre of its work and making development the priority of the peaceful rise. That is to say, China would not see political confrontation as its target, nor develop its economy through expansion or isolationism.

2.              China would participate in economic globalization and compete with others in the world market to realize a win-win result.

3.              China would persist in independent development when participating in economic globalization. That means China’s development would be based on its own strength.

4.              China would deepen reform and seek coordinated development in all areas. It would continue to build a “socialist market economy” and would handle well the problems that crop up during the course of development.

5.              In the international arena, China should play its due role as a big country, but it has no intention to seek domination in dealing with international affairs. History has proved that domination would inevitably lead to world disorder, so the Chinese leaders have pledged to the world that China would never seek hegemony, even after it basically realizes modernization.(121)

Zheng Bijian, a prominent Chinese theorist and President of the Institute of Humane Culture for Post-graduates of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, speaking on 22 April on the “Development of China's Peaceful Rise” contended that China’s choice for “peaceful rise” has broken the rule of “rising through fighting for hegemony and [in order] to rise [it] must resort to hegemony.”(122) Li Junru also believes that China’s rise is neither through military expansion nor through intense Cold War confrontation but through participation in economic globalization in a mutually beneficial way.

Elaborating on impact of China’s rise on its neighbours and the region Li Junru underscored that it would not damage the interests of other Asian countries “because China’s rise provides a huge market for its neighbors” and allows support to the progress of others in the region. He also indicated that in future, “China and other countries in the region will form various interest groups. These groups, based on common interests, will differ from some international organizations like NATO, which has a leader and sphere of influence. I believe we can develop these groups using our own Eastern wisdom, so they are relevant to this part of the world.”(123) In fact lately China has developed another notion that talks about “peaceful development” of China.(124)

‘Harmonious world’

The concept of harmonious world is forcefully advocated by the current top Chinese leadership to define China’s diplomacy and diplomatic activities, “pushing China into a new and powerful role in the world affairs.” Yuan Peng, Director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary Relations, says: “Guided by the concept of creating a ‘harmonious world’, under the principle of promoting peace, development and cooperation, supported by increasing national strength, and prompted by profound changes in the international arena, China is in the process of innovating and expanding its diplomatic thinking and behaviour.”(125) The concept of harmonious world has entered into international sphere and evolved into Chinese theory to define goals of China’s diplomacy and guidelines for foreign affairs.

The Chinese concepts of “new diplomacy” and “harmonious world” reinforce each other. The concept of a “harmonious world” was first introduced by President Hu Jintao on 22 April 2005 at the Asia-Africa summit where he proposed that Asian and African countries should “promote friendly coexistence, equality-based dialogue, and economic development and prosperity of different civilizations in order to create a harmonious world.”(126) On 1 July 2005, during President Hu’s visit to Moscow, the concept was incorporated into the joint declaration of China and Russia on world order in the 21^st century, affirming consensus between the two countries on the idea of a harmonious world.

On 15 September, President Hu elaborated on the concept in his address at the United Nations. He said:

We should respect the right of each country to select its own social system and path of development, encourage exchange, rather than mutual exclusion, learn from other rather than indulge in self-complacency, and help other countries develop on the basis of their national conditions; we should strengthen dialogues between different civilizations, improve our competition, seek common development amongst differentness, and try our best to eliminate mutual suspicion and misunderstanding, so that mankind will live in harmony and the world will become more colourful; we should, in the spirit of equality and openness, maintain the diversity of cultures, promote democracy in international relations, and work together to build a harmonious world where all civilizations tolerate each other and live peacefully together.(127)

The Central Affairs Conference held in August 2006 and the sixth plenary session of the 16^th Party Congress held in October further delved on the concept of harmonious world and identified “five adheres-to” principles that show the intricate relationship between the internal and external dimension of the “harmonious world.” These are:

First: A harmonious world and harmonious society. The latter is the foundation of the former, and the former the guarantee of the latter.

Second: A harmonious world and peace and development. To build a harmonious world is the goal, peace and development are the ways and means.

Third: A harmonious world and diplomatic practices. A harmonious world is both an abstract concept and a road map for diplomatic practice. Its main objectives are harmonious neighbourhood, harmonious regions and harmonious bilateral relations.

Forth: A harmonious world and China’s diplomatic principles. Creating a harmonious world is not the pursuit of harmony at all costs or under any circumstance, rather harmony must be pursued “with reason, to our advantage, and with restraint,” without undermining China’s core interests and fundamental diplomatic principles. It clearly says that China would not sacrifice its principle of non-intervention for constructive cooperation with the US in handling the Korean nuclear crisis and the Darfur issue in Sudan and employ its own diplomatic style, concepts, and roles. In addition, China would continue with its modest defence modernization.

Fifth: A harmonious world and diplomacy for the people. This implies that the “people, as contained within the harmony concept, are now distinctive features of the new diplomacy. That is to say as China’s national interests expand overseas and domestic and overseas interests intertwine, an important task of diplomacy is to ensure citizens’ safety.(128)

Multipolar world

Within this concept of “harmonious world” China strongly advocates a multipolar world. Thereby it firmly defends the authority of the United Nations and insists on the reform of the current international economic and political orders. In this sense, China aims to be a constructor and a reformer, not a destroyer (Li Junru). China also strongly supports the development of a multipolar world in which US influence is contained.

Indo-US strategic partnership: Regional
implications for China

As a rising power in Asia, a rising India in strategic partnership with the US, the most powerful actor in world politics, will have significant security, political and economic implications for China. Senior US officials and leadership have made it very clear that they have very clear intentions of strategic containment of China. John Cherian, an Indian analyst observes: “It is no secret that one of Washington’s primary goals in forging an alliance with India is to checkmate China’s rising power.”(129) Former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill in a speech in New Delhi had observed that both India and the US should get together to face the challenges “from the enemy beyond the third mountain range.”(130) In India there are strong apprehensions that “a successful conclusion of the India-US deal will make New Delhi a junior partner in Washington’s aggressive pursuit of its geo-political designs in Asia. India could end up supporting Washington’s game plan to monopolise the oil and gas reserves in West and Central Asia.”(131) It is also argued that India’s traditional foreign policy has been noticeably affected, as is clear from its vote against Iran in the IAEA and India’s foot-dragging on the negotiations for the gas pipeline deal with that country. The then secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, and other senior US officials advised New Delhi against signing the gas pipeline deal. Condoleezza Rice also controversially questioned the relevance of India’s membership in organisations such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).(132) To what extent India will follow Washington’s strategic goals vis-à-vis China will become clearer as Indo-US strategic partnership takes shape in the coming decade.

The following section focuses on potential implications of the operationalization of the Indo-US strategic partnership on China’s strategic, political, and economic interests in three regions of great importance to China’s periphery security: South Asia, Central Asia and East Asia. It should be underscored that the extent of implications will depend on: One, how New Delhi would play out its strategic partnership with the US and balance its relationship with China. Two, how China and India perceive each other’s position and role in Asia and the world at large.

South Asia

China’s current South Asia policy is guided and determined by its “periphery strategy which is based on China’s perception of the developments and trends of its environment in its immediate neighbouring areas.”(133) The policy was initiated by new Chinese leadership in 2002 and gives top priority to “maintaining periphery stability and making neighbours partners.” The policy is based on two assumptions. One, China’s rapid economic development would benefit its neighbours. Two, China’s development also depends on its neighbours.(134) One of the main objectives of this strategy is to “strive for sustainable stability in South Asia without which nothing could be done and expected.” The other Chinese interests are participation in regional integration, potential for trade and stability of China’s southwest border areas.

Given developments in China’s periphery, even though South Asia did not appear first and foremost on the security and strategic agenda of China, the Indo-US strategic partnership will push it to the forefront of Chinese security matrix because it is going to influence China’s other peripheries either directly or indirectly. Within the South Asian context, the nuclear deal will have profound impact on China’s South Asia policy and its relationship with India and Pakistan. The deal while directly impinging on the strategic and security interests of China, also provides an opportunity to China to reinvigorate its South Asia policy in the light of fast changing regional and global realities. There are four areas where Chinese interests would be affected by the Indo-US strategic partnership. First and foremost is the impact of the operationalization of the nuclear deal on the non-proliferation regime and deterrence stability in South Asia. Two, China will be faced with the challenge of balancing and competing US vis-à-vis US strategic partnership with India to protect its own security and economic interests in India. Third, China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan that survived the vicissitude of times would require real strategic upgradation as Pakistan would play an important role in the long-term strategic calculations and energy security for China.

China : non-proliferation regime and
deterrence stability in South Asia

The gravest threat that the Indo-US nuclear deal poses is that it has shattered prospects of a non-discriminatory regime in South Asia. Concern over the matter has been voiced by both China and Pakistan. For the sake of co-opting India as a partner in the larger balance of power in Asia, the deal has accorded a de jure status to civil nuclear cooperation in India in modifying IAEA safeguards and in trying to get a similar waiver from NSG. However, the deal does not provide a de jure nuclear weapons state status to India and India continues to be a de facto nuclear weapons state. As a result, argues Zhao, “India would have a double status: in the civilian nuclear field, India is likely to establish a legal status in order to develop cooperation with other countries, especially with members of the NSG; in the nuclear weapons field, India is likely to remain a non-signatory state of NPT and continue to be what is known as a de facto nuclear weapon state.” He also believes that there is a chance that this double status is accepted by other states as well. The question is that India’s access to such a status would nevertheless require some kind of revision of the present regime, which has not, for the moment, made such a distinction in a discriminative way. India wants an exclusive revision of the current regime. The US has already succeeded in securing India-specific IAEA safeguards and also managed to get an India-specific waiver from the NSG. Now the question is, how this development would impact on the other states, especially Pakistan which has been denied such status.

The nuclear deal has evoked great concern from Pakistan, and it has asked from the US the same deal as has offered to India. In April 2006, the then prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, observed that “nuclear non-proliferation and strategic stability will be possible when the US fulfils the needs of both Pakistan and India for civil nuclear technology on an equal basis” and warned that “a selective and discriminatory approach will have serious implications for the security environment in South Asia.”(135) Similar observations were made by president Musharraf, Pakistan’s foreign office and strategic community at large. It is argued that all of Pakistan’s commercial nuclear plants unlike India have been under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan raised its concerns at the IAEA Board meeting but did not press for a vote, largely under US pressure. However, it continues to express “serious reservations” about the deal due to its discriminatory nature. On 22 August 2008, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said the “deal must not be discriminatory against Pakistan, which should also be given access to nuclear technology for generating power. ... Pakistan has the full right to use nuclear technology to meet its growing energy needs.”(136)

China has also highlighted the discriminatory nature of the Indo-US nuclear deal but owing to its unique compulsions relating to its relationship with the US it has not obstructed the deal. China has called for any exemptions for international nuclear cooperation and trade agreed to by the NSG to be open to Pakistan as well,(137) but the US refused. But once the deal is finalized and its operationalization starts, it will clear the way for China to become more active in securing similar concessions for Pakistan ending the discriminatory practices against Pakistan. More significantly, it will free China from US pressure to engage in civil nuclear energy trade with Pakistan under the IAEA safeguards. China has already set up two 300-MG power plants at Chashma; one is complete and the other is under construction. It has also assured Pakistan of setting up another four nuclear power plants, each of 1300 MW. Nuclear power constitutes less than one per cent of Pakistan’s energy mix. Rising fuel cost is putting pressure on Pakistan to diversify its energy resources, including nuclear energy.

Deterrence stability

The operationalization of the Indo-US deal will greatly undermine deterrence stability in South Asia. India has not compromised its nuclear weapons programme which will be pursued independently, depending on its security needs. There is a strong perception in Pakistan, shared by China and many others in the world, that the nuclear deal will enhance India’s nuclear armament programme. Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) that has the responsibility for its nuclear weapon policies and production (chaired by then president Musharraf) declared: “in view of the fact the [US-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant quality of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence will be met.”(138) However, the Pakistan ambassador to the US at the time, General Jahangir Karamat, offered that “if bilaterally, the US can facilitate a moratorium on fissile material production or on testing, we are happy to be part of it.”

