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Four Indian states — Punjab, Uttaranchal, Manipur, UP — went to two polls in mid term, around 2½ years after the 14th Lok Sabha elections were held. The 2004 elections that produced a dramatic upset in the power equation at the centre. The BJP-led coalition had won two consecutive elections (1998 and 1999) and completed a full term in office before the elections were called amid high expectations that its ‘India shining’ agenda would fetch the ruling coalition enough seats for a comfortable return to power for another term. But this did not happen. The BJP was voted out of office, losing heavily in the game of numbers to the extent that it was not even able to sustain the single-largest party status in Lok Sabha that it had acquired in the 1996 elections. The Congress party, which had suffered its worst electoral debacle in 1999, made substantial gains and was able to follow in the footsteps of the BJP to cobble together a durable coalition. Assembly elections in the four states were seen as a signal of which way the wind was blowing on the Indian political scene.

However, the outcome of assembly polls in the four states has not been conclusive evidence of which of the two contending combines has secured an edge over the other. It is rather too early to make any predictions about the electorate’s behaviour in the next general election which is more than two years away. On the face of it the Congress had done more badly than the BJP — losing power in Punjab and Uttaranchal and narrowly securing another term in Manipur. But critics have refrained from calling it a shift to popular support to the BJP. It is a ‘wake-up’ call for the Congress, they have said.

In the wake of BJP victory in Punjab and Uttaranchal hopes were raised in some quarters that the BJP was on a comeback trail. Nevertheless, its dismal performance in UP from where the largest contingent of MPs would be elected, had a sobering effect on wishful thinking, more so because the BJP tally of seats fell from 107 in 2002 to 30 in a house of 403 members, the lowest ever since the BJP had conquered the Congress territory, and was reputed to have called the shots in the Hindi-belt. A more balanced view of the polls outcome has prevailed. No winners or losers are being projected, as critics see electoral contention wide open. It is anybody’s game, they say. However the possibility of a ‘third front’ emerging on the political scene as an alternative to BJP- and the Congress-led alliances — a scenario fancied by the Left parties — appears to have come a cropper, on the wake of Mulayam Singh Yadav’s failure to call the shots in UP. As critics pointed out, the ‘Third front dream’ has been the first casualty of the UP polls. The singular feature of the UP election was the rise of Mayawati — a Dalit school teacher-turned-politician who in collaboration with her mentor, Kansi Ram, founded a Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in April 1984 to launch her Dalit community (the lowest of the low caste) in politics. Mayawati has since been in and out of power in UP but in alliance with one or other party — the Congress, the BJP and her archrival Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party. But the 2007 elections were a spectacular show of realpolitik by Mayawati, who won the state-assembly election single-handedly (without any pre-poll electoral alliance) and secured absolute majority for Bahujan Samaj Party. It was in 16 years that any party had win majority of its own in the UP elections (the BJP had won majority in 1991) and therefore was in no need to form a coalition. Mayawati was installed as UP chief minister on 13 May 2007.

The other politically meaningful mid-term polls, in particular more relevant to the future of the principal contenders for power, the Congress- and the BJP-led alliances in the next general election, was the state assembly elections in Gujarat. And the focus of public attention was whether or not the Narendra Modi-led BJP government, in office for two terms, would win the third term, notwithstanding the uproar raised by human rights activists about the Modi government’s complicity in the 2001 anti-Muslim riots which reportedly killed more than 2000 Muslims. And as the Congress party launched a vigorous election campaign spearheaded by Sonia Gandhi. Expectations rose high in some quarters that even if Modi was not rejected by the electorate as a cold-blooded killer of the Muslim minority, the Congress party would manage to cash in on the anti-incumbency factor. However, Modi held his ground and convincingly won a third term in office, though the Congress party made some marginal gains.

Political analysts were engaged in endless argument over what caused Modi’s unprecedented triumph, in particular his ability to outgrow the anti-incumbency factor. Some critics said the Gujarat election had shown that ‘communalism’ was no longer seen by the populace as a stigma, while others censored the Congress for not ‘taking the bull by the horns, but rather soft-pedalling the communal issue. The Congress itself was guilty of pursuing ‘soft-Hindutva’ agenda, it was said. In some quarters it was grudgingly acknowledged that the Modi government must have delivered on some crucial areas of governance which matter to the populace. Nevertheless, the outcome of the Gujarat election brought home a message somewhat different from mid-term polls in other states. The UP polls had suggested that the BJP was not close to regaining its lost empire in the Hindi heartland, even though it was holding the fort in Madhiya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar and has now regained power in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, and it had to reckon with political rivals other than the Congress in order to stay in business. The polls in Gujarat have reinforced the BJP’s ability to call the shots in areas of its traditional power base, provided a state government led by it does not make a mess of governance.

A general election is a different ball game from mid-term assembly polls, and unless there is a ‘wave’ one way or the other, various states are likely to produce different results in the next general elections, depending on a number of variables but more so on the performance of the incumbent state government. Thus Mayawati and Narendra Modi would crucially determine the outcome of some 100 constituencies, if no dramatic developments take place between now and the holding of 15th Lok Sabha elections. The Karnataka Assembly election scheduled to be held in late May will indicate which of these forces, the Congress, the BJP, or the regional outfit, will steal the show, while the CPI (M)-led Left Front has already won a decisive victory in the tiny state of Tripura, winning 49 of the 60 assembly seats. This was Left Front’s fourth successive win in Tripura, and in the wake of high turnout (92 per cent) one is prompted to conclude that the Left parties are all set to hold their ground, particularly in the neighbouring north Bengal where 42 Lok Sabha seats would be at stake. Until a few months ago the Congress party was seen in bad shape, particularly on account of its debacle in UP and Gujarat polls, although Rahul Gandhi was commissioned with great fanfare to reclaim his ancestral support box, and Sonia Gandhi personally led the onslaught against BJP in Gujarat. However, more recently critics have pointed out the following Chitabram’s not too ‘elitist’ budget, the Congress has managed to neutralize the restless middle class, and it was perhaps time for Sonia Gandhi to think in terms of calling a snap poll.

The loss of Uttaranchal and Punjab were real setbacks for the Congress, more so in the mini-state carved out of UP, the area where the Congress party had a durable support base. However, in Punjab the Congress and the Akali Dal-BJP combine have been over the years playing sort of ‘musical chairs,’ winning or losing in turns, and the Congress defeat in 2007 has been largely attributed to the incumbency factor, as the Congress chief minister of the state was known to have made promises to the electorate which were hard to keep; for instance, free electricity to the farmers’ tubewells. And by the time the next general elections are held the Akali chief minister Prakash Singh Badal may also have faltered on many of his election promises.

