Spot Light on Regional Affairs

Over the past three decades Afghanistan went through the experience of three mutually different political systems: Soviet-style socialism, the Taliban version of Islam, and Western democracy. On 20 August 2009 the country held its second presidential election since the US invasion and the ousting of the Taliban in 2001. The first elections in the post-Taliban Afghanistan were held in 2004, with US and international community’s assistance. As the country is presently in the grip of grave insecurity owing to an upsurge in the Taliban insurgency, the elections had pivotal significance for Afghanistan, the US and the international community. To conduct elections in a war-ravaged country with insurgents in action almost everywhere posed many formidable challenges for everyone. Yet it was accomplished not just because of the huge international presence, but also owing to the hopes and aspirations and willingness of the Afghan people that were supporting the system. These elections were also different from the previous one in many ways. The bottom line is that the hard task of fighting the insurgency and having a continued political process in the country at the same time was handled rather well, the electoral flaws notwithstanding.

Main argument

The 2009 presidential elections in Afghanistan were spoiled by the flawed process and legitimacy crisis in spite of special attention given to every part of the process. There are many reasons, one being a new political system in a country where tribal laws and cultural traditions are so deeply ingrained in the polity and the people that their hold is far too strong than the writ of the central government. Another reason is that prior to the elections it was already known that Hamid Karzai will be returned to power as decided by the US. To have any high expectations from elections in a country that is in the throes of a raging war for so many years with disruptive consequences for the political and socio-economic system is itself irrational.

The electoral outcome failed to reinforce political stability and could not bring political strength to Karzai. Actually, it opened a Pandora’s box exposing former Karzai government’s crooked and fraudulent practices. Also, the role of the US administration cannot be glossed over as they kept on ignoring the urgent need for helping lay the basis for forming the state and build the polity. The role of the international community and the foreign donor agencies that failed in prioritizing assistance and funding and showed lack of commitment created more mistrust in the system. Moreover, both Afghanistan and the US strove hard to exclude the vital regional actors from the whole process which added to the chaos already prevailing in the country because the potential of neighbours’ shared commonalities was not allowed to come into play, without realizing the isolationist impact it would have on Afghanistan itself.

The paper focuses on the 2009 presidential elections and an analysis of the elections held in 2004. It highlights the political and security scenario and what significant interest it holds for both Afghanistan and the outside world, the neighbouring countries in particular. The paper looks into the challenges facing President Karzai in the future and the different and divergent interests of regional players in Afghanistan.

Political developments since 2001

Following the US invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in reaction to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US soil, the Bonn Agreement, which was actually a series of agreements, was signed at the end of 2001, in Bonn, Germany. Negotiations were held between the US and various Afghan groups under the UN auspices in November 2001. The agreement aimed at ending the conflict in Afghanistan by promoting national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country. It aspired to secure for Afghans their right to freely establish their own political future as the country since 1979 lacked proper legal and law and order mechanism.(1) It included establishing institutions like the judiciary, the army and the police force, the constitutional commission, the election commission, banking, the drug enforcement directorate and an independent human rights commission, disarming and demobilization of militias, drafting of a new constitution, fighting terrorism, drugs and organized crime, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and other related subjects. The entire process was supposed to establish a multi-ethnic, fully representative government, elected through free and fair elections by the people of Afghanistan.(2)

Under the agreement it was decided to have a transitional period of two and a half years. Hamid Karzai was appointed as the head of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in December 2001. Karzai organized an Emergency Loya Jirga, grand assembly usually set up to decide political and national matters of importance, in accordance with the agreement in June 2002. The Loya Jirga elected Karzai as the Chairman of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) for a period of two years, i.e., until June 2004. Under the Bonn Accords national elections were to be held before the end of that term. Though, due to deteriorating security situation and incomplete voter registration, the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) of Afghanistan declared to have presidential election on 9 October 2004. The 2004 presidential election marked an end of provisional government and on 3 November 2004 the JEMB declared Hamid Karzai as the elected President of Afghanistan for next five years. The highly centralized presidential form of government as envisaged in the new Constitution stands in sharp contrast to the current political realities in Afghanistan where provinces remain under the firm control of various factional and local commanders.(3)

During the Transitional Authority phase the Afghan Constitution Commission was formed under the Bonn Agreement to draft a new constitution with the consent of Afghans. The Loya jirga during the time used the 1964 constitution as the basis for drafting a new constitution. The 502-member Constitutional Loya Jirga presented the new constitution of Afghanistan on 4 January 2004.(4) The Constitution was formally ratified by President Hamid Karzai at a ceremony in Kabul on 26 January 2004. The 162-article Constitution provides for a presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature, Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) and Wolesi Jirga (Lower House).(5)

During the Bonn process, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was given the pivotal task of helping establish governing structures. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) was tasked with the political oversight of the election process while the UNDP also supported the 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary and provincial council elections along with managing all resource mobilization and donor relations for the 2005 elections. The UN Office for Project Services was the implementing agent for all electoral activities in 2005. Throughout the election time capacity building and technical support was provided to the JEMB, which was temporarily invested with electoral management and administration powers of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) as contemplated under the constitution, up until the inauguration of the National Assembly on 18 December. (under Article 57 of the Electoral Law).(6)

Established under Article 156 of the 2004 Constitution, the IEC consists of five commissioners, a chairperson, and a deputy chairperson. Its decisions are implemented by the IEC Secretariat, which is based in Kabul.(7) The IEC is the successor to the JEMB which conducted the 2004-2005 elections. On the recommendation and in consultation with the IEC and other stakeholders, a comprehensive project document was developed, “Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT),” to support the capacity-building process of the newly established Independent Election Commission in addressing the needs beyond 21 September 2006. A key element of ELECT is an inter-organizational agreement to coordinate electoral support activities. For the 2009-10 elections the ELECT after evolving a political consensus announced holding presidential and provincial council elections in the fall of 2009 and the parliamentary and district council elections in the summer of 2010. On 9 July the IEC announced it would conduct a voter registration exercise from 6 October 2008 to 2 February 2009, assisted by ELECT in appointing a new chief electoral adviser, chief of operations and other staff, and supported IEC down to the provincial and regional levels. The ELECT also organized programmes for mediapersons, security community, observers, agents, members of civil society, and voters providing information, training, and support.(8) An Office of Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) was also formed which is a temporary body established under Article 61 of the 2010 Decree on Electoral Laws and consisting of five commissioners appointed by the president. It is responsible for hearing and adjudicating complaints related to the electoral process, including challenges to the list of candidates and complaints about the conduct of campaigns and polling.(9)

The electoral laws according to the Afghanistan Constitution provide for IEC to conduct ‘free, universal, secret and direct ballot’. Laws for the electoral officials are aimed at helping them perform their duties as assigned to them in “an impartial and unbiased manner” with “decency, truthfulness, and confidentiality.” They are “not to seek or receive instructions from any government or non-government official or authority, except the Director of the Secretariat.”(10) The president is elected for a five-year term and must receive more than 50 per cent of the votes cast nationwide. The Constitution states that if none of the top candidates succeeds in receiving more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round, a run-off must be called within two weeks.(11) In the 2004 presidential elections Hamid Karzai won 56 per cent vote with an official turnout of about 70 per cent,(12) though at the time everyone knew about him being the US choice. His main rival at the time was Younus Qanooni, an ethnic Tajik and a member of Northern Alliance. These elections were conducted under the supervision of the UNAMA. Arrangements were even made for some two million refugees with all the required facilities to vote in both Pakistan and Iran.(13) There was a huge rush and enthusiasm at polling centres from early morning particularly in Kabul.

2009: Karzai’s second term

The second presidential election held on 20 August 2009, saw a blend of fear and determination among the voters. There were pre-election controversies over the date of the polling. Constitutionally, the election date is to be set 60 days before the serving president’s term ends.(14) The date was falling in May but due to security risks and financial reasons IEC put the date back to 20 August. The UN role in these elections was meant to be advisory as well as coordinating international assistance to all aspects of the polls.(15) Compared to the 2004 elections many Afghans had somewhat many options to choose from among a large number of candidates.

The 2009 voter registry update was done in four stages countrywide between October 2008 and February 2009. It was based on climate and security situation of the provinces. It was a change from the 2004 election when the registration process was conducted in two phases — one for the urban and the other for the rural areas — which took nine months. IEC said that 17 million were registered as voters among whom additional 4.5 million voter cards were issued for the newly registered people, including 3.8 per cent women.(16)

Afghan refugees in both Pakistan and Iran were facilitated to participate in the 2004 election and special arrangements were made for them. However, this time around the refugees criticized their government for not providing such facilities. The reason given by the IEC was the lack of international funding to arrange polls in Pakistan and Iran. Another inescapable issue was the ongoing military operation and lack of security in the tribal areas of Pakistan.(17)

Political participation and election process

A significant development during the 2009 election observed among Afghans was the tendency to look beyond ethnic lines over president’s nomination. Field research conducted by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) revealed that particularly among the youth an increasing tendency of crossing traditional tribal lines was evident. A notable openness was evident towards female candidates as well. Afghans were determined to follow democratic inclinations. They insisted on good governance and opposed corruption and all those who were a part of the old fraudulent system.(18)

Major political parties among the many contesting were: the National United Front of Afghanistan (UNF); National Democratic Front (NDF); Payman-e-Kabul, mainly comprising former Leftist and Maoist groups; and the Afghan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat). Prominent among the minor political parties were, Afghanistan’s Islamic Mission Organization, National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan, National Islamic Unity Party, Peace and National Unity Party, National Congress Party of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Peace Movement and the Liberal Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The primary focus of generally all the political parties was on strengthening the democratic system, putting an end to insurgency and lack of security, cutting down foreign interference in Afghanistan, pursuing negotiations with Taliban and seeking bigger role for Pashtuns in the national political system.(19)

There were 44 candidates registering with the IEC. Three of the candidates withdrew their nominations just days before the elections took place and threw their support for two of the top contenders.(20) Each presidential candidate ran with two vice-presidential candidates. Karzai also ran with two candidates, Karim Khalili from the Hazara ethnic group who was a key ally of former army chief of staff General Rashid Dostum, and the second was Muhammad Qasim Fahim, a former Tajik warlord. Fahim had been listed by the human rights group among the “worst perpetrators” of HR violations and was accused of being a former Communist secret police chief, murdering war prisoners during the 1990’s and much worse.(21) Hence, Karzai’s choice for his vice-presidential tickets earned him criticism everywhere.

Individual versus political parties

The top two candidates in the elections were Hamid Karzai and Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Hamid Karzai ran as an independent candidate while Abdullah was fielded by the United National Front.(22) Within a day of vote counting there were claims from both the Karzai and Abdullah camps of obtaining over 50 per cent majority. However, days later Hamid Karzai was reported to have been re-elected in a landslide victory. This led to unending allegations from the opposition camps, in particular from Dr. Abdullah, of vote rigging. Abdullah accused Karzai of “stealing” the elections by committing fraud. Complaints of massive vote rigging were submitted to the Election Commission while Abdullah’s supporters threatened to resort to violence if their candidate lost. A senior Western diplomat said that hundreds of thousands of ballots for Hamid Karzai were from as many as 800 fake polling sites where no one had voted in reality. In Kandahar, home province of Karzai, Western officials reported that only about 25,000 people actually voted as compared to the initial results of more than 350,000 ballots.(23)

As a result of serious allegations pouring in from all over, the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and the IEC announced having convincing fraud evidence and ordered recounting at polling stations accused of fraudulent process. There were accusations of stuffing ballot boxes, printing fake voter cards and tampering with the indelible ink used for marking voters fingers to prevent them casting multiple ballots. International actors also came in to resolve the contended delay in elections.(24)

A number of visits and phone calls from foreign officials began aiming to avert a crisis. They pressed for both Karzai and Abdullah to a power-sharing deal. Sen John Kerry, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met Karzai at least twice and met separately with Abdullah Abdullah, stressing “the necessity of a legitimate outcome.” Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, of France, arrived in Kabul to press both candidates to respect the recount process. Other officials were negotiating through phones, including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Defence Secretary Robert Gates; and the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.(25) However, it was decided to conduct a run-off on 7 November due to proven fraud conducts. In fact the official audit findings of the ECC left Karzai with 49.67 per cent of the vote and Abdullah with 30.59 per cent. These were the certified results of the August elections.(26)

Basically, incumbency gave Karzai an edge in the whole electoral scenario. The Supreme Court of Afghanistan in March 2009 extended Karzai’s term until a new leader got elected, saying that the continuation of the president and his deputies was in the interest of Afghans.(27) His opponents were critical of the decision and regarded it undemocratic and unconstitutional as it put Karzai in a position to exploit the office to his benefit.(28) Besides this, the UN election monitoring report said that there was evidence of government using state resources to support Karzai and it was also reported by the Election Commission that the state-run radio and TV of Afghanistan had reserved 71 per cent of the prime-time news coverage for the sitting president.(29)

The run-off campaign began formally on 24 October and Karzai’s leading rival Abdullah Abdullah began stressing the urgency for the dismissal of three top IEC officials, including Azizullah Ludin, the Karzai-appointed head of the Independent Election Commission. Dr. Abdullah also called for the suspension of three ministers, those interior, education and tribal affairs, who he said exploited their positions to swing the election in Karzai’s favour. He accused them of fraudulent involvement in the first round of elections.(30) With a start marked by unending confusion and anxiety Abdullah Abdullah announced his withdrawal from the run-off on 1 November. The reason he gave was that his demands against the Election Commission were not met and that made transparent elections impossible.(31) Abdullah’s withdrawal cleared the way for Karzai and on 2 November IEC officials announced cancellation of the run-off and Hamid Karzai became president for a second time.(32)

Karzai’s victory

The presidential elections in Afghanistan came with a new mood domestically and internationally. The narrative of the elections reveals that they were not up to expectations. However, at present it is crucial to understand whether the electoral developments would bring progress or stagnation. No doubt the new government is confronted with numerous challenges and an unforgettable credibility crisis, but that should be expected in developing countries struggling along with fragile fledgling democracy. Afghanistan is no different. It is important to understand the past and present circumstances in which the country took such a bold step, a country where the transfer of power was usually done through guns. Moreover, what is most remarkable is the fact that the country manages to hold elections so as to continue the democratic process while a violent war is going on on its soil.