Pakistan’s strategic community has expressed great apprehensions that the deal will undermine strategic stability and would lead to an arms race in the subcontinent. Adil Sultan, of Pakistan Strategic Plan Division (SPD), observes, if nuclear agreement is implemented without limiting India’s fissile stocks and possibility of improving its nuclear weapons it “could lead to arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India and China.”(139) He strongly feels that the nuclear deal will lead to quantitative and qualitative improvement in India’s nuclear arsenal. Most of the Chinese scholars interviewed, like Zhao Gancheng, Wu Chunsi, Yu Yingli, and Xia Liping, felt that the nuclear deal was very discriminatory towards Pakistan and would destabilise stability in South Asia. However, Dr Shen Dengli observed that it would not affect the minimum deterrence in the region as Pakistan did not need many weapons to ensure deterrence stability. He contended that by going nuclear, India lost its conventional superiority over Pakistan. In fact he argued that India’s going nuclear had stabilised the strategic balance between China and India which was a positive development. In fact there are many in the US, including its Congressmen, that feel that the deal would initiate an arms race in South Asia. Democrats Edward Markey and Ellen Tauscher(140) in a commentary published in the New York Times expressed apprehension that the nuclear deal would fuel an arms race with Pakistan unless it was amended banning New Delhi producing new weapons-grade material and conducting nuclear test explosions.

China has deep and abiding strategic interest in stability in South Asia and any undermining of deterrence stability in the region would upset the Chinese. They realise the need for peace on their borders for domestic as well as regional development. A tense South Asia will significantly harm China’s periphery strategy.(141) Thereby, China has strongly supported the India-Pakistan peace process and peaceful resolution of their disputes. The declared objective of the US, too, is to ensure peace and stability in South Asia. Condoleezza Rice in her statement on the nuclear deal at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative observed that the US was ready to help improve India-Pakistan relations and ensure strategic restraint on both sides, and was prepared to intensify significantly diplomatic effort with both India and Pakistan.(142) However, it seems that the deal may have unintended consequences for the stability of South Asia.

The undermining of strategic stability by giving India a favoured position in the international system Zhao feels would “reduce Pakistan’s self-confidence” which is the fundamental basis of the rapprochement effort with India. He points out that deterrence works at two levels, one is the perception level, and the other capability level. The nuclear deal has already destroyed stability of deterrence at the perception level. Pakistan is worried about being marginalized which has created strategic uncertainties. On the capability level, Indian utterances regarding its sustained nuclear weapons programme have only aggravated the damage to the deterrence stability. Zhao strongly believes that India being a dominant state should act responsibly and maintain strategic stability. He argues that maintaining stability requires the major players to exercise self-restraint in their nuclear weapons programmes and also pursue a transparent procedure without discrimination. That would make the international non-proliferation regime work.(143) China maintains that India should sign the NPT, CTBT and stop producing fissile material for weapons. Another Chinese nuclear expert, Xia Liping, suggests that India and Pakistan should create a nuclear-free zone, a proposal that will need more creative thinking as both countries have gone nuclear.(144)

Sino-Indian relations: Balancing US-India partnership

India is China’s immediate neighbour with which it developed a lot of mistrust in the wake of the 1962 border conflict which still remains unresolved. Although there has been an incremental improvement in their bilateral relations in the past few years, yet China views the growing Indo-US strategic partnership through the prism of its complex relations with the US. Chinese scholar Zhao Gancheng observes that the nuclear deal has made India and the US “semi strategic allies” that would have impact on Asia, not because how powerful India suddenly becomes, but for the real intention of the US in building up a workable security architect in Asia.(145) On the other hand, referring to Chinese reservations about the nuclear deal, Gurmeet Kanwal, an Indian strategic analyst, observed: “Chinese reaction was another attempt to keep India down, in consonance with China’s grand strategy of dominating Asia and confining India to the backwaters of the Indian Ocean as a subaltern state.”(146) It appears that the Indo-US strategic partnership is going to have long-term implications for China as it would bring the two Asian powers competing for strategic space, political influence and economic interests, especially access to energy resources in Asia and beyond.

At present, there exists asymmetric threat perception between China and India. While India tends to be deeply apprehensive regarding China, China appears comparatively unconcerned about threats from India, and finds it difficult to understand why India might perceive China as a threat.(147) John W. Garver gives two explanations for this asymmetry. 1) a deliberate and systematic understatement of Chinese concerns about India, resulting from the mobilization function of China’s public media, and 2) the greater effectiveness of China’s application of power over the past 50 years.(148) Consequently, Chinese government and public media systematically downplay Indian threats to China’s security interests. Given the outright US support to India manifested in their strategic partnership, China has crafted a two-pronged policy of strategic engagement with India so that US should not be able to maximize its influence over India’s policy towards China: One, China is engaging India strategically in security dialogue and economic field that promotes trust between the two countries. Two, China is trying to minimize the areas of divergence with India, or isolating them so that they do not disturb the mainstream relations.

a.        Constructive strategic engagement

Despite India’s finger pointing that it was due to the Chinese threat that it decided to go nuclear, China has devoted much of its diplomatic energy to improving relations with India. In June 2003, during prime minister Vajpayee’s visit to China, the two sides signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation, agreed to build a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and signed Political Guiding Principles for Resolving Border Issues. In April 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi and the two countries agreed to establish the Strategic Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, which marked a new era of bilateral relationship. The joint statement issued on the occasion said: “such a partnership is based on the principle of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’s concerns and aspirations, and equality; provides a sound framework for an all-around and comprehensive development of bilateral relations based on mutual and equal security, development and prosperity of the two peoples; and contributes to jointly addressing global challenges and threats.”(149) The joint statement asserted that their bilateral relations had acquired a “global and strategic character.”

In 2006, President Hu Jintao visited India and the joint declaration issued after his talks in New Delhi proposed a 10-point strategy to develop closer Sino-Indian strategic partnership that would “ensure the comprehensive development of bilateral relations, strengthen institutional linkages and dialogue mechanisms, consolidate commercial and economic exchanges, expand mutually beneficial cooperation, instill mutual trust and confidence through defence cooperation, seek an early settlement of outstanding issues, promote trans-border connectivity and cooperation, boost cooperation in science and technology, revitalize cultural ties and nurture people-to-people exchanges, and expand cooperation on the regional and international stages.(150) An important aspect of the rapprochement effort was that dialogue mechanisms were improved. Now there is Special Representative Mechanism on Border Issues, the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism and the China-India Eminent Persons Forum. The Strategic Dialogue Mechanism focuses on concerns about major security and strategic issues and is playing a significant role in increasing mutual political confidence. Under this forum the two armies have interacted. The first defence and security consultation and the first joint-anti-terrorism training were held in 2007.

In January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing and both countries signed a document called A Shared Vision for the 21^st Century that emphasized the “resolve to promote the building of a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity through developing the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity between the two countries.” It further underscored historical responsibility of China and India to “ensure comprehensive, balanced and sustainable economic and social development of the two countries and to promote peace and development in Asia and the world as a whole.”(151)

On issues affecting China’s core interests, India has maintained consistent policies. It recognizes the Taiwan province and the Tibet Autonomous Region as being part of China and “does not allow on Indian soil any anti-China activity.”(152)

Politically, China and India have adopted similar positions on major international and regional issues and both favour a multipolar world and are against unipolar hegemony. Both are cooperating closely in the UN, WTO and G8+5. China and India joined hands in the Doha Round of WTO talks to uphold the interests of developing countries.

Economic co-operation has become the driving force and the focal point of China’s ties with India. China like the US would want to exploit the vast potential market India offers. In 2003, the two governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Expansion of Border Trade, agreeing to open border markets through Nathu La (Pass). More than the trade, the decision was politically significant because with this China extended tacit recognition to India’s sovereignty over Sikkim. In April 2005 China and India launched a Financial Dialogue Mechanism and agreed to all-round economic cooperation. A Joint Study Group was set up to examine the potential complementarities between the two countries. The Group in its report identified a series of measures related to trade in goods and services, investment and other areas of economic cooperation. A Joint Task Force has also been appointed to study feasibility of China-India Regional Trading Arrangement. Consequently, there has been rapid growth in bilateral trade in the past few years. According to China’s Consul-General in Kolkata, Mao Siwei, from $2 billion in 1999, the figure increased by nearly 20 times to touch $38.7 billion in 2001 and the original target of $40 billion set for 2010 was achieved in 2007 and had to be revised to $60 billion.(153) There are upward trends promising bright prospects for economic expansion between the two countries. India has become China’s third largest trading partner. At present more than 150 Indian enterprises have sub-companies or representative offices in China. Over 60 Chinese companies are engaged in infrastructure projects in India.(154) Bilateral investment is also on the rise, with accumulated investment reaching $3.85 billion by 2005. India’s investment in China was $420 million in 2005.(155) There has also been lot of emphasis on educational and cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts.

It is important to note that the two countries are seeking cooperation in the global oil quest. With rapidly growing oil demand and increasing dependence on imports — in 2004 over 40 per cent of China's crude and some 70 per cent of India's came from abroad,(156) which shows their potential rivalry in access to energy resources.

b.       Areas of divergence

Although China and India are trying to develop a common strategic vision regarding their security and economic cooperation, there are certain issues that will keep them apart for a long time. There are likely to be three major areas of divergence that would confront the growing China-India relationship. One is a part of historical legacy and concerns boundary demarcation. Second is lack of strategic confidence that partly stems from the border issue and is likely to be reinforced by the Indo-US nuclear deal. Third, the ambitions of two fast-growing Asian powers have seeds of future rivalry.

The Boundary Issue: China and India share 4000-km long border which has not been formally demarcated. The two sides have divergent perspective on the issue and in 1962 the issue led to a border conflict that aggravated the situation. China does not recognize the MacMahon Line while India insists on its implementation and neither is ready to make any concession. In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquillity Accords, an agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). During the visit of Chinese prime minister to India in 2005 China recognized the territory of Sikkim and Assam as belonging to India, while India during the visit of its prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in 2003 recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as an autonomous part of China. In the past India had underlined China’s “suzerainty” as opposed to sovereignty over Tibet. In April 2005, India and China signed an agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of India-China Boundary Question. There have been 12 rounds of talks, without much progress. C Raja Mohan argues that India has changed its territorial diplomacy towards China from “territorial imperative to the political imperative” that envisages soft borders and comparative frontiers.(157) How this new negotiating framework that India is proposing has elements of mutual acceptability is yet to be seen.

This optimism is not shared by the Chinese academia. Chinese scholars feel that the boundary issue is very sensitive and there is no possibility of its being resolved in the near future. Dr Zhao feels that it would be difficult for China to compromise on Twang area in Arunachal Pradesh which has religious significance for Tibetan Buddhists. Dr Shen Dengli, on the other hand, feels that the significance of the boundary dispute has decreased to a large extent in their bilateral relationship. According to him resolution of the border dispute was only possible in the 1960s when China became a nuclear power and India was not a nuclear power. Now that India has also become a nuclear power both sides are not ready to give any concessions to each other. He says the fact that China can no longer take it militarily means that the dispute will linger on, because giving any concession to India which is in occupation of the Chinese land would mean that China has accepted the legality of MacMahon line which it will never do.(158) In the interim period both countries will be focusing more on managing their differences rather than solving the conflict itself.

The second major point of divergence is mutual distrust and suspicion that is not only fed by the boundary dispute but also the Tibetan issue. The question of Tibetan separatists getting support from India still lurks in the Chinese perception and there were suspicions that India might have extended some support in the March 14 incidents in Tibet. Ma Jiali observes that “China is concerned that India might offer protection to the separatist activities of Tibetan in exile, and this might affect Tibet’s stability and southwest China’s security.”(159) This distrust has been reinforced by the Indo-US nuclear deal and is likely to grow, despite New Delhi’s clarifications that India’s strategic partnership is not directed against China. The fact that the China factor looms large in India’s annual Defence Reports and strategic debate deepens this distrust. The mistrust is also rooted in the prospects of future China-India rivalry which will be partly an outcome of the Indo-US deal itself.

The third major element of divergence stems from the long-term prospects of China-India competition in the balance of power in Asia. Although this aspect has been underplayed by the Chinese official circles as well as the media and academia, the fact remains that Chinese are quite mindful of it and are factoring this in their broad strategic policies. A big segment of the Chinese academia suggests that “India should be regarded as a neighbouring, big power, a developing country as well as a key player in the multilateral diplomatic arena. …China should respect India’s interests and take appropriate steps to solve historical problems. Should these be done, and should India be willing to do the same, it is really possible to establish a new strategic partnership between the two countries.”(160) Within this context while discussing the China-India-US triangular relationship, Venu Rajamony argues , what is more likely is the emergence of a “soft balance of power” system among the three countries.(161) Zhang Guihong supporting the argument observes : “Alternately, at one end, a vicious competitive relationship among the three countries may emerge, and the “soft balance of power” may be changed into a “hard balance of power” similar to that in the Cold War era, if one of them regards the development of relations between the two other countries as a challenge to its national interests, or if any two in this triad forge a relationship as a means to contain the third country. At the other end, it is possible for China, the US and India to establish a relatively harmonious relationship if they can seek out common views and interests, and push their differences aside to deal with bilateral and unilateral relations within a strategic perspective.”(162) Whether there is going to be eventually emergence of soft balance of power or hard balance of power, the fact remains that the Indo-US partnership if operationalized in the manner it is conceived would create more uncertainties in India-China relations within the Asian balance of power.