UP elections — a landmark

The UP elections have been in many ways a singular experience — a landmark in the state’s political history. The principal contenders for power in Indian politics — the Congress and the BJP or their allies — were not in the run for the prize catch, and it was basically a competition between two regional parties — the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party, interestingly enough both upholders of low-caste cousins. It was for the first time in Indian history that a Dalit-based party won a decisive election and formed the government in a state where upper-caste Brahmans or Thakkurs had held sway. The spectacular rise of Mayawati was seen as a qualitative change in the ‘elitist’ — caste-cum-feudal — political setting, and not a freak but poised to establish a stable government for at least a full five-year term. BSP’s five-year term in office is likely to act as a catalyst for the restructuring of class forces and caste relations since the Dalits who are not only the lowest of the low in social hierarchy, but also the poorest of the poor would be the principal beneficiary of Mayawati’s agenda promising emancipation of the underdog.

In political terms Uttar Pradesh is a key strategic state not only on account of its massive numerical strength (larger than Pakistan) and therefore its being the largest voting bloc in Lok Sabha (82 MPS), but also because of its long-time political domination. And as critics rightly pointed out the UP had symbolised north India’s, or to be more precise, Hindi-heartland’s hegemonic aspirations to keep the country, especially South India, under its sway. Small wonder, eight of the 15 prime ministers in the post-independence history were from UP, and quite a few of them from the city of Allahabad, the ancestral hometown of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. Ironically, the forces of history played a rather cruel joke with the one-time bastion of India’s political power and while south India became industrialised and economically well off and in due course of time politically powered, UP along with Bihar were relegated to what was called, poor and backward states. Since the advent of the coalition-making era, UP ceased to be a key player in power politics. Interestingly enough, neither the BJP nor the Congress could count on UP’s crucial voting bloc in the Lok Sabha when they led the coalition in New Delhi.

Until 1989 the Congress party was by and large the dominant political force in UP, barring a hung assembly interlude in 1967 and the Janata wave onslaught from 1977-80. V P Singh was able to cobble together socialist factions, in particular adherents of firebrand Ram Manohar Lobia, to offer an alternative to the Congress in the 1989 election and Mulayam Singh Yadav, who became chief minister, first appeared as key political players in UP. The BJP arrived on the scene in UP as a significant political force in the wake of L K Advani’s so-called ‘rath yatra’ designed to mobilize mass support for the building of Ram Mandir at Ayodhya. In the 1991 election the BJP swept the polls in UP, and Kalyan Singh, who became chief minister, facilitated the invasion of Mandir warriors who marched on to Ayodhya from all parts of India to demolish the historic Babri Masjid where they wished to build the Ram temple.

Meanwhile, the Congress party suffered a steady decline as its support base shrank to an all-time low. Critics said it was partly due to Narasimha Rao government’s mishandling of the Babri Masjid incident which prompted the Muslim minority in UP to desert the Congress en bloc. How serious was the damage done to the Congress prestige as a secular and pro-religious minorities party was brought home by Sonia Gandhi’s belated apology (when she became the Congress president in 1998) to Indian Muslims for the Congress governor’s failure to protect the Babri Masjid. In any case it was a shock from which the Congress party has never recovered, notwithstanding the diversity of moves it has made to win back popular support in UP. On the contrary, there has been over the years a mass exodus of Congress supporters belonging to all segments of society — the Muslims, the low caste, the Brahmans and the Thakkurs, and some of them have defected to the BJP while others to the Samajwadi Party or the Bahujan Samaj Party. And things have come to such a pass that the Congress today cannot claim to have a single safe constituency in the entire state, other than the Rai Bareli-Amethe enclave where Nehru-Gandhi dynasty loyalists are still holding the fort.

New challenger to ruling elite

A new challenger to the supremacy of the ruling elite in UP was the Dalit-based Bahujan Samaj Party which came to the fore in 1993 after negotiating a partnership deal with Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party and securing the chief minister slot for Mayawati. The coalition was shortlived as the BSP fell out with Yadav in 1995 and its bid to remain in power with BJP support also failed. Mayawati’s first stint as chief minister was marred by infighting and defection and no less than three major splits in the BSP tore the party into pieces. Critics said the BSP facing disintegration was on the verge of extinction, but BSP supremo Kanshi Ram stood by Mayawati and endorsed whatever she did to deal with the dissidents. Before the 1996 election the BSP took another U-turn to tie up with the Congress party and secured 67 seats in a house of 425. But none of the three major formations in the hung assembly — the BJP, the Samajwadi-led united front, and the Congress-BJP — could muster majority support and president’s rule was imposed in the state.

In a comprehensive analysis of the BJP’s bid to break ground in UP, a Chandigarh based professor wrote in May 1999,⁽¹⁾ that the BSP had considerably increased its tally of seats in the state assembly — from 13 in 1989 to 66 in 1993 and 67 in 1996. But he pointed out that “BSP success lies not in its electoral victories alone, but more so in its capacity to bargain.” Kanshi Ram’s strategy of militant Dalit assertion, he wrote, forced a party like the Congress to give almost 300 out of 425 state assembly seats to its ‘junior’ partner, the BSP, in 1996. However, some other critics termed Kanshi Ram’s avowed ‘pragmatism’ as blatant opportunism, and charged him with staging unscrupulous somersaults, not even hesitating to make a deal with the ‘devil himself.’ Little wonder Mayawati became chief minister for the second time in 1997 at the head of another coalition, this time with the BJP, and triggered a turmoil in state politics by deciding to initiate criminal cases against her political opponents, as no less than 136 cases were filed against Mulayam Singh Yadav alone.⁽²⁾ Her third term as chief minister in 2002 was for a slightly longer period. Mayawati’s three terms as chief minister prior to 2007 were:

First term — 3 June 1995-18 October 1995 (four months) coalition with Mulayam Singh Yadev’s Samajwadi Party.

Second term — 21 March 1997-21 September 1997 (six months) coalition with BJP.

Third term — 3 May 2000-29 August 2003 (15 months) coalition with BJP.