The positive approach in this crisis were the steps taken by the existing institutions such as the Electoral Complaints Commission and Afghan civil society organizations in not just pointing out but actually carrying out actions against electoral fraud. The whole investigative and recounting process culminating in the decision to hold a run-off was a big step forward in restoring the legitimacy of democratic electoral process. It was also supported as elections are the only mechanism that provides legitimacy to leadership and ideas. Therefore, with excluding officials who committed fraud and with candidates, mainly Karzai, agreeing to have a run-off for bringing credibility in the eyes of Afghans generally was a mature approach which gives an insight into the shifting moods within Afghanistan.

Although the run-off was cancelled leaving Karzai alone facing legitimacy criticism, yet he showed a new hope and willingness to bring a progressive change to his country and suffering people with the help of international players. In his inaugural address at the presidential palace in Kabul, Hamid Karzai spoke in Dari and Pashto to reach out to country’s two largest ethnic groups in front of an audience of about 800 which included government officials, military officers and tribal elders. The most notable among the allied representatives were Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and British Foreign Minister David Miliband.(33)

Future administration

Hamid Karzai's speech was a litmus test of his commitment to reform which appeared to be meeting the US expectations. He is under lot of American pressure and their demands for visible deeds are high. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bluntly said that the US would not provide civilian aid to assist Afghanistan if their ministries were not held accountable for the way funds were being used.(34) Therefore, the US and the NATO allies responded approvingly to the six main priorities Karzai outlined in his speech. These included good governance; security; peace and reconciliation; economic development; regional cooperation; and foreign policy affairs.(35) The president has another five years to prove his credibility and an opportunity to set his record straight and disprove the charge of being a puppet by becoming a leader in deed. These six crucial matters are required to be practically dealt with in a rational way.

The most important of all these matters is good governance which must ensure strict enforcement of law and order. If there is no law and good governance then all the other above-mentioned matters would be in a constant mess. Karzai emphasized creating a transparent and accountable government which would take action against corruption and against all those involved in it. Basically, corruption in Afghanistan has to be checked at all levels, starting from the ministerial and provincial and going down to the district and village levels. In this regard Karzai referred to the narcotics problem and pledged to prosecute those involved in the country’s illicit narcotics industry that generates corruption and sustains the Taliban insurgency. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Afghanistan is ranked second-most corrupt country in the world.(36) Consequently, to check corruption and bad governance at public level Afghanistan’s Attorney General announced setting up a special court to try corrupt government officials who cannot be tried under regular judicial system.(37)

President Karzai announced setting up an anti-corruption unit and a major crime fighting force. The American FBI and Britain’s Serious Organized Crime Agency would be assisting this unit which would comprise investigators from interior ministry and national security directorate. Their task would be to investigate kidnappings, public and administration corruption as well as organized crimes.(38) The steps announced are good though it is crucial to have an effective implementation of these policies. Afghanistan already had an anti-corruption unit for over a year but it could only manage a handful of arrests. One reason is the lack of proper authorization on part of government to prosecute and punish the culprits.

President Karzai realizing the immense US and Western allies pressure for curbing favouritism and corrupt cronies who tainted his government for years, proposed forming a new cabinet of professionals. Coming up with a cabinet nomination list was a difficult task for him as he had to deal with both the international pressure and repaying favours to those who campaigned for him. In order to please the US, key ministers favoured by the US and Western governments are secured with top positions in the government.

Karzai’s list of cabinet nominees presented to the Parliament excluded former ministers of Mines and Hajj who were accused of graft and pocketing donor money. Still, his cabinet list could not get the majority approval from the Parliament. Most of the names were rejected apart from the reputed defence, interior and finance ministers. The rejected ones are believed to be Karzai's political cronies and under the influence of warlords or supposedly unqualified.(39) Karzai defended his choices which he believed was a balanced representation of country’s ethnic communities. He wanted to keep water and power minister Ismail Khan, a warlord from the Herat province criticized for retaining considerable local power; but he too was also rejected. The only woman nomination on Karzai’s team, Minister of Women’s Affairs Husn Bano, was also rejected by the parliament. This shows a welcome sign on the part of Afghanistan’s parliament as they refused to rubber-stamp Karzai’s choice. Their main concern was that the list presented to them had faces that were responsible for inefficient and corrupt government.(40)

Speaking on foreign policy President Karzai specifically appreciated that the US-Afghanistan friendship was not limited to a joint fight against extremists; rather, it was a long-term relationship and mutual interests of both countries were expanding it further. He thanked the US for being the largest contributor to Afghanistan’s security, economic development and good governance.(41) However, at the same time he pointed to the need for gradually reducing the role of international players in Afghanistan. By mentioning this he tried to allay Afghan fears and complaints from different segments against Western control in the country.

Karzai emphasized the need for building a secure and self-sufficient Afghanistan where he planned for both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Police to take lead in the unstable parts of the country for the next three years to provide security and stability. Karzai with international backing wants to implement this plan of securing Afghanistan before his five-year term expires, although with NATO forces to remain there for support if the situation gets wrong.(42) On a closer look these targets are too ambitious and could only be achieved if responsibly striven for. However, it will still be up to the NATO generals to decide whether and when could the main security tasks be handed over to Afghans.

President Karzai’s speech reflected a shift in his approach from being an anti-Taliban to becoming a conditional accommodator with them. He highlighted the peace and reconciliation process which focused on opening negotiations with those Taliban and insurgents who pledge to support the Afghan government and lay down arms. For this purpose he offered to hold a loya jirga (assembly) and invited the disgruntled compatriots not directly involved in international terrorism to return to Afghanistan.(43) Taliban insurgents have so far rejected Karzai’s reconciliation offer and regard it useless unless negotiations focus on their condition — absolute independence of Afghanistan with an Islamic system. They call these western-backed reconciliatory efforts an eyewash.(44)

However, the president remains hopeful and has called for Saudi assistance as well in restoring peace and persuading Taliban militants for joining Afghan political system.(45) Karzai managed to get the support of international community on the matter which previously was not backed by the US and its western allies. At the London conference held on 28 January 2010 the international community pledged to provide $500 million for a pay-for-peace proposal so that Taliban combatants could be assimilated into civilian fold once they renounced violence.(46)

President Karzai made a sensible shift on understanding the importance of regional cooperation. Instead of continuing with past policy blunders he showed interest in relying on regional actors for promoting peace in Afghanistan. Significant regional initiatives were taken at the trilateral summit hosted by Turkey and attended by Afghan and Pakistani leaders for strengthening cooperation in areas of economy, security, terrorism, etc.(47) Another important meeting at foreign ministerial level was held between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main theme of the discussion was the key role of immediate regional players in providing security umbrella for Afghanistan and trilateral cooperation in all sectors for future stability.(48)

To bring economic development Karzai proposed creating a legitimate national economy in accordance with the realities of the Afghan society that is achievable only within the framework of a market economy. He supported the National Solidarity Programme and other similar programmes along with facilitating young Afghans with vocational training based on the reconstruction needs in Afghanistan.(49) The ideas are good but can only be worked out with international support so that once qualified and trained, these young Afghans can take reins of their country’s economy and play central role in carrying out developmental projects. As highlighted by Karzai, international funds were inadequate and should be raised by 40-50 per cent over the next two years along with a transparency mechanism for keeping a check on disbursement of funds.(50) In addition to this, these economic measures are only possible if donor countries are fully committed and build coordination among themselves so that funds are properly spent instead of going back to the donors as observed these past years in Afghanistan. Over the past eight years there has been talk of building of infrastructure and many development projects though the reality is quite different. In this area investment and development projects by oil-producing Muslim countries, if pursued, could yield significant results.

Hence, the post-electoral developments highlight Afghan government’s understanding of the dire situation facing the country and their pledges to fight instability and militancy. Top

Public response: Hopes, concerns and criticism

During the electioneering Afghan people’s expectations were high and putting aside tribal affiliations a new generation was looking forward to participating in the polls. As more information about the actual electoral process came to light the people expressed disgust and anger. First of all, insecurity has crippled the country; yet ignoring insurgents threats and risking their lives they took part in what later turned out to be a flawed election. They felt betrayed. For Afghans to expect a meaningful vote in the future has become questionable. Hamid Karzai had been criticized earlier also. People were frustrated over his corrupt governance and lack of effective development. He was blamed for leading the country into greater chaos and failing to check the re-emergence of Taliban. Therefore, some significant challenges for Karzai and his new government which seriously concern the Afghans cannot be ignored.

A legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of citizens that understands the needs of its people is a key factor for ensuring stability in Afghanistan. Good governance is the bottom line as it promises to take care of all the other issues. The legitimacy crisis was not over yet when the choice of cabinet nominees irked the country. Most Afghans have a deep animosity towards the warlords or powerbrokers in their government; they get away with their frequent human rights abuses as well as gain power through their private militias. Therefore, expectations are high from the new government especially after Karzai’s inaugural speech. The ordinary Afghans were hoping for a cabinet that would stand for their rights and needs and bring progressive reforms.

Reputation for corruption ranging from incompetent officials to tardy bureaucratic procedures and from disloyal police to corrupt judiciary mostly defines the Afghan government. This remains a matter of serious public concern. As a result, how the Karzai government would be pursuing the agenda of establishing the writ of the state and accountability all over the country is yet to be seen. Large parts of the country are still ruled by tribal authorities and in many cases by Taliban insurgents. Lately a Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar province of eastern Afghanistan took the initiative in standing against Taliban insurgency only because they were frustrated by their government’s inability to provide support and facilities.(51) Hence checks and balances on governing bodies get debatable if undertaken by the government itself with power-brokers sharing privileges.

Security and the resurgence of Taliban is the most crucial concern of Afghans that poses the biggest danger to the country. As time passes the security problem becomes more complex. The required amount of resources both human and material originally needed was not committed. There had been differences between Karzai and the US over the tactics used to deal with insurgency. This even went against Karzai like some military practices that included raids and house searches by the US soldiers were offensive to Afghan culture and tradition. Afghans saw it as a personal insult and it aroused negative feelings both towards Karzai and foreign actors’ policies. This went into insurgent’s favour and got immensely expensive as well as far more challenging for the international mission. Initially the violence was stemming from the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan but now there are signs of instability in northern Afghanistan also. The hopeful goal of President Karzai and international community of assigning the Afghans the leading role in the security of the country and an exit strategy for the US are too optimistic. Drug addiction and lack of training is not discussed much by the Karzai government. According to an estimate done in late 2009, 15 per cent of the Afghan army and up to 60 per cent of the Afghan police in Helmand province are drug addicts.(52)

To counter Talibanization the announcement of a Reintegration Plan to support and provide an honourable status in society to those renouncing violence is a matter that needs clarity. The amount pledged by the international community, $140 million for the first year, is not enough to support the initiative as well as the number of people renouncing militancy.(53) The unemployment rate in Afghanistan is already too high, poverty rate has been rising as mentioned earlier and Afghans already serving in the country’s army and police are not getting sufficient benefits. What needs to be seen is what kind of jobs will be created for those among the population who renounce insurgency keeping in mind the low literacy rate and lack of skills among Afghans.

President Karzai promised building Afghanistan’s private sector for economic development but again how would this be pursued is still not clear. Afghanistan has become 27th country to reach completion point of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.(54) In fact most of the foreign goes waste owing to government functionaries corruption or high salaries and consultancy expenditures on foreign experts. Consequently, in the end only a handful amount is left to initiate developmental process, resulting in unfinished work. Most Afghans believe that foreign development aid is actually meant for the personal benefit of foreigners.(55)

Afghanistan being an agricultural country is one of the most poverty-stricken nations in the world. Afghans are highly concerned over the basic needs of life. According to a national survey done by ABC News in 2009 the availability of food is with time worsening and 63 per cent of the people cannot afford to buy all or even some of it.(56) The availability of seeds, fertilizer and farm equipment are a major concern of rural population. Another setback for Afghan economy and agriculture is the rise in opium production. The southern province of Helmand has become a hub of opium trade and a source of strong financial support to Taliban. The government was unable to control opium production despite the deadly consequences. Fuel prices are unaffordable and 68 per cent of the Afghans cannot buy fuel for cooking or heating especially in winters.(57) Lack of electricity supply and clean water are other complaints along with high prices and lack of economic opportunities. Though there had been some progress in some areas like education, health, roads, etc, and in eradicating opium cultivation, only practical implementation of policies can get positive results. First and foremost, the highest officials need to have their own accountability; in 2008, for instance, Karzai himself pardoned five leading drug traffickers who were his acquaintances.(58) The inefficiency and ill-practices raise public concern and create doubts about the government.

Hence, in order to address the concerns and fears of the people, the elected government of Hamid Karzai has to go beyond mere verbal pledges. The international community as well has to seriously commit itself over the basic needs of Afghans because civilian assistance is as important as military aid. Even after delivering so much of assistance and resources in Afghanistan the basic Afghan concerns and challenges remain unchanged. That means serious reforms in delivering aid and assistance are required on the part of international donors. Short-term international commitments and the hasty US exit strategy will create further chaos and threaten the integrity of the Afghan state and society.

Significance of polls for Afghanistan &
world community: Security

The US, its allies and the government of Hamid Karzai are facing difficulty in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The presidential election mattered much to both Afghanistan and the international community. The protracted war has created disillusionment among the people on both sides — the Afghans as well as the general public in the countries involved. The governments of the allied states have lately come under immense pressure from their people for little progress and more casualties. The Dutch government lately came under so much public pressure that it was left with no choice but to resign.(59) The West is experiencing direct implications of the prolonged war in terms of numerous casualties and overburdened economy. Civilian casualties in NATO/ISAF airstrikes are major complaints from the Afghan side. They blame the foreign forces for their poor targeting whereas the Afghan government is blamed for its inability to provide protection to its people.