Sino-Pakistan relationship: strategic impact

Indo-US deal is going to impact China-Pakistan relationship in at least three ways. One: it would increase the strategic value of Pakistan in China’s long term strategic calculations as a potential counter-hedge to the Indo-US partnership, if the latter starts impinging on Chinese security and strategic interests in Asia. Two: China has a common interest in joining hands with Pakistan to ensure safe access to energy sources, especially from the Middle East, West Asia and Central Asia. Three: China and Pakistan as natural allies would deepen their economic and strategic partnership in their own right which is an essential part of China’s periphery strategy and Pakistan’s security, economic and social development

(a)     Shared strategic interests

As discussed above, Pakistan would be facing direct consequences of Indo-US partnership, as it would affect the strategic environment in South Asia to the disadvantage of Pakistan. India happens to be the dominant regional power in South Asia and has a fragile deterrence relationship with Pakistan that is likely to be get upset by operationalization of this deal. The implications have been discussed above. Linked with deterrence stability is the impact of defence deal on the conventional balance between the two countries. The deal aggravates the imbalance in conventional sphere as India has been offered an entire range of advanced US military technology from F-16s, F-18 F/A-22 to the P-8 multi-mission maritime aircraft. Moreover, the anti-missile system, PAC-3, is also on the table.(163) This would not only undermine the deterrence stability but may also encourage “India to undertake military operations preemptively in a crisis situation to attempt to knock out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.”(164) Within this context, Rodney Jones argues that “regional instability does not … rest on nuclear balance per se, but on inequality of strategic depth and the potential for India to employ conventional forces to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear forces.”(165) Such fears are strengthened as India shows its interest in the Cold Start Doctrine that implies that India can fight a conventional war under the cover of the nuclear umbrella for a limited purpose.

The fear is also heightened as one of the shared interests underlined in the Indo-US strategic partnership is “cooperation in counter-proliferation”. How will it apply to Pakistan wherein the A.Q. Khan affair, political instability, and terrorism are always cited as possible dangers of its nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands — extremists, terrorists, non-state actors — and lately in this connection even the mental health of Pakistan’s president was questioned? Recently, former US ambassador Robert Blackwill had suggested that US and India should plan together to meet such a contingency. Surely all this is not helpful for strategic stability of South Asia.

How China would respond to such a situation where one of its strategic allies would be facing a serious security crisis emerging out of Indo-US collusion? China has a major stake in the regional stability in South Asia. Although it is improving its relations with India, it has assured Pakistan at the highest level that it will in no way be at the cost of its relationship with Pakistan. On the other hand, China like the US wants to come out of the “balance of power” paradigm of security relationship between India and Pakistan. Yang Jiemian, president, SIIS, observes that China wants to “transcend Cold War paradigm of balance of power in South Asia” and is searching for a “new strategic framework” in which it could deepen its strategic relationship with Pakistan, independent of Sino-Indian relations.(166)

It seems difficult to reconcile China’s interest in regional stability with threats emerging from Indo-US partnership to the prevailing security environment. The ground realities in South Asia do not allow it at the moment unless there is a dramatic improvement of relations between India and Pakistan which includes major progress on the Kashmir issue. China and the US have common interest in the stability of South Asia which allows China to play a more effective and proactive role in maintaining stability in the region. As underscored by Zhao Gancheng: Chinese role in South Asia… “should be a promoter of peace and stability by balancing position on various kinds of differences between nations in the region, and by opposing any unilateral and proactive actions that could make regional security more fragile and unstable.”(167) The inclusion of China in SAARC as an observer indicates that a soft balance of power between China, India and the US would be taking shape in the long run. In the interim period China would be quite mindful of Pakistan’s hard security needs especially in the area of conventional defence. China has been a major source of defence supplies for Pakistan.

Pakistan has strongly supported China on the issues of Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Beijing Olympics.

(b)     Common interest in energy security

Energy security is emerging as one of the most important shared interests between China and Pakistan. While Pakistan is facing its worst-ever energy crisis at the moment where demand has outstripped supply by more than 3000 MW, China with its fast growing economy is planning for secure access to energy resources as well as is interested in developing fuel reserves.

In 2006, China and Pakistan signed a Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation. Pakistan is trying to overcome its energy crisis by pursuing a two-pronged policy — developing domestic energy resources like hydel and coal as well nuclear energy on the one hand and working out gas pipeline deals with Iran, Turkmenistan and Qatar. China has agreed to assist Pakistan in developing its oil and natural gas industry, besides constructing multipurpose hydel projects such as the Basha-Diamer dam, Neelum-Jhelum power project and Thar coal project. China has agreed to build a 405MW integrated coal mining-cum-power project at Sinda at a cost of $600 million.(168) On the other hand, Pakistan has offered to serve as China’s energy corridor. The idea was floated by president Musharraf in 2006 and it envisaged a corridor linking Pakistan and China through road, rail, fibre optics and oil and gas supply connectivity. Pakistan is connected through the Karakoram Highway with China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The potential viability of this link becomes evident when one realizes that the distance between China’s Xinjiang area and Karachi/Gwadar ports is just about 2500 kilometres as against the distance of 4500 kilometre from China’s eastern seaboard.(169) the proposed link described as Gwadar-Xinjiang trade and energy corridor would boost transit trade as well as provide China opportunity to develop an alternate safe energy route that would not only be used to transport its Middle Eastern oil requirements but also connect gas pipelines to China. There are two gas pipeline projects — Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) — that can pass through Pakistan to different parts of China where energy supplies are required. China has shown interest in the energy corridor proposal and is seriously evaluating the economic and technical feasibility of the project. The idea was explored in the first Pakistan-China Energy Forum held in Islamabad in April 2006. Chinese energy experts view this project as an alternate to the Malacca Strait, the route for main transhipment of Chinese oil imports but want it to be cost effective as well as forming part of a comprehensive package.(170)

Pakistan’s location at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia makes it an ideal gateway for cooperation amongst nations of three regions in energy, trade and transportation.

(c)     China & Pakistan as natural allies

For the past few years both China and Pakistan have been trying to deepen and diversify their economic and trade relations as these do not match with the close political relations between the two countries. As a result, bilateral trade between the two countries has picked up from $ I billion in the 1990s to $6.8 billion in 2007. Pakistan and China also signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2006 that covers goods and investment and aims to raise the two-way trade to $15 billion by 2011. Both sides are also trying to adopt a corrective mechanism to offset the trade imbalance which is heavily tilted in favour of China. A Joint Five-Year Economic Plan has been worked out to promote Pakistani exports to China in a big way. To attract investment from the private sector, a Pakistan-China Joint Investment Company was set up in 2007. It is expected that Chinese companies will enhance cooperation with Pakistani companies in areas including finance, telecom, energy and transportation.

China and Pakistan are also discussing a trade in transit agreement. Under the deal, China will be able to use KKH and the ports of Gwadar and Karachi for transporting its goods to Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan. Trade is expected to flourish further and turn in Pakistan’s favour as transit trade and route facilities through the Gwadar deep-sea Port come up. Besides, in 1995 China and Pakistan along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan entered into a quadrilateral agreement on traffic-in-transit to promote traffic-in-transit among the four countries. In 1996, the member countries concluded a protocol on customs procedures for goods in transit and passport visa regime and in 1998 regulations for implementation of this agreement and a protocol on establishing the system of international road transit permit were also signed. The agreement is in force from October 2003. Under the agreement major roads from Almaty and Bishkek would be extended to join the KKH which links China and Pakistan. Besides the bilateral level, both countries are expanding cooperation through multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the ASEAN — Regional Forum (ARF) covering regions from East Asia to Eurasia.

China’s entry into SAARC as observer would also boost regional economic integration as well as promote peace and stability in the region. On 3 April 2007, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing attended the 14^th SAARC summit as an observer. Speaking at the opening session he remarked: “As the biggest neighbour of South Asia, China hopes that all South Asian countries will live in harmony and pursue common development and that SAARC will grow from strength to strength and play a bigger role in regional and world affairs.”(171) There is a great scope for establishing an institutionalized dialogue mechanism between SAARC and China which will greatly help build trust, cooperation and development in the region.

Another emerging area of cooperation between Pakistan and China is joint effort in fighting terrorism. China has fully supported Pakistan in its fight against terrorism. A joint working group has been formed to formulate anti-terrorism security arrangements that meets from time to time. China is facing the problem of Muslim secessionists and religious extremists in its Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region which threatens the internal stability of the country. Pakistan is cooperating with the Chinese government in curbing Uighur separatism.(172)

China has also agreed to provide equipment to Pakistan to fight terrorist activity. The two sides have also strengthened bilateral cooperation to check narcotics trafficking, illegal border trade and money laundering and other trans-border crimes.

Central Asia

What would be implications of Indo-US strategic partnership for China’s interests in Central Asia? China is emerging as a dominant actor in Central Asia while the United States and India also want to have strong presence in the region for energy and trade and, more importantly, to offset the growing Chinese influence in the region. Thereby the Indo-US strategic partnership will have far-reaching implications for Chinese interest in Central Asia.

Central Asia comprises five states of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that became independent with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. The region is another periphery of China as it shares borders with three of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Chinese ties with Central Asia are rooted in ancient history and acquired greater significance in the post-Soviet era.

The fact that Xinjiang, where China faces a separatist movement, borders, the Central Asian states makes China more sensitive about its periphery stability. Further, the region being rich in energy resources has attracted competition of the global actors which has made it even more important for Chinese strategic, security, political and economic interests. Against this backdrop, the Indo-US strategic partnership is going to have both direct and indirect bearings on Chinese interests in Central Asia, especially in view of Indian determination to treat Central Asia as its “extended neighbourhood” and compete for the rich energy resources as well as political influence in the region.

Competition over access to energy resources
and pipeline politics

Central Asia is rich in oil and gas resources. According to some Central Asian reports, the confirmed oil deposits in the region are 13-15 billion barrels, which is 2.7 per cent of all the confirmed deposits in the world, and around 270-360 trillion cubic feet of confirmed gas deposits. Another view is that the actual reserves of oil in the Central Asian region are in the range of 60 to 140 billion barrels. The main oil and gas deposits of the Caspian region are in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.(173) All the major powers, the US, Russia and China, are trying to get foothold in the energy sector in the region. India is a lateral entrant but is trying to increase its influence in the energy market of the region both in terms of its investment in the oil and gas industry and energy supplies through pipelines as well as to find a transit route to enhance its trade with the region.

Many analysts observe that a “new great game” in the region is unfolding focusing on strategic competition for transit routes. The US, China, the EU, Russia, India and Pakistan are all vying for the right to build the huge pipelines to get the oil and enormous natural gas reserves out of Central Asia. Russia’s interest is in maintaining its transport monopoly and privileged access to Central Asia’s energy sources. Europe and the US want an energy transport route towards the west through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. China in interested is developing a pipeline infrastructure towards the east, and India and Pakistan are keen to tap the region’s hydrocarbon resources and draw them southward. So the pipeline politics has led to rivalries in the region for influence. There are two competing energy corridors that are taking shape. They are: North-South Transport Corridor and the East-West Transport Corridor. In 2000, Russia, Iran and India signed an agreement envisaging a North-South corridor. The corridor stretches from ports in India across the Arabian Sea to the southern Iranian port of Bander Abbas, where goods then transit Iran and the Caspian Sea to ports on the Russian seacoast. From there, the route stretches along the Volga River via Moscow to northern Europe.(174) This would provide India access to Russian, Central Asian and Eastern European markets for its goods and links to a variety of energy-import sources. India and Iran are also jointly developing the Iranian port of Chahbahar to access the Central Asian States. A road will also link the port to Afghanistan and Central Asia; its Iran-Afghanistan section, Dilaram to Zaranj, has been constructed with Indian assistance and opened to traffic.