During her three terms in office Mayawati was charged with political corruption, fraud, illegal appointments and illegal funding etc but she not only managed to escape any legal conviction but also adverse public opinion of lasting significance. A notable case of corruption against Mayawati was her alleged involvement in the ‘Taj Corridor scam’ 2002-2003 in which some Rs 175 crore allotted to the project was reported to have disappeared.⁽³⁾ Her political rivals accused her of making ‘unparalleled money’⁽⁴⁾ during her rule, as BJP leader Kalyan Singh insisted that “if bureaucrats can have the courage and disclose how much money they had paid her for their postings then it could be another Watergate.”⁽⁵⁾

On the eve of May 2007 polls which gave the BSP unprecedented victory in the UP state assembly history Mayawati was seen by opinion leaders as the frontrunner but no one had imagined that she had the potential to outgrow UP’s durable instability syndrome and succeed in establishing single-party rule in 15 years. Of the four main contestants, the Congress was considered a non-starter the BJP was expected to perform better than before, and the Samajwadi Party and the BSP as close competitors. On the basis of February 2002 elections which gave Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party 146 seat and BJP 109 seats some observers believed that these two parties would be the frontrunners for the top position, while the BSP, third in the tally of seats with 97, was also seen in the power reckoning. However, wages of misrule-corruption, arbitrary functioning, nepotism, harbouring known criminals — plus the anti-incumbency factor — were handicaps Yadav could not cope with, and opinion leaders saw an early decline in the fortunes of the Samajwadi Party. Given Mulayam Singh Yadav’s expertise in fighting electoral battles, in particular his ability to muster muscle power, pollsters were yet hopeful that Yadav was likely to hold his ground in areas of his traditional support base. But as Mayawati opened her election campaign changing her strategy from a narrow-based appeal to the Dalits to a populist call for appeasing other castes — in particular the upper-caste Brahmin — and the Muslim minority her party was seen as running neck and neck with the Samajwadi party.

The BJP leaders were quite hopeful that, following its impressive win in Punjab and Uttaranchal, it would also fare well in UP. A couple of months prior to the election Arun Jaitly said that there was resurgence of BJP in UP. “In many sections of society the BJP is going to be the natural beneficiary of popular revolution against Congress government at the centre and Samajwadi party rule in UP.”⁽⁶⁾ According to a leading news weekly the BJP believed that after its Punjab and Uttaranchal victory it will be taken more seriously in the UP polls, it would effectively use the “terrorism and minority appeasement card” against the Congress and also attack it for price rise and fiscal disarray, and rope in Narendra Modi for the election campaign.⁽⁷⁾ On the other hand the Congress made a desperate bid to resurrect the beleaguered party as Sonia Gandhi herself took charge of the election campaign and launched her heir apparent Rahul Gandhi to join her. A major thrust of Rahul’s maiden electoral exercise was to regain confidence of the Muslim minority. As he visited the prestigious centre of Muslim learning, Darul Uloom Deoband he said, “I am blind to caste and religion; I only see Hindustanis.” All Hindustanis are one, he said, and if I see one Hindustani strike another, I will stand with the one who has been struck.⁽⁸⁾

Two factors were said to have greatly helped Mayawati in her meticulous and well-thought out electioneering plan (i) an early start (ii) shift from its traditional anti-upper caste political stance. She had begun her electioneering in right earnest some two years ago, and in as many as 150 constituencies the BSP had announced its candidates more than a year ago. Thus the party had built a strong organisational machinery extending to the remotest villages.⁽⁹⁾ Ironically, Mayawait herself did not control the polls as she said she wanted to concentrate on the campaign in the whole state.⁽¹⁰⁾ The other instrument of her “winning formula” was to enlarge her electoral support base by making a persistent effort to win support from the upper castes, in particular Brahmins. Small wonder Mayawati, along with Satish Chandra, BSP’s Brahmin face, had started setting up “Dalit-Brahmin brotherhood committees” across the state. The strategy was based on simple arithmetical estimate of the caste composition of the state. According to informal estimates, the Dalits constituted about 23 per cent of the voters, Brahmins about 10 per cent and Muslims about 16 per cent. Dalit and Brahmin votes would add up to 33 per cent and with a section of Muslim vote the party would rustle up an unbeatable vote share.⁽¹¹⁾

When the BSP announced its list of candidates in March 2007, a leading Indian daily commented that the BSP had come a long way from its “highly casteist slogan, Tilak, trazu aur talwar, inko maro joote char.” ⁽¹²⁾ The list of candidates included 86 Brahmins, more than double the number fielded in the 2002 election on BSP ticket (37). Thakurs were fielded on 38 seats, the Vaishyas were given 14 seats, while as many as 61 Muslims were given the BSP ticket.⁽¹³⁾ The upper castes were no longer untouchables, a daily said, was Mayawati’s new mantra.⁽¹⁴⁾ Interestingly, the BJP tried to pay the BSP in the same coin by allocating larger number of seats to the lower castes, but ironically enough there was only one Muslim among its candidates.⁽¹⁵⁾

Pre-poll survey

In a pre-poll survey (conducted by Indian Express-CNN-IRN-CSDS) held in late March 2007, a hung assembly was predicted, which the pollsters said will not surprise any Utter Pradesh watcher, since the last time any party got a clear majority was in 1991. Politics of caste polarization, absence of fresh agendas, and impossible personal egos, the survey said, had closed the possibility of a stable majority in the state. The pre-poll survey acknowledged that Mayawati had taken an early lead, and her experiment of a Dalit-upper caste alliance was opening the possibility of majority, but it ruled out this possibility, and concluded that a ‘two-horse race was likely to end in yet another hung assembly. According to the survey if elections were held in the entire state in the third week of March, the Samajwadi Party and the BSP would have been the frontrunners leaving all others far behind. The SP, it said, was marginally ahead of the BSP by about one-percentage point and was likely to bag around 145-155 seats (the number of seats it had won in 2002). The BSP was set for its best performance but well short of the magical figure of 202 seats (clear majority in a House of 403, and would end up getting between 140-150 seats. The survey did not give the BJP more than 45-55 seats, and the Congress, it said was not capable of improving on its worst-ever performance of 24 seats in the 2002 election.⁽¹⁶⁾

In an interesting analysis of UP’s elections scene with reference to caste alignment a national daily wrote that Samajwadi Party and the BSP were niche products in UP’s caste market. And as SP wooed Yadavs and BSP positioned itself as the party of Dalits, the strategy paid off in the beginning, since the targeted consumers form a sizeable section of the state population. But their numbers did not help the two parties dominate the market on their own and therefore it became necessary for them to build coalitions. The presence of 85 Brahmins in the BSP’s list of candidates, and Thakurs expected to figure in a big way in the SP’s list, showed that the SP and BSP believed that time had come for them to expand their brand profile. While the outfit, the paper said, were largely instrumental in decline of national parties, the Congress and the BJP, the big question is whether they can expand their brand profile without losing the first customer — “can the BSP keep its Dalit vote intact when it ropes in the Brahmins.”⁽¹⁷⁾ BJP’s chief ministerial candidate Kalyan Singh had the guts to publicly acknowledge that the votes in UP were literally caught between the devil and the deep sea. They could only chose the “lesser devil” which he claimed was he as compared to Mayawati and Mulayam Singh.⁽¹⁸⁾ Ironically, the incumbent chief minister Mulayam Singh Yadav was once forced to fight corruption cases in court while battling on the other front in a high stakes election. On 1 March 2007 the Supreme Court had ordered the Central Board of Investigation (CBI) to hold preliminary inquiry into charges against the chief minister that he and his family members had amassed wealth disproportionate to their known sources of income. However, Yadav alleged that the CBI lacked credibility as a ‘neutral investigating agency’ and the Congress was trying to use the CBI to ‘settle political scores.⁽¹⁹⁾