So to get support of the people both at home and abroad in favour of the new Obama strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan a legitimate and credible election was necessary. Most important was to have a credible Afghan partner having support of the majority of Afghans to shore up the NATO mission and the new US strategy in Afghanistan. The international community wants to win an edge over the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents. Previously there was an uncomfortable relationship between the US and Karzai government with both criticising each other. The rift emerged when the Afghan government raised objections over US air strikes causing numerous casualties in the country. The US tried vainly at several levels to find a replacement for Karzai but finally has resigned to relying on Karzai as a partner in Afghanistan. That is why this time around the US is providing assistance but with strict conditionalities so that checks and balances could be maintained over the aid and money delivered.(60)

The security situation in Afghanistan is worsening day by day. During the election time insecurity and Taliban threats were so alarming that even complete lists of polling centres were announced on the actual polling day. Areas where military and police felt threatened to go polling stations were ordered closed. It was reported that government ordered closing 440 polling stations on the election day.(61) That’s why on the election day the Afghan Election Commission reported that only 6,200 polling stations operated. According to the Interior Minister 12 out of 24 provinces of Afghanistan remained at high risk which meant there was either limited or no government presence at all which created doubts for over one-third of the country about participation in the elections.(62) An additional 30,000 foreign troops were deployed, the government hired 10,000 tribesmen for security measures in almost two-third of country’s provinces and 60,000 ISAF troops were ordered to help Afghan forces maintain security on election day.(63)

Despite such arrangements the government reported that 73 incidents of violence took place in 15 provinces and at least 26 people were killed.(64) The actual number of attacks that could not be reported because of the ban imposed on the media may be higher. However, ISAF reported 400 militant attacks on the election day making it the most violent day since 2001 while in Kandahar two men were said to be hanged by the insurgents for participating in elections. The capital itself witnessed five bomb blasts.(65) Hence, both sides gained some of their goals: the NATO and Afghan government managed to hold elections defying Taliban’s disruption threats, while the Taliban though failing in disrupting the election yet succeeded in intimidating voters, especially female voters, in many parts of the country. This resulted in low voter turnout particularly in the south. Still, to change the momentum of war the significance of holding elections and continuing with the democratic process in a war-stricken country have immense implications for future efforts. The success of future NATO/US mission in Afghanistan chiefly depends on an effective Afghan partner so that they can all have a safe exit from the present situation. However, the fact is that Afghanistan needs assistance for building up staying power. One important encouraging factor is that even though Afghans are not enthusiastic about their current political elites/rulers, a vast majority rejects Taliban’s return to power.

Policy implications of the polls: Afghanistan & the region

The presidential election of 2009 is not only significant for Afghanistan and the Western actors equally but also for the regional or neighbouring countries. Any political and security shift in Afghanistan impinges on its neighbour’s policies. Moreover, to stop Afghanistan from further fragmentation of the state and society it is important to realize the significance of the role and strength of the regional neighbours. Keeping in mind the possibility of a hasty exit strategy of the US and its allies from Afghanistan, it is essential to ensure stronger links and bonds between Afghanistan and its key neighbours. With the recent pressure on foreign interests and troops in the wake of Taliban resurgence the need for regional cooperation and neighbours’ presence has brought them in a limelight which cannot be ignored. The neighbouring countries are coming together for cooperating with Afghanistan and helping it sort out its troubles as they get directly affected by the situation. Afghanistan has to base its policies on future prospects and projections so when the allies leave it once again, it is not left at the mercy of a myriad of splinter groups. With the shift in the contemporary international scenario and domestic pressure for a viable solution, Karzai will have to play the regional cards with a cautious and sagacious approach. A vigilant policy is inevitable because of the pressures on Karzai from all sides. Moreover, to stop Afghanistan from becoming a battleground for Pakistan-India, Iran-US hostilities, and US-Russia tussle and not forgetting the irritant segments creating problems inside the country, it is all the more essential that Kabul proceed with sagacity.

Pakistan

In the words of former Pentagon analyst Anthony Cordesman, “A valid Afghan strategy cannot be separated from what happens in Pakistan… At the same time, it is clear that Afghanistan’s future will play a critical role in defining Pakistan’s security.”(66) So whatever happens in Afghanistan has direct implications for Pakistan that is why Pakistan has always wanted a friendly regime in neighbouring Afghanistan. The flawed policies of the past US administrations have left behind a volcanic mess in Afghanistan which had trickled down into Pakistani territory. Pakistan, its people and national interests are all at stake, threatened by insecurity just like Afghanistan. To counter insurgency and ensure security Pakistan has been actively assisting the US and its Western allies in the war against terrorism. Keeping in mind Pakistan’s past connections with the Taliban and its current fight for the single cause of defeating insurgents, the outcome of the presidential election in Afghanistan and the proposed US exit plan, all these facts require that policy-makers in Islamabad focus on the aftermath of the present situation.

Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan would not be changed by new developments there. Pakistani government and army recently conveyed to the US their position on Afghanistan. Pakistan needs a peaceful, friendly and stable Afghanistan in terms of ensuring long-term security on its western border. Pakistan wants to see Afghanistan’s institutions of both army and police established in a manner that they do not threaten its strategic interests. In addition to this, it basically does not want any kind of antagonistic situation emerging there and that includes hostile Indian activities against Pakistan as well. Pakistan also rejects a hegemonic Indian role in the future Afghan and regional affairs.(67) As a non-NATO ally Pakistan has been making far greater contributions in fighting terrorism than realized by the international community. Tens of thousands of Pakistani troops are fighting well-trained and well-equipped Taliban and al-Qaeda guerrillas who launch attacks across the Afghan border on NATO-led international forces from Pakistan’s rugged north-western tribal region. It has suffered heavy civilian and military casualties on its soil in addition to the severe blows to its economy. Pakistan has lately launched offensive operations in its own tribal areas along the Afghan frontier against insurgents so that peace is restored on both sides of the border. It is in this context that German Chancellor Angela Merkel considers Pakistan a part of the solution not of the problem. She means that without improved regional cooperation, in particular between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there would be no peace in Afghanistan.(68) However, policies during his first presidential term of treating Pakistan coldly and blindly supporting the negative designs of India in creating trouble in Pakistan’s neglected regions led to distancing of Islamabad from Kabul. Consequently, in dealing with Karzai for future peace and pursuing operations against insurgents Pakistan does not want any irritant factors spoiling the possibilities of future cooperation. Though India’s developmental work in Afghanistan is not objectionable to Pakistan, its seriously harmful designs for destabilizing Pakistan are. The more hostility grows between Pakistan and India, the tenser regional environment emerges and Afghanistan becomes a theatre of proxy war.

Pakistan has so far been supportive of Karzai’s policies introduced in the interest of stabilizing Afghanistan. The regional cooperation proposed by Afghanistan has been openly received by Pakistan as is evident from the ongoing bilateral, trilateral and international meetings. During these meetings Pakistan has been playing a prominent role and the trilateral summit held in Islamabad included only the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan and was to specify publicly that only their cooperation was key to peace and resolving the Afghan and regional problems.(69) It is understandable as Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan generally share similar problems. Not just problems, the former two are capable of providing Afghans the logistical support as they share long borders with the land-locked country; also, there are ethnic, cultural, religious and trade ties that link them. Pakistan had been providing refuge to three million Afghans since the Soviet invasion. The relatively distant neighbour, India is not considered a part of the solution while the three states agreed on including Afghanistan’s other immediate neighbours — Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan — in the regional efforts for peace and stability in the war-ravaged country.(70) This development is a clear message for the West and India to check their meddling in the region. Though Pakistan also needs to be cautious over Russia’s increasing ties with different elements in Afghanistan and historical connections between India and Russia and together with Afghanistan.

Another significant development following the US exit plan and Karzai’s prompt approach towards reconciliation with the Taliban raises thoughts of mending fences with the Taliban. The proposition poses risks for Pakistan’s security, though. Militants are known for their unforgiving attitude so there are dangers of hardliners entering Pakistan once the moderates join the Afghan government. This will have major impacts on the counter-militancy efforts made by Pakistan in its territory. A careful approach is required to be worked out by Pakistan also because both Pakistan and the non-Pashtun communities in Afghanistan need to get closer and have a better mutual understanding. Nevertheless, bringing militants to the discussion table is also an important security measures. Therefore, Pakistan has been calling for a political way out of the mess and supports the proposal of talks with “good Taliban.” Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi pointed out to the BBC that militant groups in Afghanistan represented a large number of Pashtuns who formed Afghanistan’s largest ethnic community that should not be ignored. He suggested that a line should be drawn between moderates and hardliners and then due share in power be given to the moderates to help stabilize the situation.(71) This swing in situation places Islamabad once again in a better position with a role in helping Afghanistan get out of its troubles and gives Pakistan a say in the international community.

India

The fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 paved the way for other countries to develop relations with Afghanistan. India also came in to secure its strategic interests as Afghanistan having a significant geo-strategic location provides an access to the vast energy resources and attractive markets of the Central Asian region and beyond. While the Western powers sidelined Pakistan hindering its role in reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, some distant neighbours like India were provided with such projects. India promptly and fully used the opportunity to further its regional and strategic interests and became one of the biggest contributors in developing the socio-economic sector of Afghanistan. Indian public and private sectors have been actively pursuing reconstruction projects and India has earned the goodwill of the Afghans in general. Indians made maximum use of their connections with President Karzai and expanded their influence in Afghanistan through numerous projects and a number of consulates for pursuing covert activities. Consequently, President Karzai along with India started blaming Pakistan for all the insurgent activities and insecurity in Afghanistan.

This time around Karzai’s re-election has presented certain complications for India. The major issue for Indians throughout their presence in Afghanistan remains insecurity. Their reconstruction work has often been hindered by Taliban insurgents. President Karzai’s offer of peace dialogue with the insurgents and the move to reach out to the fighters is not a welcome development for India, which initially claimed that they would only deal with the legitimate government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.(72) India had never accepted Taliban’s rule and rejects the concept of “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban” as for it all Taliban are insurgents targeting Indians and their interests in the country. Therefore, talks with Taliban create some serious implications for India. One significant implication of Karzai’s proposal for peace talks with the Taliban — whether it succeeds or not is another matter — is that it brings Pakistan once again in an important role. India had been pursuing covert operations against Pakistan behind its development projects in Afghanistan and through its consulates established along Pak-Afghan border. Even Karzai and the US were roped in to join Indian efforts to minimize the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan and to isolate it. Both Kabul and Washington chose to turn a blind eye to the trouble being stoked up by India in the Balochistan and FATA regions of Pakistan. The Indian conduct aimed at destabilizing Pakistan is openly discussed in foreign reports which also point out the growing Indian influence in the affairs of Afghanistan and its potential for exacerbating regional tensions. Christine Fair, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, spoke in a fortnight manner at a New York roundtable in March 2009:

I think it would be a mistake to completely disregard Pakistan’s regional perceptions due to doubts about Indian competence in executing covert operations. That misses the point entirely. And I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan’s apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India. Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan. Kabul has encouraged India to engage in provocative activities such as using the Border Roads Organization to build sensitive parts of the Ring Road and use the Indo-Tibetan police force for security. It is also building schools on a sensitive part of the border in Kunar — across from Bajaur. Kabul’s motivations for encouraging these activities are as obvious as India’s interest in engaging in them…(73)

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the American officer commanding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), had also asked the US to scale down irrelevant Indian activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan which are actually hindering US and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.(74) The international community wants an end to instability in Afghanistan and has also showed willingness to have peace negotiations with the “good Taliban.” At the London conference, as stated above, they announced a $500 million fund for a reconciliation programme.(75) President Karzai has been pushing ahead with the initiative and on his request the United Nations recently dropped the names of five Taliban from its blacklist to facilitate reconciliation.(76) Therefore, India to have a global position and a role in Afghanistan needs to adjust to the new developments in Afghanistan as well as in the international community.

In the post-election Afghanistan India is concerned about the peace process which includes mediation by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Recognizing the importance of the role Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour Pakistan can play in ensuring stability in his country, President Karzai has showed willingness towards Pakistan’s assistance in the reconciliation process. Pakistan playing a role in this process is alarming for India which tends to view it as a zero-sum game. The new development observed in the closeness of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours — Pakistan, Iran and Turkey — will also help strengthen regional ties.(77) At two significant summits India was not invited for assisting in resolving the Afghan crisis, one the trilateral summit held in Islamabad for discussing future roles of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours, and two, the security conference on Afghanistan hosted by Turkey. This was sceptically viewed by India as it was left with no choice but to rethink its policies along with the shifting roles.(78)

India was averse to seeing Taliban sharing power in the country and it also lacked stronger ties with other Pashtun figures outside the Kabul government circle. However, the new developments have made Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna accept the reality and say: “We’re willing to give it a try. If the Taliban meet the three conditions put forward — acceptance of the Afghan Constitution, severing ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and renunciation of violence — and they are accepted in the mainstream of Afghan politics and society, we could do business.”(79)

The onus presently lies on Indian diplomatic skills in addressing the challenging scenario.

Iran

The new developments in Afghanistan have also brought Iran in the focus. But Afghanistan needs to adopt a careful approach towards Iran because the Karzai government has to balance Iranian influence in Afghanistan with the growing US pressure on his government. For Afghanistan’s national interest strong relations with Iran are indispensable. Still, some segments of Afghans have a negative perception of growing Iranian role in parts of the country.