The US on the other hand is also trying to consolidate its influence over the region’s energy resources and is behind the development of the “East-West Transportation Corridor”. It is trying to get the support of the EU in connecting the energy markets of the East and West with Caspian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The main objective is to secure a strategic route for the export of Caspian energy resources to the Western markets. Since Russia is apprehensive of expansion of Western oil companies influence in the region it has refused to participate in the East-West Transportation Corridor. India has preferred the North-South Corridor as it is relatively short and cheap transit route to the Central Asian markets. This has raised some concerns in the US both due to Iran’s nuclear programme and its own aim of containing Russian influence in the region. As part of the strategy, the US State Department has created the South and Central Asian Affairs office in the department. Within this context, the US has also supported the idea of a ‘regional energy grid’ to transport gas and electricity from Central Asia to South Asia. Many multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, ADB are offering funds for the project. This would also act as an alternative energy route that would fit into India’s thinking.

Indian policy makers and analysts believe that the region is important because of its strategic location and proximity — Tajikistan is just 20 kilometres from greater Kashmir — and its energy resources.(175) Thus, Indian defence minister underscored that restoring traditional linkages with its extended neighbourhood in Central Asia and beyond has become “one of the primary strategic priorities” of his government. In the meantime, India is developing close relations with all the CARs in fields ranging from weapon trade, technology transfer, construction to counter-terrorism.(176) In 2006, India approved its participation in the US$5 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project.

China is also developing close bilateral commercial relations with the CARs, and has become a major investor in Kazakhstan oil industry. The Kazakhs have also built an oil pipeline that links Kekiyak in Kazakhstan to Atyrau in the Xinjiang province of China. Although China and India have demonstrated some cooperation in joint bidding in Syria and Sudan, yet when it comes to Central Asian energy, their competition is fierce. This became obvious when in 2005 China outbid India to acquire Petro-Kazakhstan, with the Chinese petroleum corporation raising its bid to US $ 4.18 billion.(177)

China’s evolving security structure in CA
and Indo-US partnership

The strategic competition in Central Asia among the major global players — US, China, Russia and India — has intensified in the last few years. The US influence in Central Asia grew in the post Cold War period, especially after 9/11. The objective was not only to thwart Russian military doctrine of “Near Abroad”, (1993), but also act as a counterweight to the expanding Chinese influence in the region. Hence, after 9/11 the region witnessed an increased American military engagement with its bases spreading from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The war on terrorism thus provided opportunity to the US to strengthen its military presence in the area. However, after the May 2005 uprising in Andijan province of Uzbekistan and the so-called colour revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbek government ended military cooperation with the US and asked for the withdrawal of its Karshi-Khanabad air base. Since US and India share interests in counter-terrorism and energy production, it seems that US intends to rely on Indian cooperation in the region.

Within this context the Indo-US strategic partnership becomes more important. Gulshan Sachdeva underscores: “In Central Asia, India will be expected to play its role as a balancer in the backdrop of increasing Chinese dominance and declining Russian presence”.(178) Another Indian analyst, Kapil Kak discussing India’s growing role in Central Asia argues: “India would need to bring to bear its rapidly increasing political, economic and military capabilities to the table as a threshold great power with vital stakes in the region.”(179) Consequently, India has expanded its military contacts with Central Asia. It has set up a military base in Tajikistan Ayani, a refurbished Soviet airbase of Farkhor. It is India's first real military outpost in a foreign land and will give New Delhi a 'strategic' capability in the energy-rich Central Asia. India’s immediate plan, according to defence ministry sources, was to deploy Mi-17 helicopters as well as some Kiran trainer aircraft to train Tajik pilots. But this is likely to be just a prelude to establishing a larger strategic imprint that would include deployment of MiG-29s.(180) The establishment of the air base gives India an opportunity to increase its influence in the region.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

China attaches great importance to the SCO partnership with its Central Asian neighbours. The organization grew out of Shanghai Five that was formed in 1996. SCO was set up in 2001 by six countries — China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 2004 and 2005, the SCO admitted Mongolia, India and Pakistan and Iran as observers. China has expressed its support to Pakistan’s full membership of in the organization. SCO is the first intergovernmental international organization based in China. China shares 14,799 km of borderline with SCO members and observer countries that shows the political and strategic significance of the organization for China and for regional stability.

Originally the organization was aimed at enhancing security, trade, cultural, military and justice cooperation among member countries. It started with functional issues such as demilitarization of the Sino-Russian borders, tackling drug trafficking, and boosting intra-regional trade.(181) As a result, China has settled its historical disputes with its Central Asian neighbours as well as Russia through consultations.

Besides, the SCO has also focused on closer regional cooperation for economic development. There is a cooperation programme in multilateral economic and trade fields among SCO members that is meant to facilitate free flow of commodities, capital, services, and technology in the region. An SCO Business Council was also formed to forge an inter-bank agreement in the region to facilitate finance development projects. In fact, in 2005 China extended nearly US $ 1 billion worth of loans to Central Asian states.(182) According to the General Administration of Customs of China, China registered US $ 40 billion trade with SCO members in 2005 which was 47 per cent up over 2004.(183)

In recent years, the SCO has focused more on fighting three forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism to maintain regional peace, security and stability. It has set up an anti-terrorism agency to coordinate anti-terrorist efforts. Within this context, China is participating in anti-terrorism military exercises with SCO members. It has also involved itself in combating drug trafficking and has helped Afghanistan in the reconstruction process. In 2004, the organization established Regional Anti-Terrorism Structures (RATS) to coordinate SCO members activities in this area. Based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, it has conducted several multilateral anti-terrorism military exercises in the region. In 2007 the SCO held a “Peace Mission 2007” exercise, the first joint anti-terror exercise involving military forces from all the member countries. Chinese ambassador in Russia Liu Guchang, elaborating on the objective of the exercise, said that “it indicated the importance attached by member countries to the drill and their firm will to enhance cooperation, jointly crack down on the three evil forces, and maintain regional peace, security and stability as well as determination to promote the development of SCO”. He tried to allay Western, especially American, fears by saying: “The SCO, which holds a defence and security principle of fairness, openness and transparency, will not play any role as a military bloc but will advocate a new concept of security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.” He added that the SCO holds “a principle of non-alliance, non-confrontation and will not target any third country or organization.”(184) A Chinese scholar, Pan who heads Shanghai-based SCO Research Center Academy of Social Sciences, observed that it was within the framework of the SCO had China established a close, yet unaligned partnership with Russia and its Central Asian neighbours.(185) However, this unaligned partnership is viewed differently in Washington and, now, in New Delhi. Since the US is not a member of the SCO, it feels that it is directed against its interests in the region. There is a growing feeling in Washington that it is a parallel security structure dominated by China. The fact that Russia got crucial support “for its peace efforts in South Ossetia from China and other allies in SCO”(186) at the summit meeting held in August 2008, would further strengthen such perceptions. The West, especially the US, has denounced “Russian aggression” against Georgia and threatened even sanctions against Russia.

Against this backdrop, New Delhi is distancing itself from SCO while getting closer to the US. Gulshan Sachdeva argues “if Chinese expansion coincides with declining Russian influence, India will have no choice but to expand its political, economic and military capabilities in Central Asia.” Simple realist logic would suggest close Indo-US cooperation in Central Asia. These realities are fuelling India’s “forward” Central Asia policy.(187) However, India’s geopolitical ambitions in CA are constrained by its current partnership with the US, continued strategic closeness with Russia, an important player in Central Asia whose relations with the US are getting worse, and China’s assertion as a dominant power in the region at the moment.

East Asia

What would be the implications of Indo-US strategic partnership for China in East Asia? East Asia, including South-East Asia, is another strategically and economically important periphery of China. Closer strategic cooperation between the US and India would certainly impinge on Chinese strategic, economic and political interests in the region.

East Asia is an amalgamation of South-East Asia — the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which includes Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos — and North-East Asia — which includes China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. The region holds an important position in Chinese energy security, maritime security, economic and trade development… China is a big power in East Asia. To promote its economic interests and ensure regional stability, China is heavily involved in many multilateral mechanisms in East Asia, including ASEAN, ASEAN 10+3, ASEAN 10+1 and the Six-Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue.

The ASEAN, formed in 1967 expanded over the years and now has 10 states as its members. In 1976, ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which emphasizes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Since it was open to non-members, China, India, Japan, Russia and South Korea could sign in. The main objective of ASEAN was to “accelerate economic growth” among the member states and to “promote peace and stability across the region.”(188) In 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was set up that showed willingness of the group to deal with security issues. ARF agenda included promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and adoption of peaceful approaches to conflict resolution. ARF has 24 members including the US, Russia, China, India, Japan and North Korea. The ARF discusses major regional security issues such as the relationship amongst the major powers, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, transnational crimes, South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula.(189) In 1997 ASEAN members signed Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. In 2003, ASEAN leaders set up the ASEAN Community with three pillars — ASEAN Security Community; ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Under the ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted in 1997, it would work for economic integration of the region which would include trans-ASEAN transportation and trans-ASEAN energy networks. India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1995. At present India’s trade with ASEAN countries stands at US $ 38 billion and is expected to go up to US $ 50 billion by 2010.(190) Recently, India and ASEAN concluded a trade-in-goods agreement after six years of talks and negotiations on investment and services would start soon.

In 1999 Asean+3 was institutionalized that included China, Japan and South Korea. In regional terms, what was significant for China was that both the United States and Australia were not included in the forum. In 2005, China, along with Malaysia, got East Asia Summit (EAS) of 16 regional countries off the ground. Besides the 13 Asean+3 member states, this grouping included India, Australia and New Zealand. “The presence of India was met by “quiet resistance” from China. This stance reflected, in part, the perception that the presence of India would act “to lessen Chinese influence in the EAS.”(191)

The region holds very important position in the global and regional interests of the US. On 28 July 2008, deputy secretary of state John D. Negroponte, talking on the US Policy in Asia: Meeting Opportunities and Challenges, at Brookings Institution, noted that US was shaping its policy to meet the opportunities and challenges posed by “Asia’s extra-ordinary rise.”(192) He argued that the US was basically a Pacific Power and had played a stabilizing role in maintaining balance of power in the region. Underlining the economic importance of the region he said 21 APEC economies, including most of East and Southeast Asia, accounted for 60 per cent of global GDP and half of global trade. Within this context he emphasized: “Our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand remain the foundation of peace and security in Asia.” He observed that since 2001, US had modernized its alliances with its key allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, to “reflect the realities of the 21^st century.” He said the US had supported Japan’s efforts “to play a broader international role befitting its status as a great power.” US had also strengthened its alliance with South Korea “to continue promoting regional security while also helping to meet global challenges.” In addition, US had reached out to new friends in South-East Asia like Indonesia and Vietnam. It is against the broader perspective that the US had entered into a strategic relationship with India which is certainly going to have lot of impact on Chinese interests in the region.

Chinese interests in the region

China has significant economic, strategic and political interests in the region that are embodied in China’s “new security concept” that was in fact evolved in the 1990s in the context of Chinese interests in Southeast Asia. This concept expanded the definition of security to include political, defence, diplomatic and, above all, economic considerations. According to Wu Baiyi, Deputy Director of the Research Department, China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, “compared to past policies, the current concept signifies two major changes… For the first time economic security is treated as equally important with those of ‘high politics.’” Second, it “focuses more on the interrelationship between external and internal security.”(193)

Against this broad perspective, China attaches great importance to its economic interests in the region as it considers itself a regional economic power. The main challenge for China is to convince the regional countries that “China is an economic opportunity for them and not a threat… the worst case for China is that ASEAN members extend their fears of Chinese economic growth to an all-round apprehension of China.”(194) To pursue this interest China wants to present itself as the biggest market, and source of investment so as to make China an engine of economic growth in the region.

China has strong strategic interests in the region which has heavy concentration of major powers, including the US, Japan, Russia, India and China itself. The “primary aim of the Chinese regional security is thus to avoid the formation of coalition of regional countries against the rise of China”.(195) Within this context China attaches great significance to the small and medium powers such as the two Koreas in Northeast Asia and ASEAN members in South-East Asia for Chinese security environment. It should be noted that China has serious disputes with ASEAN members states on the South China Sea. Then there are sensitive issues of Taiwan and Sino-Japanese relations which are viewed more through the prism of China’s status as a rising power. The Sino-US relations are another important element in the security of the region and evoke Chinese sensitivities. Within this context China’s heavy reliance on the Malacca Strait for its oil shipments makes China oversensitive to the growing military cooperation and presence of rival powers in the region.