As the polling in the UP election began in a seven-phase staggered exercise press correspondents covering Mayawati’s campaign trail were overwhelmed by the response she evoked among the Dalit voters. “A journalist with her ears to the ground can perhaps detect sounds not heard by the surveyor,” a weekly reported, as doubts began to surface about the credibility of opinion surveys and exit polls.⁽²⁰⁾ In an on-the-spot coverage of a Mayawati election rally, the Frontline correspondent gave a vivid description of the ‘Dalit queen’ and her spellbound audience. “Thousand and thousands of women, babies tucked under arms, are trudging to the rally ground,” she reported from Sultanpur. The audience listens in rapt attention as score of lesser functionaries make speeches extolling Mayawati and her multi-caste social engineering experiment. The only time the large assembly of men and women stirs is when slogans are raised. Behen Mayawati zindabad Sarvajan (all-castes) zindabad, they shout after the speaker. The BSP chief, the correspondent says, is not the best of orators. Her tone is monotonous, her speech without humour and without the flourish of her rivals. It does not help that she reads out from a prepared text. But her listeners hang on to every word. She tells them that BSP is now a party of all castes, all religions, as even she matter-of-factly provides the caste and denominational break-up of their candidates: 139 from the forward castes, 110 from other backward classes (OBCs) 93 from scheduled castes, and 61 Muslims. Mayawati has a manual of ‘dos and don’ts’ for the voting days. She tells the women “keep a fast for a day” and “don’t light the chulha (stove) until you have finished exercising your franchise.” To the man folk she advises not to fall prey to any distraction. “Whatever is the urgency of doing another job, you must first caste your vote and then attend to other business.”⁽²¹⁾

In an intriguing comparison, the Frontline correspondent recounts her experience of attending rallies addressed by Rahul Gandhi and L K Advani. Rahul, she says, attracted rapturous but inattentive crowds. They wanted to see the celebrated Gandhi heir, not to hear him. According to her, virtually the same lot turned up to hear Advani. This time they were visibly restless. What caught their fancy was foreign television crew filming the rally, as the crowd kept waving to the camera while Advani was dwelling upon the strength of Indian democracy. In conclusion she says, the “Dalit vote is typically silent. Yet the passion of this vote is difficult to miss.” The motivation, she says, is visible in the rallies and the queues outside polling booths.⁽²²⁾ Ironically enough, the Frontline correspondent, who said she had checked her findings with the Lukhnow bureaucracy which agreed that BSP could be heading for a majority, was confronted with opinion and exit polls after her return to New Delhi which projected a hung UP assembly, giving BSP between 120 and 155 seats, the Samajwadi Party between 90 and 110 seats, and the BJP between 90 and 125 seats. How wrong could be the exit polls is indeed a question to ponder.

Political pundits were made to eat humble pie as Mayawati’s phenomenal victory gave a lie to their projections but they were rather generous in acknowledging their miscalculation and shower praises on the rising star in the Indian polity. It was a “magnificent victory” for Mayawati in “UP’s landmark poll,” said a renowned journalist Inder Malhotra.⁽²³⁾ According to Swandas Gupta the novelty of Mayawati’s victory was that the ‘Dalits were a part of the winning combination.⁽²⁴⁾ K Subrahmanyam termed it an example of “realpolitik.” Mayawati, he said, was able to organize a “multi-caste and multi-community coalition” and win absolute majority.⁽²⁵⁾ Sumanta Sen acknowledged that no word of praise was enough for Mayawati’s resounding success in the UP election. “Yes, it was a personal success, as the BSP is Mayawati and Mayawati alone.” She is today not just the voice of Dalits, he wrote, in UP the poor, irrespective of caste and religion, has voted for her. For the first time Mayawati has been able to breach the divide in UP’s caste-ridden society and that is no mean thing.⁽²⁶⁾

Eminent intellectual Zoya Hasan dwelt upon the long-term consequences of Mayawati’s stunning victory in the UP election. It is undoubtedly an extraordinary event in the history of Indian democracy, she said. UP accounts for 16 per cent of country’s population and having 80 plus seats in the Lok Sabha means a significant say in the formation of the government at the centre. The electoral victory of BSP is UP specific, but its consequences are unlikely to be limited to the state. Even though the creation of a large social alliance under Dalit leadership may not be replicable in other states the BSP holds considerable appeal for the disadvantageous, disenchanted voter in the neighbouring states, especially in Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Chhatisgarh. But the further expansion of BSP’s influence in other North Indian states will depend on its performance in office in UP.⁽²⁷⁾

Mayawati’s multi-caste social alliance

A good deal has since been written about Mayawati’s spectacular success in forging a multi-caste social alliance and other factors which gave her absolute majority in UP’s long-time fragmented politics. However, it was pointed out by some analysts that the anti-incumbency vote was certainly not a factor, even though the BSP, the Congress and the BJP had all targeted Mulayam Singh Yadav’s “misrule” for attack in their campaign. Ironically, the Samajwadi Party had in fact marginally improved its vote share from 25.37 per cent in the 2002 election to 26.14 per cent in 2007. In terms of vote share the BJP was the biggest loser, slumping to 17 per cent from 20.08 in 2002. Nevertheless, the BSP’s vote share registered a spectacular rise of 7.39 per cent from 23.06 per cent in 2002, obviously at the expense of the BJP support base.⁽²⁸⁾

Mayawati’s transformation from a ‘casteist’ hawk to a promoter of a multi-caste alliance has been attributed to her political pragmatism — her willingness to learn from the experience of ground realities of practical politics. Gone are the days when she was seen as a rabble-rouser when marked hostility towards upper castes, little respect for ideologies, convention, niceties or decency and uncouth manners drew scorn of the social elite. Little wonder that when she became chief minister of UP for the first time in 1995, opinion leaders were not pleased when the then prime minister Narasimha Rao described the event as a “miracle of democracy.”⁽²⁹⁾ And twelve years later as she was installed as UP’s chief minister for the fourth time, there were no cynics to sneer at her convincing win. Of course she is a changed person; gone is the hatred for the upper class, with Dalits firmly on her side, and Brahmins no longer wary of courting her, she has also earned the support of Muslims. No one, not even her political adversaries are prone to treating her as a lightweight. Ironically, political pundits have now been entertaining the possibility of Mayawati being a strong contender for the prime minister’s job some ten years hence. Leading columnist Pran Chopra has some words of advice for Mayawati: “A rainbow is a very transitory phenomenon and even when it lasts it can be slippery.” It is easy to conjure but difficult to consolidate, he wrote.⁽³⁰⁾ Another leading columnist, Praful Bidwai, brought home the imperative that the BSP should deliver to its constituency — the Dalits. This could only be done through serious social reform, including land reforms and by putting the redistribution agenda right on top while concentrating on law and order and responsible governance.⁽³¹⁾

As the 51-years-old Dalit supremo became chief minister of India’s most populous state for the fourth time in 12 years in the wake of a massive electoral victory which gave her 7.39 per cent more votes than the previous election and as many as 206 seats in a house of 403 to allow her the extraordinary leverage of heading a single-party government in UP since 1991, political pundits were seized with the question of long-term implications of UP’s landmark election. Mayawati had led a Dalit-based party to a spectacular election victory in a caste-ridden polity which they believed could have a momentous bearing on the awareness and self-assertion level of the lowest-of-the-low in the social strata, hitherto seen as the “silent majority.” Consequently, this would be a stimulant for the multitude of have-nots to aggressively contend with upper castes for a batter and more dignified social existence, or more precisely to vie for equality of economic opportunity, social justice and rule of law. Needless to say, having discovered their political identity the low caste, in particular the Dalits, would henceforth be difficult customers to woo for the national parties, in particular the Congress party, which would be vulnerable to the decline in their vote bank speedier than ever before. Mayawati’s phenomenal success as “social engineering” whereby she was able to rope in upper-caste Brahmins to her “multi-caste social alliance” led by a Dalit party has been the other facet of the BSP’s splendid breakthrough. Can the experiment be replicated in other parts of India, particularly the Hindi-heartland is the key question. If yes, this has the potential to radically alter the alignment of political forces at the centre, and change the landscape of power politics in India in a not too distant future.

If Dalit politics across the country sees a resurgence following the BSP’s victory in UP, a commentator said, it would give a “new meaning to the category of ‘Sarva Samaj’ in redefining caste alignments for future electoral competition.” The BSP victory, he said, poses a serious challenge to the two coalitions at the national level, the NDP and the UPP. Mayawati has already hinted that the Dalit claim to power at Delhi will soon become a reality. The BSP can very well do this by consolidating its position in UP, while the party is also likely to explore possibilities to “inch its way into other parts of the country.” The real test of the BSP would come when it starts expanding to other states. It is probable, the commentator said, that Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh would be the next on the BSP’s agenda, while, a state like Maharashtra could also provide a fertile ground for BSP, since a stagnant but expectant Dalit movement exits there.⁽³²⁾ Little wonder, on completion of 100 days the power beaming chief minister Mayawati made it clear New Delhi would be the next stop for BSP.⁽³³⁾

Kanshi Ram — architect of Bahujan Samaj

It may be worthwhile as a backgrounder to briefly trace the history of the Bahujan Samaj Party since it was founded on 14 April 1984 by Kanshi Ram, a petty government servant turned a Dalit ideologue. No one since Dr Ambedkar, the messiah of the low-caste emancipation, had appeared on the scene to formulate an ideology for the lowest-of-the-low and strive for giving them an identity, as Kanshi Ram set about to achieve. The BSP made a rapid progress on the electoral front, as Kanshi Ram shifted his focus from social work to party politics. In the 1984 general election, it received more than one million votes, and this number was multiplied sixfold the 1989 when the party got 6,215,093 votes and secured three seats in the Lok Sabha. In 1991 it won only two seats and 1.16 per cent of the vote, but five years later it gained 11 seats with 3.64 per cent of vote.⁽³⁴⁾ After the 1996 election BSP was able to secure from the Election Commission the status of a national party.

Kanshi Ram adopted a wide range of techniques for mobilizing the oppressed and the exploited people, and built a network of party apparatus in parts of North India, in particular UP. In fact the BSP had emerged out of a huge gathering in New Delhi on the culmination of a 100-day campaign during which 7,000 meetings were held all over India.⁽³⁵⁾ The demonstrations led by Kanshi Ram were intended to deliver an ideological message articulated through scores of aggressively designed slogan such as vote hamara, raj tumhara, nahin chalega (We have the vote, you have the power, this will not last), or tilak, traju, aur talwar, isko mara joote char, (hit them with your shoes, — an expression of hatred for the high-caste Brahmins, Kashtria and the merchants). The BSP making inroads into UP politics was visible soon after it was founded, as it managed to secure second position in most of the constituencies in the by-elections held in the mid and late 1980s. In 1985 Mayawati fought against Meira Kumar (daughter of the well-known untouchable Congress leader) and lost but managed to secure as many as 65,000 votes. In 1987 she lost again to the Congress candidate but came second ahead of the Janata Dal leader, Ram Vilas Paswan. The following years Kanshi Ram himself chose to stand from Allahabad against V P Singh and put up a reasonably good show of electoral support. Region-wise vote-share of the BSP in UP is shown in the following table.⁽³⁶⁾

 The leap forward in UP between 1993 and 1996 could partly be explained by tactical alliances. Kanshi Ram had initially refused to make electoral alliances, but in 1993 the BSP made a pre-election alliance with Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party. The reason why Kanshi Ram had concluded a pact with Yadav was an expression of expedient politics as he himself acknowledged that if ‘we join our votes in UP, it would be able to form the government.”⁽³⁷⁾ As a result of the pre-poll alliance in the 1993 election the Samajwadi Party secured 109 seats and the BSP got 67. The two parties formed coalition in the state. While Yadav become chief minister the BSP obtained 11 ministerial berths in a government of 27. However the coalition partners could not stick together for long and the BSP put an end to its alliance with SP. In 1995 Mayawati became chief minister of a shortlived coalition backed by BJP. Mayawati’s rise to power was an unprecedented event as she was the first-ever Dalit to become chief minister of a state. Mayawati comes from a Chamar family (among the most segregated untouchables). Born in 1956 in a village in Ghaziabad district she had the good luck to go to college as her father was employed in the telephone department. She took her bachelor’s degree in education from Meerat and then LLB from Delhi and sought employment as a school teacher but she had the ambition to become an IAS officer. While she was preparing for the elite service examination she was spotted by Kanshi Ram who roped in Mayawati for a political role. Thereafter she became a Kanshi Ram loyalist, leaving her job and devoting herself as a whole-time activist of the BSP. She faithfully pursued the politics of her mentor for almost two decades, even when she became a Dalit leader in her own right and exercised more political authority than the BSP supremo. But it was towards her final campaign for power that Kanshi Ram was marginalised because of ill-health. And before he passed away in October 2006 he lived the life of a recluse in his final years.