Iran has been contributing a lot in the economic sphere of Afghanistan and its export market is huge. Iranian firms continue to assist actively in reconstruction and infrastructure building with several hundred million dollars investment to date. Iran’s non-oil exports to Afghanistan in 2008 were over half a billion dollars while Iranian aid totals more than US$280 million so far. It includes $220 million for road construction projects and $60 million for education, telecommunications, electricity, border security, higher education, health and sports. Trade volume between Iran and Afghanistan is more than $1.3 billion.(80) Iran is also spending 100 million dollars on building a university in Kabul. Iran’s presence in Afghanistan is more visible in the Herat province which owes its development to Iranian funding. Iran has also expanded its commercial links into the northern provinces of Afghanistan and has often expressed its commitment to linking regional economies and providing aid in other sectors. However, some sections of Afghans take a negative view of Iran’s role in the field of religious education. Also, the open support organized by Iranian organizations in Afghanistan for the causes of Palestine and Iraq might be problematic for Kabul.(81)

Iran highlights its chief interests in Afghanistan which include, drug flow from Afghanistan to Iran; shared historical, cultural and linguistic linkages; security for Iranian investment in Afghanistan; border security; and withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.(82) At the political level both countries have maintained close ties and there have been exchanges of visits. The regional influence of Iran in Afghanistan is seen in the criticism over foreign troops and the US presence in Afghanistan. President Ahmadinejad of Iran says that extremism “in Afghanistan is a result of foreigners’ presence that are here for colonialist purpose and since these forces don’t belong to this region so Afghanistan’s problems better be left for regional solutions.”(83)

The Iranian interests once worked on properly are beneficial for Afghanistan as they converge with that of Afghanistan. Iran wants to work together in economic and socio-cultural sectors that includes development in all the civilian areas which are to the benefit of Afghanistan and highly helpful for national and regional growth. However, with active contribution to development in different sector Iran does use its influence against the West. It becomes noteworthy when it comes to the issue of foreign presence. The Afghan government needs to find a middle way to pursue its interests while balancing US-Iran hostility on its soil and US attitude towards Karzai himself. On the one hand Afghanistan needs continued support of both countries and their assistance, particularly that of the US, the main strategic partner, to sustain the country along with Iranian support and investment for Afghans, while on the other, the past uncomfortable relations with the US and the expression of a tougher stance towards Karzai by the new Obama administration has given Karzai an alternative of regional opening so that Afghanistan’s problems are sorted out through other ways as well instead of total reliance on US plans. Iran has welcomed Karzai’s decision and has keenly provided its support as an outlet to Afghanistan. This has been viewed suspiciously by the US and recently in a visit to Afghanistan US Defence Secretary Robert Gates accused Iran of playing a double game which led to similar counteraccusations from Iran.(84) Therefore, US-Iran animosity has a negative impact for the country.

With Karzai’s re-election both Kabul and Tehran have lately become too eager to close past gaps with the region. Iran has been actively hosting and participating in several summits organized for getting together the three crucial regional states of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran itself. These are aimed at boosting political and economic ties at bilateral, trilateral and international levels. Many significant issues have been discussed between high officials of the three states which include ways to curb extremism and terrorism, military interventions, regional security and reconstruction of Afghanistan etc.(85) Though Iran is supportive of Karzai’s new policies for combating extremism, yet it opposes the process of reintegration of the insurgents introduced by the US and actively pursued by Karzai. Iran had never recognized the legitimacy of Taliban rule and is not enthusiastic about working with them. As for the contentious matter of Iranian influence in Afghanistan there is the issue of insurgent activities that needs to be checked by the Afghan government. It is believed in Afghanistan that Iran also continues to support insurgent activities in Afghanistan through supplying arms to Afghan insurgents. Recently the commander of Afghanistan’s 205 Army Corps, General Zazai, reported recovering Iranian-made weapons during the operation in the Marjah district of Helmand.(86) A Kabul newspaper also reported that militant groups active in western Afghanistan maintained training camps in Iran’s Khorasan and Kerman provinces. Concerns over insurgents coming from Iran were raised when Afghan security officials arrested an Iranian suicide bomber in the Helmand province.(87) Actually, Iran might be backing insurgent activities to undermine the US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. Perhaps due to socio-economic reasons the Afghan government refrained from raising such issues in the past but circumstances have changed and Karzai needs to reform past policies so that such kind of activities could be restrained.

Another issue between the two neighbours that puts pressure on the Afghan government is the refugee crisis. Afghans are one of the world’s largest refugee groups since the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the US war against the Taliban regime since 2001. Initially, Iran welcomed these migrants but soon afterward started the repatriation process. Iran hosts about 900,000 legalized Afghan refugees while an unknown number of illegal refugees also resides in Iran. Since 2002, however, both legal and illegal Afghan refugees are subject to repatriation. The Iranian government has reportedly deported at least one million refugees over the past years and continues to repatriate at the rate of about 500 per day. Iran has also imposed restrictions on legal Afghan refugees as well and the matter remains a point of friction between the two countries.(88) The United Nations Children’s Fund reported that Iran deported over 1,000 extremely impoverished child refugees to Herat in 2008. In spite of a signed agreement between Kabul and Tehran that Tehran would not expel Afghan refugees until March 2009, it did.(89) Afghanistan being a poor country with unemployment levels alarmingly high, seeks employment and better societal opportunities for its refugees in Iran. Iran’s policy of deporting refugees creates further domestic burden on Afghanistan. That needs to be settled amicably and reasonably through bilateral negotiations.

On the issues of drug smuggling and border security both governments can work out solutions mutually. Iran serves as transhipment point for drugs trafficking through Asia and Europe. That’s why Iran has been partly sealing its eastern border with Afghanistan to address the refugee and drug problems. Iranian government is interested in curbing narcotics trade and is actively working along with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran reportedly seized 1,000 tons of illicit narcotics going through its territory in 2008.(90) Afghanistan can learn and work with Iran in curbing its opium production and illegal trade flow. Hence, Karzai needs to be sagacious and careful in dealing with Iran as a regional partner and make sure that Afghanistan does not become a battlefield for the conflicting interests of its allies. So far, Iran is eager to address the common problems between the two neighbours. This will be helpful also in breaking the regional isolation inflicted on Iran by the West. Most important is to give practical shape to the commitments made by each other at different platforms and occasions so that it not only serves Afghanistan’s national agendas but brings regional progress as well. Afghanistan’s stability ensures that regional stability needs are realized.

China

Throughout the 20^th century China showed little interest in Afghanistan with a narrowly defined policy. That contrasts with the growing relations that are seen lately. With an increase in the Afghan openness towards exploration of its natural resources and foreign investments China also seeks to fulfil its potential demands. China has noteworthy economic interests in Afghanistan similar to Afghanistan’s interests in Chinese investments — one way of looking for prospective partners away from the West within the region. The reasons behind China-Afghanistan bilateral relations are their converging interests. China has a fast growing economy and requires natural resources like fuel, copper, oil and gas, and Afghanistan wants these natural resources to be utilized for a structured economy. In 2008 China’s Jiangxi Copper Company and China Metallurgical Group Corporation made a joint investment of $3.5 billion and earned full mining rights for developing Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field. This copper field is estimated to be the world’s largest undeveloped field, untouched since the Soviet invasion in 1979. The contract is China’s triumph and has been so far the highest investment made in Afghanistan’s history. Along with mining it also involves the construction of a $500 million power plant and a railway link from Tajikistan to Pakistan. To Afghanistan’s benefit the contract brings 10,000 employments for Afghans, while $400 million of royalties will be given annually to the Afghan government.(91)

China’s commercial interests led its companies ZTE and Huawei, partnered with the Afghan Ministry of Communications, into a digital telephone project. China also took part in the Parwan irrigation project for restoring water supply in Parwan province and the reconstruction of the public hospitals in Kabul and Kandahar. Furthermore, the European Union hired Chinese firms for numerous construction projects in Afghanistan including road restoration work.(92)

China’s policy on Afghanistan generally remained focused on financial assistance for the UN mission, protection of Chinese investments and personnel in the region along with maintaining strong ties with Pakistan. Beijing provided Kabul approximately $130 million aid and assistance for reconstruction and has promised $75 million more.(93) However, this is going to increase as recently President Karzai visited China to re-establish their relations and both countries pledged to cooperate in promoting regional security for peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan through combating terrorism and extremism and cross-border crimes. They signed a series of trade and economic agreements and ensured deeper political ties in future. China encouraged Afghanistan to play a greater role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well which would bring the key regional states closer to each other leading to stability of Afghanistan and the region as a whole.(94) More Chinese engagements are expected in the future as Afghanistan has vast resources of oil and gas in its northern parts. The US Geological Survey estimated Afghan oil reserves at a mean of 1.596 million barrels and natural gas reserves standing at a mean of 15.687 trillion cubic feet.(95) Tapped effectively, it will benefit both Afghanistan and China.

Another crucial interest shared by the two states is combating terrorism, extremism and separatism. For China, these three threats are located in its Xinjiang province which shares a 76-km long border with Afghanistan. There are cross-border activities involving training and supporting separatist and terrorist activities by al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. Moreover, there is also drug trafficking going on from Afghanistan into Chinese territory. Therefore securing the border and stabilizing Afghanistan is the highest priority as it is pivotal to all the other interests and development efforts in Afghanistan.

With a stable Afghanistan regional and strategic interests can be promoted as well. China also being an Asian power wants to expand its influence and the geo-strategic layout offers huge potentials for China. China has been constructing railway links from the Aynak copper mines to the Gwadar Port and another from Gwadar to China’s western lines in the Xinjiang province.(96) These strategic linkages connect regional interests and for this regional stability and security is a chief requirement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At present due to limited involvement of China there are debates within China regarding its future policies. A section of Chinese analysts argues that China must realize that its growing power brings more responsibilities and it should have greater role in the entire Middle Eastern and South Asian regions for stabilizing its neighbours with the use of both hard and soft power. For them, it is extremely important that China should send its troops to Afghanistan for protecting Chinese economic interests, its global image and strategic frontiers. They want China to own its responsibilities in Afghanistan as security for the Aynak copper mines is provided by the American and Afghan forces. This section wants to secure Chinese position in Afghanistan once the US withdraws and counter US and western expansion in the region.(97)

Another group of observers seeks a middle path where they argue that China should consider sending peacekeeping forces under the UN flag, or police or civilian security forces to Afghanistan for providing protection to those key infrastructure and reconstruction sites where Chinese interests lie, though with the approval of the Kabul government. A third section, which comprises a majority of Chinese observers and analysts, favours the continuation of China’s expansion in its economic development and humanitarian efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan under the aegis of UN or other international or multilateral agencies like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.(98)

Thus, at present Chinese policies towards Afghanistan are of a limited nature but with significant non-combat policies of assistance. In dealing with Afghan insurgents so far China has been carefully pursuing policies of non-interference in the war-ravaged country. China resisted sending troops or providing logistical support facilities to the US/NATO military mission and refrained from fighting terrorists in Afghanistan directly to avoid risking its own Muslim ethnic minorities located mainly in the Xinjian autonomous region.

Russia

In seeking other means of assistance and efforts to engage regional powers in Afghanistan for brighter prospects, President Karzai turned to Russia, too. American criticism of his incompetence also pushed Karzai and other Afghan officials closer to Russia for resuming ties. Karzai repeatedly tried to use the Russian option while dealing with the US/NATO. On the other hand the Russian Federation was one of the first foreign states to welcome both presidential and provincial council election results in 2009. Russia even welcomed the returning of Karzai to power as a stabilizing factor for the political development of Afghanistan.(99) With the approval of the Karzai government Russia is interested in furthering cooperation at all levels of political, economic, and humanitarian areas as well as anti-terror fight.(100) Moscow went to the extent of writing off 93 per cent of Afghanistan’s Soviet-era debts to strengthen relations.(101) The revival of bilateral ties is observed in frequent visits especially from the Afghan side. Moscow welcomed the three-day official visit of former Afghan foreign minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, meeting between Russian and Afghan deputy foreign ministers in Moscow over political issues prior to the London conference, meeting between the speakers of Afghanistan’s Upper House and Russian Lower House soon after Karzai’s victory in the 2009 elections, and the visit by a delegation of Afghanistan’s Lower House of Parliament to St. Petersburg and Moscow.(102) Basically, since 2007 Russia’s intelligence apparatus also reactivated their relations with the Northern Alliance members and warlords, though it might disturb a balanced process of re-establishing the relationship. Moscow re-opened its consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif. All these growing connections indicate the height of interest shown by both governments in rebuilding their ties.(103)

The Russian government has shown its readiness to help rebuild Afghanistan. They are especially involved in reconstructing the 142 facilities built by the Soviet Union in the country with the international community financing the projects.(104) This includes the reconstruction of the strategic 2.7-km long Salang tunnel built by the Soviet Union in 1964 and destroyed in 1998 that links the central part of the country with the north.(105) On humanitarian side, Russia supplied 18,000 tons of good-quality flour since January 2009 while another 23,000 tons of flour along with vehicles were scheduled to be supplied later.(106)

Russia is also eager to resume cooperation in military and military-technical aid. In the wake of Taliban/al-Qaeda resurgence the Karzai government requested that Moscow resume military equipment supplies. Russia’s arms exporter agency Rosoboronexport announced its readiness to cooperate in military technical area.(107) The NATO secretary general during his visit to Moscow to seek aid for the fight in Afghanistan asked for hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, pistols, armoured personnel carriers, field artillery, AN-32 cargo aircraft and helicopters.(108) US Defence Secretary Robert Gates conveyed US expectations of Russia sending troops for stabilizing Afghanistan and assisting the coalition forces. Russia so far has opposed using force for solving the Afghan problem and refused sending its troops there.(109)

Russians are highly concerned over the threats emanating from drug trafficking every year despite the presence of international coalition forces in Afghanistan. For Russia drug trafficking poses the largest national security concern. According to UN estimates, Russia has more than 200,000 heroin and morphine addicts and 30,000 were dying from addiction annually.(110) That is why bilateral agreements have been signed to help check illegal transport and sale of narcotics, psychotropic substances and other drugs. The head of Afghan Counter-Narcotics Ministry, Gen Khodaidad, spoke highly of the operation code-named Kanal carried out by the Russians to put an end to drug trafficking.(111) Afghanistan’s police officers would be given anti-drugs training by Russia. The course, organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), will be attended by a group of 11 Afghan police officers.(112) There is divergence of views between the NATO and Russians over stamping out opium production in Afghanistan. Russian ambassador to the UN clearly expressed concern over NATO plans to give up on destroying poppy fields. NATO argues that it does not want to have a situation where the only source of livelihood for the poor Afghans is taken away from them.(113)

Resurgence in insurgency and fears of international coalition forces facing defeat in Afghanistan compelled NATO to mend fences with Russia. (Their relations were suspended after Russia’s war with Georgia.) Besides, the NATO urgently seeks new supply routes for the alliance troops in Afghanistan as the existing routes through Pakistan are becoming insecure. Russians don’t want to see the re-emergence of Taliban and its spillover effects in the already vulnerable Central Asian region so they allowed NATO access to Russian lines.(114) However, the US presence in Central Asia is resented by Russia as it considers it to be its traditional sphere of influence. The closure of the vital Manas air base for the US by Kyrgyzstan in return for the $2 billion loan promise by Russia to Kyrgyzstan and transit of NATO supplies through Russia instead speak clearly of Russian policies of restricting US role in Central Asia.(115) Russia wants to help the US and Afghanistan as part of the international community but on its own terms as stated by Dmitri Rogozin, Russian envoy to NATO, that they “negotiate from a position of strength” on Afghanistan.(116) Bringing Russia back in Afghanistan to provide training and equipment for the security forces and reconstruction efforts gives leverage to Russia over the US and other Western powers.

Afghanistan expressed its openness to be a part of regional organizations to gain maximum assistance possible from the platforms of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia has also welcomed the engagement of SCO for providing stability and rebuilding of Afghanistan. In March 2009, the SCO held a special conference on Afghanistan in Moscow which was attended by China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, NATO representatives, Group of Eight-member nations, European Union and the United Nations. The conference aimed at establishing the SCO as an important stakeholder or investor in the security and stability of Afghanistan.(117) Russia has been promoting CSTO-SCO cooperation as well which other than providing Afghanistan assistance also points to Russian interest in limiting the growing Chinese influence in Central Asia. All this Russian involvement balances the US influence though for Afghanistan a cautious approach is also needed in encouraging Russian influence once again in the country.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is in the grip of numerous troubles with an unending fundamental security problem causing deterioration of the state and society. Reconstruction and development tasks in Afghanistan have become so questionable that under any circumstances it raises scepticism about the future of the country and its effects on the region. The incompetence and reckless approach of the previous US administration in Afghanistan has created an utterly uncontrollable mess for not only the present Obama administration but for the regional states as well. In the nine years since 2001 the seeds of chaos and disorder have been sown so deep and wide in Afghanistan by the past corrupt government of President Karzai and his cronies that no matter how many constructive measures and heavily armed forces are installed the results are dissatisfactory for everyone. Both the Afghan government and its international partners failed in delivering a stable mechanism to Afghans who are today more unprotected and poorer than before. The country is still under the control of private militias, warlords and drug mafias who go around unchallenged and unchecked as many of them were accommodated by the government officials. Lack of food supplies, particularly in the South, the growing number of displaced families, insufficient health and education facilities and the rising number of civilian casualties reaching a new high every year are testing Afghans’ patience. To overcome such misery the new policy shift decided by the US and Afghanistan reflects optimism, though only if it is worked out practically with full commitment by all the three parties — the Karzai government, regional players and international partners.

The timing for holding the presidential election in Afghanistan was crucial for the future efforts in the country and that’s why so much attention and resources were devoted for the purpose. Both the Karzai government and the international community bear the responsibility for the outcome of election as many known irresponsible power holders remained associated with the Karzai camp and protected by international patrons. However, despite dissatisfaction expressed by the majority in Afghanistan, the US choice of Karzai as partner was achieved. The flawed elections marred the legitimacy of the electoral process at a crucial moment and exposed the inadequate and corrupt records of the Karzai government. Therefore, while the election process cannot be redone it is still possible for Kabul to repair the reputation and show performance by fully committing itself to the crucial policy agenda introduced by President Karzai and the international actors. There is a dire need for focusing on capacity-building of leadership and civilian sectors rather than having only a military approach.

Counterinsurgency measures can only work in Afghanistan if the societal structure is understood properly. A viable legitimate government is needed which links itself at the local level so that popular support is built up. This is possible but needs really hard work on the part of President Karzai and his government. In Afghanistan the political system is basically local with a strong tribal structure. Taliban insurgents are well aware of their political basis and one reason behind their re-emergence is the use of local politics by manipulating the grievances of the poor Afghans against the central government. That is why the insurgency in Afghanistan does not recruit only former warlords, former military and political commanders motivated to establish an Islamic system but also local disillusioned villagers who get paid from the militants for carrying out destructive tasks. The international community needs to understand the importance of the local nature of tribal politics while reaching out to Afghans for support.

Therefore, more attention must be paid to creating a workable government with a blend of Afghans cultural values as against making democracy the focal point, so that local people could relate themselves to the central system. Afghanistan being steeped in tradition is still too young to get infused with democratic values effectively. A gradual approach in this direction could be pragmatic. Moreover, in having a workable democratic system the vital role of political parties and political pluralism cannot be ignored. There is no democracy without political parties and a closer look at the elections showed that only 16 per cent candidates belonged to political parties. Most of those running for presidency were independent, including Karzai himself who neither belonged to a political party nor intends to form one.

As for improvement in governance, any anti-corruption mechanism must have practical implementation. And confining it just to the central government level is not enough; a top-down approach is essential. Decentralization approach has been neglected by Karzai; that needs reconsideration so that governance and rule of law can reach all over the country. Eradication of corruption in any form and at all levels is imperative for Afghanistan. The US, its international allies and the Afghans are not willing to accept any corrupt leader or partner. The Obama administration has already put conditions on aid and assistance so that transparency is ensured and their aid does not get wasted. Therefore, if Karzai wants to salvage Afghanistan from the war and disorder he will have to show it through deeds and not just words. The practical need is to prioritize objectives and allocate resources accordingly to get desired results. An important task that has been ignored so far by Karzai in his new agenda is to bring reforms in the crucial police and judicial systems. To think of Afghanistan with its power-holders completely clean of corruption, and an opium-free society with a booming economy is a very idealistic approach. So to weaken the trouble-makers and then getting hold of them for better security and accountability, effective police and judiciary is essential. Afghanistan police is not trained and only adding to its numbers would not work unless they are properly trained, respectably paid so that they don’t join the insurgents. If both the army and police are partnered with NATO that would ensure they are more trained speedily.

The present judicial system is too weak and tainted with corruption. One way to improve the legal system keeping in mind the literacy rate of Afghans and the dominant status of tribal elders, is to employ the services of seasoned elders or public servants who have a positive image in their communities. Besides this, assistance of Afghan law students, at home and abroad, and international legal experts can also be taken to improve the judicial system.

Regarding the re-integration plan for the insurgents renouncing violence, the Afghan government in collaboration with the global actors can work out rehabilitation projects and supportive programmes with different communities in the country. Arrangements can be made to keep hardcore elements from creating disturbance in trouble-prone areas the way the Shinwari tribe has done. Moreover, local militias need to be curbed so they do not operate outside their community boundaries and accept government’s supervision.

Keeping in mind the poverty crisis of Afghans and lack of socio-economic development what international donors can do is to initiate their assistance according to the needs of the people in different parts of the country. International reconstructive and humanitarian projects must be need-oriented so resources are utilized best where they are needed most. Also, rather than having similar multiple projects in one area coordination needs to be built among the planners. The skills of Afghans must be utilized in all these development projects instead of resorting to subcontracting and allowing foreign workforce into Afghanistan. This way unemployment can also be addressed to some extent.

Regional actors

A sound approach has been adopted by President Karzai in realizing the importance of regional actors. However, cautious steps are needed in tackling regional complexities. All the vital regional players have divergent national interests and apprehensions in Afghanistan. Since there are no easy ways to fix the problems in Afghanistan, regional assistance could be helpful in solving them. For a solution-based approach it is essential to evolve a convergence of interests among regional players. Otherwise it could touch off a blame game as seen in the past. One important factor in involving the regional actors is the wholehearted support of the US as well; while it has been observed that the US and its Western allies sometimes choose to put pressure on Pakistan and Iran, and that creates difficulties. The uneasy relationship between the regional states continues to hamper regional efforts. In many ways these regional countries have mainly caused problems for each other. However, new developments have presented new opportunities for making up with each other and working jointly for resolving bilateral and regional issues. As Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said regional issues could be resolved with regional solutions.(118) In Afghanistan the involvement and presence of international community is also viewed sceptically. The majority support for the US that was seen during the removal of Taliban has declined and US is now viewed unfavourably.

A policy of neutrality if pursued by Afghanistan in dealing with the neighbours would be more helpful rather than sticking with the previous biased attitude. Afghanistan in appeasing the US and India sought to isolate Pakistan, a non-NATO ally in the war against insurgency and immediate neighbour of Afghanistan. The past policy mistakes only further isolated Karzai and created regional complexities for Afghanistan. However, with the new shift in US attitude Pakistan is not seen as a troublemaker but an important part of the solution. As Pakistan is also fighting an insurgency, greater engagements between Pakistan and Afghanistan would lead to solutions. With the resurgence in insurgency, both the US and Afghanistan have realized the constructive role Pakistan can play in peace initiatives. Although India is still regarded a friend, yet with Pakistan playing a leading role Indian position in Afghanistan gets affected.

Despite regional challenges Pakistan, Iran, India, China and Russia all these neighbours of Afghanistan are full of potential and resources needed for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. However, India-Pakistan rivalry with unconstructive US meddling have negative effects in Afghanistan. Other negative factors are the Iran-US tussle over Iranian nuclear projects, suspicions between the US and Russia, China-Russia competition for a leading status in Central Asia, and instability in Central Asian states. But one single concern shared by all the regional states is to see an end to US/NATO presence and expansion in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Therefore, if the US wants to see peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region then it has to put behind its bilateral issues with the regional countries whose role is crucial in ensuring peace and stability in the region.

Hence, all the efforts can be fruitful only if the international actors and Afghan government have a unified approach to work on both civilian and military sides and proceed in a balanced manner. Any hasty exit of the US and its Western allies in order to save themselves may lead to the collapse of the already vulnerable Afghan state and society. It might also lead to more violence in the country if left on its own. A stronger integration of approach and shared responsibilities among regional states would also help ensure sustainability in the war-ravaged country.

7. <http://www.undp-elect.org/index.php?page=en_Independent+Election+Commission>.

15. “Afghanistan’s Election Challenges”, International Crisis Group Report, Asia Report N°171, 24 June 2009, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/ documents/asia/south_asia/171_afghanistan_s_election_ challenges.pdf>.

19. “Afghanistan’s Presidential Election: Power to the People, or the Powerful?”, The International Council on Security and Development, April 2009, <http://www.icosgroup.net/ documents/power_to_the_people.pdf>.

21. Prof. Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani and Iffat Humayun Khan. “Global Elections Report”, Weekly Report No. 87, 7 October 2009, <http://www.gilanifoundation.com/homepage/Week87/Global%20Elections %20Weekly%20Report%20NO.%2087.pdf>.

23. Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, “Fake Afghan Poll Sites Favored Karzai, Officials Assert”, The New York Times, 6 September 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/07/world/asia/07fraud.html?_r=1&hpw= &pagewanted=all>.

25. Sabrina Tavernise and Mark Landler. “Allies Press Karzai to Accept Election Audit Results”, The New York Times, 17 October 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/ world/asia/18afghan.html>.

28. Farangis Najibullah. “Karzai's Opponents Slam Supreme Court Ruling as 'Unconstitutional'”, <www.globalsecurity.org> 30-03-09, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/03/mil-090330-rferl03.htm>.

30. Ben Farmer. “Abdullah Abdullah demands Hamid Karzai ministers are suspended”, Telegraph.co.uk, 26-10-09, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 6438714/Abdullah-Abdullah-demands-Hamid-Karzai-ministers-are-suspended.html>.

32. Golnar Motevalli. “Karzai declared Afghan president, run-off cancelled”, National Post, 2 November 2009, <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/ world/afghanistan/story.html?id=2172062>.

33. Alissa J. Rubin and Mark Landler. “Karzai is upbeat at inaugural”, boston.com, 20 November 2009, <http://www.boston.com/news/world/ middleeast/articles/2009/11/20/karzai_sets_ambitious_reassuring_goals_in_inaugural/>.

34. “Will Kabul’s new anti-corruption task force establish itself as Afghan FBI?”, People’s Daily Online, 17-11-09, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/ 90851/6816004.html.

36. Kirsten Grieshaber. “Afghanistan slips in corruption index despite aid”, guardian.co.uk,17-11-09, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/ 88137565>.

39. Deb Riechmann and Rahim Faiez. “Parliament rejects Karzai's Cabinet list”, The Washington Post, 3 January 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2010/jan/03/afghan-parliament-rejects-karzais-cabinet-list/>.

45. “Karzai seeks Saudi Mediation with Taliban”, rferl.org, 4 February 2010, <http:www.rferl.org/content/Karzai_Seeks_Saudi_Mediation_With_Taliban/1948199.html>.

55. Humera Iqbal, “Afghanistan: Aid and accountability mechanism,” Regional Studies, Vol XXVII, No.3, Summer 2009, p.68.

56. Gary Langer. “Frustration with War, Problems in Daily Life Send Afghans' Support for U.S. Efforts Tumbling”, ABC News/BBC/ARD National Survey of Afghanistan, 9 February 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/ story?id=6787686&page=1>.

59. Stefan Bos. “Dutch Government Collapses Over Afghanistan Mission”, Voice Of America News, 20 February 2010, <http://www1.voanews.com/ english/news/Dutch-Government-Collapses-Amid-Disagreement-on-Afghan-Troop-Withdrawal-84830287.html>.

60. Michael E. O'Hanlon, “No Big Blank Checks for Afghanistan”, Brookings Institution, 1 October 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ 2009/1001_afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx.

61. Ben Farmer and Dean Nelson. “Afghan polling stations shut amid fears of voting fraud”, Telegraph.co.uk, 19 August 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6050245/ Afghan-polling-stations-shut-amid-fears-of-voting-fraud.html>.

66. Raghav Sharma. “Afghanistan — Watching from the Sidelines”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2 February 2010, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/ india-the-world/afghanistan-watching-from-the-sidelines-3055.html>.

68. Dr Babak Khalabari, “Afghanistan cannot be stabilised without involving neighbouring states,” The New, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 19 March 2010 (Dr Khalabari is Resident Representative of the German political foundation, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, in Islamabad and Kabul.

69. “Kayani speaks”, Dawn News, 3 February 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/ wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/19-kayani-speaks-hh-04>.

72. “Pakistan advises Taliban role in Afghan government”, BBC News, 28 January 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8485077.stm>.

73. C. Christine Fair speaking in a roundtable discussion on the causes of instability in Pakistan. The roundtable, on ‘What’s the Problem With Pakistan?’, was organized by the (US) Council on Foreign Relations, New York, on 31 March 2009, <http://www/foreignaffairs.com/discussions/ roundtables/what-the-problem-with-pakistan>. Christine Fair is presently working with the Georgetown University as Assistant Professor at its School of Management of Foreign Projects.

75. “India, Pakistan and Afghanistan: the impossible triangle”, www.reuters.com, 25 September 2009, <http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2009/09/25/india-pakistan-and-afghanistan-the-impossible-triangle/>.

79. Indrani Bagchi. “India willing to try out ‘good Taliban’,” The Times of India, 3 January 2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-willing-to-try-out-good-Taliban/articleshow/5514757.cms>.

81. Maseh Zarif and Ahmad Majidyar. “Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Recent Developments”, <www.irantracker.org, 21 August 2009, <http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/iranian-influence-afghanistan-recent-developments>.

83. “Leader strongly supports Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan agreements”, Tehran Times, 25 May 2009, <http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_ View.asp?code=195360>.

84. Abubakar Siddique. “Kabul Stuck Between U.S., Iranian 'Double Game' Accusations”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 March 2010, <http://www.rferl.org/content/Kabul_Stuck_In_Between_ US_Iranian_Double_Game_Accusations/1980137.html>.

88. Carrie Chomuik. “From Open Door to No-Go: Interpreting Iran’s Policy toward Afghan Refugees”, Stimson Centre, 23 February 2009, <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=756>.

91. Nicklas Norling. “The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 14 May 2008, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/? q=node/4858>.

93. “Afghanistan, China sign economic agreements”, Yahoo News, 25 March 2010, <http://nz.news.yahoo.com/a/-/world/6978415/afghanistan-china-sign-economic-agreements>.

96. “China taking keen interest in Afghanistan”, Sana News, 21 April 2009, <http://www.sananews.com.pk/english/2009/04/21/china-taking-keen-interests-in-afghanistan/>.

99. “GRU: Hamid Karzai’s win stabilizes the situation in Afghanistan”, Afghanistan.ru, 6 November 2009, <http://en.afghanistan.ru/doc/156.html>.

100. “Spanta: We are sincerely keen on promoting relations with Russia”, Afghanistan.ru, 29 May 2008, <http://en.afghanistan.ru/doc/87.html>.

101. Nicklas Norling. “Don't Put Afghanistan in ‘Reset’ with Russia”, www.realclearworld.com, 6 June 2009, <http://www.realclearworld.com/ articles/2009/06/dont_put_afghanistan_in_reset.html>.

106. “Emergency Situations Ministry: Russia resumes rendering assistance to Afghanistan”, Afghanistan.ru, 7 March 2009, <http://en.afghanistan.ru/ doc/126.html>.

108. “NATO seeks aid for Afghanistan in Moscow”, rt.com, 15 December 2009, <http://rt.com/Politics/2009-12-15/nato-russia-aid-afghanistan.html>.

109. “US expects Russia’s assistance in Afghanistan”, The Voice of Russia, 6 October 2009, <http://english.ruvr.ru/2009/10/06/1816458.html>.

110. David Brunnstrom. “NATO rejects Russian call for Afghan drug removal”, reuters.com, 24 March 2009, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/ idAFTRE62N4SL20100324>.

114. “NATO, Russia Mend Relations As Afghan War Heats Up”, Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, Associated Press, 26 January 2009, <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2009/01/nato-russia-mend-relations-as-afghan-war-heats-up.html>.

Introduction

The 15th Lok Sabha elections held in Indian in April-May 2009 were marked by a stunning performance of the Congress Party across the country. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) retuned to power with a clear mandate while its arch-rival Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) suffered a surprised drubbing. The performance of the Left parties-led Third Front was even worse than expected. Similarly, the newly-formed Fourth Front comprising Samajwadi Party and Rashtriya Janata Dal fared miserably and was unable to make its mark.

The elections were unique in many ways and threw up many surprises. Against all predictions of a “hung parliament,” “neck-and-neck race” between UPA and NDA and “unstable government,” the Indian voter gave a comprehensive mandate to the Congress party to form a stable government at the Centre and continue its policies much more effectively. A strong Centre was accompanied by resurgence of state parties such as Bihar under Nitish Kumar and Orissa under Naveen Patnaik. Significantly, state-specificity greatly shaped the electoral outcome across India. The performance of the chief ministers was at the heart of their victory. The issues of development, unemployment, price rise, social justice and good governance came out as overriding concerns with people cutting across classes. Communal politics, Hindutva, reservations and the debate around Indo-US deal did not excite the people while the issues of national security, especially internal security, were handled deftly by the Congress party.

The performance of the Manmohan Singh government was a resounding approval of his leadership and policies that he pursued over the past five years. No less was the role of Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi who led an effective election campaign and threw their weight behind Manmohan Singh as the prime ministerial candidate. The BJP lost much of its allies as well votes and issues that used to garner extra vote for the party. The CPIM-led Left Front failed to offer either an alternative agenda or maintain coherence in its ranks and thereby badly lost ground even in its strongholds. The ragtag Fourth Front came a cropper and was unable to play the role of king-maker that it aspired for in the wake of a hung parliament.

The paper analyzes the factors that shaped the outcome of the 2009 Lok Sabha election; the voting patterns across Indian states and societal groups; the performance of various political parties and alliances and emerging regional and national trends in various Indian states, polity and politics. It argues that 15^th Lok Sabha elections signified continuation of coalition politics in India but with a difference — the electorate demanded good governance, economic development and social justice with middle of the road politics.

Pre-poll realignment of forces

Four broad political formations comprising the Congress-led UPA, the BJP-led NDA, the Left-dominated Third Front and Samajwadi Party- led Fourth Front geared up for the 15^th Lok Sabha elections. While the UPA and NDA lost more allies in the run-up to the elections than it gained, the Third and Fourth Fronts largely emerged out of the churning within the two main alliances. In fact, the efforts to form alliances at the national and state levels ended with ‘sub-optimal’ alliances.(1)

The UPA, a 13-party alliance originally formed soon after the 2004 elections(2) remained relatively a stable alliance but lost some of its important allies like Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Lok Jan Shakti Party (LJP) and Jharkand Mukti Morcha (JMM). However, it won over Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal and National Conference (NC) in the Indian-held Kashmir (IHK). The alliance had already lost some minor allies over the last couple of years or so, such as the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), in Andhra Pradesh; Marumalarchi Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (MDMK) and Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) in Tamil Nadu; People's Democratic Party (PDP) in IHK. However, the major loss to the Congress was withdrawal of support by the Left Front which pulled out over the issue of Indo-US nuclear deal and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). In October 2008, Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) also threatened to quit the government if the Centre failed to stop violence against civilians in Sri Lanka. However, on 4 November Karunanidhi said that he was “satisfied” with the measures taken by the UPA government on the Sri Lankan Tamils issue. Practically, the Congress was left with allies in only three major states: Tamil Nadu (DMK), West Bengal (Trinamool Congress) and Maharashtra (NCP). Except for Maharashtra, it was the junior partner in the other two states.

The dominant thinking in the Congress leadership was that as part of its grand strategy to resurrect the party it should not rely more on allies. However, the real reason for its reluctance to form alliances was that it did not want to share power with other parties. It had accepted coalitional strategy under compulsion but now wanted to revive its own support base which would have been compromised if it relied more on regional parties. Even before the announcement of the parliamentary elections, the Congress made it clear to its partners in the UPA that the party will contest the election nationally on its own, and make alliances at the state level. The performance of the UPA government, the victories in Rajasthan, Delhi and Mizoram and the impression that the anti-incumbency factor was not such an iron law of politics after all — all contributed to the feeling of self-sufficiency.(3)

The regional parties also wanted their pound of flesh. In Uttar Pradesh, the Congress tried but could not reach an electoral understanding with the Samajwadi Party (SP) or BSP and in Bihar the Lalu Prasad-led Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), a Congress ally for the past one decade, pulled out of alliance. As a corollary, the Congress’ regional allies for the 15^th Lok Sabha included, DMK (Tamil Nadu); Nationalist Congress Party (NCP-Maharashtra and Goa), Trinamool Congress (West Bengal), Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), National Conference (NC) in IHK, All-India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM); Republic Party of India (RPI); Sikkim Democratic Front ( Sikkim); Indian Union Muslim League and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) (Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry). The Congress had 150 seats in the outgoing Lok Sabha.

Although the BJP had started its preparations for elections much earlier, it got confronted infighting and tried to put its act together under the leadership of its prime ministerial candidate L. K. Advani. This infused some solidarity in cadres and drew the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), which was disengaged until recently, back to its role as the moral guardian. Nonetheless, the NDA that stood with Advani was a crippled version of the NDA that had captured over 300 seats in the 1999 Lok Sabha election. Eventually, only three allies stayed on: the Akali Dal of Parkash Singh Badal in Punjab, and the Janata Dal (United) of Nitish Kumar in Bihar and the Shiv Sena led by Bal Thackeray in Maharashtra. Since 2002, there has been a continuous withdrawal from the NDA. Among those who left the BJP were the National Conference of IHK; the Indian National Lok Dal; the Lok Jan Shakti Party, the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam and its state allies, the Rashtriya Lok Dal, the Himachal Vikas Congress and the Indian Federal Democratic Party. At its peak in 1999, the NDA enjoyed support of 23 parties.

As the general elections approached, the BJP-led NDA further lost important allies, Trinamool Congress (TMC) to the Congress, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), the Telegu Desam Party (TDP) and All-India Anna Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (AIADMK) to the Third Front. While it could not retain smaller allies such as the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), it was able to regain the support of the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD). The main reason for the loss of BJP allies was the feeling among them that their alliance with the BJP had damaged their support base especially among the Muslim community. The main constituents of the NDA in the 2009 elections included the BJP, Shiv Sena, (Maharashtra) Janta Dal (United) based in Bihar and Karnataka), Shiromani Akali Dal (Punjab); Indian National Lok Dal (INLD-Haryana) Asom Gana Parishad (AGP-Assam); Rashtriaya Lok Dal (RLD-UP); and Nagaland People’s Front (Nagaland). The departure of Kalyan Singh from BJP came as a setback to the party in Uttar Pradesh. The JD (U) and AGP were not firmly tied with the NDA and expressed their disagreements with BJP’s Hindutva agenda.

The Third Front comprised parties that had nothing common among them but were trying to forge a united front against the Congress and the BJP. Each of them followed a separate agenda but they got together to present an alternative to alliances led by the Congress and the BJP. Third Front was officially launched on 12 March 2009. BSP leader Mayawati, AIADMK leader J. Jayalalitha and HJHC leader Bhajan Lal did not attend the launching rally and sent their representatives instead, which showed that they were still keeping their options open. There were different interpretations regarding the shift of the regional parties to a non-Congress, non-BJP platform. One explanation was that these regional parties left the two big parties when they were denied the greater political space they bargained for.(4) Another important reason was that these parties did not want to get irrelevant and marginalized following the elections(5) and were looking for better bargaining power in the post-poll situation of a hung parliament. There was also a strong perception in the rank and file of these parties that the big parties and many of their policy parameters were handicaps for them. It seems that BJP’s Hindutva plank and economic and foreign policy perspectives of Congress also pushed them to form an alternative front.

The major constituents of the newly formed Third Front were Left parties including the Communist Party of India-Marxist, (CPIM), the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Forward Bloc, and the All-India Anna Dravida Munnettra Kazagham (AIADMK); the Janata Dal (Secular) (JD-S), the BJD, the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), Haryana Janahit Party, and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP). While AIADMK, TDP and BJD were breakaway allies of NDA, the Left parties had parted ways with the Congress. The BSP toyed with the idea of joining the Third Front for some time but as its leader Mayawati’s demand to be the prime ministerial candidate did not find favour she decided to stay away and go it alone. Although the leaders of the Third Front claimed that they had come together to provide a “new alternative” to the voters yet they were quite mindful of its limitations. Prakash Karat, CPI-M General Secretary, stated: “What we are witnessing now is the steady development of a cooperative federal alliance, a kind of federation of the parties. Many parties who have come together as part of this federation have still not assimilated the ideal of the Third Alternative fully, which means that it would take some time to decide things and initiate concrete steps towards building a structured front.”(6) Congress termed it the “biggest mirage of Indian politics.” Party spokesman Manish Tewari said that it would only benefit the “communal forces directly” as it would divide the secular forces.(7)

The Fourth Front was a by-product of the realignment of forces in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. It comprised Samajwadi Party (SP) led by Mulayam Singh Yadav, Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) led by Lalu Prasad Yadav and the Ram Vilas Paswan-led Lok Janshakti Party (LJP). The SP has a strong base in UP while RJD and LJP are important players in Bihar. These parties were desperate to check Congress attempts to revive itself in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and therefore teamed up to take on the Congress in both states which together constitute 120 seats. The basic premise of the Front was that partners would not encroach upon each other’s space and it was restricted to two states.