Politically, China wants to increase its clout in the region. It desires recognition and appreciation as a regional power. A Chinese analyst, Zhang Tiejun, observes: “China recognizes that in foreseeable future, China’s global influence will only be limited, and thus the main arena on which China exerts influences would be regional. ... The best way to achieve so is thus to promote China’s image as a responsible regional power.”(196) China’s role in resolving the North Korean crisis should be viewed in this light. Given the significance that China attaches to its political, economic and strategic interests, the operationalization of Indo-US strategic partnership will have far-reaching implications for China.

Impact of Indo-US partnership on Chinese
interests in East Asia

Both the US and India have common strategic and economic interests in the East Asian region. US being the most dominant power in the Asia–Pacific region and India pursuing a proactive “Look East” policy since 1990s, makes it abundantly clear that there is a politico-strategic convergence of interests to increase their influence in the region which will certainly be at the expense of China. It seems there would be a common interest in containing China’s growing influence in the region.

India’s “Look East” policy is also a manifestation of its aspiration for a status as a global power which will get a boost from its close political and defence relationship with the US. India is emerging as a soft ally of the US in its counter-terrorism strategy in the region as well as in maritime security, especially the safety of the Malacca Strait. India argues that its increased role would be commensurate with its growing oil imports through the strait. This does not auger well for Beijing. “Some Chinese strategists believe that India’s cooperation with South-East Asian states on counter-terrorism and maritime security is part of the larger Indian strategy to control the Indian Ocean, and that India’s Look East Policy is, in fact, influenced to some degree by the desire to limit China’s growing influence.”(197) In addition, India’s growing maritime cooperation with Japan and South-East Asia is seen as a strategy to counter China’s growing maritime clout. This is evident in the assertion made by the India navy from time to time. The Indian navy, in particular, has expressed concerns about China’s “string of pearls” strategy of clinching regional defence and security agreements to enhance its military profile in the Indian Ocean.(198) A former Indian naval chief Adm. Arun Prakash said: India is in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and that is where China has implemented its “strings of pearls” strategy by creating right around us what are best described as “weapon-client states” — “Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan”.(199) It should be underlined that the US holds similar perception about the growth of the Chinese navy. Moreover, India wants to station its forces around the Malacca Strait in the Bay of Bengal.(200) India’s Eastern Naval Command has around 50 naval ships and 55 aircraft ranging from carrier, missile destroyers, submarines, stealth frigates, naval sea fighters and helicopters.(201) This indicates that the Indo-US strategic partnership would encourage a Chinese-Indian competition over the security of the Malacca Strait and surrounding regions.

The Malacca dilemma

China’s dependence on ship-borne energy supplies is growing and thereby the Malacca Strait is gaining importance in its energy security. At present 69 per cent of its oil is transported through this strategic sealane. Thereby the safely of the strait, a narrow stretch of waterway between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra become very important for the Chinese. A Chinese scholar, You Ji, while referring to the strait observes that the safety of the sea lane of communication (SLOC) is “at once a nonconventional and a military one, which may trigger maritime conflict. The difficulty in dealing with this challenge is that it is integral to geo-politics and hence subject to complicated major power relations. Geostrategic politics will increasingly determine Beijing’s SLOC policy of political cooperation and military hedging.”(202) Although safety of the Malacca Strait is in the interest of all major powers, an exclusive control of such security by the US and India along with American allies Japan, Australia and Indonesia would not be desirable for China. You Ji argues “what worries President Hu is the apprehension of access denial. Only US is capable of doing so.”(203) Such fears arise because in 1992 the US navy forcefully inspected Chinese ship Yinghe in the Indian Ocean. Chinese concerns are further reinforced by the possibility of a “war in the Taiwan Strait with US involvement,” which would lead to interdiction of Chinese shipments through the strait.(204) The US Navy has the largest naval base in the Indian Ocean. More than 80 per cent of Chinese oil tankers go through this dangerous lane under 100 per cent US surveillance and control.(205) It is against this strategic backdrop that China contends its navy is acquiring “contingency capabilities.” These concerns have also led Beijing to seek alternative land-based energy transportation routes.

The Indo-US partnership which has unfolded joint maritime exercises such as Malabar in 2007, involving navies of the US, Japan, Australia and India doing war games in the Andaman Sea, near the strategic Strait of Malacca, has raised eyebrows in Beijing. It should be underscored that in the post-9/11 period, the US has strengthened its alliance relationship with Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, while China’s relations with Japan have taken a bad turn.

The threat of maritime terrorism, piracy, human trafficking and other transnational crimes to the Malacca Strait would be a common interest where Beijing would not feel threatened. Moreover, the littoral states like Malaysia and Indonesia would be unwilling to accept any direct US role in the security of the strait which would also impinge on their sovereignty and security. Within this context, they would be unwilling to allow India to assume central role in the security of the sealane. It needs to be emphasized that China is pursuing a cooperative security approach through regional multilateral and bilateral initiatives with ASEAN and ARF and the individual states of Southeast Asia(206) to protect its geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in the region. Within this context, the factor of sealane security has been added to China’s maritime strategy.

Indo-US strategic partnership: Global
implications for China

What are the implications of the Indo-US nuclear deal for China at the global level? Indo-US strategic partnership is in part an outgrowth of reshaping of US Asia policy which is geared to protect American interests in the 21^st century. Hence, the Indo-US partnership has wider global implications for China, especially in terms of its relations with the US as well as Russia.

China-US relationship

Sino-US relations are central to the emerging balance of power in Asia. They are defined by enormous complexity which would continue to shape US Asia policy. Chen Dongxio, Vice President SIIS, elaborating on the complexity of Sino-US relationship observes: “on the one hand the interdependence of interest is growing, which further exacerbate the shocks on the economy, political structure and social psyche of each other. The shock from China is even stronger. On the other hand, dialogues as well as frictions over conceptions and values around building regional and global orders will … become an important aspect of bilateral relations.”(207) The broad convergence and divergence of strategic, economic, political as well as societal interests of the two most important and most powerful actors in the world politics is going to stay central to Sino-US relationship in the coming decade. US President Barack Obama's China policy is expected to follow the principle of continuity, with some difference appearing in their trade and economic relations due to economic challenges that both countries will be facing because of the global financial crisis. In the security area, many challenges that Obama administration would be facing like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the nuclear programmes in Iran and North Korea, require cooperation with China. Moreover, on many global issues such as climate change, energy, environmental protection and HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, China and the United States have wide space to cooperate.

From Containment to ‘Responsible Stakeholder’

The challenge posed by the rise of China to the US has led to debates in the US on America’s China policy. Ex-president Bush himself described relationship with China “complex” and asserted to “engage China in a constructive and candid fashion.”(208) The two competing perspective have been “a positive-sum perspective in which the US, China, and other regional actors have strong incentives to increase mutual trust, transparency, and economic ties, thereby minimizing the likelihood of avoidable military conflicts that serve no nation’s long-term interests; and a zero-sum perspective, in which the continued relative increase in Chinese power poses the most formidable long-term danger to the national security and economic interests of the US and its allies in the region, regardless of whether Beijing’s relations with US or its neighbours appear cordial and constructive in this decade.”(209) At the same time a search for synthesis between the two perspectives is going on that would have both elements of engagement and containment of China as is referred to China as a “responsible stakeholder”. In September 2005, then US deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick put forward this new proposition for managing bilateral relations between the US and China: the US would like to work with China as a “responsible stakeholder”, which includes collaboration in managing regional and global affairs as well.(210) In the same vein, in a recent article, titled “Rethinking the National Interest; American Realism for a New World” Condoleezza Rice observes that the US is faced with the “challenge to deal with rising Chinese influence, something we have no reason to fear if that power is used responsibly. We have stressed on Beijing that with China’s full membership in the international community comes responsibilities, whether in the conduct of its economic and trade policy, its approach to energy and the environment, or its policies in the developing world.”(211) She points out that Chinese leaders are increasingly realize this and are moving, “albeit slowly, to a more cooperative approach on a range of problems.” A recent US Independent Task Force Report by the Council on Foreign Relations,” US-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, a Responsible Course, (2007),” also argued: “integration is a responsible course involving a blend of engaging China on issues of mutual concern, weaving China into a fabric of international regimes on security, trade, and human rights, and balancing China’s growing military power.” This conception of responsible stakeholder is now becoming guiding principle of US policy towards China.(212)

Within this new paradigm of “responsible stakeholder” or “shared responsibility”, the US is building partnership of shared values amongst others with India and wants to circumspect the rise of China in its Asian peripheral regions as well as across the globe. India is one such emerging power that can become a valuable partner at both regional and global levels. There is a strong perception in China that the nuclear deal is part of an American strategy to retain control of fast changing balance of power in Asia which is drifting in China’s favour.

Interdependence and convergence of interests

The growing economic interdependence between the US and China is the single most important factor that is going to sustain the fragile Sino-US relations, though there will be some frictions within the economic relationship. China’s foreign trade, which constitutes a large part of its economy, is much dependent on American market. The US is the biggest trading partner of China. In 2006 the US accounted for 19.4 per cent of China’s exports but only 7.5 per cent of its imports.(213) China’s huge trade surplus with the US has evoked some concerns in America but the fact remains that China has provided American market with low-price and high-quality products that benefits American consumers. Significantly, Chinese exports are mainly produced with foreign direct investment in which US investment accounts for a large part. China also considers US the most important country for its market, capital, technology and management(214) ever since its economic reforms began in 1978.

There are some frictions within the economic relationship. For instance, much to the dislike of Washington, China after keeping its currency pegged to the US dollar for years, in July 2005, revalued it — by 2.1 per cent against the dollar — and moved to an exchange rate system that is referred to as basket of currencies. The US also wants China to further open its market to US business, and correct imbalances within its system by relying more heavily on domestic demand to stimulate growth and complete the transition to an open, market based economy.(215) Within this context, however, the real issue for the US is the political impact of China’s emergence as an economic power.

Complexity and divergence of interests

China-US relationship is very complex, especially at the regional level. At the strategic level Beijing is cooperating with Washington to the extent that it suits China’s strategic interests. At the regional level, although both share common interests in a number of areas such as anti-terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD, safeguarding international sealanes and maintaining regional stability, yet differences remain over approaches.

These include the Korean and Iranian nuclear crisis, the double standards applied by the US in defining and implementing international non-proliferation regime. On the Korean nuclear crisis China’s primary objective is ensuring stability in the region as both Koreas are China’s neighbours. Both US and China however want a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Thereby China has initiated six-party talks and its role has been appreciated by the US as “constructive.” However, while China favours settling issue through negotiations, the US does not want to accommodate North Korea but is more interested in the security of its allies in northeast Asia , which could be ensured only by “eliminating nuclear development of North Korea.” In fact China is apprehensive about US policy towards Asian security post-Cold War and post 9/11 period that has focused on bilateral treaties and upgrading of security relationship with Japan, South Korea and India. China, conversely, is following a multilateral approach and supporting multilateral dialogues in the region based on common security, collective security and cooperative security. Besides, China has also worked with the US in the UN Security Council to achieve an international consensus to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons programme, but does not share Washington’s approach of imposing sanctions on Iran which will isolate that country. China has opposed regime change both in the case of North Korea and Iran. Moreover, China continues to maintain close security ties with both countries.

Taiwan is another issue that divided the two countries. Although, the US does not support Taiwan’s independence, it continues providing arms to Taiwan which is not seen positively by China. Chinese analyst Zhao contends that “US wants to provide Taiwan with sufficient means to defend its de facto independence but not supporting its de jure independence.” Consequently, “the United States One-China policy becomes an empty statement from Chinese perspective.”(216) China feels that the Taiwan issue is very important for peace and stability in Asia.

China is also cooperating with the US in its counter-terrorism efforts at the global and regional levels. However, it is apprehensive that the US may use counter-terrorism to advance its geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in China’s periphery which is very obvious in the case of Central Asia.

The US is also apprehensive of China’s military modernization and wants it to have transparency in this area. The Task Force report contends that China’s military modernization has two main drivers, one with a clear operational objective (Taiwan) and the other with a clear strategic objective (to build a modern military because China will be a modern power). It concludes that as a consequence of its military modernization, China is making progress towards being able to fight and win a war with Taiwan (absent US intervention), and it is also beginning to build capabilities to safeguard its growing global interests. The mere existence of these capabilities — including anti-missile systems — poses challenges for the US.(217) However, China and the US have initiated military-to-military dialogue to improve understanding of China’s military modernization.