Paying tributes to the Dalit icon, the Times of India wrote, “a man who single-handedly turned the politics of North India on its head by thrusting Dalits as a factor in the regional power play.”⁽³⁸⁾ And The Hindus said that the rise of BSP was a fascinating story and for several years its superstar has been Mayawati. But it must not be forgotten that the “superstructure of the party’s electoral success rests on the foundation laid by a visionary who had long ago recognised the power and potential of a united bahusamaj.”⁽³⁹⁾

Gujarat elections

Unlike UP, elections in Gujarat had a direct bearing on the power equation in New Delhi since the competitors in the field were the incumbent state government led by the BJP, and the opposition Congress party trying to seize power in the state after two abortive attempts. Two factors were in particular focus of public attention. The first was the incumbency factor. The Narendra Modi government was in power in the state for two consecutive terms, and observers expected the anti-incumbency factor to play a vital role in the choice of the electorate who by virtue of political logic should have grown sick and tired of voting for the same people, as it happened in Punjab and Uttaranchal. The second variable was the “communal factor” which critics believed should have at some stage aroused liberal opinion to disassociate itself from hardcore communal elements responsible for killing in cold blood more than 2,000 Muslims in the 2002 riots, more so because several human rights forums had now conclusively established that the administration under Narendra Modi had linkages with the RSS and CHP firebrands who went on an anti-Muslim rampage, killing, looting, raping women and burning people alive, even though Modi had won an earlier snap election soon after the riots took place.

The Congress party had geared up for a decisive battle with BJP, since regaining Gujarat would have been considered a ‘great victory’, a shot in the arm for the ruling coalition in New Delhi close to the next general election. On the other hand, Narendra Modi appears firmly set in the saddle and in some quarters seen as the rising BJP star who could sell the Hindutva agenda, without any ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ like Vajpayee or even Advani. Ironically, in the state assemblies polls preceding Gujarat, Modi was chosen as the BJP’s star performer, as there was a feeling in some BJP quarters that Modi could replicate the Gujarat experience in other states. The RSS parcharak was deputed to work for the BJP and thereafter held the BJP fort in Gujarat with flying colours, while at times threatening to outshine L K Advani as the party supremo.

It must be reminded that the Gujarat state has traditionally been the fortress of Hindu communal forces — the RSS, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal have flourished in the state, as Hindu warriors have set on mission to settle the score with religious minorities. During the 1991 destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhiya the largest contingent of Mandir warriors came from Gujarat and Surat was worst hit by communal riots in the aftermath when Muslim women were paraded naked in the streets. In early 2000 the VHP and Bajrang Dal activists launched a violent crusade against Christian missionaries accusing them of ‘forcibly converting’ tribal and low-caste people. Churches, school and hospitals run by them were attacked. And then happened the infamous 2002 carnage which critics said was pre-planned with the complicity of the state administration. Ironically, Mahatma Gandhi and his killer Nathu Ram Gadse were both from Gujarat, as the apostle of peace and non-violence was shot dead for what the communalists considered appeasing the Muslims. Small wonder that there were quite a few optimists who believed that the birth place of ‘Mahatma’ could be retrieved from the stranglehold of the communal forces.

Congress party’s decline in Gujarat

Tracing the history of the Congress party’s decline in Gujarat a correspondent wrote, 1989 saw the beginning of the Congress downfall, and the rise of BJP.⁽⁴⁰⁾ After winning the Surat Lok Sabha seat there was no looking back for the ‘Saffron brigade’ from 1989 onwards. In January 2000 the BJP state government of Gujarat ‘lifted the ban on government employees joining the RSS, which a daily described as “covert vs overt,” saying the veil will thus be lifted from what has actually been growing on since the BJP came to power. A majority of Indians, the paper wrote, will certainly dread the prospect, even as they quite justifiably lament the absence of a “strong secular initiative to check the RSS inroads.”⁽⁴¹⁾ In an elaborate analysis of how the BJP-run government in Gujarat was trying to transform a secular state into saffron, the Left-leaning weekly pointed out that it was the RSS agenda which was implemented by the BJP. “The process of constructing Hindu Rashtra began two years ago with a vicious propaganda against minorities, the Muslim and Christian in particular, important places were chosen to target the minorities with active support from sections of government and the media.”⁽⁴²⁾ Acknowledging that the BJP’s growth in Gujarat has been “faster and deeper,” a well-known analyst said that Gujarat was the only state where the BJP was in power on its own; and where other members of the sangh pariwar, the RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal, were not only sticking to their ideology but also behaving in an aggressive manner. According to him, the BJP had moderate face where it had to rule in alliance and a hardened face where it was in power by itself, as in Gujarat.⁽⁴³⁾

In October 2000 the BJP suffered a temporary setback losing heavily in the civic polls as the Congress party won 21 of the 23 district panchayats establishing majority in 2,302 taluka panchayats.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Ironically, the BJP’s national executive attributed the debacle in civic polls to “anti-Christian riots and the party’s anti-Muslim image.”⁽⁴⁵⁾ In October 2001, chief minister Keshubahi Patel was forced to quit by the BJP high command, and Narendra Modi appointed the new Gujarat ‘sartap.’ According to a correspondent, Modi was sent to Gujarat for his administrative abilities. Senior BJP leaders believe, he wrote, Modi is a “go-getter,” a manipulator and one who can get things done.”⁽⁴⁶⁾ Within a year of his taking over as chief minister Narendra Modi has had the ignoble distinction of presiding over the Gujarat carnage which liberal opinion leaders called an outrage after which “India stands dismissed as a nation.”⁽⁴⁷⁾ Nevertheless, Modi couldn’t care less about what critics said about his administration’s sponsorship of Hindu rioters and got away with running an anti-Muslim reign of terror in the state. The Left parties called for Modi’s removal but the BJP gave him a clean chit, saying “why should he go? He has handled the situation well.”⁽⁴⁸⁾ BJP’s faith in Narendra Modi to deliver proved right as he swept the assembly polls in December 2002 and became chief minister of Gujarat for the second time in two years. In a cover story in January 2003, nation’s leading newsweekly India Today conferred on him the title “Newsmaker of the year.” “The India of many illusion cracked beneath his feet, the divide is stark. Force Modi in swaying the nation, still.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Modi should have gone down under, the paper wrote, instead he went ahead, leaving behind a society polarised. It also gave credit to Modi for “aggressively symbolising a new tomorrow as the BJP was suffering from ideological fatigue.