The formation of pre-poll alliances was significantly influenced by the new delimitation exercise that was undertaken in all the states except IHK, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Jharkand, Manipur and Nagaland, and resulted in redrawing of 499 constituencies. The 2009 election was the first election held after the fresh delimitation. The redrawing of the constituencies introduced an element of uncertainty that created new spaces in the pre-electoral jockeying. As past performances that earlier determined pre-electoral alliances could not be leveraged into negotiations, parties pushed for hard bargains not only for seats but also for the advantage of the location.(8) This resulted in great shake-ups within the existing electoral alliances with bizarre agreements and seat adjustments being made more at the state level. Further, the entire focus shifted to pre-poll state-specific alliances and post-poll alliances. This provided an opportunity to the Congress to spurn a national alliance as it would have entailed yielding space in its own areas of strength to accommodate allies. Since there was no national level alliance the fronts in the fray did not come up with a common minimum political programme but focused on their individual party electoral promises.

Election process

Election manifestos

Four national parties — the Congress, BJP, CPIM and CPI — along with five regional parties — TDP , NCP (Nationalist Congress Party), JD(S) (Janata Dal (Secular) and DMK (Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam) — came out with election manifestos giving their vision for the future and making tall promises to the electorate. The Congress, BJP and CPIM in their election manifestos focused on issues relating to socio-economic development, secularism and minorities, social justice and foreign policy while regional parties focused more on local issues.

On 24 March 2009, Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi released the party election manifesto saying “security, respect and prosperity of all citizens will be the party’s endeavour.” It highlighted the performance of the party over the last five years, made tall promises to the electorate while being quite dismissive of its rivals and opponents. The manifesto claimed that Congress was the “only party that is forward-looking, the only party that believes a better future is the right of every Indian.”(9) It claimed that the party was a bulwark against communalism, linguistic chauvinism, regional parochialism and casteism. The manifesto dismissed the BJP as “narrow, divisive and communal.” It took credit for the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and the Right to Information Act (RTI) and asserted that it had done a lot for the benefit of weaker sections of society such as tribal people, Dalits and women. It promised faster and more inclusive growth. It also pledged the enactment of a National Food Security Act that would assure 25 kg of rice a month to every below-the-poverty-line (BPL) family at Rs. 3 a kg and one-third reservation for women in central government jobs.

Other promises pertained to education, health, agriculture and farmers, small and medium industry, weaker sections of the population, and local body funding. On energy, the manifesto promised “a very significant increase in the share of nuclear power, both through domestic and imported technology, which has now been made possible by the civil nuclear agreements.” Significantly, it did not list the nuclear deal with the US as one of it achievements though it mentioned civil nuclear agreements having been entered into with many countries “entirely on our own terms.”(10)

The party vowed a policy of “zero-tolerance towards terrorism from whatever source it originates.” It envisaged the raising of more specialist battalions that would be positioned at key locations across the country. It pledged highest level of defence preparedness and modernisation of the defence forces. It promised to pursue an independent foreign policy.

On relations with Pakistan, it said “Mumbai attacks have cast a long shadow on the on-going dialogue and engagement process. It is now entirely up to Pakistan to break the impasse by taking credible action against those responsible for the carnage in Mumbai. If it does so and dismantles the terrorist networks that operate from its soil, a Congress-led government will not be found wanting in its response.”(11)

The BJP released its election manifesto on 3 April 2009, and took on the UPA Government on three fronts of good governance, development and security. The manifesto devoted a lot of space to the issue of security and proposed a wholly law-and-order-driven approach to tackle external and internal threats to security. It emphasized the need for reviving strong, POTA-like anti-terrorism laws, revamping of internal and external security agencies, a digital security agency; strict border management and coastal security, and special trial courts for terrorists. It vowed that the “Chhattisgarh Model” would be applied to counter the Maoists threat. This was a reference to the Salwa Judum* operations under BJP dispensation in Chhattisgarh. The key slogans were “good governance, development and security” with emphasis that “India needs a decisive leader”. It described Manmohan Singh as the “weakest prime minister” and projected L. K. Advani as a leader who can deliver and provide India security and stability.

The BJP also tried to woo the poor and middle classes — the aam admi (common man) — with many promises. In an attempt to outbid the Congress, it offered BPL families 35 kg of rice or wheat at Rs 2 per kg. It also offered loan waiver for all farmers, future loans to them at 4 per cent, income tax exemption to all armed forces and paramilitary personnel, and those earning up to Rs 3 lakh per annum and an additional benefit of Rs 50,000 for women and senior citizens.(12) Like the Congress, it also made a long list of promises concerning youth, women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and minorities. It accused the Congress of playing politics of fear to get the minority vote. It laid emphasis on reviving the economy, reorienting it towards agriculture, rural development, and unorganized and informal sectors; creating adequate employment opportunities for youth; reversing the price hike and investing heavily in infrastructure projects.(13)

The BJP also tried to exploit the Hindutva sentiment by promising Ram Rajya, Ram temple and preserving cultural heritage, especially the Ram Sethu. The party chose to release its manifesto on the occasion of Ram Navmi. BJP’s prime ministerial candidate L. K. Advani promised ushering in a “Ram Rajya.” He said: “Ram Rajya is possible.”(14) The Ram temple issue formed part of the manifesto, and BJP promised “to explore all possibilities, including negotiations and judicial proceedings, to facilitate the construction of the temple at Ayodhya.” It also promised to look for an alternative alignment for the proposed “Sethusamudram channel project” in the disputed territorial waters of the Palk Straits while declaring Ram Sethu (the Bridge of Rama, more commonly known as the Adam’s Bridge) a “national heritage.” This was the first BJP manifesto of its own after 11 years that underscored its ideological concerns like cow protection, implementation of a uniform civil code and abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution according special status to IHK. The party, however, favoured creation of small states and promised to carve out a separate Telangana state out of Andhra Pradesh and viewed sympathetically the demand for Gorkhaland.

On foreign policy, the BJP believed in a “resurgent India,” and a multipolar world. It emphasised India’s independent strategic nuclear programme which was “deeply compromised” by the Congress. However, it did not ask for any modification and merely stressed expediting India’s indigenous thorium technology programme that will help in reducing dependence on American fuel supplies.

It adopted a tough posture on Pakistan saying there can be no “comprehensive dialogue” for peace unless Pakistan “dismantles the terrorist infrastructure,” prosecutes terror elements and organizations; puts a permanent, verifiable end to cross-border terrorism; stops using third countries to launch terror attacks on India and hands over individuals wanted for committing crimes on Indian soil.(15) The party emphasized strengthening of internal security and promised that the Prevention of Terrorism Act would be revived and strengthened.

The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) in its manifesto released by General Secretary Prakash Karat on 16 March 2009, emphasised strengthening democracy and ensuring equitable economic development and social justice. It advocated for alternative policies with at least four components: reversing the neo-liberal policies and bringing in pro-poor policies; standing firm on secularism and defending it; giving a new deal to all oppressed sections of population and ensuring social justice; and having an independent foreign policy.(16) The CPIM maintained that the Defence Framework Agreement with the US would be scrapped and the 123 Agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation reviewed and reworked. On terrorism, the manifesto called for revamping the intelligence machinery, enhancing coordination between the security and intelligence agencies, modernising police forces and strengthening coastal security.

The CPI manifesto sought vote for a non-Congress and non-BJP alternative that would carry forward their agenda of anti-imperialism, secular polity and independent economic development ensuring economic and social justice to all.(17)

The NC Party, a Congress ally led by Sharad Pawar, in its manifesto released on 3 April 2009 expressed its commitment to a democratic secular society wedded to equality and social justice as well as committed to preserving “the unity and integrity of our country.”(18) The party stressed the importance of human development with emphasis on education, healthcare, and agricultural development. It emphasised private investment in generating energy and developing Thorium for nuclear power generation in place of uranium. NCP’s election slogan was good governance and a stable government, development-oriented, transparent and corruption-free.

BSP supremo Mayawati’s “appeal” to the voters of UP was virtually the party’s manifesto. Besides, listing her government’s achievements in various sectors, she frontally attacked the Congress, the BJP and its allies as well as the media for trying to spoil the “image” of her government.(19) She laid emphasis on the BSP’s modified ideology which now talked of taking into its ambit the “wellbeing of all castes without confining itself to the interests of Dalits alone.” It asked the electorate to vote for the BSP to help build an equitable society “which is the ultimate goal of our party.”(20)

Janata Dal (Secular), a constituent of Third Front led by H. D. Deve Gowda, in its manifesto released on 6 April criticized the economic, social, foreign and defence policies of the UPA government. It laid emphasis on promotion of development through mixed-economy approach and social justice through reducing the wide inequalities created by globalization, liberalization and privatization. Its promised pro-rural measures such as writing off all loans of small and marginal farmers borrowed from co-operative and public sector banks; social security for unorganized workers; empowering of women and youth; protection of minorities and creation of a national natural calamity agency for managing natural disasters. The party underscored an independent foreign policy combined with pragmatic non-alignment policy of promoting friendship and cooperation with all countries. It envisioned a comprehensive defence policy including developing nuclear-capable missiles, ICBMs, space weapons system and airborne brigade, assault landing brigade and a helicopter gunship brigade.(21)

DMK President and Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi in the party manifesto sought votes on the basis of five slogans: secular and good governance; upholding religious harmony; defending social justice; nurturing equality and promoting democracy. The party envisaged appropriate changes in the Constitution for autonomy at the state level and federal governance at the union level to strengthen federalism in India. It also laid stress on regional economic development.(22)

The manifestos did not receive much attention in the media a major section of which focused more on verbal duels among key protagonists in rival formations rather than looking at the substantive issues facing the electorate.

Candidates

The final list of candidates released by the Election Commission showed a sharp jump compared to the previous elections. After the Election Commission introduced a vast range of measures to curb “non-serious” candidates in 1997, the average number of candidates per constituency had declined to a little less than nine in 1998 and 1999 and 10 in 2004. In 2009, the average number of candidates per constituency rose sharply to a little over 14. Altogether, a number of 8,070 candidates were in the fray for 543 Lok Sabha seats. The NDA fielded candidates for 512 seats — 433 by the BJP and 79 by its allies. In 2004, the NDA contested 434 Lok Sabha seats, 271 by the BJP and 163 by its allies. The Congress-led UPA fielded 526 candidates — 440 from the Congress and 86 from its allies. In 2004, the Congress and its allies had contested in 425 seats with 110 allies.(23) The Left parties were contesting from 177 seats; the BSP from 500 seats. The Fourth Front contested for 343 seats with SP in 193 seats while RJD in 44 and LJSP in 106.

Under a model code of conduct it was mandatory for all candidates to file, along with their nominations, two affidavits with information on their criminal antecedents, if any; assets (including the movable and immovable properties of the candidate, spouse and dependents), their liabilities and educational qualifications. Non-filing of the affidavits was to result in rejection of nominations by the returning officer.

The parties fielded candidates with candidates with “communal and criminal backgrounds.” A major lacuna in the Representation of the People Act is that it permits individuals facing a criminal charge in a court to contest elections. BJP fielded a sangh parivar leader, Manoj Pradhan, who was in jail for his alleged involvement in at least half-a-dozen murder cases during anti-Christian violence in Kandhamal district. BJP also fielded Ashok Sahu, who had resigned as president of the Orissa unit of the Hindu Jagran Manch, in the Kandhamal Lok Sabha constituency. Actor Sanjay Dutt, an SP candidate, for a Lucknow seat, was disqualified. The Supreme Court rejected his plea for allowing him to contest the elections by staying his conviction and six-year sentence by a TADA court in connection with the 1993 Mumbai blasts. Sanjay’s appeal against his conviction and sentence by the TADA court for illegal possession of firearms is pending before the apex court.

Election campaign

The 2009 general elections were largely considered issueless elections but the fact of the matter was that local issues dominated the people’s mind while major political parties focused on issues around personalities and leadership. The Congress party projected Manmohan Singh as the prime ministerial candidate while BJP pitched L. K. Advani for the top slot. Both parties indulged in an intense war of words over “weak” and “strong” prime ministerial candidates. They accused each other of desperation and frustration, reflected in personal attacks and sought to defend their own prime ministerial candidates. The Congress leadership maintained that BJP leaders were making personal attacks on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh because they had no national agenda or issues to win the polls. The BJP, on the other hand, claimed that frustration was gripping the top leadership of the Congress which “being unable to explain the mess created by its five years of misgovernance” was digging up “the nine-years-old Kandahar hijack incident.”

Besides personalities, both competing alliances raised popular slogans to woo the voters. The Congress party’s election slogan was aam admi ke badthe kadam, her kadam per Bharat buland which roughly translates to: the common man moves forward, and with his every step India prospers. The party used the Oscar winning soundtrack Jai Ho from the movie Slumdog Millionaire for the campaign. The song title ‘Jai Ho’ translates to ‘Let there be victory’. In contrast, the BJP coined the phrase kushal neta, nirnayak sarkaar which translates to able leader, decisive government. The BJP raised the slogans of “good governance, development and security” as its main election plank. The Congress continued to officially maintain that the Third Front was not a viable alternative and its fight was directly with the NDA.

The Congress while countering NDA and Third Front accusations, sought to win the election on the basis of its own programme and its performance over the last five years. The campaign of the party focused on its rural infrastructure development programme, “Bharat Nirman,” and a progress report of the various schemes launched and implemented for the common people by the UPA government.”(24) Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi and Manmohan Singh were the main campaigners of the party.