There are also issues such as climate change, human rights, democratization of China and China’s efforts to ensure access to energy resources that have added to the complexity of relationship. On top of it there is the major issue of distrust between the two powers as general perception in the US is whether the rise of China would lead to decline of American power. Within this context, US cooption of India is an attempt to balance uncertainties created by the rise of China. Although American strategic cooperation with India will help India tremendously in finding its place and role in shaping regional and global affairs there is a strong perception in India that it will follow an independent course of action in its foreign policy issues and will not serve American interest blindly. However, by virtue of sheer rise of India that has its complex set of relations with China there will be many areas of convergence between New Delhi and Washington where they can cooperate. For instance, Delhi will be more than happy to get Washington’s support in increasing its influence in China’s periphery of Central Asia and East Asia. In the context of South Asia, Beijing’s relationship with New Delhi is already complex as it has to overcome lot of mutual distrust which would limit its role in the stability of the region. However, China’s growing economic relations with the regional states including India would allow it to play a dynamic role in regional economic integration.

Sino-Russian relations

China-Russia relationship is also quite a complex one. While Russia has been a close ally of India and would also be a beneficiary of civil nuclear energy cooperation with India, at the same time, Russia’s relations with the US nosedived under the Bush administration which forced it to rely more on Chinese support against the US policies that were aimed at undermining Russian influence, specifically in its backyard. However, under Obama administration there has been thaw in relations. This is largely due to the change in US policy and his attempt to press the ‘rest button’. The improvement is much to do with the fact that Obama has decided to avoid confronting Russia on many thorny issues. This is reflected in America’s weak response to the closure of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan and avoiding support to Ukraine and Georgia for Nato membership. Meanwhile, China and Russia have also deepened cooperation in the energy sphere which has brought them closer than ever before.

Broadly speaking, wherever Sino-Russian interests converge they speak in one voice and wherever their interests diverge or are competitive they follow an independent course. Indo-US strategic partnership is one area where Sino-Russian approaches will diverge at the strategic level but will converge at the tactical level. Within this context, Russia’s relationship with the US, Central Asia and China would largely shape its attitude towards the Indo-US strategic partnership. The growing tension with the US will push Russia towards China.

Convergence of interests

The deal coincided with the intensification of a “new cold war” wherein NATO transformed into a new grouping, and identified Russia and China as its rivals. At the Bucharest NATO summit, president Bush announced that NATO was “now an expeditionary alliance that is sending its forces across the world to help secure a future for freedom and peace for millions”.(218) In addition, the Bush administration announced plans for an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system aimed at neutralizing the comparatively small intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) of China and threatened Russia by putting up missile bases on its borders. At the Bishkik summit in May 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement condemning the American ABM plan. The two leaders were also critical of the “double standards” in the current US foreign policy, especially on its reliance on unilateral use of force.(219)

At the bilateral level, China is improving its relations with Russia in political, economic and strategic spheres. Significantly, on 22 July 2008, both sides signed an agreement that ended a decades-long territorial dispute and finally determined their borders. It added to an existing agreement on their 4,300-kilometre boundary, implying that the entire frontier is now decided. After the agreement Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said, “We exchanged views about how to further promote our bilateral strategic relationship and strengthen our cooperation at the regional and global levels.” This implied that both countries are now in a better position to deepen their strategic coordination over the regional and international issues. This was manifested in Chinese support to Russia on the crisis in South Ossetia which led to Georgia-Russia conflict with Washington warning Moscow that it had an ‘abiding’ interest in the regions once dominated by Kremlin.(220) The competition over energy resources in Central Asia is at the heart of the Caucasus crisis. Russian Prime Vladimir Putin has hinted at diverting Russian oil and gas from Europe to China. This will certainly a big diplomatic coup by the Chinese.

The demarcation of boundary has also opened avenues for bilateral economic cooperation. Chinese foreign minister observed: “As we preserve domestic stability in our respective societies, we have now created a very good external environment for social and economic development, which is of huge benefit to us both,” What Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on the occasion also expressed an upswing in their relationship with China: “From a legal point of view we have created the preconditions for the border to become a link of stability, openness, mutual benefit, friendship and cooperation.”(221) In 2001 China and Russia signed Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation which included ‘joint action against perceived US hegemonism.(222)

The two sides have also expanded their economic relations. During his visit to Russia in November 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told Russian media that China had set a target of boosting investment in Russia at a total 12 billion US dollars by 2020. He said Chinese companies had invested in a wide range of fields in Russia, including mining, energy, electricity, manufacturing, infrastructure, agriculture, fishery and forestry.(223)

With improvement in China-Russia bilateral relations, both would like to have a strategically triangular relationship with India so that it does not get closer to the United States.

Divergence of interests

China and Russia followed an entirely different course of action on the issue of Indo-US nuclear deal. While Russia supported the deal enthusiastically, China took a principled stand that India should follow international regulations on non-proliferation. Their different approaches stemmed from their divergent political, strategic and economic interests vis-à-vis India. Russia has been a close ally of India during the Cold War and continues to be the main source of India’s military supplies. The Indian army has placed a $2bn order for cruise missiles from the Russo-Indian company BrahMos. Russia is also going to be one of the major beneficiaries from of the lifting of restrictions on international cooperation with India in the nuclear field. Thereby the Russian Foreign Ministry in a statement after the NSG waiver observed: “We are convinced that the exemption made for India reflects Delhi’s impeccable record in the non-proliferation sphere and will guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear exports to India”.(224) The waiver opens the way for implementing of a preliminary agreement India signed with Russia earlier in 2008 for the construction of four additional reactors at Kudankulam. However, a Russian expert, Dmitry Yevstafiev, of PIR-Centre think tank, observed that the waiver would push India closer towards the US. “India is clearly drifting towards the US. We [Russia] may have tactical gains, but the strategic outlook for us in dim”.(225) This implied that Russia has also apprehensions that strategically India would be moving towards the US.

China, on the other hand, was quite concerned over an unconditional lifting of restrictions on nuclear trade with India which in no way would be helpful to the fragile non-proliferation regime. The Chinese representative, Cheng Jingye, reportedly stated that China hoped that the NSG would “equally address the aspirations of all parties for the peaceful use of nuclear power while adhering to the nuclear non-proliferation mechanism.” He also said that the decision made by the NSG would “stand the test of time and contribute to the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear power.” He also underscored that China would cooperate with all parties on the peaceful use of nuclear power “in accordance with its international obligations and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.”(226) Following the waiver, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu in a statement said: “China believes that all countries are entitled to make peaceful use of nuclear energy, and conduct international cooperation in this regard. Meanwhile the relevant cooperation should be conducive to safeguarding the integrity and efficacy of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.”(227) This signified that China is not only concerned over the consequences of the India-specific amendments in international proliferation regime but also feels that it will not have positive impact in its South Asian periphery. This divergence of perspective is likely to continue in both countries attitude towards nuclear cooperation with India. It seems while Russia would emerge as the largest nuclear trade partner of India, China is likely to increase its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. This may not affect their relations much as such because they have been following this policy for a long time.

A more serious implication is likely to be the role that India can play in energy politics of Central Asia after becoming a partner of the US. While Russia has gained a foothold in the energy sources of Central Asia, the US has suffered a series of major reverses in the past two years in the “great game” over Caspian energy.(228) Against this backdrop, the US will like India to play a role that advances its interests in the region. This may cause some anxiety in Russia and China, but they would not like India posing challenges to their interests but it all depends on New Delhi how it does the balancing act to pursue its own interests without threatening Chinese and Russian interests.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis shows that in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era US Asia policy is in a flux as realignment of forces is taking place both at the global and regional levels. The emergence of Indo-US strategic partnership is going to be the central pillar of US Asia policy in the 21st century. The partnership will have long-term security, economic and political implications for China in its peripheries of South Asia, Central and East Asia at large. The Indo-US partnership will also affect China’s relations with the US and Russia in different degrees. However, the most important caveat would be how this partnership will take shape in the coming decade. In other words what would be the limitations on the Indo-US strategic partnership? How US foreign policy goals and priorities can be reconciled with India’s own foreign policy goals and traditions and its aspirations to have a greater say in global affairs in the coming decades? More importantly, how far Indian interests would converge with US in hedging China?

Rajiv Sikri, a former secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, underscores limits of the Indo-US strategic partnership. There are many points of divergences. First, whereas the US wants the current so-called “unipolar world order to continue, India believes that the world should be multipolar, with India itself as one of the poles.”(229) Second, a “fundamental problem for any country in having a strategic relationship with the US is that it can never be one of equality. No ally or partner of US is treated as an equal by the US on issues where the US feels strongly enough or exerts sufficient pressure; all are expected to fall in line, and they invariably do.”(230) The question is whether India will be ready to do that. While India is firmly committed to pursuing an independent foreign policy and non-alignment still resonates in its official circles, political elites and intellectuals, the US would like India to advance its strategic policy goals. If India follows an independent course of action, it will have to resist US pressures and if it does not, it will always remain a stunted global player. Third, India claims that to have some kind of strategic relationship with all the major global players, i.e. Russia, France, UK, Germany, EU, Brazil, China, Japan, Iran and even Saudi Arabia. it is simply not possible to have such multiplicity of “strategic” partnerships without any contradictions.(231) Chinese scholars also believe that major divergences in the strategic interest of India and the US will not allow India to deepen its relations with the US. Shen Qiang underscores that India’s commitment to multipolarity and a democratization of international order; independent and non-aligned foreign policy, differences of strategic interest in South Asia, Iran, Russia will not allow India to follow the US diktat.(232) Shen argues if India follows US strategic goals it will “not only damage its important strategic interests in Indo-China and Indo-Russia strategic partnerships but will also weaken India’s role in the present international relations.”

China is shaping its strategic response to Indo-US strategic partnership keeping in view its own dispassionate enlightened national interest.

Notes and References

1.              “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh”, 18 July 2005. <http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>.

2.              “US-India Joint Statement”, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2006/03/print/20060302-5.html>.

3.              “National Security Strategy of the United States” at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>.

4.              John Cherian, “India’s Foreign Policy Shift: From NAM to ‘Strategic partnership’ with the US,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. Vol.3, No. January-March 2008.

5.              “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India,” <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/28109.html>, released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary on 12 January 2004.

6.              “Statement by the President on India”, 1 January 2004, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relrases/2004/01/20040112-1.html> see original.

7.              “India – US Relations: A General Overview”, <http://www. indianembassy.org/ newsite/induspolAug07.asp>.

8.              Samuel Cherian, “Indo-US Defence Cooperation and the Emerging Strategic Partnership”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. 31. No. 2, March 2007, p.210.

9.              Text of the “New framework for the US-India Defense Relationship”, Washington, DC 28 June 2005. <http://www.indianembassy. org/press_release/2005/June/31.htm>.

10.           “Joint Statement,” op.cit, (ref.1).

11.           Ibid.

12.           Dinshaw Mistry, “Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the US-India Nuclear Agreement”, Asian Survey, Vol. XLVI, No. 5, September/October 2006, p.684.

13.           Ibid.

14.           See, Text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement) 3 August 2007, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm>.

15.           R. Nicholas Burns, US under secretary for political affairs, “On-The-Record Briefing on the Status of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative”, 27 July 2007. Available at <http://www.state.gov./p/us/rm/2007/89559.htm>.

16.           See text, United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, H.R. 5682 available at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682enr.txt.pdf>.

17.           Michael Krepon, “Deal to do more harm than good for NSG, IAEA”, The Hindu, Delhi, 10 September 2008, at <http://www.thehindu. com/2008/09/10/ stories/2008091055631100.htm>.

18.           Aurobinda Mahapatra, “India’s Nuclear Debate”, 23 July 2008. <http://en.fondsk.ru/print.php?id=1499>.

19.           Ibid.

20.           The UPA coalition held approximately 215 seats in the 545-seat Lok Sabha (lower house of the parliament) and the leftist parties held 60 seats.

21.           R. Ramachandran, “Power & the truth”, Frontline, Chennai, 5 July 2008.

22.           “BJP not against nuclear deal,” The Hindu, 4 June 2008.

23.           “I have never seen so much despair in people: Advani”, interview with N. Ram, The Hindu, 11 July 2008.

24.           Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan undecided about seeking IAEA vote on Indian deal”, <http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/29/top3.htm>.

25.           IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards Agreement: Agreement Would Widen IAEA Access to Civil Nuclear Facilities”, 1 August 2008. <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter?News/2008/board01808.htm>.

26.           Ibid.

27.           Ibid.

28.           Veronika Oleksyn, “IAEA approves deal for India’s nuclear inspection”, 1 August 2008. Available at <http://ap.google.com/ article/ ALeqM5jfsmyT161jxHn8eL4VMUO9w_mu_wD929QIU00>.