Rise of Narendra Modi

Narendra Modi was said to have often provided himself as Sardar Patel — the so-called ‘iron man’ — as the BJP’s star campaigner in the coming state assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhatisgarh. Wrote a correspondent in November 2003, the party hopes to present him as “Lok Prush and Vikas Prush symbolising the new face of Hindutva nationalism.”⁽⁵⁰⁾ According to him Godhra as ‘vibrant Gujarat’ are too events that define his nationalism. The burning to death of 42 karsevaks in a train by local Muslims at Godhra in February 2002 gave Modi the occasion to spell out, in words and blood, his kind of nationalism. Godhra was avenged several times over by VHP and Bajrang Dal mobs. The state acquiesced in, perhaps even encouraged, this violence. And ‘vibrant Gujarat’ was a “series of events Modi staged last month to invite NRI and foreign capital in the state.” Modi, the correspondent says, like any sangh pariwar member believes that the Muslims are “unpatriotic, fanatic and socially backward,” and it is “backwardness’ that Modi has highlighted, and in the process earned for himself great popularity among the middle lower class and caste Hindus of the state. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was said to have been unhappy with Modi’s role in the 2002 anti-Muslim riots, but had failed to openly censure him, finally broke his silence more than a year later, as he told a news channel that “not removing Narendra Modi as chief minister after the Gujarat episode was a big mistake.”⁽⁵¹⁾ His remarks that the Gujarat riots were responsible for the BJP’s defeat in the 2004 Lok Sabha polls attracted immediate response from the RSS supremo K Sudarshan who blamed the English-language media for blowing up the post-Godhra riots, and “the so-called modern, liberals for trying to keep the issue of Gujarat riots alive.”⁽⁵²⁾ Ironically, Vajpayee had also hinted that the question of removing Modi was “still open” and the BJP national executive would decide the matter. Little wonder that the RSS chief’s thinking proved more decisive than Vajpayee’s voice in the wilderness as Narendra Modi not only stayed but also went from strength to strength in his hold on power in Gujarat.

Towards the end of the year 2003, a national daily wrote “BJP is up, Congress is down.” The year 2003 belonged to the BJP, the paper said “and so it seems from today subjective perspective will year 2004.”⁽⁵³⁾ Although the BJP suffered a humiliating defeat in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and the Congress managed to stage a comeback at the Centre at the head of an alternative coalition, the BJP in Gujarat led by Narendra Modi who had pulled off a remarkable election victory in 2002, held the fort for the ‘saffron brigade.’ Ironically the BJP general secretary had said in December 2003 that secularism was a ‘sugar-coated candy’ which had made the Indian minorities “diabetic.” Muslim society, he said, had suffered badly in the last decade due to vote bank” policies of the Congress.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Best Bakery trial

In the wake of the holding of the Best Bakery trial, the events of the 2002 Gujarat riots were in the news again. In an exhaustive commentary of what was the scene like in early 2005, a prestigious journal, The Seminar wrote: “Modi and his allies have been trying to convince the world that looting, arson, sexual abuse and mass murder was a legitimate expression of ‘Hindu outrage,’ and within a few months of massacres, even as thousands of Muslims were in relief camps, the chief minister insisted that normalcy had returned. In the early phase the victims were hesitant to come forward and register cases. In many instances the police intimidated them to withdraw their cases. Finally over 4,256 cases were registered and investigated by the same state police force which was openly seen to be aiding and abetting the rioters and murderers. Not surprisingly within a few months summary reports were field in 2,108 cases and their files closed for investigation. The turning point came in mid-2003 when the fast-track court trying the Best Bakery case, in which 14 people were burnt alive, acquitted all the accused for lack of evidence. Just as all hopes of justice were lost, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial of the case to be conducted outside Gujarat. The Supreme Court also ordered reopening of the 2,108 cases which had been closed down by the state government.”⁽⁵⁵⁾

The Seminar also pointed out the paradox that though in Ahmadabad the municipal corporation was controlled by the Congress, vacancies for teachers in Urdu-medium schools run by the corporation were not filled and there was even talk of closing down all these schools. Some Muslim members of the Congress were reported to have complained that “Congress corporators and MNAs often behave as if they are part of the BJP.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Interesting enough, Narendra Modi was denied a diplomatic visa by the US and then his business trip was cancelled by the American embassy in New Delhi in March 2005.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Commenting on the denial of US visa to Modi a Congress spokesman said, “Modi has become a cause for national embarrassment, while Praful Bidwai was optimistic enough to suggest that secularism gets a shot in the arm,⁽⁵⁸⁾ while Nihal Singh describing it as “BJP’s Modi problem” said that denial of visa to Modi had added to the party’s woes.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Infighting in Gujarat BJP openly surfaced in October 2005 as Modi detractors led by former chief minister Keshubhai Patel together with two other senior BJP leaders dissociated themselves from the recently formed election committee to oversee local elections, saying that they were not consulted.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In December 2005 Narendra Modi once again proved his critics wrong by wresting control of the Ahmadabad municipal corporation from the Congress by a huge margin. When he had announced his intention to run the campaign, Congress general secretary who saw it as “panic reaction” had declared that they had won half the battle. Modi opponents in the BJP also got it wrong and stayed away from the campaign. They were hoping that a defeat in the corporation elections would make Modi more vulnerable.⁽⁶¹⁾ Commenting on the Congress defeat a correspondent said that the Congress must do more before it could really challenge Modi. The party was being led by remote control from Delhi. The last party chief in Gujarat died three months ago and even before his death he had been bed-ridden for five months, and there was no one to coordinate the Congress politics in the state.⁽⁶²⁾ Another commentator said that the BJP had a lot to thank the Congress for its sweeping success, because the Congress in Gujarat had virtually disintegrated. In Godhra for instance, it did not nominate a single candidate, and even the city Congress president had to contest as an independent. Narendra Modi, he said, was using his victory to proclaim his undying popularity in the state, known as “Hindutva laboratory.” A Godhra businessman was reported to have told the correspondent “the Modi bulldozer is on. They are winning by strong-arm tactics. They have the entire administration with them.”⁽⁶³⁾ The Congress party was under fire from other quarters for its failure to stand up to the challenge of effectively dealing with Narendra Modi and his “Hindutva fiefdom” in Gujarat. As eminent columnist Kuldip Nayyar pointed out the secular credentials of the Congress party could not be doubted but one suspected its political motive. The party seldom takes a bold stand against communalism. “There is hesitation if not fear to take on the BJP.”⁽⁶⁴⁾

On the eve of the Gujarat election which were held on 11-16 December 2007 the communal forces led by the BJP were as aggressive as ever before. Narendra Modi was in total command of the party as well as the state administration. He had successfully warded off demands for his removal in some BJP quarters and more so in the aftermath of Vajpayee’s confession. The fallout of Gujarat riots was instrumental in BJP’s defeat in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections but he had sorted out his rivals in the Gujarat BJP. Modi had also managed to neutralise the ‘anti-communalist’ campaign against him launched by the human rights activists and was able to bring home the message that things were not only back to normal but also on the threshold of a new era of progress and prosperity. Having won two assembly elections in a row Modi was superconfident of staging a hat trick. The Congress party, on the other hand, as Kuldip Nayyar pointed out, was hesitant of taking on the BJP. The trouble with the Congress campaign was its unwillingness to “hold the bull by the horns,” and thus its failure to draw a clear battle line between communal and secular forces. Little wonder some observer said the Congress campaign gave the image of a “softer-Hindutva.”

