Vol. XXVII
No. 4
Autumn 2009 Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Regional Studies,
Islamabad, Pakistan.
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RELIGIOUS PARTIES AND MILITANT GROUPS IN BANGLADESH POLITICS Arshi Saleem Hashmi |
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DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSISF Farzana Rizvi |
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MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS AND INDIA: Tariq Asghar |
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BANGLADESH’S POLITICAL TURMOIL, 2006-08: AN ANALYSIS Maryam Mastoor |
RELIGIOUS PARTIES
AND MILITANT GROUPS IN BANGLADESH POLITICS
Religion in politics and its
transition to
Demerath and Ryan while discussing
“Cultural Power” in 1992(1) said
that religion is often an ally in the pursuit of power, once power has been
secured, religion can become an unwelcome constraint in the quite different
processes of state administration. The most conspicuous exceptions here are not
“religious states” but rather “state religions” in which the government seeks to
control religion. Strangely enough, this often involves state support for
religion in an effort to co-opt and nullify it as an independent power-base.
Because religion in one sphere is
matched symmetrically by religion in the other, a religious state would seem to
go hand in hand with religious politics. The combination is more the exception
than the rule, and this is because it is so volatile and potentially violent.
When a religious state is faced with religious politics, there is a religious
conflict at issue. Under such circumstances, the state's very legitimacy is
called into question, and violence may reflect preemptive actions of state
control as well as the clash among contending religious parties. If there is a
single pattern that lends itself to the most widespread religious and cultural
violence, it is surely this one. And while the category is rare, it is hardly
nonexistent. The combination of a religious state and religious politics has
occasioned some of the most deeply rooted and tragic violence of the modern era,
Pakistan being an apt example of this situation.
Some highly delicate aspects of the
problems connected with the religious beliefs of people, in order to make clear
the difference between the spiritual values of religion and certain ambitions —
political and other aggressive goals — which are far from religious, which
certain forces try to make us achieve using slogans, like the Islamic revival.
The very fact of the stable existence of religions, including Islam, for
millennia testifies that they have deep roots in human nature and perform a set
of essential functions. Being predominantly the spiritual sphere of society,
groups and individuals, religion has absorbed and reflects universal norms of
morality, making them compulsory standards of behaviour. It has considerably
influenced culture and has helped/is helping to overcome human isolation and
alienation from other human beings.
While acknowledging the important
role of religion, it should be pointed out at the same time that the religious
conception of the world has not been the only way of thinking about man's
attitude towards the world and towards his kind. Parallel with this, and with
the same right to existence, has been the development of what is usually called
secular thinking or a secular way of living. Perhaps it is precisely this
coexistence of different attitudes, unfortunately not always peaceful in
comprehending the reason for living that has promoted the richness and variety
of the human world. Its spiritual activity is a stimulus to its development,
because a society composed of similarly reasoning people would become gray
instead of multicoloured.
Religion, as a component of social
life, is linked inextricably with other spheres of social life, exerting
influence but also influenced by the impact of social pressures. It is not
accidental that most of the religious systems existing today were formed during
periods of social, economic and political revolution and crisis. This shows that
religion has, throughout human history, been employed to a greater or lesser
degree to achieve political goals, which were not always noble. Unfortunately,
the history of mankind has many examples of people's faith, a component of
religious consciousness, being used not as a constructive power, but as a
destructive force, as fanatism, which is characterized by such features or
manifestations as a passionate conviction in the veracity of only one confession
and an accompanying intolerance towards all others.
Any religious system itself is not
able to make any recommendations on the settlement of social and economic
problems. No religious system contains concrete measures corresponding to the
modern level of world development, and the religious fundamentalists' appeal to
a return to the circumstances in which the religions originated may hardly be
considered as constructive and viable.
On the one hand, the cultural values
of Islam, its traditions and its huge spiritual heritage greatly contribute not
only to the historical evolution of our region, but also to the qualitative
shaping of its new image. On the other hand, as an instrument in the political
struggle for control and influence over the political mind of the masses, Islam
is able to play the role of a banner under which forces are united that do not
pursue definite programme objectives, but are guided by only one goal — that is
the struggle for power. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, there are
dramatic changes in the social, political and economic spheres.
Bangladesh is no exception when it
comes to religious extremism and its role in politics. There can be many
reasons, like the cold war during which the US in its efforts to contain the
spread of the Communist ideology encouraged the religious, rightist
conservatives to engage in politics to check the communist influence from west
Bengal or as in Pakistan where military regimes during the same period,
concentrated on strengthening the country as an Islamic state. The role of Saudi
Arabia and the US cannot be ignored but what was going on at the societal level
in Bangladesh? My argument is that it is because of the power struggle between
the two political parties in Bangladesh that created the political space for the
Islamists. Its result has been the weakening of the political/democratic
dispensation and radicalization of society with religious parties getting
stronger, politically and socially.
Religion, culture and politics in
Bangladesh
Religious extremism and its role in
Bangladeshi politics is visible not just in the countryside but in urban areas
as well. General Zia-ur-Rehman’s political Islam of the 1970s seems to be paying
dividends. Bangladesh is experiencing the influx of alumni from the estimated
64,000 madrassas in the country.(2) In
addition to that several other radical groups are getting legitimacy due to
close alliance with the largest political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP) which formed government in coalition with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) after
the 2001 elections. Although these religious parties were not as strong as in
Pakistan or in India, yet their inclusion in government was a change towards
that end. This has indirectly strengthened the radical
groups to act with freedom.
Sufi scholars had played a
significant role in spreading the message of Islam in Bangladesh, even before
the arrival of Muslim armies from the west. Around 1200 AD, Muslim rulers
established political control over the Bengal region.(3) This
political control also encouraged the spread of Islam in that area enabling a
Muslim majority to emerge in the eastern part of Bengal. In the late 16th
century, a dynasty of Chughtai Turks commonly known as the Mughals annexed
Bengal to their vast Indian empire, thereby ending the delta’s long isolation
from North India. By the mid 17th century, the Mughals had
established their rule throughout the delta. Bengali chieftains who witnessed
these successes increasingly understood that the advantages of joining the new
order outweighed those of resisting it. The conquest was accompanied by
fundamental changes in the region’s economic structure, its socio-political
system, and its cultural complexion, both at the court and in the countryside.(4) From
a religious perspective, socio-political institutions facilitated the diffusion
of Islamic conceptions of Divine and human authority among groups under their
influence. Often the term conversion is used to define the Islamization process,
but it is perhaps misleading in as far as it connotes a sudden and total
transformation whereas in Bengal, as in South Asia generally, the process of
Islamization as a social phenomenon was so gradual as to be nearly
imperceptible.
Bangladesh is not as monolithic a
society as it appears. Political differences on ideological lines have led to
violent confrontations and fragmented Bangla society along a variety of
allegiances of a communal kind, while appearing to be following the same
nationalism and the same faith.(5) Interestingly, the struggle for separation and Bangla nationalism grew
out of the Bangla language movement, and not religion. At the same time, the
newly independent, secular Bangladesh became the only country in South Asia with
one dominant language group and few ethnic and religious minorities. However, it
is important to note that the religious element has always been present, though
it was not so dominant in Bangla culture. It’s a matter of debate though that
Islam did not play its political role because of the unique socio-political
developments in East Pakistan, especially during the period of 1947-1971.(6)
Bangladeshi Muslims at different
levels have adopted various other types of Islam — escapist, fatalist, puritan,
and militant, for example — as an alternative to their failed welfare state. An
understanding of political Islam and other variables in the arena of Bangladesh
politics requires an intimate knowledge of what the people need and what the
leaders have been promising them since the inception of the separatist movement
in the 1960s. The gap between what the people have attained since independence
and what the liberal-democrat, socialist-secular and nationalist leaders (both
“Bengali” and “Bangladeshi”) have been promising to deliver is the key to our
understanding of the problem.
Since Bangladesh is the
third-largest Muslim country in the world (after Indonesia and Pakistan), it is
only natural to assume that Islam plays an important role in moulding its
politics and culture. Around 90 per cent of the population is Muslim — most
importantly, representing one of the poorest, least literate and most backward
sections of the world population. If mass poverty, illiteracy and unequal
distribution of wealth have any positive correlation with Islamic resurgence and
militancy, then Bangladesh has to be a fertile breeding ground of what is
wrongly defined as “Islamic fundamentalism.” Of late, the Awami League (the
party under Sheikh Mujib that championed the cause of greater autonomy for East
Pakistan, ultimately leading to the independence of Bangladesh) has been
projecting its main political opponents — the BNP and the Jamaat-i-Islam — as
“fundamentalist” with a view to gaining political leverage.
The nature of Islamic movements in
Bangladesh
Islamic movements have another
dimension—they are primarily rural-based, agrarian and reflective of peasant
culture and behaviour. The country is predominantly agrarian, with more than 80
per cent of the population being rural, mostly impoverished peasants primarily
depending on primitive modes of cultivation, having incomplete access to the
means of production, lacking power, security of tenure and viable means of
sustenance and employment. And as we know, peasants, being traditional, fatalist
and religious if not pious by nature, often resort to religion as a means of
identity as well as support and sustenance. In short, peasants’ political
behaviour and culture are not devoid of religion. Their mundane activities,
including the political ones (in power perspectives), are inspired by their
“moral economy,” which again is subject to their religious belief system. Hence,
the significance of the peasant factor in understanding Islam in Bangladesh
society and politics.
The synthesis of the two traditions,
i.e. “peasant Islam” and “Urban elite” leading to syncretism is what prevails as
“Islam” in Bangladesh. Despite their concerted efforts, the Islamic puritan
reformers, the “Wahabis,” and others since the early nineteenth century, have
been able to change little in this regard. While sections of ultra-orthodox
Muslims claim to be adherents of the Islamic “great traditions,” they have also
inherited syncretistic beliefs and rituals as their forebears were not immune to
the traditions of Arabia, Central Asia, Iran and northwestern India and Bengal.
Until the 1990s, Bangladesh was
considered a liberal society. But that has changed rapidly. Bangladesh has seen
a rapid growth of political Islam. The main religious political party is
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB - a sister organization of
Jamaat-e-Islami, in Pakistan). It is an openly pro-Pakistan party. In the
general elections held in 2001, the JIB won 18 seats in the parliament, with the
help of BNP. The JIB uses its position to spread the ideas of Islamic
fundamentalism.(7)
Military regimes and establishment
With the military takeover led by
General Zia-ur-Rehman on 7 November 1975, the use of religion as a counterweight
to the Awami League’s secular and vaguely socialist ideology was adopted as a
government policy. In 1977, Zia dropped secularism as one of the four
cornerstones of Bangladesh’s constitution and used the Islamic ideological
platform to justify the military take over and to prolong his rule. The trend
continued even after his assassination and grew stronger with Lt. Gen. Hossain
Muhammad Ershad assuming power on 24 March 1982. In 1988, Ershad made Islam the
state religion of Bangladesh, thus institutionalising the new brand of
nationalism with the Islamic flavour that Zia-ur-Rehman had introduced. To
counter the secular opposition the Jamaat-e-Islami was revived, and use of
religion in politics increased.(8) The
constitutional amendments introduced, beginning from 1977 to the Eighth
amendment, can be viewed as attempts by the governments to broaden their power
bases as well as to maintain good relations with the Muslim Middle East.(9)
In the past several years a number
of militant Islamic groups have emerged in Bangladesh. Some are affiliated with
particular political parties, while others have no specific political
affiliation. What factors helped spawn these groups? The answer is complex. In
part they arose as a result of the general transformation of Bangladesh’s
political and social milieu. In their quest for legitimacy, two military rulers
had wrapped themselves in the mantle of Islam. In the process they created
conditions for the emergence of various radical groups. Specifically, they
allowed elements of the conservative Muslim clergy to express their views more
freely and granted them opportunities to preach against religious minorities and
insist on particular interpretations of Islamic theology. In effect, they not
only altered the terms of political discourse in Bangladesh but also helped
fashion a new political culture that could accommodate a shift toward a more
pristine, austere, and parochial vision of Islam.
With the oil crisis in 1970s and the
Iranian revolution in 1979, and Saudi Arabia’s aggressive policies to counter
the spread of Iranian (Shia) influence, missionary programmes were launched with
financial support in Muslim countries. Bangladesh was also influenced by this
phenomenon. The proliferation of Islam-based institutions and organizations,
mainly of charitable and missionary character, and the construction of new
mosques and madrassas were the manifestation of this trend. Internal
developments in Bangladesh also accelerated the growth and functioning of these
institutions. With the ban on religious parties under Awami League government
for their opposition to creation of a new state based on Bangla nationalism,
these parties had no alternative but to extend and intensify their religious
activities. President Zia, later in order to enlist the support of the rejected
rightist elements and the affluent West Asian countries, helped in the
rehabilitation of the religious parties and organisations.(10)
The subsequent governments gradually
leaned toward the oil-rich Muslim countries of the Middle East and the West for
the sake of sustained growth and legitimacy. Significantly, the Saudi
recognition of Bangladesh came only after the assassination and overthrow of
Sheikh Mujib. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s transformation into a quasi-Islamic state
by discarding socialism and secularism went unhindered because the West,
especially the United States, preferred pro-Western Islamists to pro-Communist
social democrats during the Cold War’s tail end period of the 1980s.
Ershad introduced the Zakat
Fund to raise poor-tax in accordance with the teachings of Islam. He also
declared Friday as the weekly holiday and frequently visited mosques, shrines
and the Muslim holy places in Mecca and Medina. Even when military rule ended in
Bangladesh and civilian democratic rule was restored, the emerging political
culture supplanted previous notions of cultural pluralism and tolerance. Attacks
against Hindus, the principal minority population, increased and the state
proved unwilling to stop the perpetrators.
Bangladesh’s political scene has
been tumultuous since independence. Periods of democratic rule have been
interrupted by coups, martial law, and states of emergency. There are a number
of small political groups apart from the major political parties. Most of these
are small, fringe parties formed mostly by a small group of like-minded
intellectuals or politicians who usually have broken away from larger groupings.
There are, however, five major political forces in the country. The Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies form the right-of-center to conservative
grouping in Bangladesh. The Awami League (AL), which initially saw its birth as
a socialistic organization has now transformed into a center/center-left
political stream. The extreme right or left, while not supported by a large
proportion of the populace, is typified by having very dedicated followers. To
the left are the Bangladesh Communist Party, factions of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik
Dal, and other socialist groups advocating revolutionary change. To the right is
a group of parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Oikyo Jote, who call
for an increased role for Islam in public life. The fifth major party is the
party founded by ex-military ruler General Ershad, the Jatiyo Party (JP) is
ideologically not too different from the AL or the BNP but operates
independently.
The successive democratic
governments after Zia and Ershad were unable to tackle with the rising extremism
and religious radicalism. The increasing number of madrassas over the period of
time has encouraged extremism and religious intolerance towards minorities.
There has been, rather, an institutional growth of madrassas as an indispensable
part of the national religious-educational system. Prior to secession (1971),
there were 1,467 madrassas in Bangladesh, but by 2002 they were estimated to be
around 64,000 with about 1.8 million students.(11) The
government has no control over these madrassas and the students passing out from
them are ill equipped to enter mainstream professions. They are, therefore,
easily available targets for militant organizations for recruitment.(12)
The general election of 2001,
brought a new right wing regime in Bangladesh, the BNP-led four party alliance
won the majority and formed a coalition with the Jamaat-e-Islami. This was the
first time that a religious party had been able to come in the mainstream
political arena and into government. This has raised the fear of Islamic
resurgence in Bangladesh; although the Jamaat may not be directly involved in
promoting extremism, however, being in power created a sense of impunity among
the religious militant groups. The intimidation of minorities has worsened over
the period of time and discrimination among them has become a problem.
After over 34 years of independence,
the dreams of prosperity, stable democracy and political stability are still not
fulfilled. Both political parties are split on the basis of being considered
‘pro-Indian’ or ‘pro-Pakistan’. The Awami League is considered pro-Indian,
liberal and secular, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is considered
pro-Pakistan, reactionary and right wing. Despite these political differences
among the parties, Islam has remained an important component of Bangladeshi
ideology. The Constitution, as originally framed in 1972, explicitly described
the government of Bangladesh as “secular.” But in 1977, an executive
proclamation made three changes in wording that did away with this legacy. The
proclamation deleted “secular” and inserted a phrase stating that a fundamental
state principle is “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah.” The phrase
Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim
(In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) was inserted before the
preamble of the Constitution. Another clause states that the government should
“preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on
Islamic solidarity.”(13) These
changes in terminology reflected an overt state policy aimed at strengthening
Islamic culture and religious institutions as central symbols of nationalism and
at reinforcing international ties with other Islamic nations. Domestically,
state support for Islam, including recognition of Islam as the state religion
took place in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in June of 1988.(14)
Intrusion of religious parties in
politics:
During the political upheaval of
1971, elements of East Pakistan’s society, most notably the members of the
Jamaat-i-Islami, chose not to support the independence movement. As a result of
their role in the civil war, immediately after Bangladesh’s independence they
were largely marginalized. In addition, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of
Bangladesh, had a pro-Indian bent and sought to forge a secular, democratic
republic. As a result of their initial setback, Islamist elements in Bangladeshi
society remained dormant. They held the secular Muslim intelligentsia in disdain
but were unable to publicly challenge their authority. Their ability to reassert
themselves came about as a consequence of the Awami League’s governance. Its
incompetence, corruption, and maladministration, coupled with natural disasters,
led to Sheikh Mujib’s assassination and the overthrow of his regime in August
1975.
The rise of fundamentalism in
Bangladesh is not just a side effect of military politics. Enayetullah Khan,
editor of the Bangladesh weekly Holiday, says that a Muslim element has
always been present; otherwise, East Pakistan could have merged with the
predominantly Hindu Indian state of West Bengal, where the same language is
spoken. He believed that Bangladeshis were having a bit of an identity crisis,
he questioned if the Bangladeshis were Bengalis first and Muslims second, or
Muslims first and Bengalis second? When Muslim identity becomes an Islamic
identity its real trouble.”(15)
The conflict between Awami League
and BNP has contributed to fundamental failures of governance. The reliance of
the BNP on the Jamaat for support enables the latter to wield political
influence well beyond its parliamentary (and electoral) strength. One of the
most troubling aspects of the Jamaat’s presence in parliament is its links with
various radical Islamist organizations. In the wake of the 2005 bomb blasts that
rocked Bangladesh, the authorities arrested seven members of the Jama’atul
Mujahideen. All had been members of either the Jamaat or its student wing, the
Islami Chhatra Shibir.(16)
It would be inaccurate to suggest
that the Jamaat is the only party in Bangladesh seeking to establish an Islamic
state. A variety of other entities share the same goal. According to the
Bangladeshi newspaper The Daily Star, at least 30 such organizations
operate in the country.(17) Some
have stayed clear of mainstream politics, but others have worked with existing
political parties. The most compelling, proximate cause of the emergence of
militant Islam in Bangladesh is the state’s failure to address endemic problems
of unemployment, poverty, environmental degradation, and political order. As a
result large segments of the population have little faith in the efficacy of
state institutions.
There are various Islamic groups,
parties and individuals with both pro- and anti-government inclinations. These
groups and individuals may be classified as (a) the fatalist/escapist; (b) the
Sufis/pirs; (c) the militant reformist (“fundamentalist”), and (d) the
“Anglo-Mohammedan” (“opportunist”/“pragmatist”).(18) The
fatalist/escapist groups represent the bulk of the poor,
unemployed/underemployed people having a ‘next-worldly’ outlook and philosophy.
They often belong to the Tableeghi Jamaat; a grassroots-based puritan movement
originated in northern India in the 1920s, having millions of adherents in
Bangladesh. Unlike the militant reformists belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami
(despite their formal adherence to constitutional politics) and other groups,
including the clandestine ones, the Tableeghis represent a pacifist, puritan and
missionary movement. Every winter they organize a mammoth rally or ijtama
at Tungi, near Dhaka, attended by more than a million devout Muslims from
Bangladesh and elsewhere.(19) The
Sufis and pirs represent mystic Islam. They belong to several mystic
orders or tariqas, having muridin or disciples among all sections
of the population, especially among peasants. They exert tremendous influence on
their followers.
While the militant reformists,
including the Jamaat-i-Islami, are in favour of an Islamic state as an
alternative to the existing system of government in Bangladesh, the “Anglo
Mohammedans” are the anglicized or Westernized Muslims aiming to synthesize
Islamic and Western values for temporal benefits. They popularize political
Islam, which could be avowedly anti-Indian and tacitly anti-Hindu. It is
noteworthy that the followers of the above groups might shift allegiance. A
Tableeghi might join the Jamaat-i-Islami and an Anglo-Mohammedan might turn
Tableeghi one day. However, despite their mutual differences and enmity,
especially between the orthodox ulema/pirs and the Jamaat-i-Islami, these groups
have certain commonalities. Excepting the Anglo-Mohammedans, the other three
groups oppose women’s liberation; Western codes of conduct, law and ethics, and
even dress and culture; and are in favour of establishing shari’a or Islamic
law. The most important aspect, which is common to all four groups, is their
stand vis-à-vis India and Pakistan. They are invariably anti-Indian and
pro-Pakistan.
Bengali peasant support for the
various Islamic movements since the early nineteenth century not only projects
the violent, “pre-political” and non-committal aspects of the peasant community,
but also suggests how vulnerable Muslim peasants have been to the manipulative
leaders who mobilize mass support in the name of Islam or any other ideology. It
is noteworthy that before their political mobilization took place in the early
nineteenth century by Islamic reformists/militants, the Wahabis, East Bengali
peasants and tribesmen had come under the influence of Sufis in the late
medieval period. The warrior-Sufis were mainly responsible for the rapid
Islamization and peasantization of the region in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, converting the bulk of the indigenous population who had not yet
fully integrated into the amorphous Hindu and peasant communities. Sufis played
the leading role in reclaiming land by clearing forests in the deltaic
southeastern “frontier land.” They introduced Islam, as well as new agrarian
implements and technology, such as the plough and other methods to contain the
turbulent rivers, which were shifting eastward during the period. The Wahabi
leaders, and especially the most influential Maulana Karamat Ali Jaunpuri
(1800–1873),(20) a
former Wahabi-turned-“loyalist” Islamic reformer of the nineteenth century,
brought the syncretistic Bengali Muslims, mainly peasants, into the fold of
shari’a based, orthodox and puritan Islam. The Wahabi leaders mobilized Bengali
Muslim masses against British colonial rule as well as against the local
exploiting classes of Hindus.
The first step toward the
mobilization process was through the extensive Islamization of the masses.
Karamat Ali and his hundreds of successors, who adopted pro-British loyalist
attitude out of pragmatism after the failure of the Indian Mutiny of 1857–58,
not only Islamized the bulk of the Bengali Muslims but also created a strong
sense of belonging to an amorphous Muslim community of the subcontinent. The
omnipotence of the Islamic reformers in the absence of a powerful modern and
moderate Muslim leadership in nineteenth century Bengal led to the ascendancy of
the ulema as political and religious leaders of the Muslim community. The Hindu
revivalist movements, as well as the anti-Muslim socio-economic and political
stand of the bulk of the Hindu elites and middle classes in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, further strengthened the hold of the ulema and their
patrons, the ashraf (aristocratic, upper-class Muslims), on the Bengali
Muslim masses. The Hindu opposition to legislative and other government measures
to benefit the Bengali Muslims, such as the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, its
amendments, the enactment of the Bengal Free (rural) Primary Education Bill and
the establishment of the Dhaka University in Muslim majority East Bengal,
further antagonized the latter toward the Hindus and prepared them as staunch
supporters of the communal partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The
re-emergence of the ulema in the arena of Bengal politics in 1919, spearheading
the pervasive anti-British Khilafat (Caliphate) movement with Muslim support at
every level, Islam and ulema continued to play very important roles in the
political mobilization of the Bengali Muslims up to the partition of 1947. The
Muslim elite, representing Muslim aristocrats, clergy, and rich peasants/petty
landlords, successfully mobilized Bengali Muslims against the dominant Hindus,
common enemy of both the upper- and lower-class.
It is interesting that despite the
constant harping on the themes of Islamic solidarity and Muslim separatism, most
East Bengali Muslims distanced themselves from “communal/political Islam.” Not
long after the Partition of 1947, East Bengali Muslims started preferring
secular institutions, including democracy, to Islam for the sake of their
Bengali identity. The clash of these two identities — “Islamic” (being part of
Pakistani) and “secular” (Bengali nationalism) — ultimately led to the creation
of Bangladesh.
Sympathizers of religious radicalism
These groups have sought to
dramatize and exploit the many failures of the Bangladeshi state. Because of
their ideological underpinnings they have also sought to highlight their
religious credentials. To this end, they express widespread concern about the
plight of fellow Muslims worldwide. Not surprisingly, much of their ire is
directed toward Israel because of the Palestinian question, against India
because of the Kashmir issue (and the periodic outbreaks of communal violence
within India), and at the United States for its support of Israel, involvement
in Afghanistan, and invasion of Iraq. Assuming unyielding positions on these
issues generates considerable popular support in Bangladesh, many of these
causes are seen as those of the global Islamic community. Such support
reinforces notions of victimisation and injustice. Focusing on the real and
imagined shortcomings of India, Israel, and the United States enables the ruling
regime in Bangladesh to divert public attention from a range of failures of
governance.
Radical Islamists direct their wrath
against any individuals or groups that profess secularism and express
unrelenting hostility toward sectarian and religious minorities. Jamaat's stand
on the 'war against terrorism', however, contrasts sharply to that of the more
established parties. Shortly after the US attacks on Afghanistan began in
October 2001, Jamaat created a fund for “helping the innocent victims of
America’s war.” According to Jamaat, Tk12m (US$210,000) was raised before the
effort was discontinued in March. Remaining funds, Jamaat says, will go to
Afghan refugees in camps in Pakistan. Anti-US rhetoric has continued.(21) In
December 2001, Maulana Ubaidul Haq, the khatib (cleric) of Bangladesh’s national
mosque, Baitul Mukarram, and a Jamaat associate, publicly condemned the US war
on terror and urged followers to wage holy war against the USA.(22)
From religious radicals to extremist
Currently several militant Islamist
groups exist in Bangladesh. These include the Jam’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB),
the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami (HuJI),
and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir.(23) The
JMB was formed in Jamalpur district in 1998. Its precise antecedents are
unclear. Some reports in the Bangladeshi press contend that it is the youth wing
of the outlawed militant organization, the Harkat-ul-Jihad. It first came to the
attention of the press, political authorities, and the public in May 2002, when
eight members were arrested while allegedly in possession of incendiary bombs.
In February 2005, faced with growing pressures from international donors, the
government of Bangladesh banned the organization.
The JMJB derives its inspiration
from the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. It is widely believed to have formed
in 1998 but came to public attention in 2004 when it started to target members
of the left-wing organization, the Purbo Banglar Communist Party (East Bengal’s
Communist Party). The JMJB was banned in February 2005. In March 2006, under
international pressure, the Bangladesh government finally arrested one of the
most notorious JMJB operatives, Siddiqur Islam, who was known by his nom de
guerre, “Bangla Bhai” (Bengali brother).
The Hizb-ut-Tahrir, intriguingly
enough, was founded in Jerusalem in 1953. Its Bangladeshi chapter started in
November 2001 in the wake of a rising tide of anti-Americanism. The organization
has managed to gain considerable strength in various public and private
universities.
Following are some of the
religious-political parties and some radical Islamist organizations that openly
support Al-Qaeda and the Taliban:
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) A
political party that dates back to the British colonial era, and the
(East) Pakistan period (1947-1971). It supported Pakistan against Bengali
nationalists during the liberation war, and most of its leaders fled to
(West) Pakistan after Bangladesh's independence in 1971. In December 2000,
Motiur Rahman Nizami, a former pro Pakistani militant, became leader. In
the October 2001 election, JI emerged as the third largest party, with 17
seats in the parliament and two ministers in the new coalition government.
JI's final aim is to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh, although
this will be implemented step by step. Islami
Chhatra Shibir (ICS) (Islami
Jamiat-e-Talaba) Jamaat’s
youth organisation. Set up in 1941, it became a member of the
International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations in 1979. ICS is
also a member of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and has close contacts
with other radical Muslim youth groups in Pakistan, the Middle East,
Malaysia and Indonesia. One of its main strongholds in Bangladesh is at
the university in Chittagong and it dominates privately-run madrassas all
over the country. It has been implicated in a number of bombings and
politically and religiously motivated assassinations. Nurul Islam Bulbul
is its current president and Mohammed Nazrul Islam is the secretary
general. Islami
Olkyo Jote (IOJ) A smaller
Islamic party that last year joined the four-party alliance led by the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which won the October 2001 election. The IOJ
secured two seats in the parliament, but did not get any cabinet posts.
The fourth member of the alliance, a faction of the Jatyio Party led by
Naziur Rahman Manzur, has no obvious Islamic profile.
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI)
Bangladesh’s main militant outfit. Set up in 1992, it now has an estimated
strength of 15,000 and is headed by Shawkat Osman aka Maulana or Sheikh
Farid in Chittagong. Its members are recruited mainly from students of the
country's madrassas, and until last year they called themselves
'Bangladeshi Taliban'. The group is believed to have extensive contacts
with Muslim groups in the Indian states of West Bengal and Assam. The
Jihad Movement Osama bin
Laden’s February 23, 1998 fatwa urging jihad against the USA was co-signed
by two Egyptian clerics, one from Pakistan, and Fazlul Rahman, “leader of
the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.” This is not believed to be a separate
organisation but a common name for several Islamic groups in Bangladesh,
of which HUJI is considered the biggest and most important. Arakan
Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) A
political group among Rohingya migrants from Myanmar, who live in the
Chittagong-Cox's Bazar area. It claims to be fighting for an autonomous
Muslim region in Myanmar's Arakan (Rakhine) State. It was set up in 1999
through a merger of the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and the
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO)
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) Following
the breakup of ARNO in 2000-2001, three new factions emerged, all of them
re-claiming the old name RSO. Traditionally, the RSO has been very close
to Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Chhatra Shibir in Chittagong and Cox's Bazar.
In the early 1990s, RSO had several military camps near the Myanmar
border, where cadres from the Islami Chhatra Shibir were also trained in
guerrilla warfare.
Source:
http://www.asiapacificms.com/papers/pdf/religious_extremism_
bangladesh.pdf
Liberals versus the conservatives:
society reacts
Bangladesh’s militants may be a
small minority, but they are becoming more vocal and daring in their attacks on
‘infidels,’ a worrying sign in what is a basically very tolerant society. The
Muslim radicals first came to international attention in 1993, when author
Taslima Nasrin was forced to flee the country after receiving death threats from
Islamic fundamentalists who objected to her critical writings about what she
termed outdated religious beliefs. Extremist groups offered a reward for her
death.(24)
Although various feminist and human
rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) bitterly criticized the State
Religion Act in Bangladesh, most of the Bengali Muslims have accepted the
provision. So far no subsequent government has gathered enough courage to alter
the amendment. Two women’s organizations, Naripakhyo and Oikyobaddho Nari Samaj,
came forward to protest against the act.(25) In
doing so, they stoked the issues of “sovereignty of the country” and “the spirit
of the Freedom Struggle,” presumed to be in danger because of the act.
Not long after the enactment of the
State Religion Act, several liberal democrats and women’s organizations started
a campaign to rekindle the “Spirit of the Liberation War” or secularism to
contain Ershad’s autocracy. Several NGOs, funded by overseas donors, came
forward in support.
After failing to repeal the act, a
section of left-oriented intellectuals, lent support to the anti-Ershad
movement.(26) Under
the banner of the Centre for the development of the Spirit of the Liberation
War, they spoke at some of the women’s rallies, stressing the virtues of
democracy, socialism and secularism. The polity since then has been sharply
polarized between the so-called “pro-” and “anti-Liberation” forces. The former
represent the so-called secular and liberal parties and individuals who are soft
on India and harsh on Pakistan. The latter, the so-called “Islam-loving” groups
and individuals, have strong to very strong anti-India and pro-Islam
commitments. The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the gradual transformation
of the cold war between the Islamists (mainly the Jamaat) and the so-called
secular/liberal forces into open confrontation in Bangladesh. One may cite
scores of scurrilous writings against the so-called Islamic
fundamentalist-cum-communal forces, especially the Jamaat. Soon the polarized
polity witnessed the showdown between pro-fatwa clerics and anti-fatwa, pro-NGO
(Citizen’s Movement).
Pir of Charmonai, Mufti Amini and
Mufti Azizul Haq, organized a grand pro-fatwa rally in Dhaka on February 2,
2001.(27) Declaring
the NGOs as “number one enemy” of Islam and Bangladesh, the clerics blamed the
Awami League government for appointing judges with bias against Islam. The
pro-NGO and anti-fatwa civil society groups confronted the clerics and asked the
government to ban all religiously motivated political parties.
The Muslim community at the
grassroots level favours fatwa as the fastest and cheapest way of getting
justice. The average mullah’s revulsion for NGOs is well taken by Bangladeshi
Muslims at the grassroots level as well. Death warrants and bomb attacks on some
of the enlisted anti-Islam individuals and groups presumably by Islamic
militants became quite common during 1991 and 2001. The ongoing conflict between
the pro-NGO “civil society” and the anti-NGO Islamists in early 2001 alarmed the
US State Department and various donor agencies, including the Asian Development
Bank. Pointing out its adverse effects on the economy of Bangladesh, they
condemned the “violation of human rights” in the name of Islam. While
celebrating the Bengali New Year — an “un-Islamic” festival to some Muslim
clerics — on April 14, 2001, a bomb killed several people at Ramna Park in
Dhaka.(28) In
June, a village church was bombed at Gopalganj (Sheikh Hasina’s home district)
and soon the police arrested one Mufti Hannan, the alleged mastermind.(29)
A cover story by the Far Eastern
Economic Review in April 2002 is another reflection of this alarmist view.
The story does not comfort the liberal democrats and secular people. According
to Bertil Lintner, “A revolution is taking place in Bangladesh that threatens
trouble for the region and beyond if left unchallenged. Islamic fundamentalism,
religious intolerance, militant Muslim groups with links to international
terrorist groups, a powerful military with ties to the militants, the
mushrooming of Islamic schools churning out radical students, middle class
apathy, poverty and lawlessness — all are combining to transform the nation.”(30) The
report also suggested that Western donors and diplomats, more concerned with the
problems of governance and development than the rise of Islamic militancy in
Bangladesh “seem to have paid scant attention to the deeper long-term danger” of
Islamic resurgence in the country.
According to the report, more
extremist Islamic clerics and groups in Bangladesh, such as Maulana Ubaidul Haq
and the “shadowy” Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Islami, having connections with their
Pakistani, Afghan, Chechen, and Southeast Asian counterparts with the blessings
from Osama bin Laden, have been active in the region.(31)
A similar sensational report came
out in the Wall Street Journal (April 2, 2002) entitled, “In Bangladesh,
as in Pakistan, a Worrisome Rise in Islamic Extremism.” “Militant groups with
links with international terrorists” and “powerful military with ties to
militants” are said to have mobilized Islamic militants in the country.(32)
A strong political dispensation
Political developments within
Bangladesh and the growth of militant Islamist organizations in that country
are related to the prevailing political instability in India’s northeastern
states in two ways. First, there are issues between the government of India and
government of Bangladesh about the involvement of various Islamist organizations
in aiding and abetting the existing political turmoil in this region. Second,
the region faces a very pressing problem of substantial illegal immigration from
Bangladesh. Much of the ongoing political upheaval in these states is of
indigenous origin. However, the willingness of various Bangladeshi regimes to be
sympathetic towards insurgents by providing sanctuaries, weapons, and other
forms of logistical assistance has contributed to the prolongation and
exacerbation of the conflicts.(33)
In the changed post-Cold War
environment of globalization and market economy, which is forcing the less
developed countries (LDCs) like Bangladesh to adopt World Bank and IMF
recommendations — at the cost of the poor and underemployed beneficiaries of
state subsidies and welfare — Islamism has been emerging as an alternative
order. Bangladesh polity has been divided between the Western and “vernacular
elite,” the latter representing the underdogs, forced to adopt alternative
ideologies for the sake of survival.
During the Cold War, socialism,
nationalism and separatist ideologies had been quite handy as alternatives to
“Neo-Colonialism,” said to be the root of all evils. Curiously, the West,
especially the United States, during the Cold War promoted Islamism in various
countries including Egypt, Pakistan and Afghanistan to counterpoise communism.
Leaders belonging to the upper classes often espoused radical ideas in the name
of establishing the Islamic welfare state. In the post-Cold War era, Islamism
has replaced the earlier doctrines with certain modifications — though retaining
the same mass appeal — to empower the underdogs representing the peasantry
(and/or tribes) and the “vernacular elite” from the lower middle classes.
Given the vulnerability of the state
due to governance issue, and rising radicalization of the society, Bangladesh is
at a crossroads in its march towards democratic order. Although it started its
political journey with a parliamentary system after independence, it failed to
sustain it; slowly but steadily, the parliamentary government degenerated into
an authoritarian system. As Bangladesh completed its 20 years of independence it
also completed 13 years of military rule or governments dominated by the
military. In late 1990, however, the political situation altered dramatically.
Autocratic rule was ultimately defeated by a popular uprising, and General
Ershad had to resign.
What made Islam in Bengal not only
historically successful but a continuing vital social reality has been its
capacity to adapt to the land and the culture of its people, even while
transforming both. Despite serious problems related to a dysfunctional political
system, weak governance and pervasive corruption, Bangladesh remains one of the
few democracies in the Muslim world. Bangladeshis regard democracy as an
important legacy of their war for independence, and they vote in large numbers.
The practice and understanding of democratic concepts, however, is often
shallow.
As far as political and social
development is concerned, the economic crisis in Bangladesh has been compounded
by political problems. Class conflicts, which had for so long been subjugated by
the demand for regional autonomy, emerged as the crucial problem. The real
threat to political and social stability in Bangladesh during the Awami League
regime came from the radical forces. They attempted to bring about a ‘second
revolution’ through armed struggle. They argued that the Bangladesh Revolution
of 1971 was an ‘unfinished one’. They believed that when the War of Independence
was being transformed into a truly people’s liberation war and the radical
forces were coming to the forefront, the ‘land-based bourgeois government of
India’ in league with the ‘Soviet Social Imperialist Power’ interfered, and the
Awami League leadership, which represented the exploiting classes in Bangladesh,
came to power. Its strategy was to replace the puppet regime by force.(34)
Contrary to conventional wisdom,
Islamism is no longer the monopoly of the mullah. In Bangladesh, the bulk of the
Jamaat-i-Islami cadres, if not the leaders, are not madrassa-educated mullahs,
but are from the various petty bourgeois classes representing the middle and
poor peasantry, petty businessmen and shopkeepers, school teachers and other
underemployed and unemployed classes. Many of them can be classified as members
of the peripheral “vernacular elite” or graduates from Bengali medium
institutions — the least preferred in the private sector job market. They
nourish a tremendous sense of deprivation and have the potential to turn very
violent and anarchical. Their madrassa-educated counterparts — even poorer and
almost totally unemployable in both the public and private sectors other than in
low-paid teaching positions or as employees of mosques — are frustrated with
anything that goes in the name of secularism and modernism.
The mutual admiration of
ultra-orthodox mullahs and sections of the politicians, their advocacy of
shari’a law are reflective of their desire to get political legitimacy by using
Islam. It seems radical Islamic rhetoric is their only way to make room for
themselves in the political arena of Bangladesh. Otherwise, they know, it is
next to impossible to dislodge the BNP and Awami League to their advantage. The
BNP and Awami League, on the other hand, use the Islamic card firstly to
neutralize the Jamaat and secondly to appease the vast majority of Bengali
Muslims for the sake of political legitimacy and leverage.
Historically, the replacement of
Hindu landed and professional elite in the wake of the Partition, non-Bengali
elite after the Liberation of 1971, and of English-educated elite in the name of
Bengali nationalism by the relatively inferior and unskilled people, has also
been responsible for social disorder, political chaos and economic
mismanagement. The ongoing triangular conflict among modernists in line with
globalization, Bengali nationalists and Islamists in the country is reflective
of the situation.
The broken promises of the
successive governments since independence, which have delivered more of the same
promises, corruption, unemployment and misery, adversely affecting the loyalty
of the bourgeoisie and the fast disappearing middle classes—may trigger the rise
of the religious parties as the alternative to the so-called liberal democratic
and secular parties. However, it would be a little exaggerated to say that
Bangladesh would witness the ascendancy of Islamic militants’ communal forces to
power in the near future.
Nevertheless, it is evident that the
increasing extremism and growing terrorism in the country has destabilized the
monolithic nature of the Bangladesh society. The policies adopted by the
respective governments and their inability to deal with the human development
issues have created politically and religiously motivated violent groups.
Notes and References
1.
Demerath and Ryan and
Rhys H. Williams, A Bridging of Faiths:
Religion and Politics in a New England City, (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1992).
2.
Alok Kumar Gupta and
Sarswati Chanda, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh and Pakistan: Role of
Madrassas”, IPCS , New Delhi, article # 753, 21 May 2002, <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/700/753-pak-alok.htm>.
3.
Richard Eaton, The
rise of Islam and the Bengal frontier, 1204-1760, (Berkely: University of
California Press, 1993).
4.
Ibid.
5.
“Terrorism: The South
Asian Experience”, Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Islamabad, Vol. xviii,
No. 7-8 (July-August 1999), 41.
6.
U. A. B. Razia Akter
Banu, Islam in Bangladesh (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 183.
7.
Socialistworld, 10
February 2005, <http://www.socialistworld.net>.
8.
Bertil Lintner, “Religious
Extremism and Nationalism in Bangladesh,
Religion & Security in South Asia,” paper presented at an International
Workshop, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 19-22
August 2002,
<http://www.asiapacificms.com/articles/ bangladesh_extremism/>, accessed
on 23 September 2009.
9.
Emajuddin Ahmed and
Dil Roushan Jinnat Ara Nazneen, “Islamization in Bangladesh: Political Rhetoric
or Substantive?,” Chatterji (ed.), Religion, Politics and Communalism,
(New Delhi, South Asia Publishers Limited, 1994), 116.
10.
Mati ur Rahman,
“Impact of Terrorism,” (ed.) Khatri and Kueck, Terrorism in South Asia,
(New Delhi: Shipra), 2003, 173.
11.
Bertil Lintner, op.cit., (ref 8).
12.
Gupta and Chanda,
op.cit., (ref 2).
13.
Bismillahir
Rahmanir Rahim (In
the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful).
This Islamic opening phrase was inserted through the Proclamation (Amendment)
Order, 1977 (Proclamation Order No. 1 of 1977).
14.
8th
Amendment in the Constitution 1977, Article 2A says, “The state religion of the
Republic is Islam, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in
the republic.” With this insertion, one of the religions as practiced in this
country has been placed above the other ones, and discrimination and religious
persecution against other religious groups intensified.
15.
“Is religious
extremism on the rise in Bangladesh?” Jane's Intelligence Review, May
2002.
16.
Sumit Ganguly, “The
rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh,” USIP Special Report, 17 August 2009.
17.
Ashraf Shamim, “All
Seven JMB Shura Men Had Links to Jamaat,” The Daily Star, 28 April 2006.
18.
Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia,
ed. Limaye, Wirsing, Malik, (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia Pacific Center for Security
Studies, 2004). <www.apcss.
org/.../PagesfromReligiousRadicalismand SecurityinSouthAsiach3.pdf>.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Ibid.
21.
Bertil Lintner, op.cit.,
(ref 8).
22.
Ibid.
23.
Ganguly, op.cit.,
(ref 16).
24.
Bertil Lintner, op.cit.,
(ref 8).
25.
For a detailed
analysis see “Fatwas against women in Bangladesh”, published by Women Living
Under Islamic Laws, 1996, <http://
www.wluml.org/english/pubs/pdf/misc/fatwa-bangladesh-eng.pdf>.
26.
Bangladesh: A
Country Study, ed. James
Heitzman and Robert Worden, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989,
<http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/93.htm> accessed on 23 September 2009.
27.
Bertil Lintner,
op.cit., (ref 8).
28.
“14 militants
including ringleader charged with bomb blasts in Bangladesh,” <www.chinaview.cn,
16 April 2009. http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/16/content_11195934.htm>,
accessed on 27 September 2009.
29.
“Bangladesh church
bomb kills nine,” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1367073.stm>, accessed
on 15 October 2009.
30.
Far Eastern
Economic Review, April
2002.
31.
Ibid.
32.
Wall Street Journal,
2 April 2002.
33.
Ganguly, op.cit.,
(ref 16).
Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Bangladesh in 1975: The fall of the Mujib regime and its
aftermath,” Asian Survey 16(2), 1976,
119-29.
Regional Studies, Vol. XXVII, No.4,
Autumn
2009, pp.3-28 Arshi Saleem Hashmi
is a Research Analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies.
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES
OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES:
extremism: Conceptual understanding
of a religious state in Bangladesh
Who is to blame?
groups and their agenda
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The objective of the study is to examine the overall demographic situation in South Asia, because it is the most populated region in the world. Due to the controversy about the definition of the South Asian region, the following countries have been chosen for the purpose of this study: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. There are a number of demographic variables out of which the most important indicators have been chosen for this study.
The United Nations Millennium Summit held in 2000 set clear targets by declaring Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals aim at eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, empowering women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS/Malaria/ other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for development.(1) Most of these goals link with demography which is an essential tool in determining current and future public needs and also identify their solution. Demography represents a fundamental approach to the understanding of human society.(2) Its primary tasks is to ascertain the number of people in a given area, to determine what change that number represents from a previous census, to explain the change, and to estimate the future trends of population changes. The demographer also traces the origins of population changes and studies their impact.(3) The present study is based on comparative analysis of the demographic situation in the South Asian region.
Population size and growth
Nowadays almost all governments pay more attention to their population size because it strongly affects the developmental pattern of any nation. Plato as an early exponent of population planning emphasized the quality of population rather than quantity and preferred population stability to growth while Aristotle advocated limiting the number of children by law.(4) Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) discussed the benefits of a growing population. He argued that population growth created the need for specialization in occupations. The inhabitants of a more populous city were more prosperous than their counterparts in a less populous one.(5) Marx and Engels’s idea was that the normal consequences of population growth should be a significant increase in production. After all, each worker obviously was producing more than he or she required. In a well-ordered society, if there were more people, there ought to be more wealth, not more poverty.(6) While Malthus put forward a theory of the relationship between population growth and economic development that was still applicable today(7) and Mill accepted the Malthusian calculations but he was more optimistic about human nature than was Malthus. His basic thesis was that the standard of living was a major determinant of fertility levels.(8) In the post World War II span decline in mortality followed the world pattern and population grew rapidly during this period. With the advancement in health technology and improvement in services accessibility and availability, the death rate declined sharply and the gap between birth and death rate widened because of almost constant fertility behaviour.(9) Population size can create a number of social, political and economic problems, which affect or lead to many other problems such as poverty, scarcity, shelter, which further leads to migration, urbanization, brain drain, unemployment, energy crises etc. Due to these reasons, today almost all countries around the globe count their total population and conduct census to assess the needs of the population. In the following table, the total population and the growth rate in South Asian countries are discussed. The most populated region in South Asia is India, second populated region is Pakistan, third is Bangladesh and the lowest populated country is Maldives. Population wise India is the second largest country of the world, Pakistan, seventh and Bangladesh, eighth. The highest growth rates can be observed in Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Bhutan, while the lowest in Sri Lanka. Maldives’ population growth rate is in the negative which indicates its population is declining.
Table 1
Population size and growth rates in South Asian region — 2008-09
|
Countries |
Total Population |
Population growth rates |
|
Bangladesh |
158,050,883 |
1.292 % |
|
Bhutan |
691,141 |
1.267 % |
|
India |
1,166,079,217 |
1.548 % |
|
Maldives |
396,031 |
-0.168 % |
|
Nepal |
28,563,377 |
1.281 % |
|
Pakistan |
176,242,949 |
1.947 % |
|
Sri Lanka |
21,324,791 |
0.904 % |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2008 09.
Note: Population growth rate: The average annual per cent change in the population, results from a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths and the balance of migrants entering and leaving a country. The rate may be positive or negative. The growth rate is a factor in determining how great a burden would be imposed on a country by the changing needs of its people for infrastructure (e.g., schools, hospitals, housing, roads), resources (e.g., food, water, electricity), and jobs.
Rapid population growth in South Asian countries has created problems for their socio-economic development(10) like lack of educational and health facilities, shortages of food, living space, arable land and clean water etc. It also increases unemployment, land fragmentation, import of goods and services and environmental problems.(11) A fast growing population has a number of short- and long-term effects on social and economic development objectives. An effective population welfare programme can reduce the rate of population growth and can enhance the developmental efforts in a number of ways. A reduction in the fertility rate would have an immediate effect on the health of mothers and children and would begin to affect school enrolment rates and education expenditures in a short period. In the long-term, the requirements for urban services and investment would be affected.(12)
Birth, death and total fertility rates
The developed societies of the West have applied population management policies and have successfully controlled their mortality and fertility rates through a highly advanced health and medical system and the invention of contraceptives. For developing countries family planning policies are important for achieving decline in fertility rates. Governments of many developing countries, especially in Asia, have subsidized family planning programmes that Western donors like the United States support financially.(13) Measuring the impact of family planning programmes on fertility decline requires controlling other possible causes of fertility decline — such as increases in education or declines in mortality. It also requires data on some exogenous change in the availability or quality of family planning services to a household, community or nation.(14) The following table indicates the high birth rates in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal and the declining rates in the Maldives and Sri Lanka. These indicators are important and affect the developmental pattern in the respective countries. Human beings are amazingly adaptable when they want to be. When people believe that having no children or only a few children is in their best interest, they start behaving in that manner. Sophisticated contraceptive techniques make it easier for them.(15)
Table 2
Birth, death and total fertility rates in South Asian region — 2009
|
Countries |
Birth rate: Births/1000 population |
Death rate: Deaths/1000 population |
Total fertility rate: Children born/women |
|
Bangladesh |
24.68 |
9.23 |
2.74 |
|
Bhutan |
20.07 |
7.39 |
2.38 |
|
India |
21.76 |
6.23 |
2.72 |
|
Maldives |
14.55 |
3.65 |
1.9 |
|
Nepal |
23.18 |
6.97 |
2.64 |
|
Pakistan |
27.62 |
7.62 |
3.6 |
|
Sri Lanka |
16.26 |
6.13 |
1.99 |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Note: Birth rate is the average annual number of births during a year per 1,000 persons in the population at midyear. It is also known as crude birth rate. The birth rate is usually the dominant factor in determining the rate of population growth. It depends on both the level of fertility and the age structure of the population.
Death rate gives the average annual number of deaths during a year per 1,000 population at midyear; also known as crude death rate. The death rate, while only a rough indicator of the mortality situation in a country, accurately indicates the current mortality impact on population growth. This indicator is significantly affected by age distribution, and most countries will eventually show a rise in the overall death rate, in spite of continued decline in mortality at all ages, as declining fertility results in an aging population.
Total fertility rate gives a figure for the average number of children that would be born per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age. The total fertility rate (TFR) is a more direct measure of the level of fertility than the crude birth rate, since it refers to births per woman. This indicator shows the potential for population change in a country. A rate of two children per woman is considered the replacement rate for a population, resulting in relative stability in terms of total numbers. Rates above two children indicate populations growing in size and whose median age is declining. Higher rates may also indicate difficulties for families, in some situations, to feed and educate their children and for women to enter the labour force. Rates below two children indicate populations decreasing in size and growing older. Global fertility rates are in general declining and this trend is most pronounced in industrialized countries, especially Western Europe, where populations are projected to decline dramatically over the next 50 years.
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)
There are few things in the world more frightening than the responsibility for a new born child, fragile and completely dependent on others for survival. In many societies, that fragility and dependency are translated into high infant mortality rates.(16) The data in the following table indicates the position of infant mortality rates:
Table 3
Infant Mortality Rate in South Asian region — 2009
Deaths/1000 live births
|
Countries |
Male |
Female |
Total |
|
Bangladesh |
66.12 |
51.64 |
59.02 |
|
Bhutan |
50.38 |
48.29 |
49.36 |
|
India |
34.61 |
25.17 |
30.15 |
|
Maldives |
32.04 |
26.89 |
29.53 |
|
Nepal |
47.4 |
47.52 |
47.46 |
|
Pakistan |
65.24 |
65.64 |
65.14 |
|
Sri Lanka |
20.33 |
16.73 |
18.57 |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Note: Infant Mortality Rate gives the number of deaths of infants under one year old in a given year per 1,000 live births in the same year; included is the total death rate, and deaths by sex, male and female. This rate is often used as an indicator of the level of health in a country.
Life expectancy
The other measure of mortality is the expectation of life at birth. It indicates the average number of years that persons can expect to live from the time of birth (if they experience the currently prevailing age/specific death rates throughout their lives). The expectation of life at birth is heavily influenced by infant and early childhood mortality, because these deaths mean the loss of a whole lifetime with a potential length of upto 70 years.(17) Life expectancy in the Roman era is estimated to have been 22 years, but by the Middle Ages nutrition had probably improved enough to raise life expectancy to more than 30 years. The plague, or Black Death, hit Europe in the 14th Century, having spread west from Asia. It is estimated that one-third of the population of Europe may have perished from the disease between 1346 and 1350.(18) The plague then made a home for itself in Europe and for more than three centuries epidemics of plague kept flaring up in one or the other area. The recurrent outbreaks of the disease deeply affected European life at all levels — the demographic, economic, social, political, artistic and religious etc.(19) During 19th and 20th centuries life expectancy increased globally. The following table indicates life expectation at birth in the region that puts Sri Lanka at 84th, Maldives at 94th number, India 145th, Bhutan 161st, Pakistan and Nepal 165th and Bangladesh 183rd(20) position on a world scale.
Table 4
Life expectancy at birth — 2009
|
Countries |
Male |
Female |
Total |
|
Bangladesh |
57.57 years |
63.03 years |
60.25 years |
|
Bhutan |
65.33 years |
66.97 years |
66.13 years |
|
India |
67.46 years |
72.61 years |
69.89 years |
|
Maldives |
71.78 years |
76.28 years |
73.97 years |
|
Nepal |
64.3 years |
66.67 years |
65.46 years |
|
Pakistan |
63.4 years |
65.64 years |
64.49 years |
|
Sri Lanka |
73.08 years |
77.28 years |
75.14years |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Note: Life expectancy at birth shows the average number of years to be lived by a group of people born in the same year, if mortality at each age remains constant in the future. It includes total population as well as the male and female components. Life expectancy at birth is also a measure of overall quality of life in a country and summarizes the mortality at all ages. It can also be thought of as indicating the potential return on investment in human capital and is necessary for the calculation of various actuarial measures).
Median age
Sri Lanka represents the highest median age which indicates her better position in the region. The lowest median age is observed in Pakistan and Nepal which indicates the dependency ratio in these countries is higher and the working age group is under pressure. Bangladesh’s median age is above that of Pakistan, Bhutan and Nepal.
Table 5
Median age — 2009
|
Countries |
Male |
Female |
Total |
|
Bangladesh |
22.9 years |
23.5 years |
23.3 years |
|
Bhutan |
24.5 years |
23.3 years |
23.9 years |
|
India |
24.9 years |
25.9 years |
25.3 years |
|
Maldives |
26.5 years |
24.3 years |
25.7 years |
|
Nepal |
19.8 years |
21.7 years |
20.8 years |
|
Pakistan |
20.6 years |
21 years |
20.8 years |
|
Sri Lanka |
29.9 years |
31.8 years |
30.9 years |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Note: Median age is the age that divides a population into two numerically equal groups; that is, half the people are younger than this age and half are older. It is an index that summarizes the age distribution of a population.
Sex ratio (male/female ratio)
Generally, 105 or 106 males are born to every 100 females. It’ll affect the whole socio-economic pattern of any country if this ratio is disturbed as gender imbalances affect family formation in matters such as the number of marriages possible or the number of legitimate births etc. The determination of sex ratio at birth needs empirical research to find out if it is higher than the theoretical value of 105 males per 100 females births and if there is over enumeration of males.(21) Some times it creates social unrest as people cannot find suitable partners. If females are more than male or if males are more than females the ratio is disturbed resulting in illegitimate births. The following table gives the complete picture of sex ratio in the region:
Table 6
Distribution of sex ratio in South Asian countries — 2009
|
Countries |
At birth |
Under 15 years |
15-45 years |
65 years and over |
Total population |
|
Bangladesh |
1.04 |
1.01 |
0.9 |
0.9 |
0.93 |
|
Bhutan |
1.05 |
1.13 |
1.13 |
1.12 |
1.1 |
|
India |
1.12 |
1.1 |
1.06 |
0.9 |
1.06 |
|
Maldives |
1.05 |
1.04 |
1.62 |
1 |
1.44 |
|
Nepal |
1.04 |
1.04 |
0.92 |
0.89 |
0.96 |
|
Pakistan |
1.05 |
1.06 |
1.05 |
0.88 |
1.04 |
|
Sri Lanka |
1.04 |
1.04 |
0.96 |
0.87 |
0.97 |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Note: SEX RATIO gives the number of males for each female in five age groups - at birth, under 15 years, 15-64 years, 65 years and over, and for the total population. Sex ratio at birth has recently emerged as an indicator of certain kinds of sex discrimination in some countries. For instance, high sex ratios at birth in some Asian countries are now attributed to sex-selective abortion and infanticide due to a strong preference for sons. This will affect future marriage patterns and fertility patterns. Eventually, it could cause unrest among young adult males who are unable to find partners.
Age structure
Age structure is something that is built or constructed. In social science it refers more broadly to a pattern of interrelationships between parts of a society. An age/sex structure actually combines both definitions, since from the input of births at age zero and deaths and migration at every age. Age and sex influence the working of society in important ways because society assigns social roles and frequently organizes people into groups on the basis of their age and gender.(22) Population is considered old or young depending on the proportion of people at different ages. In general, a population with more than about 35 per cent of its people under age 15 is “young”, and a population with more than about 10 per cent of its people aged 65 or older can be considered “old”. Further, as the proportion of young people increases relative to the total of the population it is considered to be growing younger. An aging population is one in which the proportion of older people is increasing relative to the total.(23) Migration, mortality and fertility can affect on the age/sex structure. Age and sex are the two biological factors which affect demographic processes. Persons moving out are replaced by others moving in and eventually all the remaining die. These processes of fertility, migration and mortality together determine not only the current size of the population of any area but also its structure, or the distribution by sex and age.
In the following three tables a complete picture of age structure in South Asia is given:
Table7
Age structure — 2009 (0-14 years)
|
Countries |
Male |
Female |
% |
|
Bangladesh |
27,065,625 |
26,913,961 |
34.6 |
|
Bhutan |
106,410 |
102,164 |
30.2 |
|
India |
190,075,426 |
172,799,553 |
31.1 |
|
Maldives |
45,038 |
43,291 |
22.3 |
|
Nepal |
5,327,484 |
5,127,178 |
36.6 |
|
Pakistan |
33,739,547 |
31,868,065 |
37.2 |
|
Sri Lanka |
2,594,815 |
2, 493,002 |
23.9 |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Table 8
Age structure — 2009 (15-64 years)
|
Countries |
Male |
Female |
% |
|
Bangladesh |
45,222,182 |
50,537,052 |
61.4 |
|
Bhutan |
235,988 |
208,484 |
64.3 |
|
India |
381,446,079 |
359,802,209 |
63.6 |
|
Maldives |
180,874 |
111,703 |
73.8 |
|
Nepal |
8,094,494 |
8,812,675 |
59.2 |
|
Pakistan |
52,849,607 |
50,378,198 |
58.6 |
|
Sri Lanka |
7,089,307 |
7,418,123 |
68 |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Table 9
Age structure — 2009 (65 years and over)
|
Countries |
Male |
Female |
% |
|
Bangladesh |
3,057,225 |
3,254,808 |
4 |
|
Bhutan |
20,169 |
17,926 |
5.5 |
|
India |
29,364,920 |
32,591,030 |
5.3 |
|
Maldives |
7,711 |
7,717 |
3.9 |
|
Nepal |
566,666 |
634,880 |
4.2 |
|
Pakistan |
3,475,927 |
3,931,605 |
4.2 |
|
Sri Lanka |
803,172 |
926,372 |
8.1 |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Note: Age structure provides the distribution of the population according to age groups of 0-14 years, 15-64 years, 65 years and over. The age structure of a population affects a nation's key socio-economic issues. Countries with young populations (high percentage under age 15) need to invest more in schools, while countries with older populations (high percentage ages 65 and over) need to invest more in the health sector. The age structure can also be used to help predict potential political issues. For example, the rapid growth of a young adult population unable to find employment can lead to unrest.
Literacy rate
There are no universal definitions and standards of literacy. Unless otherwise specified, all rates are based on the most common definition — the ability to read and write at a specified age or standards that individual countries use to assess the ability to read and write.(24) Information on literacy while not a perfect measure of educational results, is probably the most easily available and valid for international comparisons. Low levels of literacy, and education in general, can impede the economic development of a country in the current rapidly changing, technology-driven world.(25) Greater educational attainment helps a country to “move up the ladder” from production and export of less to more skill – and capital – intensive goods. An educated work force is also better able to absorb foreign technology.(26) When a person becomes literate, he/she will enjoy a higher lifetime consumption path, according to statistics for a large number of countries. Others will also benefit if the country has a more literate population – through lower transaction costs than if they were dealing with illiterates.(27) Many educated females may be more productive in variety of goods and services produced within the household. They may provide better sanitation conditions for all members of the family and more nutritive meals. Such effects should be counted as part of the social impact of education.(28) Literacy is one of the principal goals of education around the world. The ability to read and write is considered almost a basic human right. Both enrolment rates and gender disparities in enrolment differ dramatically by region. Except for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, all regions have achieved nearly universal primary education for boys.(29) The situation of literacy in South Asian region can be seen in table 10.
Table 10
Literacy rate — 2009
|
Countries |
Male |
Female |
Total |
|
Bangladesh |
54 % |
41.4 % |
47.9 % |
|
Bhutan |
60 % |
34 % |
47 % |
|
India |
73.4 % |
47.8 % |
61 % |
|
Maldives |
96.2 % |
96.4 % |
96.3 % |
|
Nepal |
62.7 % |
34.9 % |
48.6 % |
|
Pakistan |
63 % |
36 % |
49.9 % |
|
Sri Lanka |
92.3 % |
89.1 % |
90.7 % |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Enrolment rates by age group are based on national representative household surveys. They measure the proportion of people in a given age range reported to be attending school at the time of the household survey.(30) The highest enrolment rate in both male and female can be observed in Maldives, while the lowest is in Pakistan.
Table 11
Enrolment rates (%)
|
|
Male |
Female |
||||
|
Countries |
Ages 12-14 |
Ages 15-17 |
Ages 18-24 |
Ages 12-14 |
Ages 15-17 |
Ages 18-24 |
|
Bangladesh |
62 |
40 |
24 |
72 |
54 |
11 |
|
Bhutan |
71 |
61 |
29 |
63 |
44 |
16 |
|
India |
77 |
57 |
21 |
65 |
43 |
11 |
|
Maldives |
93 |
73 |
19 |
92 |
71 |
24 |
|
Nepal |
71 |
51 |
18 |
51 |
36 |
9 |
|
Pakistan |
63 |
46 |
13 |
43 |
27 |
7 |
Source: World Development Report, 2007. Development and the Next Generation, the World Book, Washington, D.C., 20433, p. 272.
Although fertility and mortality determine the rate of natural increase in population, the size of any population depends also on population movement, a process through which people leave or join particular geographic units. Demographers conventionally describe this process, termed migration, as the relatively permanent movement of persons over a significant distance.(31) It is a general estimation that a person moves for better life and opportunities. Migration is the oldest and very complicated phenomenon in human history. It is the central concept in demographic studies. Today it is considered as a social phenomena but it is not only an economic but a social problem also. Its impact on a country is quite important that can now change the whole pattern of politics, economy, and social values and norms.(32) Migration refers to the movement of persons from an origin place to a destination place across some pre-defined, political boundary. Migration researchers do not designate movements as 'migrations' unless they are somewhat permanent.(33) The picture of net migration rate (international migration) is presented in the following table. Almost all countries show the (-) or (o) sign, which indicates that the movement of the population is toward outside from their country. No country represents the plus sign that indicates that a very minimum population wants to come and settle in this region. It also indicates that population faces a number of problems in its country, economic as well as social. Some times migration can change the whole pattern of politics, economy and above all social norms and values of any country. Since developed countries want skilled immigration, developing countries often face the problem of brain drain etc.
Table 12
Net international migration rates
|
Countries |
Migrant(s) / 1000 population |
|
Bangladesh |
-2.53 |
|
Bhutan |
NA |
|
India |
-0.05 |
|
Maldives |
-12.58 |
|
Nepal |
-3.39 |
|
Pakistan |
-0.48 |
|
Sri Lanka |
-1.09 |
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
Note: Net migration rate is the difference between the number of persons entering and leaving a country during the year per 1,000 persons (based on midyear population). An excess of persons entering the country is referred to as net immigration (e.g., 3.56 migrants/1,000 population); an excess of persons leaving the country as net emigration (e.g., -9.26 migrants/1,000 population). The net migration rate indicates the contribution of migration to the overall level of population change. High levels of migration can cause problems such as unemployment and potential ethnic strife (if people are coming in) or a reduction in the labour force, perhaps in certain key sectors (if people are leaving).
Demographic indicators are very important indicators nowadays to analysise the trends of populations in any country. Demography is today widely taught in many universities across the world, attracting students with initial training in social sciences, statistics or health. Being at the crossroads of several disciplines such as geography, economics, sociology or epidemiology, demography offers tools to approach a large range of population issues by combining a more technical quantitative approach that represents the core of the discipline with many other methods borrowed from social or other sciences.(34) The size, composition, and rate of growth of the population are important in the social and economic development of a country. The future of people, economies, societies and the state lies in their population dynamics.(35) Demographic statistics are essential in assessing growth and development, determining educational capabilities, drafting plans and drawing up economic policies etc.(36)
Recent estimates of Bangladesh's population range from 142 to 159 million, making it the 7th most populous nation in the world. With a land area of 144,000 square kilometres, ranked 94th, the population density is remarkable.(37) Bangladesh's population growth was among the highest in the world in the 1960s and 70s, when the country grew from 50 to 90 million, but with the promotion of birth control in the 1980s, the growth rate slowed down.(38) The literacy rate in Bangladesh is approximately 47.9%; there is gender disparity, though, as literacy rates are 54% among men and 41.1% among women. Literacy has gone up due to many programmes introduced in the country. Among the most successful ones are the Food for education (FFE) programme introduced in 1993, and a stipend programme for women at the primary and secondary levels.(39) The population is relatively young, with the 15-64 age group comprising 61.4 %, while 4 % are above 65 or older and 0-14 age group is based on 34.6 %.. Life expectancy is 60.25 years for both males and females, the lowest in the region.
Bhutan’s total population is only 691,141 and growth rate is 1.267 %. Life expectancy of 66.13 years (65.33 for males and 66.97 for females), higher than Bangladesh and Nepal. While gender disparity can be observed in literacy rate — for males about 60% and for females 34% —literacy rate is 47%, the lowest in this region. If we compare the present-day situation to that prevailing a few years back, the remarkable changes lead us to the conclusion that Bhutan is a very rapidly improving country.
India — its size and geographical location – clearly appears to be of a definite significance in the region. This size and strength make India the most striking culprit in the eyes of its smaller neighbours in South Asia.(40) The national sex ratio is 944 females to 1,000 males.(41) With an estimated population of 1.2 billion, India is the world’s second most populous country. The last 50 years have seen a rapid increase in population due to medical advances and massive increase in agricultural productivity.(42) India’s median age is 25.3 years which is lower than Sri Lanka’s, and the population growth rate is 1.548%. Total literacy rate is 61% — 47.8% for females and 73.4% for males — a glaring gender disparity in the world’s biggest democracy. It is below than Maldives (96.3%) and Sri Lanka (90.7%). India’s life expectancy at birth (69.89 years) is also below than that for Maldives (73.97 years) and Sri Lanka (75.14 years). But in the real demographic sense the position of India is relatively secondary in this region.
Maldives’s demographic position is quite satisfactory, due to its lowest total fertality rate, lowest infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth, and age structure. Litearcy rate and enrolment rate is even better than that for India. Because Maldives’s education expenditure (8%) is comparatively higher than India’s (3.2%).(43) A census has been recorded since 1905, which shows that the population of the country remained around 100,000 for sixty years. Following independence in 1965, the health status of the population improved so much that the population doubled ( 200,000 ) by 1978, and the population growth rate peaked at 3.4% in 1985. By 2007, the population had reached 300,000, although the census in 2000 showed that the population growth rate had declined to 1.9% and at present -0.168% which representes stability in population growth.(44)
Nepal is fourth most populated country in the South Asian region. Nepal’s life expectancy at birth is 65.46, better than for Bangladesh and Pakistan, but literacy rate is below that for Pakistan. According to the World Refugee Survey 2008, published by the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Nepal hosted a population of refugees and asylum seekers in 2007 numbering approximately 130,000. Of this population, approximately 109,200 persons were from Bhutan and 20,500 from People’s Republic of China.(45) The government of Nepal restricted Bhutanese refugees to seven camps in the Jhapa and Morang districts, and refugees were not permitted to work in most professions. Despite the migration of a significant section of the population to the southern plains or Terai in recent years, the majority of the population still lives in the central highlands. The northern mountains are sparsely populated. Kathmandu, with a population of around 800,000 (metropolitan area: 1.5 million), is the largest city in the country.(46) Nepal’s literacy rate is 48.6% — for males 62.7 and for females 34.9% — not even saticfactory. It also represents gender disparity. Enrolment rate is highest for males at 71%.
The estimated population of Pakistan in 2009 was over 176,242,949, making it the world’s sixth most populous country — behind Brazil and ahead of Russia — and second largest in the South Asian reagon. By the year 2020, the country’s population is expected to reach 208 million, owing to a relatively high growth rate.(47) About 20% of the population live below the international poverty line — US$1.25 a day. Population projections for Pakistan are relatively difficult to make because of the differences in the accuracy of each census and the inconsistencies among various surveys related to the fertility rate. Yet it is likely that the rate of growth peaked in the 1980s and has since declined significantly.(48) While Pakistan and Bangladesh are most populated countries after India, they are demographically weak and need to pay greater attention to the welfare of their people.
Pakistan has the highest infant mortality rate (65.14%) in this region. Life expectancy is better (64.49%), literacy rate is, however, very low (49.9%) compared to Sri Lanka’s 90.7% and Maldives’ 96.3%.
Sri Lanka is the 53rd most populated nation in the world, with an annual population growth rate of 0.904%.(49) Overall, Sri Lanka relatively stands at the top due to its lowest growth rate (0.982 %), lowest birth rate (17 births/1000 population), lowest death rate (6.01, deaths/1000 population), lowest total fertility rate (2.05, childern born/women), lowest infant mortality rate (19.63, deaths/1000 live births), highest life expectancy at birth (74.8 years), median age (30 years), and a better age structure in this region. Demographically, Sri Lanka stands at the top position in the South Asian region.
Overall, there are major requirments to reduce population size, fertility rate, illiteracy and gender inequlity in the region. Population welfare should be the main objective and main national conern for all governments. NGOs can play an effective role in this context. Workshops, seminars, lectures, group meetings, and accessible and affordable health policies are obvious measures that could contribute a lot towards improvement. Above all, the major requirment is coordination and cooperation among South Asian countries to bring about a good social change in the region.
Notes and References
1. Rubina Tayyab, Lt. Col. Aitzaz Hasan Bhutti,“A Critical Review of the Population Policy of Pakistan, 2002”, Public Administration Review, (Nipa Papers), Lahore, No. 10, 2005, p.78.
2. Ibid.
3. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/demography>.
4. John R. Weeks, Population: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues, Wadsworth Publishing Company, USA, 7th Edition, 1999, p.75.
5. Ibid., p.76.
6. Ibid, p.88.
7. Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development, (New York: Addison-Wesley), pp.224–225.
8. Weeks, op cit., (ref 4) p.90.
9. Rubina Tayyab and Bhutti, op cit., (ref 1), p.79.
10. Ibid, p.82.
11. Ibid. p.83.
12. Ibid.
13. Gerald M. Meier, James E. Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development, (Oxford: Oxford University, 7th Edition, 2000) p.246.
14. Weeks, op cit., (ref 4), p.157.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p.147.
17. David Lucas & Paul Meyer, Ed. Beginning Population Studies, National Centre for Development Studies, The Australian National University: Reprinted, 2003, p.36.
18. Weeks, op cit., (ref 4) p.132.
19. Ibid.
20. CIA World Fact Book, 2009.
21. Rubina Tayyab and Bhutti, op cit., (ref 1), p.80.
22. Weeks, op cit., (ref 4), p.278.
23. Ibid., p.279.
24. CIA World Fact Book, 2007 and 2008.
25. Ibid.
26. Meier and Rauch, op cit., (ref 13), p.225.
27. Ibid., p.226.
28. Ibid., pp.225-226.
29. Ibid., p.263.
30. World Development Report: Development and the Next Generation, The World Book, Washington, D. C., 2007, p.283.
31. Lucas & Meyer, op cit., (ref 17), p.81.
32. Farzana Rizvi. 2005, “International Migration and Pakistan”, Pakistan Vision, Vol.6, July 2005, p.97.
33. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/migration>.
34. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/demography>.
35. Sarfraz Khawaja & Aqila Khawaja, Governance and Poverty in Pakistan: Some Reflections 2000–2006, (Islamabad: Mr. Books), p.101.
36. Ibid.
37. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bangladesh>.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. E. Sudhakar, SAARC: Origin, Growth and Future, (Lahore: Book Traders, 1994), pp.115-116.
41. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bhutan>.
42. Ibid.
43. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/maldives>.
44. Ibid.
45. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/nepal>.
46. Ibid.
47. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/pakistan>.
48. Ibid.
49. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sri lanka>.
Regional Studies, Vol. XXVII, No.4, Autumn 2009, pp.29-49
Farzana Rizvi is on the visiting faculty of the Punjab University, Lahore
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND INDIA:
A MID-TERM REVIEW
The paper discusses Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with special reference to India. It begins with the theoretical and historical background of MDGs and proceeds to examine India’s progress towards achieving these goals. The MDGs give first priority to the elimination of poverty and hunger from the world. Disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation and discrimination against women are among other challenges to be met in the given time frame. In September 2000, all United Nations (UN) members agreed to achieve these goals by 2015. The paper argues that India is still lagging behind in many areas with less than half the time left to the target date. It needs to take aggressive measures to achieve the goals on time.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first, ‘The development process of MDGs: Historical background,’ discusses the origin of MDGs. The second, ‘Defining Millennium Development Goals’ describes the MDGs in detail and the third section, ‘India’s progress since 2001,’ critically examines India’s progress in achieving the targets. It discusses the different policies and strategies India has adopted to accomplish this task. It also discusses the role of public policy, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society in this regard. The main findings are discussed in the conclusion.
The development process of MDGs:
Historical background
The history of conception and formulation of Millennium Development Goals goes back to the early 1960s when discussions on development started at conferences at the UN. In nearly three decades of such discussions the primary objective to slash poverty by half across the globe by 2015 was identified among the eight MDGs: eradicate extreme poverty; achieve universal education; endorse gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; develop a global partnership for development. The First, Second and Third UN Development Decades (1960s, 1970s, 1980s) focused largely on economic growth. In the 1990s, debates about development focused on the need to establish macroeconomic stability, strong institutions and governance, enforce the rule of law, control corruption, and provide greater social justice.(1) MDGs thus reflect the role of human rights campaigns in drawing attention to economic, social and cultural rights of the people enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — right to food, education, health care, and decent standard of living. The MDGs also reflect the role a number of human rights advocacy groups and civil society organizations participating in these discussions played in bringing human rights to the realm of economic theory.
These goals were first set out by international conferences and summits held in the 1990s. They were later compiled and became known as the International Development Goals.(2) The International Development Goals, drafted in 1996 by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), also strongly influenced identification and formulations of the MDGs. Little wonder seven of the eight MDGs are exactly the same as the OECD goals. Like the OECD goals, the first seven MDGs are time-bound and measurable. The eighth goal is not time-bound and is in the nature of an aspiration. The UN also followed the manner in which the OECD relied on bilateral donors to further its development goals. Unlike the OECD goals, however, the MDGs were formally adopted by developed and developing countries alike.(3)
On 17 December 1998 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted to convene the Millennium Summit of the United Nations. The Millennium Summit met from 6-8 September 2000 in New York. The summit included plenary meetings and four interactive roundtables. The Prime Minister of Singapore, the President of Poland, the President of Venezuela, and the President of Algeria each chaired one of the roundtables.(4)
In September 2000 the UNGA, representing 189 countries, unanimously adopted the Millennium Declaration. Acting on the General Assembly’s request, the Secretary General and various UN agencies, as well as representatives of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and OECD, devised a plan for realising the Millennium Declaration’s objectives, known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They put obligations on both rich and poor governments, and endeavoured to place a heavier burden on rich countries.
The Millennium Development Goals based on UN’s millennium declaration were at the centre of the Millennium Declaration. But, in addition to these eight goals, the Millennium Declaration also refers to other important issues such as peace, security and disarmament, human rights, democracy and good governance, special needs of Africa and strengthening the United Nations institutions. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly, in the 8th plenary meeting on 8th September 2000, contained concentrated values and principles for betterment of humanity and world peace. The summary of the rules of Declaration says:
We, heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, at the dawn of a new millennium, to reaffirm our faith in the Organization and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous world. We have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to the entire world’s people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs... We are determined to establish a just and lasting peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. We will spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than 5 million lives in the past decade. We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their territorial integrity and political independence… We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people…We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected… We will promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.(5)
Defining Millennium Development Goals
As listed above, there are eight MDGs. Goals one through seven are mutually reinforcing and are aimed at reducing poverty. The eighth goal, global partnership for development, is the way to achieving the first seven. Each goal contains a set of targets and indicators designed as a “road map” for guiding how to achieve the MDGs. The targets and indicators were drafted to assess the progress of each country on an international level.
The Millennium Development Goals are premised on six core values: freedom, equality; solidarity; tolerance; respect for nature; and shared responsibility. Each one can be traced to economic, social, or cultural rights originally set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Arts. 22, 24, 25, 26) and later enumerated in a separate treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.(6) While attaining the MDGs will not mean that human rights are being universally respected, the international community normally agrees that the goals are a step in the right direction towards that end.
One important feature of the goals is that during the drafting process, the targets were intentionally tailored to recognizable human rights. This was done so that members of the General Assembly would view the targets as more of an obligation than an aspiration. As obligations, countries must not only refrain from violating the targets, they must also take affirmative steps towards achieving the goals.
Taken as a whole, the MDGs have been influential in the international community. In some countries the goals have prompted democratic debates about government performance and fostering political freedom. Brazilian President Luis Inacio da Silva, for example, used the MDGs as his political platform in his electioneering.(7)
Although there are ongoing efforts worldwide to achieve the MDGs, progress on this front has been slow and uneven. While some countries are on track for some goals, none of the MDGs is likely to be reached at the current rate of global progress. For example, in 1990 “The Education for All” goal was set for the year 2000; yet the progress made was only a tenth of the target, so the goalpost was then moved to 2015. At the current rate this promise too may not be kept either. The progress will have to quadruple if the universal education goal is to be achieved.(8)
The realization of these goals in India is vital for not only attaining its own human development goals but also for economic growth in the country. Hence India has set targets within its current five-year plan that surpass the global Millennium Development Goals.
Every developing country has numerous national and state government programmes which often fail to reach the people. That is why MDGs have become the central theme of global development cooperation efforts. At this midpoint of the Millennium Development Goals we will examine Indian achievements towards all eight goals separately. Looking back at the successes and challenges of the last seven years this section analyses some important conceptual issues linked to the MDGs. Such analysis will later contribute to the re-formulation of strategies for the achievement of MDGs by 2015 and beyond. Amongst the conceptual issues covered, the following will be given particular attention: a) some goals are about inputs (i.e. water access), some about processes (goal 8 on international cooperation), some about outputs (school completion), and some others about outcomes (health indicators or poverty).
India has an important role to play in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and the broader global objectives laid down in the Millennium Declaration. At the turn of the century, India alone accounted for nearly one-fourth — 364 million — of the world’s poor! Despite the rapid strides in economic growth in the last decade, India accounts for the largest number of maternal deaths in the world and its dismal rates of infant mortality and maternal mortality are worse than those in some countries of sub-Saharan Africa. India is also home to the highest number of undernourished people in the world, and one-third of the world’s under-weight children.(9)
The progress made by India will significantly determine whether the world as a whole will be able to meet some of the most critical targets of the MDGs — such as in relation to infant mortality rates (IMR), maternal mortality rates (MMR), school enrolment and retention, as well as universal access to water and sanitation. (10) The following table provides the value of the MDGs indicators for available period.
Source: http://asiapacific.endpoverty2015.org/pdf/India%20MDG%20status.pdf
Poverty: The most challenging goal
Widespread poverty and excessive inequality remain the principal challenges in the globalization process. The significance of public action in dealing with poverty and vulnerability has increased. It is for this reason that the World Summit for Social Development, held in 1995, called upon countries to reduce overall poverty substantially and to eradicate extreme poverty. These goals were re-emphasized in a time-bound and measurable framework by the United Nations as core MDGs. The very first goal is about eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. It has two following targets and five indicators. All these targets and indicators specifically deal with the standard of living, per capita income, per capita resources consumption, etc. Target one: halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day. Target two: halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.(11) The indicators in line with the first are the poverty headcount ratio (percentage of population below national poverty line); poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty); share of poorest quintile in national consumption; prevalence of underweight among children (under five years of age), and proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption.(12)
In India, it is estimated that more than 320-400 million people are below the poverty line, 75 per cent of them in the rural areas.(13) Extreme poverty is defined as the proportion of individuals in developing countries who live on less than a dollar a day (based on purchasing power parity 1993 constant prices). Poverty estimates are computed based on data covering 93 per cent of developing countries’ population. (14)
India suffers from significant poverty. The Planning Commission has estimated that 27.5 per cent of the population was living below the poverty line in 2004–2005, down from 51.3 per cent in 1977–1978, and 36 per cent in 1993-1994. The source for this figure was the 61st round of the National Sample Survey (NSS) and the criterion used was monthly per capita consumption/expenditure below Rs. 356.35 ($9.13) for rural areas and Rs. 538.60 ($13.46) for urban areas. About 75 per cent of the poor live in rural areas; most of them are daily wagers, self-employed householders and landless labourers.
Although Indian economy has grown progressively over the last two decades, yet this growth was uneven when we compare different economic groups, social groups, geographic regions, and rural and urban areas. Wealth distribution in India is quite uneven, with the top 10 per cent of income groups earning 33 per cent of the total income. Despite significant economic progress, one -quarter of the nation's population earns less than the government-specified poverty threshold of $0.40/day. Official figures estimate that 27.5 per cent of Indians lived below the national poverty line in 2004-2005. A 2007 report by the state-run National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) found that 25 per cent of Indians, or 236 million people, lived on less than 20 rupees per day with most working in "informal labour sector with no job or social security, living in abject poverty.(15)
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Source: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId= LNAV01REGSUB5
Current trends show the South Asian region has reduced poverty by only 23 per cent between 1990 and 2015. According to Global Monitoring Report 2008,(16) in 1990 South Asia had the second-highest proportion of 43 per cent people living on less than a dollar a day but has made substantial progress in reducing poverty and on current trends may surpass the target in 2015. Most of the progress in this region can be attributed to India’s rapid growth over the past decade.
On the other hand government’s latest survey of living standards shows that the number of extremely poor Indians, those chronically incapable of consuming even the minimum calories needed for full functioning, is an astonishing 301 million, just 19 million less than in 1983; prevalence of malnutrition among children under five in 2000 was 44.4%, in 2005 it was 43.5% and after three years in 2008 it stayed at the same level — 43.5. Whereas prevalence of undernourishment in 1990 was 24%, in 1995 it was 21% and in 2005, after 10 years, there was no improvement and stood at 21%.(17) At this rate, it would take India 300 years to lift its entire people out of even the most extreme levels of poverty. The survey’s results suggest that extreme poverty has fallen no faster, possibly more slowly, in the past 15 years of spectacular economic growth than in earlier periods, challenging the notion that money “trickles down” to all.(18)
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that all poverty reduction programmes have failed in India. Several recent studies indicate that urban poverty is on the rise in India because of rapid urbanisation.(19) What pushes urbanisation is the fact that the vast majority of India’s poor live in rural areas and they are continuously migrating to urban areas. A survey carried out by the NCAER along with the Canada-based International Development Research Centre drew similar conclusions. So, in 2005, The Hunger Project was launched which aimed to empower rural people and create direct access of the poor to authorities (to reduce migration towards metropolitan areas). The project initiated the Aagaz Academy — a centre for women’s leadership. Aagaz means “a new beginning.” The Hunger Project trains elected women representatives in linking the people to government resources that are rightfully theirs, and in this way empowers the people to achieve the MDGs.
The first Aagaz academies are located in the states of Rajasthan, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. To date, these academies have trained over 30,000 elected women representatives to take effective action to end hunger and poverty in their communities and villages. The Women’s Leadership Workshop (WLW) trains women to organize themselves into self-help groups, through which they gain access to credit and establish small businesses, which improve their livelihoods. They have succeeded in increasing the nutritional value of school meal programmes, growing small kitchen gardens, and making grain supplies available to the poorest of the poor.(20)
The main causes of poverty are illiteracy, a population growth rate by far exceeding the economic growth rate, protectionist policies pursued since 1947 to 1991 which prevented foreign investment in the country. Poverty alleviation is expected to make better progress in the next 50 years than in the past, as a trickle-down effect of the growing middle class. Increasing stress on education, reservation of seats in government jobs and the increasing empowerment of women and the economically weaker sections of society, are also expected to contribute to the alleviation of poverty. Poverty in India has been reduced by 10 per cent over the last few years.(21) The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) says that while overall economic growth has been impressive since the start of reforms in the early 1990s, this has not had a positive impact on rural poverty. Most analysts attribute the failure to reduce rural poverty to declining public investment in agriculture, which provides livelihood to 70 per cent of Indians.(22) Trade liberalization in recent years has also led to extreme price volatility in many agricultural products that has hurt poor farmers. These problems are being addressed by authorities. Having analyzed the current trends in India, it would not be wrong to say that though progress in this regard has been enhanced, still the development in poverty alleviation is not satisfactory; with this momentum it is hard to achieve the first goal in the given time.
Education: Efforts towards achieving this goal
The second millennium development goal is to achieve universal primary education for all children regardless of gender. The World Declaration on Education for All, in 1990, and the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000 reaffirmed the right to learn and a commitment to meet the basic learning needs of all people by expanding learning opportunities and working for a fully literate society. In the Indian context, particularly in rural India, it is still a cherished dream. Two-thirds of the population of India lives in rural areas (approximately 700,000,000 people in 634,321 villages), among whom 207,000,000 are illiterate adults. The rural population of India is around 12.2 per cent of the world’s population(23) and development of the rural sector together with the rural people is essential for transforming developing India into developed India. It contains the following one target and four indicators. The target demands assurance that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. Indicators include: Net enrolment ratio in primary education; proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary and literacy rate of 15-24-year-old, women and men.
Education is one of the most powerful instruments for reducing poverty and inequality. Education is equally important in enhancing India’s competitiveness in the global economy. Therefore, ensuring access to quality education for all, in particular for the poor and rural population, is central to the economic and social development of India.
The primary education system in India suffers from numerous shortcomings owing to lack of financial resources. It requires setting up a nationwide network of schools. Traditionally, the sector has been characterized by poor infrastructure, unmotivated student population, disillusioned parents and underpaid teachers. In the light of its commitment to the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education, India is facing some major challenges, e.g. gender disparity, financial and societal blocks that prevent access of girls to primary education. Because of marginalized social groups, the number of out-of-school children is not decreasing from 9.6 million; it was 25 million in 2003. India is ensuring good quality education to reach some 9 million children not yet enrolled. India yet to achieve the primary school enrolment rate to 100 percent and wipe out the drop-outs by 2015 against 41.96 per cent in 1991-92. The drop-out rate for primary education during 2002-03 was 34.89 per cent.(24) The gross enrolment ratio in primary education has tended to remain near 100 per cent for boys and recorded an increase of nearly 20 percentage points in the ten years period from 1992-93 to 2002-03 for girls (93 per cent). The literacy rate (seven years and above) has also increased from 52.2 per cent in 1992-93 to 65.4 per cent in 2000-01. India still faces challenges in providing quality early-childhood development programmes for all children.(25)
Expanding secondary education and improving quality of education yields social and economic benefits, so it should be universalized. It is very tough for a developing country to provide quality education to a population as large as India’s. Conducting surveys and improving management can help improve the efficiency of the current system, e.g. less than 40 per cent of Indian adolescents attending secondary schools(26) can be motivated; curriculum and teaching practices need upgrading to impart more relevant skills, such as learning-to-learn, and critical and independent thinking. Moreover, public-private partnerships need to be explored.
Since 2000, the World Bank has committed over US$1 billion to education in India. It provides technical support. But it should ensure accountability and good use of resources. The World Bank has financed different educational programmes. It has sponsored eight district primary education projects in the last decade at the national level with special projects at the state level. It pooled funds with other donors and the federal and state governments to support the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan programme for four years. It invested US$ 500 million to expand facilities and improve infrastructure, get children to school, and set up a system to assess learning.(27) In addition to financing, its evaluations and research provide pointers to further improvements. This includes studies on financing elementary education, instructional time and quality in primary education and the impact of information sharing and incentives to improve quality.
The World Bank is also conducting research and analysis on expanding access to secondary education, particularly for girls and other marginalized groups. It is also examining the role and effectiveness of the private sector and public-private partnership in expanding secondary education. A US$250 million operation is helping improve India’s technical/engineering education. It finances major reforms in 128 competitively selected engineering institutions in 13 states to improve quality of education and meet the demands of a fast growing economy. Literacy rates have shown remarkable improvement in India in the last decade, both for males and females. Total literacy rates increased from 52 per cent in 1991 to 66 per cent in 2001, with male literacy rates increasing from 64 per cent to 76 per cent and female literacy rates increasing from 39 per cent to 54 per cent. The most heartening aspect of India’s educational strides is the improvements recorded by the educationally backward states, especially the state of Madhya Pradesh.(28) This goal will most probably touch the highest point in India’s graph on MDG achievements. If we see the World Bank reports South Asia is on track regarding primary education,
Achieve universal primary education
Source: <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do? siteId=2&menuId=LNAV01GOAL8SUB7>
However, to maintain this momentum, the challenge now for the Government of India (GoI) is to dramatically improve access, enrolment and quality in primary education. This requires setting up a mass primary education structure, whereas India has only three National Boards with their own curriculum and certifying examinations.(29) The funding for schools comes from states, but the financing of new investments has declined.
Recommendations:
· Construct public schools, especially in rural areas where private suppliers are unlikely to venture;
· Introduce double-shift teaching in urban schools;
· Increase schools’ autonomy and parental involvement;
· Reform Grant-in-Aid System to make public financing conditional on achieving performance standards,
· Provide financial and in-kind assistance for poor and disadvantaged students.
Promoting gender equality & empowering women
The 19th century witnessed a number of reform movements to improve the lot of women, with regard to issues like the practice of sati violence, child marriage, and employment. With the introduction of the National Policy for Empowerment of Women, the Government of India had declared 2001 Women’s Empowerment Year. It was said, "Our vision in the new century of a nation where women are equal partners with men". Many new projects were launched like Swashakti and Stree Shakti (empowerment of women) for women’s empowerment; Swayam Sidha to benefit 100,000 women through micro-credit programmes, Balika Samrudhi Yojana for the girl child and many more.(30)
The principle of gender equality is enshrined in the Indian Constitution in its Preamble, Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Duties and Directive Principles. The Constitution not only grants equality to women, but also empowers the State to adopt measures of positive discrimination in favour of women. Within the framework of a democratic polity, their laws, development policies, Plans and programmes have aimed at women’s advancement in different spheres. From the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-78) onwards there has been a marked shift in the approach to women’s issues from development to welfare. In recent years, the empowerment of women has been recognized as the vital issue in determining the status of women. The National Commission for Women was set up by an Act of Parliament in 1990 to safeguard the rights and legal entitlements of women. The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1993) to the Constitution of India have provided for reservation of seats in the local bodies of Panchayats and Municipalities for women, laying a strong foundation for their participation in decision making at the local levels.(31)
The legal-judicial system will be made more responsive and gender-sensitive to women’s needs, especially in cases of domestic violence and personal assault. New laws will be enacted and existing laws reviewed to ensure that justice is quick and the punishment meted out to the culprits is commensurate with the severity of the offence.(32)
India will have to promote female participation at all levels to reach a female-male proportion of equal level by 2015. The female-male proportion in respect of primary education was 71:100 in 1990-91 which has increased to 78:100 in 2000-01. During the same period, the proportion has increased from 49:100 to 63:100 in case of secondary education.
In most developing countries gender inequality is a major obstacle to meeting the MDG targets. In fact, achieving the goals will be impossible without closing the gaps between women and men in terms of capacities, access to resources and opportunities, and vulnerability to violence and conflict.(33)
The call “Promote gender equality and empowerment of women” is the culmination of years of determined advocacy and action by the international women’s movement. The high priority accorded to Goal 3 represents a global affirmation of women’s rights and gender equality as core values of development. This hard-won recognition that “development, if not engendered, is endangered” was also an outcome of debates and discussions at the UN conferences of the 1990s, including the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), the World Summit on Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) and the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995). Growing recognition of the gender dimensions of development paradigms and policies during the 1990s created the momentum for a consensus on gender mainstreaming — the incorporation of gender perspectives into all aspects of development theory and practice — as a key strategy to achieve gender equality.(34) The target is to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and at all levels of education no later than 2015. The indicators are: the ratio of literate women to men ages 15 to 24; share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector; proportion of seats held by women in national parliament.
Indicator: Percentage of Seats held by women in parliament
· Only 8.3 per cent of the seats in the Indian parliament were held by women as of 2006.
· Indicator: Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector as of 2006.
· Only 17.3 per cent of women enjoy wage employment in the non-agricultural sector.
· The MDGs aimed at the reduction of gender gaps in literacy and wage rates by at least 50 per cent by 2007.
Millennium Development Goal 3 is ‘to promote gender equality and empower women’. The goal has one target: ‘to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005’ and at ‘all levels of education no later than 2015’. Four indicators are used to measure progress towards the goal: the ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education; the ratio of literate women to men in the 15 to 24-year-old age group; the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector; and the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments.(35)
In its first ever gender gap study covering 58 nations, the World Economic Forum has ranked India a lowly 53. The report, titled The Women's Empowerment: Measuring the Global Gender Gap, measures the gap between women and men in five critical areas like economic participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, access to education and access to reproductive health care. This report is based on United Nations Development Fund for Women's findings on global patterns of inequality between men and women. The low ranking reflects the large disparity between men and women in all five areas of the index.(36)
Although progress has been made towards achieving this goal, yet gender equality in India will remain a distant dream. It is unlikely to happen without adequate women's participation in politics.
India will have to promote female participation at all levels to reach a female-male proportion of equal level by 2015. The female-male proportion in respect of primary education was 71:100 in 1990-91, which has increased to 78:100 in 2000-01. During the same period, the proportion has increased from 49:100 to 63:100 in the case of secondary education.(37) India’s challenge is to maintain the momentum achieved in increasing participation in primary education while making sure that girls continue to complete their secondary education. Beside education, in bureaucracy, we see the gender discrimination is there more blatantly. The political parties don’t yet believe in the 33 per cent quota for women.
So, women empowerment should be seen from a broader angle as now many new avenues are opening up for competent women such as the media, corporate world, army, police and sports. The IT industry has brought a radical change employing an increasing proportion of women in software and related areas.(38)
India was the first country in the world to launch a family planning programme in 1951. A report by the UN Children’s Fund or UNICEF says one-fifth of the worldwide deaths of children under the age of five occur in the populous South Asian country. The report says India accounted for more than two million of the 9.7 million children who died in the world before their fifth birthday in 2006. UN officials say that child mortality rates in India — as in the rest of the world — have declined over the last 15 years. But in India this has happened slowly, at an average rate of two-and-a-half per cent a year. The UNICEF representative in India, Gianni Murzi, said, “The world without India will not make the development goals; therefore there is a need for accelerating in the country this pace.” The UN has identified malnutrition as a major challenge in India, and says it is the underlying cause of death among 50 per cent of the children who die. India, a country of over a billion people, is today one of the youngest countries in the world. Nearly one-third of its population is under 15 years of age. Economists and developers have repeatedly stressed that India needs to provide far greater access to improved healthcare and education for this young population.(39) The target is set as, to reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate, infant mortality rate, and the proportion of one-year-old children immunized against measles.
The authors of the report focus on infant and child mortality in rural areas of India. They construct a flexible duration model framework that allows for frailty at multiple levels and interactions between the child's age and individual socioeconomic and environmental characteristics. The model is estimated using the 1998-99 waves of the Indian National Family and Health Survey. The estimated results show that socioeconomic and environmental characteristics have significantly different effects on mortality rates at different ages. These are particularly important immediately after birth. The authors use the estimated model for policy experiments. These indicate that child mortality can be reduced substantially, particularly by improving the education of women and reducing indoor air pollution caused by cooking fuels. In addition, providing access to electricity and sanitation facilities can reduce under-five-year mortality rates significantly.
In 1998, about 2.5 million under-5-year-olds died in India, the highest total for any country. India’s health goals for the year 2000 included reducing: the national mortality rate for under-5 children to less than 100 per 1000 live births; the infant mortality rate to less than 60 per 1000 live births; and the perinatal mortality rate to less than 85 per 1000 live births. Between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, significant progress was made towards these goals and national targets appeared to be within reach, despite large disparities in mortality levels, rates of decline and child health determinants among the various Indian states. However, recent data indicate that the decline in child mortality rates is slowing down.(40)
At present India is not on track to achieving the IMR as well as the U5MR targets. The IMR for India was estimated to be 58/1,000 live births in 2006, though this masks disparities between rural and urban areas (64 and 40, respectively) and between boys and girls (56 and 61, respectively). Malnutrition is directly or indirectly associated with more than half of all young child mortality. Studies show that 13 per cent of under-five mortality globally, and an estimated 16 per cent in India, could be prevented by the universal practice of exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life. Nationally, full immunization coverage has increased from 42.0 per cent in 1998-99 to 43.5 per cent in 2005-06. Polio outbreaks occurred in 2002 and 2006, spreading the disease to areas of the country that were largely polio-free.(41)
Renuka Chowdhury, India’s Minister of State for Woman and Child Development, and Karin Hulshof, UNICEF Representative in India, launched the GOI-UNICEF Programme of Co-operation, 2008-2012 on 21 August 2008.
The joint initiative is designed to help India achieve its national development goals while ensuring that no child is left behind as India moves forward. About one-fifth of the world’s children live in India. The country’s progress is the key to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The joint plan focuses on the reduction of India’s infant mortality and maternal mortality rates (IMR and MMR),
Figure 2
Source: Millennium Development Goals: India Country Report 2005.
Figure 3
Source: Millennium Development Goals: India Country Report 2005.
In 2000, more than half a million women died in childbirth or from pregnancy-related complications across the world. Ninety-nine per cent of these deaths, many of them preventable, occur in developing countries. Infections, severe blood loss and unsafe abortions account for the majority of deaths. Goal 5 calls for reducing the rate of maternal mortality by 75 per cent by 2015.(42) The target is set as to reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, maternal mortality ratio and to increase proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel.
Here too progress has been far too slow. The target is to reduce the maternal mortality ratio by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015, but the ratio in the average Asian developing country has only declined from 395 to 342. Even more alarming, of the 42 countries for which data are available, maternal mortality has gone up in 22. Around two-thirds of Asian maternal deaths, 164,000, take place in India and Pakistan, both among the regressing countries. The highest maternal mortality rates per 100,000 live births are, however, in Afghanistan (1,900), Nepal (740) and Timor-Leste (660). Each year, across the region around one-quarter of a million women die as a result of a normal life cycle event: pregnancy and childbirth. Almost all these deaths could be avoided if mothers had routine obstetric care and access to emergency obstetric care.
India has the largest number of births per year (27 million) in the world. With its high maternal mortality of about 300–500 per 100,000 births, about 75,000 to 150,000 maternal deaths occur every year in India.(43) This is about 20 per cent of the global burden. Hence India’s progress in reducing maternal deaths is crucial to the global achievement of Millennium Development Goal 5 (MDG 5). Why is India’s maternal mortality high in spite of rapid economic growth? We believe the key reasons are political, administrative and managerial rather than a lack of technical knowledge.
Since the 1990s, it has been recognized that emergency obstetric care (EmOC) is one of the cost-effective strategies for reduction of maternal deaths.(44) In 1992, India launched its Child Survival and Safe Motherhood programme (at a cost of approximately US$ 300 million) followed by a five-year programme (approximately US$ 250 million) called Reproductive and Child Health-I in 1997. Although EmOC was one of the strategies, it was not implemented due to lack of focus and limited management capacity. Even today the government does not systematically monitor how many EmOC facilities are fully functional. The National Rural Health Mission, a major new reform initiative launched in 2005, has been promoting training of village health volunteers and institutional deliveries. Again, improving EmOC is one of the many activities of the National Rural Health Mission lacking clear strategy or focus.(45)
In the 1960s, India created a cadre of two-year trained rural midwives called ‘auxiliary nurse midwives’ (ANMs) to provide maternal and child health services. They substantially fitted the definition of skilled birth attendant. Unfortunately, their designation as ‘auxiliary’ undermined their status and function as midwives. Sri Lanka had a similar cadre of workers called “public health midwives” with a focus on delivery care, which contributed significantly to reducing maternal mortality. After 1966, under pressure from international agencies, the role of ANMs in India changed from midwifery to family planning and immunization.(46)
India also abolished the posts of institution-based midwives, replacing them with general nurse midwives. Nurses are generally rotated in all the departments of the hospital, thus they did not develop any expertise in midwifery, and the training programmes exclusively for midwifery were stopped. As a consequence, although female nurses and ANMs are automatically registered as midwives, there are no professional/skilled midwives in India.
As more than 60 per cent of births are domiciliary deliveries, India needs to come up with an option to provide skilled birth attendance at community level. Lack of qualified midwives is a major human resource constraint for providing locally accessible skilled delivery care for rural women. Any country with a political commitment to reducing maternal mortality has to concentrate on well-trained midwives in the hospital and the community. Conversely, India ignored the development of a midwifery cadre, which has led to persistent dependence on traditional birth attendants for deliveries and a high maternal mortality rate.
India has only three technical officers for maternal health at the national level! Almost no state in India has a maternal health director. This explains why maternal health strategies are not implemented effectively, and maternal deaths and pregnancy outcomes are not monitored. Lack of management capacity in the health system has led to poor quality services and slow progress.(47)
For politicians, health is a low priority. Government expenditure on health has been a mere 0.9 per cent of GDP,(48) while a large percentage of the budget is spent on defence, un-targeted subsidies and non-vital infrastructure. No political party has maternal health on its priority agenda. Hardly any questions are asked about maternal deaths in the parliament or state legislatures. The media has also ignored maternal health.
With the change in the role of ANMs and programme priorities, comprehensive services have been neglected. Not only delivery care but antenatal and postnatal care are also neglected. The National Family Health Survey (2006) shows that only 52 per cent of women receive three antenatal contacts and 42 per cent receive any postnatal care.(49) Abortion and birth-spacing services are receiving less attention lately. All of this has a major impact on maternal health indicators. In spite of rhetoric from the National Rural Health Mission, changes on the ground to improve maternal health care are slow and lack focus. We feel strongly that without a clear strategic focus on skilled birth attendance, EmOC and referral services, India will not be able to reduce maternal mortality rapidly. There is a need to provide comprehensive maternal health services, including antenatal care, delivery care, EmOC and postnatal care, within an efficient health system. The extent of the increase in political priority, managerial capacity and resource allocation will determine, if and when, India will be able to meet MDG 5.
In rural India, one woman dies every five minutes giving birth, often due to poor health, unsafe home births and inadequate access to quality healthcare. In the country more than 100,000 women die every year due to childbirth-related causes. UNICEF has been working with the government of India, health partners and donors to address this situation. The Women's Right to Life and Health project aims at ensuring that women and their children, especially among the poorest communities, receive adequate health care. Over the last four years in Rajasthan, for example, the percentage of deliveries assisted by skilled birth attendants increased by more than 30 per cent. Communities have responded positively with a boost in voluntary blood donations for use during obstetric emergencies. Today, maternal mortality reduction has become both a state and a national priority, which is reflected in the government's National Population Policy and National Health Policy.
Tuberculosis (TB) is a major public health problem in India. Each year over 1.8 million people contract TB and about 450,000 die from it. Also one in 630 people is infected with malaria. According to reports of the National Aids Control Organization (NACO), India had 2.3 million people infected with HIV. The target is set as to have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, to have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases, to have halted HIV prevalence among pregnant women aged 15-24. Other include condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate, condom use at last high-risk sex, percentage of 15-24-year-old with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS, contraceptive prevalence rate, ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans ages 10-14, prevalence and death rates associated with malaria, proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures, prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis, proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course (DOTS).
Since the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other diseases has a devastating impact on every effort to lift people out of poverty, the Global AIDS and Health Fund is thus both a campaign to improve health and part of an essential strategy to achieve sustainable development;(50) to have, by 2015, halted and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity.
Approximately three million people died of AIDS in 2000 alone, and some 36 million people are currently living with HIV/AIDS. By the end of 2000, the global HIV/AIDS catastrophe had claimed nearly 22 million lives. Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis is increasing in many countries, due to poor treatment practices. Eight million people develop active tuberculosis and nearly two million die annually. Over 90 per cent of cases and deaths are in developing countries. Tuberculosis is also the leading cause of death in people with HIV/AIDS.(51)
Ensuring environmental sustainability
Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are set to achieve their MDGs by 2010. But some countries such as India or Indonesia are lagging behind in some goals. None of the countries have achieved all the goals. Goal 7 especially, which is environmental sustainability, is hard to achieve. In water and sanitation, too, many countries are lagging behind. Many are on track on reducing poverty, but not on reducing hunger or malnutrition of children.(52)
Our natural environment is the unequivocal basis of human survival. It is the foundation for all economic and, more importantly, human development. However, poorly managed economic development that has resulted in widespread pollution, land erosion and deforestation endangers the future of our natural resources — and our very survival. Because the environment provides the raw materials vital to sustaining human development, we must ensure that, in turn, international development policies work to preserve our natural environment
Around 40 million households in rural India do not have a safe source for drinking water and over 100 million rural households live without access to sanitation facilities.
The Indian government has recently released the National Action Plan on Climate Change. Increasing population, falling water tables, coupled with serious drought conditions are formidable challenges having dire consequences for health, nutrition and the overall development, especially of children. The targets are set as to integrate the principles of sustainable development into national policies and programme and reverse the loss of environmental resources, to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation and to have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers and, in line with this, to increase the proportion of population with access to improved sanitation in both urban and rural areas and proportion of households with access to secure tenure.
Strategies to achieve MDGs: Importance of foreign aid
Different developing countries receive very different amounts of aid. Even considering just low-income countries, amounts ranged in 2004 from around $90 per capita in Zambia and Senegal to less than $5 per capita in Nigeria and less than $1 per capita in India (World Bank Report, 2006). Are these differences justified, and if not, what would an improved allocation look like? Much research has been undertaken already. Several studies have looked at whether donors’ allocations are based on recipient country’s ‘need’, as measured by per capita GDP or some non-income welfare indicator.
The main finding is that most donors’ allocations are only weakly based on recipient country’s needs. There is, however, a good deal of variation among donors, with multilaterals generally performing better than bilaterals, and some bilaterals — e.g. the UK, Netherlands — generally performing better than others — e.g. France or Japan. Although useful, studies of this nature share a drawback: there are few obvious benchmarks by which to judge donors’ allocations. What proportion of aid, for instance, should go to the poorest countries? By how much should aid received fall as a country’s per capita GDP rises? Recognising this, researchers have begun to think more systematically about what an optimal allocation of aid should look like. In particular, which variables should determine the amounts of aid that different countries receive, and what should be their relative contributions?
At this juncture, two sorts of disagreements have arisen. One is about principles: what are the fundamental principles according to which aid allocations should be determined? This involves deeper questions about the role of aid and notions of equity and fairness. The second is about evidence and implementation. Even if we agree on the fundamental principles, we may not agree about what those principles imply in practice. This is because the evidence on the effects of aid is not always clear cut. These issues have particular relevance in the context of recent debates around the Millennium Development Goals. In particular, will the large scaling up of aid volumes, called for and agreed during 2005, be combined with a sound approach to its allocation across countries? This issue was relatively neglected during the 2005 debate, but 2007 — the mid-point between the setting of the MDGs and the key target date of 2015 — will heighten attention on the issue.(53)
The strategy to achieve MDGs must be formulated in the backdrop of population. Thus, a coordinated strategy will not be achieved without better coordination among international institutions and agencies, including those within the United Nations systems, and this effort must also mobilize the energies of all actors, including notably the private sector philanthropic foundations, non-governmental organizations, academic and cultural institutions and other members of civil society.(54)
MDGs represent a partnership between the developed countries and the developing countries “to create an environment at the national and global levels alike which is conducive to development and the elimination of poverty”. They represent commitments by governments worldwide to do more to reduce poverty and hunger and to tackle ill-health, gender inequality, lack of education, and lack of access to clean water, and problems like environmental degradation and also commitments to reduce debt burdens, increase technology transfers and build development partnerships.
The study particularly focused on India’s status regarding MDGs. India is increasingly recognized as a regional power in key economic sectors. The paper observed two contrasting prominent trends in India: impressive economic growth and wealth creation on the one hand, and stagnation in key social indicators, particularly among disadvantaged populations (i.e. geographically, caste-wise and gender-wise) on the other. The rapid growth of the economy since the early 1990s, and the Government of India’s increased commitment to accelerating social development, present a unique opportunity and importance for significance for achieving Millennium Development Goals. But, in spite of such economic growth, opportunity and promises to its people and international community, the then finance minister, P. Chidambaram, said in 2007 that India might fail to achieve some of the Millennium Development Goals set by the United Nations. India is world’s largest democratic republic with 2.4% of world’s land area and 16% of world’s population. He argued that India was one of the most populous nations and because of dense population it was hard for it to achieve MDGs in the given timeframe.(55) But there have also been positive trends on certain social indicators in India, like the near eradication of polio; a significant increase in literacy rates; and the enrolment of both boys and girls in primary school. However, progress has been slow in many areas which demand systemic changes, such as in the provision of good quality services (i.e. primary health care and community-based nutrition services). Since the inception of the ambitious 10th Five-Year Plan in 2003, current rates of progress on many indicators are not sufficient to give hope of realizing either many National Development Targets, or the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.(56) Another factor in being slow is that India on its part has set out similar development goals under its 10th Plan as those promised in MDGs. It seems more concerned with trying to achieve the former targets than those set under MDGs.
Thus, without thoroughgoing action to change the current scenario, the MDGs could turn from an opportunity into liability. As 2015 nears, the UN becomes increasingly vulnerable to criticism if it still lacks data to prove whether the MDGs are or are not being met. A stream of embarrassing disclosures, similar to the external evaluation of RBM, will likely ensue. Certainly journalists will report the embarrassments, and opponents of foreign aid may use them to discredit further generosity to poor countries. Such an awkward situation is entirely foreseeable, and for that reason, must give pause to anyone who naively believes that measuring the MDGs is an occupation only scientists need care about. Anyone wishing to preserve the credibility of the UN and the global development enterprise ten years from now also must care. More thoughtful and timely action for the sake of these institutions and, needless to say, for the millions of people who shall live — or die — with the success or failure of the MDGs, is only wise.(57)
The MDGs should be viewed not only as goals that must be attained by developing nations, but also as obligations of the developed nations. The goals are ideals which are meaningless unless the political constellations and power relations at global, national and local levels are taken into account. The MDGs should act as a catalyst towards the creation of a concept and approach that is truly on the side of the poor. The MDGs can be achieved but most countries are unlikely to reach them without concerted support from the government and international community, including support in the form of resources, policy advice and advocacy.(58)
India has been graduating from a country receiving assistance and is on track to itself becoming a donor, If it reaches the targets, and it will be through its domestic resources. Whether Africa reaches those targets is mostly in the hands of Western aid donors. But whether South Asia can reach those targets is in the hands of South Asia and depends on whether the best policies prevail or not. So far, progress towards the MDGs has been mixed. The developed countries promised in MDGs declaration to give 7.6% or .76% of their GNP for MDGs. If they really do, these goals would be achieved, as with this collective money mega projects can be materialized.
Notes and References
1. <http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/MDG.shtml>.
2. <http://dte.gn.apc.org/Af36.htm>.
3. <http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/MDG.shtml>.
4. <http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/MDG.shtml>.
5. <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>.
6. <www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/MDG.shtml>.
7. <http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/MDG.shtml>.
8. <http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/7062-MDG_Brochures_for_the_Public_-_Country_Examples_-_Lao_PDR.pdf>.
9. <www.dalitvoice.org/Templates/sep2007/reports.htm>.
10. Measuring India’s Progress on the Millennium Development Goals – A Mid-Term Checklist, July 2007, published by Wada Na Todo Abhiyan — National Secretariat, Green Park Extension, New Delhi, India.
11. <http://devdata.worldbank.org/gmis/mdg/list_of_goals.htm>.
12. Ibid.
13. <http://www.unsiap.or.jp/participants_work/cos03_homepages/group4/boon-india-present.htm>.
14. <www:\MDG reports\Global Monitoring Report 2008 - Goal 1 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger.htm>.
15. <http://images.google.com.pk/imgres?imgurl=http://feedingavillage.org/images/The_Real_India.jpg&imgrefurl=http://feedingavillage.org/realIndia.php&h=326&w=420&sz=67&hl=en&start=1&um=1&usg=__fhBTj_1LmSZ0fgvzg4T53Ols5O8=&tbnid=OB7Z-wyW1qk62M:&tbnh= 97&tbnw=125&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dnational%2Bpoverty% 2Bsurvey%2Bindia%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN>.
16. <E:\MDG reports\Global Monitoring Report 2008 - Goal 1 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger.htm>.
17. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_ID= 1336&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED
18. <http://www.worldproutassembly.org/images/poverty_india11.jpg&imgrefurl=http://escapefromindia.wordpress.com/2008/02/11/india-need-300-years-to-lift-all-its-people-out-of-extreme-levels-of-poverty/&h=587&w= 580&sz=53&hl=en&start=6&um=1&usg=__ oTIANX1Ap8Q3NAYObOjG9pAqU14=&tbnid=TPGvEA77rVJBSM:&tbnh=135&tbnw=133&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dnational%2Bpoverty%2Bsurvey%2Bindia%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN>.
19. <http://www.devinit.org/india.html>.
20. <www.thp.org/reports/family/2005/oct/index.html>.
21. <http://www.unsiap.or.jp/participants_work/cos03_homepages/group4/boon-india-present.htm>.
22. <http://www.devinit.org/india.html>.
23. <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/remi/2006/00000043/00000002/art00006>.
24. <mospi.nic.in/mospi_social_pr.htm>.
25. <http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21493265~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295584,00.html>.
26. Ibid.
27. <www.worldbank.org.in>.
28. <http://www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/bajpai_india_mdg_001.pdf>.
29. <http://go.worldbank.org/OM4RKQRT80>.
30. <http://viveknahata.sulekha.com/blog/post/2007/07/women-empowerment-in-india-a-reality-check.htm>.
31. <www.goarticles.com/cgi-bin/showa.cgi?C=1577722>.
32. <http://wcd.nic.in/empwomen.htm>.
33. <http://www.waccglobal.org/index.php/wacc/publications/media_development/2006_3/gender_and_the_millennium_development_goals>.
34. <http://www.mdgender.net/upload/monographs/UNDP_MDGR_genderlens.pdf>.
35. <http://www.waccglobal.org/index.php/wacc/publications/media_development/2006_3/gender_and_the_millennium_development_goals>.
36. <http://viveknahata.sulekha.com/blog/post/2007/07/women-empowerment-in-india-a-reality-check.htm>.
37. <http://www.inwent.org/v-ez/lis/indien/indien_entwicklung_mdgs.pdf>.
38. <http://www.isvarmurti.com/2007/08/21/women-empowerment/>.
39. <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-12/2007-12-10-voa58. cfm?CFID=35889917&CFTOKEN=76645396>.
40. <http://whqlibdoc.who.int/bulletin/2000/Number%2010/78(10)1192-1199.pdf>.
42. <InfoChange India News & Features development news India - MDG 2015.htm>.
43. <http://www.who.in/bulletin/volumes/86/4/07-048454/en/ index.html#R2>.
44. Ibid.
45. <http://www.who.in/bulletin/volumes/86/4/07-048454/en/index.html#R6>.
46. <http://www.who.in/bulletin/volumes/86/4/07-048454/en/index.html#R7>.
47. D. Mavalankar, P Raman, M Shankar. Top management capacity: Key constraints in Safe Motherhood Program in India, Ahmedabad: Indian Institute of Management, 2006.
48. See ref 43.
49. Maternal Health, National Family Health Survey, NFHS-3, India: International Institute for Population Sciences, 2006. Chapter 8.
50. Report of the Secretary-General, A/56/326, Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, 6 September 2001.
51. Ibid.
52. ‘We have nicknamed MDGs “the minimum development goals”’, Paromita Shastri,. available at <http://www.livemint.com/2007/10/ 31005029/8216We-have-nicknamed-MDGs.html>.
53. <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/bp_april07_aid_allocation.pdf>.
54. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/sgreport2001.pdf?OpenElement>.
55. <http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/03/stories/2007120354991200.htm>
56. <http://www.unicef.org/india/overview_3696.htm>.
57. <http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi= 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020318>.
<http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/7062-MDG_Brochures_for_the_ Public_-_Country_Examples_-_Lao_PDR.pdf>.
Regional Studies, Vol. XXVII, No.4, Autumn 2009, pp.50-81
Tariq Asghar is an Assistant Research Officer at the Institute of Regional Studies.
BANGLADESH’S POLITICAL TURMOIL, 2006-08: AN ANALYSIS
The international system broadly comprises the interaction of five types of actors: nation-states; international governmental organizations (IGOs); non-governmental organizations (NGOs); movements such as national liberation movements (NLMs), and multi-national corporations (MNCs). In the process of interaction of nation-states the nature of relationship is either bilateral or multilateral. Bilateral relationship can broadly be divided into three kinds: endurable, non-endurable and non-interfered.(1) The relationship between Pakistan and India since 1947 has largely been of the non- endurable type.
This paper is an attempt to analyse the relationsh