29.           Siddharth Varadarajan, “Looking beyond the NSG debacle”, The Hindu, 25 August 2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/ 2008/08/25/stories/ 2008082555591100.htm>.

30.           Siddharth Varadarajan, “Conditions mooted for Indian waiver”, The Hindu, New Delhi, 23 August 2008. <http://www.thehindu.com/ 2008/08/23/stories/ 20080823607360731200.htm>.

31.           Siddharth Varadarajan, “Mulford said NSG waiver would be clean, not unconditional”, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/07/29/stories/ 2008072960361000.htm>.

32.           Krepon, op.cit., (ref.17).

33.           “Bush signs India-US nuclear bill into law,” The Hindu, 10 October 2008. <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/10/10/stories/ 2008101060940100. htm>.

34.           Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

35.           Stephen Philip Cohen, Emerging Power: India, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2001.)

36.           Sumit Ganguly, ed., India as an Emerging Power, (London: Frank Cass, 2003.)

37.           The United States and South Asia: An Expanding Agenda”, 17 May 2006. <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/66374.htm#india>.

38.           Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of US India Ties: Missile Defence in an Emerging Strategic Relationship”, International Security, Vol. 30. No. 4, Spring 2006. p.127.

39.           Seema Sirohi, “US-India Relations: India, Big Time”, Outlook, New Delhi, 11 July 2005. See, Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf>.

40.           “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India,” <http://www. state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/28109.htm>, released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary.

41.           “Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US –India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, 5 April 2006, at <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/ 2006/RiceTestimony060405.pdf>.

42.           Ibid.

43.           R. Nicholas Burns, under secretary for political affairs, “America's Strategic Opportunity with India”, article in Nov/Dec issue of foreign affairs, 18 October 2007. <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/ 2007/93728.htm>.

44.           Ibid., <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63016/r-nicholas-burns/ americas-strategic-opportunity-with-india>.

45.           Ibid.

46.           Ibid.

47.           Mistry, op.cit. (ref 12).

48.           Date:24/10/2008 URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/10/24/stories/ 2008102458770100.htm>

49.           “The India-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 - A Year Later,” address by Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, 14 July 2006.

50.           Ibid.

51.           Strobe Talbott, Emerging India, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2005, p.194.

52.           “Remarks of Secretary of State Rice…,” op.cit., (ref 41).

53.           Ibid.

54.           Ibid.

55.           “US “will work to make India a full NSG partner”, The Hindu, 9 September 2008. URL <:http://www.thehindu.com/2008/09/09/stories/ 2008090956131200.htm>.

56.           “PM’s reply to the debate on the Motion of Confidence in the Lok Sabha”, 22 July 2008. http://www.hindu.com/nic/pmspeech-confidencevote.pdf

57.           “Pranab hopeful of nod for draft at IAEA,” The Hindu, 27 July 2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/07/27/stories/ 2008072751810900.htm>.

58.           R. Prasad, “Waiver offers opportunity for nuclear exports” The Hindu, 10 September 2008. at URL: <http://www.thehindu.com /2008/09/10/stories/2008091055651200.htm>.

59.           Sujay Mehdudia, “20,000 MW nuclear power by 2020 if deal gets through”, The Hindu, 31 July 2008. There is a counter-argument offered by Ramachandran. He observes: Exploitable uranium reserves in the country can generate only 10,000-12,000 MWe through PHWRs but the plutonium derived from the spent fuel of the PHWRs can be burnt in fast breeder reactors (FBRs). Besides “breeding” more plutonium than they burn, the FBRs can also convert the fertile thorium (Th-232), which India has in plenty, into fissile uranium-233 when used as a blanket to the reactor core. U-233-based heavy water reactors can operate in a self-sustaining fuel cycle of burning U-233 and converting Th-232 into U-233. Thus nuclear power generation will be completely delinked from the limited natural uranium availability and will form the basis for long-term energy security. See R. Ramachandran, “Power & the truth”, Frontline, Chennai, 5 July 2008, op.cit. (ref.21).

60.           Ramachandran, op.cit., (ref.21).

61.           The programme has already entered into its second stage with the upcoming 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam, near Chennai, which should become operational by 2011. Indigenous Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWRs) that will use U-233 as fuel and Th-232 as blanket, which will form the third stage, are already in an advanced phase of development. See., Ramachandran, op.cit., (ref.21).

62.           Ramachandran, Ibid.

63.           Ibid.

64.           “PM’s reply to the debate on the Motion of Confidence in the Lok Sabha”, 22 July 2008. op.cit.

65.           “Remarks of Secretary of State Rice…” op.cit. (ref.41).

66.           Ibid.

67.           See, Ashley J. Tellis in his report Atoms for War? US-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf>.

68.           Howard L. Berman, Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee, US House of Representatives, 5 August 2008. Available at <www.armscontrol.org/ system/files/ 20080805_Berman+NSG_letter_to_Rice.pdf>.

69.           Edward Markey, from Massachusetts, is co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation and Ellen Tauscher, from California, is chair of the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee. See, “India N-deal may trigger arms race, say lawmakers”, Dawn, Islamabad, 21 August 2008. <http://www.dawn.com/2008/ 08/21/int1.htm>.

70.           “India N-deal may trigger arms race, say lawmakers”, <http://www.dawn.com/ 2008/08/21/int1.htm>.

71.           Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M. V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the US-Indian Nuclear Deal,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006, pp.36.

72.           Ibid.

73.           Daryl G. Kimball, Fred McGoldrick and Lawrence Scheinman, “IAEA-Indian Nuclear Safeguards Agreement: A Critical Analysis”, available at <http://www.armscontrol.org>.

74.           ‘India-IAEA safeguard agreement threat to NPT regime”, Daily Times, Lahore, 6 August 2008. <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page= 2008%5C08%5C06%5Cstory_6-8-2008_pg7_21>.

75.           Ibid.

76.           Stephen Fidler and Amy Kazmin, “IAEA smooth way for US-India accord”, The Financial Times, London, 2 August 2008. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/44b17af2-602b-11dd-805e-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1>.

77.           Oleksyn, op.cit., (ref.28).

78.           Text of the “New framework for the US-India Defense Relationship”, op.cit., (ref.9).

79.           Ibid.

80.           John Cherian, “India’s Foreign Policy Shift: From NAM to Strategic partnership with the US”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 3. No. January–March 2008. pp.58-59.

81.           Indo-US bilateral naval exercise “Malabar 08” begins”, Thaindian.com (Web), October 19, 2008.)

82.           “India joins ‘war game’ in US” The Hindu, Delhi, 12 August 2008.

83.           Sushanta Talukdar, “US troops train at Indian jungle war school”, The Hindu, Delhi, 12 August 2008.

84.           John Cherian, “India’s Foreign Policy Shift: From NAM to Strategic partnership” with the US”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 3. No. January–March 2008. p.59.

85.           Indo-US trade touches new high despite N-deal impasse”, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 4 July 2008.

86.           “US to sell Harpoon missiles to India”, The Hindu, 11 September 2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/09/11/stories/ 2008091161041400.htm>.

87.           “With Left out, military pacts with US on fast track”, The Tribune, 29 July 2008.

88.           Alan Macmillan and Ken Booth, Appendix: “Strategic Culture — Framework for Analysis”, in Ken Booth & Russell Trood, eds., Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, (London: Macmillan, 1999.) p.363.

89.           Ibid., pp.364-65.

90.           “India: The World Factbook,” available at <https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/in/html>, accessed on 26 August 2008.

91.           Sirohi, “India, Big Time”, Outlook op.cit., (ref.39).

92.           Ibid.

93.           Rajesh M. Basrur, “India’s Nuclear Security: Strategic Culture and Doctrine”, <www.pircenter.org/data/news/basrur.pdf>.

94.           Rodney W. Jones, “India’s Strategic Culture”, p.28, available at <www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/comparative_strategic_culture_curriculum/case%20/india20(jones)%20final%2031%20Oct.pdf>.

95.           Basrur, op.cit. (ref.93).

96.           “Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on the Indian Nuclear Doctrine”, available at <http://www.meadev.gov.in/ govt/indnucld.htm>.

97.           Ibid.

98.           “India’s Credible Minimum Deterrence: A Report”, February 2006, available at <http:// www.ipcs.org/ipcs-Special_Report.13pdf>.

99.           Ashely Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture”, in Sumit Ganguly, ed., India as an Emerging Power, op.cit. (ref.36), pp.62-63.

100.        Ibid., pp.102-103.

101.        Ibid., pp.98-99.

102.        Jones, op.cit (ref.94), p.24.

103.        Ibid.

104.        Cohen, op.cit. (ref.35), p.32.

105.        Amit Gupta, “The US-India Relationship”, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2005. The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests? ... <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pubs/people.cfm?authorID=38>.

106.        According to EIA, China’s energy mix is: coal 69%, oil 22%, hydroelectricity 6% natural gas, 3% and nuclear 1%. China is world’s third largest importer of oil after the US and Japan. China: Country Analysis Briefs, Energy Information Administration (EIA) available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/ emeu/cabs/china/background.html>.

107.        Xin Benjin, “Who's pushing nuclear proliferation”, People’s Daily, Beijing, 27 October 2005. <http://english.peopledaily. com.cn/200510/27/ eng20051027_217234.html>.

108.        Jabin T Jacob, “Indo-US nuclear deal: The China factor “, IPCS Special Report, March 2006, available at <www.ipcs.org/ipcs-special-Report-14pdf>.

109.        “China still non-committal”, The Hindu, 27 August 2008, <http:// www.thehindu.com/2008/08/27/stories/2008082759881200.htm>.

110.        Pallavi Aiyar, “No assurance on nuclear deal”, Hindu, 30 July 2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/07/30/stories/ 2008073061131500>.

111.        Ibid.

112.        “China calls for balance of nuclear non-proliferation, energy use”, People’s Daily, 2 September 2008. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 90001/90776/90883/6491626.htm>.

113.        Dr Shen Dengli, Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, interview with the author, 22 August 2008.

114.        Dr Wu Chunsi, Deputy Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS, Shanghai, interview with the author 11 July 2008.

115.        Zhao Gancheng, “US-India Civilian Nuclear deal and its Impact on Regional Stability: A Chinese Perspective”, unpublished paper.

116.        Zhao Gancheng, Director, Department of South Asian Studies, SIIS, Shanghai. interview with the author, 30 June 2008.

117.        Shen Dengli, op.cit., (ref.113).

118.        Shen Qiang, “Strategic factors in the transformation of Indo-US relations”, International Strategic Studies, first issue, 2008, pp. 58-59.

119.        Ibid., p.60.

120.        “China’s Peaceful Rise”, interview by Zan Jifang with Vice President Li Junru of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China. Beijing Review, Beijing, 22 April 2004, available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/ 2004/Apr/93730.htm>.

121.        Ibid.

122.        “China to be Mainstay for Peace after Peaceful Rise”, People's Daily, 26 April 2004, available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/ international/94030.htm>.

123.        “China’s Peaceful Rise”, op.cit. (ref.120).

124.        Shi Yinhong, “China’s Peaceful Development, Harmonious World and International Responsibility”, International Review, Spring 2008, at <http://www.siis.org.cn/Sh_Yj_Cms/Mgz/200801/ 20086241833728PZ.PDF>.

125.        Yuan Peng, “A Harmonious World and China’s New Diplomacy,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 17. No. 3 May/June 2007, p.1.

126.        Ibid.

127.        See text, “Making Great Efforts to Build a Harmonious World with Long-lasting Peace and Common Prosperity”, President Hu Jintao’s speech at the summit meeting marking the 60^th Anniversary of the United Nations, 15 September 2005. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/ zyjh/t213091.htm> also see, Peoples Daily 16 September 2005.

128.        Yuan op.cit., (ref.125), pp.5-8.

129.        John Cherian, “Strategic embrace”, Frontline, Chennai, Vol. 25 No.14, 5 July 2008. URL: <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2514/stories/ 20080718251401800.htm>.

130.        Ibid.

131.        Ibid.

132.        Ibid.

133.        Zhao Gancheng, “China’s South Asia Policy: Balancing and Stabilising”, Regional Studies, Vol. XXIII, No 3, Summer 2005.

134.        Ibid.

135.        “Aziz pleads for Pak-US N-Deal”, Daily Times, 6 April 2006.

136.        “We won’t obstruct Indo-US N-deal: Pakistan”, 22 August 2008. Rediff.com at <http://www.rediff.com/cms/print.jsp?docpath=news/ 2008/aug/22ndeal5.htm>.