From Hindutva icon to economic reformer

As the two-phase elections were announced by the Election Commission critics said that Modi would shift his emphasis from his earlier image as Hindutva icon to one as an earnest economic reformer. Soon it became quite clear that he was not hoping to win two elections in a row on an anti-Muslim plank. But observers pointed out that beneath the slogans of a “vibrant Gujarat” was a reliance on the Hindutva card.⁽⁶⁵⁾ The anti-Modi factions in Gujarat BJP were clearly told by party President Rajnath Singh to close ranks behind Modi as he declared he “who had managed to build Gujarat into model state,” would remain the BJP chief ministerial candidate.⁽⁶⁶⁾ The Congress President Mrs Sonia Gandhi, opened the Congress election campaign in Gujarat on 30 October. But before that her party used an innovative publicity technique — adapting the title of a popular Bollywood film, “Chak De India,” to coin its election slogan “Chak De Congress” — to sell the Congress to the electorate. Colourful ‘Chak De Congress’ posters were handed over to the party district chief at a special function.⁽⁶⁷⁾

According to a correspondent, the Congress believed that several factors were working in its favour, and the party planned to “cash in on Modi’s poor track record as an administrator, the promises he failed to keep and his dictatorial style of functioning.”⁽⁶⁸⁾

Before Sonia Gandhi took off for Gujarat to begin her election campaign she said in New Delhi that the Congress would not make the 2002 riots the “centrepiece” of its campaign for the Gujarat election.⁽⁶⁹⁾ In her first election rally Sonia made a frontal attack on Modi alleging that “misdeeds” in the Godhra aftermath were a shame to a civilised society and asked for raising a voice against the “barbaric people.”⁽⁷⁰⁾ In a pre-poll opinion survey conducted by CNN-PBN-Indian Express in mid-November the BJP was projected as a clear winner, securing 100 of the 182 assembly seats. The survey showed a five per cent decline in the BJP’s vote share since the 2002 polls, but despite the decline the BJP was still ahead of the Congress by five per cent securing 45 per cent of the total. The survey gave the Congress 76 seats as against 100 for the BJP.⁽⁷¹⁾ Leading newsweekly Frontline called the Gujarat election a “one horse race.” Narendra Modi rides high in the absence of the effective opposition, the paper wrote. In the 2002 polls Modi had won a landslide victory (126 of 182 seats) by creating “communal criteria” after the Godhra incident. Five years later, the paper said, in Modi’s regime Muslims who constitute nine per cent of the population have been totally marginalised. They are “second class citizens.” Modi is remodelled avatar whose new mantra is “Vibrant Gujarat.” Small wonder the BJP spokesman claimed that Gujarat was India’s number one state in all aspects of development. “We have attracted Rs 94,000 crore investment which is more than the combined investment in the four states after us.”⁽⁷²⁾

Ironically Sonia Gandhi was reported have been drawing big crowds as compared to L K Advani who was also campaigning in the state, which gave wrong ideas to the Congress about its election prospects. But what left the BJP fuming was Sonia’s remark that “Godse has replaced Gandhi in today’s Gujarat.” Modi was aggressively quick to retaliate. “It is the mud from Italy that is being thrown on me,” he said.⁽⁷³⁾ Meanwhile it was reported in the Press that the BJP was making some eleventh hour modifications in its campaign strategy and trying to pull out some Hindutva issues. Observers said that the BJP was apprehensive that “Vibrant Gujarat” may not be enough to win the polls.

Campaigning for the first phase of polling ended amidst reports of violence from several parts of the state. The worst incident was reported from the town of Vadodara where a large number of sadhus clashed with BJP workers.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Interestingly, a correspondent said “regardless of which party win the assembly election the real beneficiaries from this electoral exercise would be the state’s powerful sadhus who are playing a major role in Gujarat’s politics.⁽⁷⁵⁾ An estimated 58 to 60 per cent voting was recorded in the first phase, which covered 1.78 crore voters, and 87 of the 182 constituencies. The NDTV exit polls showed the Congress was making gains, and the BJP suffering reverses. The Star News survey said the Congress would get 37 seats (a gain of seven and the BJP 48 (five less than its 2002 tally), while the NDTV gave 43 to the Congress and 40 to the BJP.⁽⁷⁶⁾ However, senior BJP leaders dismissed the exit polls as unreliable. Meanwhile BJP supremo L K Advani persisted with war of words, accusing Sonia Gandhi of “insulting the voters of Gujarat” by calling Modi and co. “merchants of death.” The Congress had committed a blunder by using “unhealthy language,” he said, and this would prove very costly for the party.⁽⁷⁷⁾

As the second phase of voting ended on 16 December, an estimated 62 to 64 per cent voters turned out to elect 95 assembly seats. Exit polls conducted by TV channels said that the BJP was poised to retain power but with reduced majority. The CNN-IBN-CDs gave BJP 92 to 100 seats with the Congress securing 77 to 85. The Star News saw the BJP getting 103 seats and the Congress 76.⁽⁷⁸⁾ BJP president L K Advani who was among the first voters, predicted that his party would win hands down.

As the election results started pouring in, it became quite clear, that the BJP had managed to retain power, even though several of Modi’s ministers were among the losers. Modi himself had won against this Congress rival by a huge margin of 187,161 votes, but among his ministerial colleagues who all lost to the Congress were: Inderajay Singh Jadeja, Kaushik Patel, Bhupendara Singh Chudasma, Chatrasinah Mori, Prabhatamh Chauhan, Dilip Thakur and Ratilal Sureja. The Congress party made haste to accept defeat, as prime minister Manmohan Singh called up Modi to congratulate him on the election victory, and the Congress spokesperson called it “great, remarkable” election victory.⁽⁷⁹⁾ L K Advani described the Gujarat victory as a “turning point” in national politics because it “signals BJP’s comeback” as the frontrunner in the next parliamentary election. And Modi took pride in winning the Gujarat election for the “fifth time.” This was a positive vote, he said, to bring back the government.⁽⁸⁰⁾

Although the pre-poll surveys and exit polls did not go entirely wrong as was the case in UP, they were quite off the mark in projecting the BJP and the Congress seats. The BJP performance was much better than the most optimistic projections while the Congress trailed behind the lowest. In the final tally of seats the BJP won 117, ten less than the 2002 polls but at least 14 more than the exit poll projections, while the Congress winning 62 seats just managed to surpass its 2002 tally but to was far below the projected strength of 76 seats. Observers pointed out that the Congress had done fairly well in Gujarat in the 2004 Lok Sabha election — winning 12 of 26 seats, but it squandered the 2007 opportunity.⁽⁸¹⁾ However it was some consolation for the Congress that it had regained some lost ground in central Gujarat. In the 2002 elections the BJP had captured 38 of the 43 assembly seats from central Gujarat, leaving only five seats for the Congress — its lowest ever tally in the region. In 2007 the Congress managed to win as many as 22 seats leaving the BJP with 18 seats.^(82)<