The NDA despite projecting the image of a united national alliance, suffered from the lack of an emotive campaign issue. It persisted with slogans highlighting the failures of the UPA government in terms of tackling the issue of terrorism and internal security(25) but failed to develop the issue as an election winner. In fact L. K. Advani lacked Vajpayee’s charisma and could not create a wave in favour of NDA that was crucial for victory. Although aggressive pursuit of Hindutva was not officially part of the BJP campaign, yet sporadic communal speeches such as one by Varun Gandhi were made to evoke communal sentiments. Varun, who was contesting from Pilibhit constituency (UP), indulged in vitriolic propagation of Hindutva theme to garner majority Hindu votes. In his election speeches, he talked of chopping the hands of those who attacked Hindus and said that Muslims had frightening names. He alleged that arms were being smuggled into ghettoes (i.e. Muslim localities), Hindus were being targeted, cow slaughter ‘remains’ were found but no action was taken.(26) The Election Commission took note of his taped speech and sent him a notice for violation of the code of conduct. The top leadership of the BJP kept mum and stuck to its decision to field him as party candidate from Pilibhit. Varun first apologized and then disowned the tape. The Commission indicted Varun for his anti-Muslim speeches and recommended BJP not to field him in the Lok Sabha polls.(27)

The Third Front raised the issues of the nuclear deal with the US as a sellout, the price rise and its impact on the poor. CPI-M tried to extend its outreach, with the aim to attract the youth and added cyberspace to its campaign for the elections. Party Politburo member and MP Sitaram Yechury launched the website: www.vote.cpim.org. Yechury argued internet penetration in the country was in the range of 6 to 8 per cent and in terms of sheer numbers, it translated into some 60 million to 80 million people.(28)

Mayawati launched her election campaign from Bihar saying that the BSP was committed to building an “equitable” society and the party was the only alternative to the Congress and BJP, whose “policies are influenced by big houses and brokers.”(29) She claimed the current economic slowdown and price rise were result of the policies followed by the Congress or the BJP-led governments and promised that she would pursue policies which would uplift all sections of the population. Mayawati emphasized that her party would ensure reservations for the well-being of all castes without being confined to the Dalits’ interests alone.

A unique feature of the election campaign was that the local and regional issues largely eclipsed national issues. Pre-election surveys including the one conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) showed that issues like the Indo-US deal, Hindutva and reservations did not excite the people. The issue of national security also lost most of its shine as the Congress moved closer to the BJP position on the issue. Instead, unemployment and price rise became overriding concerns with people cutting across classes. Besides, bijli, sarak, pani, (electricity, road, water), the unfulfilled promises of the ruling party, issues of administrative high-handedness, and the economic plight of specific sections of society evoked public response.(30)

As the principal arena of political contestation had shifted to the state level, a number of issues in various states dominated the election campaign and influenced election outcomes in a big way. In Assam the issues of infiltration, insurgency, law and order, ethnic identity and development dominated the campaign. In Manipur, state’s territorial integrity topped the campaign issues. In Nagaland, the Naga political problem and integration of the Naga-inhabited areas of certain neighbouring states to create “Greater Nagaland” dominated the campaign. Statehood or autonomy issues figured high in Telangana in Andhra Pradesh, in the Gorkha and Rajbanshi-dominated belt in West Bengal and in the Naga-dominated hills of Manipur. Some state-level issues have generated intense feelings and sometimes caused political realignment: Nandigram and Singur in West Bengal, reservations for Marathas in Maharashtra and for Gujjars in Rajasthan, and allegations of caste or communal bias in the functioning of state governments in Haryana, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh. Elections turned into a referendum on the state governments in Punjab, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Serious allegations of corruption put the ruling parties in the dock in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Punjab and Assam, while the issue of public morality worked for the ruling parties in Orissa, Rajasthan and Tripura. The ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka resonated in Tamil Nadu.(31)

Issues relating to electoral practices also came up in the campaign. These were related to campaign expenditure, the extent of money paid to influence voters, the way the news media covered the polls and representative character of the elected MPs, MLAs and governments. Despite some Election Commission initiatives, poll campaign expenditure skyrocketed. L K Advani raised the issue of bringing the black money back from the Swiss banks. He criticized the UPA for neglecting the agricultural irrigation and farming that pushed tens of thousands of farmers into suicides.

On 1 April, following intelligence inputs about threat to about 25 top leaders of the country from terrorist outfits during the polls, the Border Security Force (BSF) augmented security along the highly-sensitive Indo-Pakistan border in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat.(32) The list included Sonia Gandhi, her children Rahul and Priyanka, Manmohan Singh, L. K. Advani, Ghulam Nabi Azad, Farooq Abdullah and Omar Abdullah, Parkash Singh Badal, J. Jayalalitha, Narendra Modi and Mayawati.

Polling

The 15th Lok Sabha elections were held to elect 543 members in five phases spanning over a month. Polling for 124 constituencies was held on 16 April; in 141 constituencies (including one in Manipur which went to the polls on 22 April) on 23 April in 107 constituencies on 30 April in 85 constituencies on 7 May and in 86 constituencies on 13 May. While IHK and Uttar Pradesh had a five-day polling programme, it was a four-day event in Bihar and a three-day exercise in Maharashtra and West Bengal. The election was held in two phases in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Orissa and Punjab. The remaining 15 states and seven Union Territories witnessed one-day polls.

For the first time, photo electoral rolls were used in 522 out of 543 constituencies in an effort to prevent impersonation and bogus voting. The Election Commission put in place about 1.36 million electronic voting machines (EVMs) in 8.28 lakh polling stations for an electorate of 714 million which had gone up by 43 million in 2004. More than four million civil staff members and 2.1 million security personnel were deployed for the smooth conduct of polls. The EC undertook an exercise of ‘Vulnerability Mapping’ in all constituencies so as to identify areas and voter segments vulnerable to threat and intimidation. The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), N. Gopalaswami, observed: “The possible cross-border influences that could affect the peaceful conduct of elections in the constituencies located on either side of inter-State boundaries have been mapped and this aspect has also been factored in, to the extent possible, while deciding on the phasing and sequencing options.”(33)

The overall turnout was 58.42 per cent, slightly better than 58.1 per cent in 2004. The scorching heat, a dull national-level campaign, and the increasingly strict requirements for voter identification affected the turnout. The first phase registered a turnout of about 58 to 62%; the second phase 55 per cent,(34) the third phase 50 per cent,(35) the fourth phase 57 per cent(36) and the fifth phase 62 per cent.(37) Polls were “by and large very peaceful.”

During the five phases 37 persons including security personnel, polling staff and civilians lost their lives. While 23 were killed in violence, Naxalite attacks and police firing, the others died in accidents. Polling witnessed a changeover of Chief Election Commissioner of India. N. Gopalaswami conducted Phase I, while Navin B. Chawla conducted the other four phases.

Election verdict

The electoral outcome took political pundits by surprise. Poll analysts and exit channels were thrown into confusion. Predictions of a fragmented or hung Lok Sabha with a fragile coalition forming the government at the Centre proved wrong. The Congress-led coalition UPA won 262 of the 543 Lok Sabha seats with Congress itself accounting for 206, a gain of 61 seats over its score in 2004. The BJP-led NDA could secure only 157 seats, with BJP’s tally being 116, a loss of 22 seats. The Third Front got 72 seats with Left parties reduced to a dismal 24 seats only — faring miserably in its strongholds such as West Bengal and Kerala. The Fourth Front that was striving for its pound of flesh in post-election bargains was pushed to just 27 seats. The verdict provided an opportunity to the UPA to form its government by choosing its allies at its own will. In terms of percentages of votes polled, the UPA was on the top with 36.22 per cent with Congress securing 28.56 per cent — a gain of 2.03 per cent over the 2004 elections. The NDA vote share was 24.11 per cent with BJP garnering18.81 per cent, a decline of 3.35 per cent over the last elections. There was a wide gap of 12.22 percentage points between the two competing alliances.

United Progressive Alliance		National Democratic Alliance		Third Front		Fourth Front		Others
INC	206	BJP	116	CPI(M)	16	SP	23	MIM	1
AITC	19	SS	11	CPI	4	RJD	4	Swabhimani Paksha	1
DMK	18	SAD	4	RSP	2			BVA	1
NCP	9	JD(U)	20	FB	2			BPF	1
JKNC	3	RLD	5	JD(S)	3			JVM(P)	1
JMM	2	AGP	1	AIADMK	9			BSP	21
IUML	2	NPF	1	TRS	2			AUDF	1
KCM	1	SDF	1	MDMK	1
VCK	1			BJD	14			Independents	9
IND(Congress)	1
RPI	1			HJC(BL)	1
Total	261		159				27

Vote share (%) 2004 2009		Seats won 2004 2009		Seats contested 2004 2009		Party
28.56	26.53	206	145	440	417	INC
18.81	22.16	116	138	433	364	BJP
1.52	2.35	20	8	55	73	JD(U)
1.43	1.41	4	10	56	34	CPI
5.33	5.66	16	43	82	69	CPM
6.17	5.33	21	19	500	435	BSP
3.20	2.07	19	2	35	33	TRMC(AITC)
2.04	1.80	9	9	68	32	NCP
1.55	1.81	11	12	47	56	SHS
0.21	0.20	2	1	16	10	MUL
0.82	1.47	3	3	33	43	ID(S)
3.43	4.32	23	36	193	237	SP
0.12	0.13	3	2	3	6	JKNC
0.96	0.90	4	8	10	10	SAD
0.40	0.47	2	5	42	9	JMM
1.67	2.19	9	0	23	33	AIADMK/ADMK
1.83	1.81	18	16	22	16	DMK
2.51	3.04	6	5	31	33	TDP
0.47	0.56	0	6	7	6	PMK
0.43	0.53	1	2	6	12	AGP
0.45	0.71	0	4	106	40	LJNSP/LP
1.27	2.41	4	24	44	42	RJD
0.62	0.63	2	5	9	22	TRS
1.59	1.30	14	11	18	12	BJD
0.75	-	0	-	40	-	DMDK
0.26	-	0	-	11	-	MNS
5.16	4.25	9	5	3829	2385	IND

The main characteristics

Various factors have been cited to explain the 2009 Lok Sabha election verdict. These range from the electorate’s desire for a stable and secular government, their abhorrence of communalism and hate politics, the track record of the Manmohan Singh government, particularly its social sector initiatives, shift of the Muslim vote towards the Congress in the Hindi heartland in general and in UP in particular to “the degree of unity or disunity among the forces ranged against the ruling dispensation in each state, a host of local factors and of course, the economic issues.”(39) Suhas Palshikar argues that the 2009 electoral outcome demonstrated the “state specificity,” “normal nature” of the election and “strength of middle-of-the road politics.”(40) The Congress has emerged stronger but the state parties have not lost their relevance either. Despite winning 206 seats, Congress was very much dependent upon the state parties to run the coalition government as it required 11 members to form the government. However, a major point of difference was that it was not begging for support but got it unconditionally from the BSP, SP, JD(S), RJD, taking its tally to 330. The main characteristics of the 2009 Lok Sabha elections in terms of state specificity, emerging pattern of coalition politics and new political forces and emerging electoral behaviour of different social groups in the society are analyzed below.

“State specificity” and “normal election”

A post-poll survey conducted by the National Election Survey (NES) 2009 reveals that the national leadership failed to catch the imagination of the voters at large. In contrast it was the state leadership that greatly mattered in the election outcome. Data shows that issues that defined and determined the voters’ choice were specific to a particular state. This is against the usual trend in India where national elections often revolve around the personality of the incumbent or prospective prime minister. This is despite the fact that in the 2009 election campaign the focus on prime ministerial candidates was very much part of the strategy of the two main players, the Congress and the BJP. In fact, the NDA had won the 1999 election using Atal Bihari Vajpayee as its “election mascot.” Also, in the 2004 elections, the vote for BJP was linked with the party leadership. But in the 2009 elections no single leader got attention of more than 20% of the respondents. The incumbent prime minister received the highest rating, 18%, followed by Congress President Sonia Gandhi 16% ; L K Advani 15 %; Congress youth leader Rahul Gandhi 6%; and Mayawati 5%.(41) Conversely, the centre of politics has now shifted to the states of India. The 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabha elections have provided sufficient proof that each of these elections were not one verdict but 28 authentically different verdicts. In 10 of the states, the incumbent chief minister was endorsed by 40% of the respondents. In another 6 states, the incumbent secured more than 20% support, higher than any national leader received.(42) Thus in 22 states, the support for the incumbent chief minister was more than the support any national level leader received. Regional parties did well in states such as Orissa and Bihar, riding on the popularity of the chief minister. In some states where the Congress was in power and the party did well in Lok Sabha elections, the chief ministers rating was quite high. The states included, Delhi, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Assam and Mizoram. Similarly, in some of the BJP-ruled states such as Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Karnataka, the high rating of the chief minister positively impacted on the election. In contrast, in the states where ruling party/alliance did not do well, the ratings of the chief minister was quite low, like in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Goa. Maharashtra was an exception but there the chief minister was in power only for a short period. In addition, in the states where national parties did well, it was state level leaders/chief ministers who ran successful campaigns and brought a local flavour to the campaign.

States	UPA	NDA	Third Front	Forth Front	others
Andhra Pradesh	34		08
Arunachal Pradesh	02
Assam	08	05			01
Bihar	02	32		04	02
Chhattisgarh	01	10
NCTof Delhi	07
Goa	01	01
Gujarat	11	15
Haryana	09				01
Himachal Pradesh	01	03
Jammu and Kashmir	05				01
Jharkhand	01	08			05
Karnataka	06	19	03
Kerala	16		04
Madhya Pradesh	12	16	01
Maharashtra	25	20			03
Manipur	02

LOK SABHA ELCTIONS-2009

AFGHAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION

Democratic process in Afghanistan

Main argument

Political developments since 2001

2009: Karzai’s second term

Political participation and election process

Individual versus political parties

Karzai’s victory

Future administration

Public response: Hopes, concerns and criticism

Significance of polls for Afghanistan &
world community: Security

Policy implications of the polls: Afghanistan & the region

Pakistan

India

Iran

China

Russia

Conclusion

Regional actors

Introduction

Pre-poll realignment of forces

Election process

Election manifestos

Candidates

Election campaign

Polling

Election verdict

The main characteristics

“State specificity” and “normal election”

Party	Seats Contested	Seats Won	Vote (%)
Congress allies	526	261	36.22
NDA	512	159	24.11
Left/Third Front	177	24	7.61
Fourth Front	343	27	5.15

Main argument

Political developments since 2001

2009: Karzai’s second term

Political participation and election process

Individual versus political parties

Karzai’s victory

Future administration

Public response: Hopes, concerns and criticism

Significance of polls for Afghanistan & world community: Security

Policy implications of the polls: Afghanistan & the region

Pakistan

India

Iran

China

Russia

Conclusion

Regional actors

Significance of polls for Afghanistan &
world community: Security