137.        Mark Hibbs, “China favours NSG solution on India that facilitates trade with Pakistan”, Nuclear Fuel, 7 November 2005. Cited in Zia Mian, op.cit. (ref.71).

138.        Shakil Sheikh, “Pakistan vows to maintain credible N-deterrence”, The News, Islamabad, 13 April 2006.

139.        Adil Sultan Muhammad, “Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implications for South Asian Security Environment” The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2006, p.12.

140.        Markey, from Massachusetts, is co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation and Tauscher, from California, is chair of the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee. See, “India N-deal may trigger arms race, say lawmakers”, Dawn, Islamabad, 21 August 2008. <http://www.dawn.com/ 2008/08/21/int1.htm>.

141.        Zhao, op.cit., (ref.115).

142.        “Remarks of Secretary of State Rice …” op.cit., (ref.40).

143.        Zhao, op.cit., (ref.115)

144.        Professor Xia Liping, Deputy Dean of School of Law and Political Science, Tongji University, General Secretary of Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies. Interview with author, 21 August 2008.

145.        Zhao, op.cit., (ref.115)

146.        Gurmeet Kanwal, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for Non-proliferation”, South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), SASSI Research Report 10, February 2008. p.26. http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Indo-S%20Nuclear%20Deal_kanwal.pdf

147.        John W. Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions”, Ganguly, op.cit., (ref.36), p.109.

148.        Ibid., p.227.

149.        “China, India agree on “strategic partnership”, 13 April 2005, at <http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/zygx/t191496.htm>.

150.        Ma Jiali, “Emerging Sino-Indian Relations”, Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 17. No. 3 May/June 2007, p.74.

151.        “A Shared Vision for the 21^st Century of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India”, 18 January 2008. Available at <http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/fwzg/t399584.htm>.

152.        Zhang Yan, “A perspective on India & China-India ties”, The Hindu, 1 July 2008.

153.        “India-China trade target likely to be achieved ahead of schedule”, The Hindu, 7 June 2008.

154.        Zhang, op.cit., (ref. 152).

155.        Ma, op.cit. (ref.150).

156.        “China, India seek cooperation in global oil quest”, 5 April 2005. <http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/zygx/xy/t190213.htm>.

157.        C. Rajamohan, “Soft borders and cooperative frontiers: India’s changing territorial diplomacy towards Pakistan and China”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. 31. No 1, January-February 2007.p.15.

158.        Dr Shen Dengli, Interview with the author, op.cit., (ref.113).

159.        Ma, op.cit., (ref.150), p.77.

160.        Ibid, p.79.

161.        Venu Rajamony, “India-China-US Triangle: A ‘Soft Balance of Power System’ in the Making 2002,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, Washington DC, March 2002. p.8. Available at <www.csis.org/ saprog/venu.pdf>.

162.        Zhang Guihong, “US-India security relations: Implications for China”, available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/ volume14/article2.htm>.

163.        H.U. Khan, “The US-India Nuclear Agreement in the Context of Developing Strategic Partnership: Implications for Pakistan’s Security”, Margalla Papers, Islamabad, 2006. p.117.

164.        Ibid, p.118.

165.        Dr. Rodney W. Jones, “Conventional Military Imbalances and Strategic Stability”, South Asia Stability Unit (SASSU), Research Paper No.1, March 2005, p.4. http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/conventional _imbalance_rjones.pdf

166.        Author’s discussion with Yang Jiemian, President, SIIS, Shanghai, 21 August 2008.

167.        Zhao, op.cit, (ref.133).

168.        Khalid Mustafa, “China to install 405 MW power project at Sinda-Jerruk”, The News, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 29 February 2008.

169.        Amb (r) Khalid Mehmood, “Economic Dimension of Pakistan-China Relations”, in Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario, Proceedings of one-day international seminar organised by Area Study Centre, Far East and South East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan. 29 September 2005. p.78. <http://www.fesea.org/publications/proceedings/Proceedings2.pdf>.

170.        Based on author’s interviews with Liang Xiang Jin, Research Fellow, Department of West Asian and African Studies, SIIS, Shanghai, Wang Dehua, Senior Fellow and Director, Institute of South and Central Asia Studies, Shanghai Centre for International Studies, and Yu Jian Hua, Deputy Director, Institute of Eurasian Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.

171.        Mawara Inayat, “The Broadening horizon of SAARC,” Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol.xxv No.3, Summer 2007.

172.        Professor Dr Shang Quanyu, “China-Pakistan Friendship is coming to an end?, in Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario, op.cit., (ref. 169), pp.111.120.

173.        Meena Singh Roy, “India-Kazakhstan: Emerging Ties”, Strategic Analysis, Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, January-March 2002, Vol. 26, No. 1, p.51.

174.        Mohammad Monir Alam, “Iran and Central Asia: Emerging Geopolitical and Strategic Imperatives”, in V. Nagendrra Rao and Mohammad Monir Alam (eds), Central Asia: Present Challenges and Future Prospects (Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2005).

175.        Gulshan Sachdeva, “India’s attitude towards China’s growing influence in Central Asia”, China and Eurasia Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 2006, p.23.

176.        See speech of then Indian defence minister Pranab Mukherjee at Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Washington, DC 27 June 2005. <www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/June/11.htm>.

177.        “India loses Kazkh oil firm to China”, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 23 August 2005. <www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050823/biz.htm#2>.

178.        Sachdeva, op.cit., (ref.175).

179.        Kapil Kak, “India’s Strategic and Security Interests in Central Asia”, in V. Nagendra Rao and Mohammad Monir Alam (eds), Central Asia: Present Challenges and Future Prospects (Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2005) p.208.

180.        “India’s first overseas ‘military base’ taking shape in Tajikistan”, 24 July 2007. <www.newscentralasia.net/print/137.html>.

181.        Lionel Beehner, “Backgrounder: The Rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, (US) Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2006. <www.cfr.org/publications/10883>.

182.        “SCO provides big opportunities for business”, Beijing, People’s Daily, 14 June 2006. <http://english.peoplesdaily.com.c/200606/14/ eng20060614_273872.htm>.

183.        “Shanghai witnesses China’s efforts in SCO progress”, 13 June 2006. <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t257656.htm>.

184.        “China says SCO military drill not targeting any country”, People’s Daily, 11 August 2007, <http://english.peoplesdaily.com.cn/90001/ 90776/6237114.htm>.

185.        “Shanghai witnesses China’s efforts …,” op.cit., (ref.183).

186.        Vladimir Radyuhin, “Support for Russia at SCO Summit”, The Hindu, 29 August 2008. <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/08/29/stories/ 2008082961231600htm>, “SCO: Solve problems by dialogue”, China Daily, Beijing, 29 August 2008. <http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-08/29/content_6979254.htm>.

187.        Sachdeva, op.cit., (ref.175), p.34.

188.        “Overview: Association of South East Asian Nations”, <http://www.aseansec.org/147.htm>.

189.        Ibid.

190.        P.S. Suryanarayana, “India, ASEAN clinch a free trade agreement”, The Hindu, 29 August 2008. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/ 2008/08/29/ stories/2008082956371500.htm>.

191.        “Wikipedia:” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Asia_Summit>.

192.        US deputy secretary of state John D. Negroponte, “US Policy in Asia: Meeting Opportunities and Challenges”, Center for Northeast Asian Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 28 July 2008, p.2.

193.        Wu Baiyi, “The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10 No 27, 2001.p. 278. Cited in Prof. Carlyle A Thayer, “China’s International Security Cooperation with Southeast Asia”, Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue No. 172, 2007. At <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dfi/ ADFJ_172.pdf#page-18>.

194.        Zhang Tiejun, “China and East Asian Community”, International Review, SIIS, Shanghai, Vol. 40, Autumn 2005, p.27.

195.        Ibid., p.28.

196.        Ibid.

197.        Shebonti Ray Dadwal, “China’s Search for Energy Security: Emerging Dilemma”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31. No. 6. November 2007, p.905

198.        Ibid., p.905

199.        Arun Prakash, “China’s Naval Gazers”, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 5 September 2007, at <http://www.indianexpress.com/story/ 214471.html>.

200.        R Suryamurthy, “Kalam outlines Navy’s Future Role”, The Tribune, 13 February 2006.

201.        Ibid.

202.        You Ji, “Dealig with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s efforts to protect its energy supply”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31. No. 3 May 2007. p.467.

203.        Ibid., p.473.

204.        Ibid., p.473.

205.        Ibid., p.473.

206.        Prof Carlyle A Thayer, “China’s International Security Cooperation with Southeast Asia”, Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue No. 172, 2007. At <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dfi/ ADFJ_172.pdf#page-18>.

207.        Chen Dongxio, “Complex and Changing Structure of Sino-US Relations.”

208.        “US-China Relations”, Fact Sheet, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 18 April, 2006. At <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ 64715.htm>.

209.        Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?: The Rise of China and US Policy towards East Asia”, International Security, Vol. 31 No. 1 Summer 2006, p.81.

210.        US-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Report of an Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, p.9, at <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ ChinaTaskForce.pdf>.

211.        Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008, available at <http://foreignaffairs,org/20080701faessay87401/condoleeza-rice/rethinking-the-national-interest,html?>.

212.        US-China Relations:…, op.cit., (ref.210), p.9.

213.        “China: The World Factbook,” at <htp://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/print/ch.html>.

214.        Zhao Gancheng, “China-US Relations: Fragile but Sustainable”, at <http://www.siis.org.cn/sh_yj_cms//upics/2008729202844DR27.PDF>.

215.        “US-China Relations,” Fact Sheet, op.cit, (ref.208).

216.        Zhao op.cit., (ref.214).

217.        US-China Relations: op.cit., (ref.210).

218.        John Cherian, “Strategic embrace”, Frontline, Vol. 25, No. 14. 18 July 2008 <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2514/stories/20080718251401800. htm>.

219.        Ibid.

220.        Russia sent tanks and troops into Georgia after a Georgian offensive on 7 August 2008 to retake the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Moscow withdrew most of its forces under a French-brokered ceasefire, but thousands of Russian troops that Moscow terms ‘peacekeepers’ remain in the two rebel regions and in a buffer zone. “America interested in Russia’s backyard: Cheney,” Dawn, Islamabad, 4 September 2008. <http://www.dawn.com./2008/09/04/int2.htm>.

221.        Ibid.

222.        The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in Eurasia? by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., 18 July 2001, Backgrounder #1459, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1459.cfm>.

223.        “Chinese premier: China-Russia relations at most important stage”, at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/02/content_6995010. htm>.

224.        Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russia welcomes NSG waiver for India”, The Hindu, 9 September 2008. At URL: <http//www.thehindu.com. /2008/09/09/stories/2008090956631800. htm>.

225.        Ibid.

226.        Jawed Naqvi, “India disappointed by China’s role”, Dawn, Islamabad, 7 September 2008.

227.        “Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu’s remarks on NSG’s Lifting Nuclear Trade Ban on India”, 8 September 2008. <http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t512323.htm>.

228.        Moscow’s success in getting Turkmenistan to commit its entire gas production to Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled energy giant, for export was a stunning blow to the US’ energy diplomacy. Moscow has now made a similar offer to Azerbaijan to buy all its gas on highly attractive terms that the Western companies cannot match. Similarly, the US failed to get Kazakhstan to jettison its close ties with Russia, especially the arrangement to route its oil exports primarily through Russian pipelines. The brilliant success of Russian energy diplomacy puts a question mark on the viability of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which was commissioned in 2005 with US funding and political support. Similarly, the progress of Russia’s South Stream project, aimed at transporting energy to the Balkans and southern European countries, and the failure of the US-sponsored Nabucco gas pipeline project (which broadly has the same orientation as South Stream) are setbacks to Washington. All in all, Moscow handed down to the George W. Bush administration, whose ties with Big Oil are legion, a historic defeat in the struggle for energy. See, M.K. Bhadrakumar, “Caucasus crisis”, Frontline, Vol. 25. No. 18, 30 August-12 September 2008.

229.        Rajiv Sikri, “The limits of Indo-US partnership”, <http://rediff.com/ cms/print.jps?docpath=//news/2007/jan/02guest2. htm>.

230.        Ibid.

231.        Ibid.

232.        Shen Qiang, “Strategic factors in the transformation of Indo-US relations,” op.cit. (ref.118), p.62.

Regional Studies, Vol. XXVII, No.1, Winter 2008-09, pp.3-80

Dr. Shaheen Akhtar is Research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies