Spot Light on Regional Affairs

"Kashmir can be resolved somewhat along the lines the problem in Northern Ireland was sorted out. … For this, what need to be pursued was majority rule, ensuring minority rights and a ‘self-government’ with shared values…. Politicians from both sides may want to keep the issue going. But in the interest of the two countries, ‘sacrifices will have to be made and risks taken’.…I hope you (India and Pakistan) begin direct talks and keep trying working it out…. Outsiders cannot resolve it.”

Former US President Clinton’s statement in a keynote address at the India Today conclave via satellite on 2 March 2003 (1)

The Irish peace process was initiated with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) on 10 April 1998. It was a multi-party agreement signed between the two governments — the United Kingdom of Britain and the Republic of Ireland — and eight political parties of Northern Ireland including Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) led by Jerry Adams; Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) led by John Hume; and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) led by David Trimble as major actors in the conflict. The other parties were: Alliance Party; Labour Coalition; Ulster Democratic Party (UDP); Progressive Unionist Party (PUP); and Women’s Coalition. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and UK Unionist Party (UKUP) opposed the agreement.

The fundamental problem in Northern Ireland was, and remains, that its six counties are not exclusively Protestant and Unionist and the Catholic nationalist minority look to the day when Northern Ireland would be reunited with the Republic of Ireland, while the Protestants want it to continue as part of the UK. The Agreement remains merely the first tentative step on a long road to a complete and lasting peace. An array of seemingly intractable problems, relating to decommissioning of weapons by IRA (2) and the smooth functioning of the power-sharing assembly remains to be solved. A recent attempt to restore government after holding fresh assembly elections has failed as in the elections the hardliner the anti-GFA Democratic Unionist Party has clinched 30 seats — more than any of its rivals — and refused to share power with Sinn Fein.

In the wake of the Good Friday Agreement "a senior Indian official" based in London said on April 12 that the principles underlying it "will now have a strong bearing on all international disputes". He remarked: "Other people are getting up and doing what we at present find unthinkable."(3)The GFA provided impetus to the projection of its elements to Cypriots, Basques, Kashmiris, and Quebecois in their respective struggles in terms of resolving these conflicts.

After US president Clinton’s statement, Pakistani, Indian, and Kashmiri political analysts in their writings discussed the relevance/applicability of the Irish model to the Kashmir situation. Prominent amongst them are A G Noorani, Balraj Puri, Sumantra Bose and Radha Kumar.(4)The idea was also taken up and appreciated by the leading Kashmiri political umbrella group, the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). Another Kashmiri analyst, Shaikh Tajammal-ul-Islam, appreciated the principles involved in the agreement, especially the right of self-determination.(5) The idea is also going around in the Indian and Pakistani official circles, each trying to see it from its own national perspective.

No two conflict situations are similar or two cases identical. But lessons can always be drawn from a comparable peace process and as such the Irish peace process, struggling to settle an equally complex and protracted conflict, offers some insights for the resolution of Kashmir conflict. The Irish model provides peer learning in at least two ways. One, it offers an analogy of structured and sustained course of dialogue/negotiation process supported by well-defined mechanisms — three strands — functioning quite satisfactorily. And, two, the resolution of the conflict is based on certain principles that may have some usefulness in determining the final settlement of the Kashmir conflict.

The paper would try to identify where the Irish model could be useful in formulating a structure for the Kashmir peace process and to what extent the principles providing basis to the Irish peace agreement are relevant to the Kashmir situation and can be activated for the settlement of the conflict.

Conflict is an inherent feature of all human societies and, potentially, an aspect of all social relationships — the inter-personal, inter-group, inter-organisational, and international. While mere presence of differences might not necessarily lead to a conflict, almost all conflicts revolve around dissimilarity in attitudes, perceptions, cultural values, communitarian style, needs and goals.(6) Conflicts could be characterised by high intensity, medium intensity and low intensity.

Conflict resolution is a rapidly evolving field and is presently going through a transitory phase due to massive changes brought about first due to the end of the Cold War(7) and then because of the changes taking place as a result of 9/11 and the US-led war against terrorism. Now the major international players consider terrorism rather than ethnicity, political or tribal feuds as the main issue. This is certainly going to influence the course of conflict resolution in the world and is quite relevant to the Kashmir conflict. Conflict resolution experts like John Burton, E Azar, James Schellenberg, Lincoln P. Bloomfield and others have made foremost contributions in developing theories and concepts of conflict resolution in the post-WWII era. Conflict resolution broadly refers to efforts to prevent or mitigate violence resulting from inter-group or inter-state conflict, as well as efforts to reduce the underlying disagreements”.(8) According to John Burton, “conflict avoidance is not conflict resolution.”(9) He draws distinction between conflict resolution, management and settlement. Management is “by alternative dispute resolution skills” and can confine or limit conflict; settlement is “by authoritative and legal processes” and can be imposed by elites.(10) On the other hand, he contends that conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods that are analytical and that get to the root of the problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or “settlement,” points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is a permanent solution to a problem.(11) According to Sundeep Waselkar, “Conflict resolution involves resolving a conflict to the satisfaction of all parties.”(12)

John Burton’s premise on conflict resolution is based on the basic ‘Human Needs theory’ (HNT). He argues “conflicts concern only situations where the satisfaction of human needs is denied. Resolution of such conflicts occurs only after relationships have been reexamined and realigned.” As such conflict resolution is, in the long term, a process of change in political, social, and economic systems. It is an analytical and problem-solving process that takes into account such individual and group needs as identity and recognition, as well as institutional changes that are required to satisfy these needs.(13)

The conflict resolution mechanisms encompass both traditional and non-traditional approaches. The traditional conflict resolution mechanisms include negotiations, good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. Another mechanism that has entered the vocabulary of conflict resolution is facilitation. Facilitation is similar to mediation but generally does not involve an impasse. The facilitator leads a collaborative process in which individuals and groups with divergent views meet to reach an agreement. The conventional methods have long been used to manage and resolve conflicts. However, these approaches can only work when the conflicting parties are amenable to negotiation and have something tangible they are able to bargain.

After the end of the Cold War in 1991 though traditional approaches to conflict resolution continued to dominate the inter-state and intra-state relations, however, the theorist of conflict resolution began to conceptualise and follow non-traditional approaches. The non-traditional methodology of conflict resolution is still in a transitory phase because the state-centric approach in dealing with conflicts is still dominant. Some non-traditional methodologies which have emerged over the years but remained underutilised are being slowly adopted by the practitioners in combination with each other or with traditional approaches. These include: Conflict Transformation; Structural Prevention and Normative Change. These strategies deviate from the zero-sum logic of international conflict as a confrontation of interests. ‘Conflict transformation’ seems to have greater relevance to the Kashmir conflict. This strategy focuses on the effort to “reach accommodation between the parties in conflict through interactive processes that lead to reconciling tensions, redefining interests, or finding common ground.”(14) The ‘conflict transformation’ strategy features facilitated meetings at which members of groups in conflict seek to understand each other’s positions and world views in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to the peaceful resolution of disputes. The ‘structural prevention’ strategy basically focuses on the problems of culturally and ethnically divided states. The strategy in contrast to the “operational prevention,” which involves dealing with immediate crises likely to erupt quickly into deadly violence, focuses on “creating organizations or institutionalized systems of laws and rules that establish and strengthen nonviolent channels for adjudicating inter-group disputes, accommodating conflicting interests, and transforming conflicts by finding common ground.”(15) The third strategy of ‘normative change’ is defined as “developing and institutionalizing formal principles and informal expectations that are intended to create a new context for the management of conflict. Norms may also define responsibilities for states to prevent violent conflict.”(16)Some new tools of conflict resolution used by new methodologies are peacemaking and peacekeeping; role of NGOs; Track II and III diplomacy; use of technology; use of the media; use of economic incentives and role of transnational corporations.

The issue of timing and ripeness in negotiations and mediation is central to whatever conflict resolution methodology is used. When and why conflicting parties are amenable to resolve conflict is a basic assumption underlying the “Ripeness theory”, strongly advocated by William Zartman. Zartman contends that “Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so — when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive.”(17)

The concept of a ‘ripe moment’ centres on the parties' perception of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. Zartman has formulated six propositions delineating important elements and components of MHS model. They are:

Proposition 1. Ripeness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated.

Proposition 2. (Definitional): If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to begin).

Proposition 3. An MHS contains objective and subjective elements, of which only the latter are necessary and sufficient to its existence.

Proposition 4. If the parties’ subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the costs of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such indicators of an MHS can be found, along with expressions of a sense of a way out, ripeness exists.

Proposition 5. (a) Once ripeness has been established, specific tactics by mediators can help seize the ripe moment and turn it into negotiations; (b) If only objective elements of ripeness exist, specific tactics by mediators can bring the conflicting parties to feel/understand the pain of their mutual stalemate and turn to negotiations.

Proposition 6. The perception of a mutually enticing opportunity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the continuation of negotiations to the successful conclusion of a conflict.(18)

MHS needs to address/contain resistant reaction, whether stemming from perseverance, agent escalation, true belief, or ideological cultures and back it up with Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEOs). The negotiations pushed by MHS are likely to be unstable unless they are supported by the prospects for a more attractive future to pull the parties out of the conflict. This could be engineered by a “formula for settlement and prospects of reconciliation that negotiating (may) design during negotiations.”(19)

Resolution of the Kashmir conflict can be fully comprehended in the theoretical parameters discussed above. It is a conflict which began with the onset of the Cold War and has outlived it. During this period almost all the traditional negotiatory mechanisms (negotiations, good offices, mediation and conciliation) were tried, though with partial successes. The Cold War also impinged on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute as Washington and Moscow supported one side or the other in various international fora with Moscow holding a veto threat in favour of India, though it tried to broker the Tahkent Agreement (1966), there were no follow-up negotiations on Kashmir.

The conflict entered into the post-Cold War period with eruption of the freedom struggle in the Indian-held Kashmir, which amongst several indigenous factors — was seemingly encouraged by the wave of freedom sweeping across erstwhile Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, soon Kashmiris discovered that they were on the wrong side of the wave of freedom supported by the West and thereby did not merit similar support. Despite heavy odds the struggle is going on for the last 14 years and symbolises the rejection of political, administrative and constitutional structures built by India in the state during the past four decades. India despite all its might and highhandedness remains unable to crush the resistance movement and legitimise its control over Kashmir.

From 1989 to 2001 the situation in Kashmir activated confrontation and conflict along the LoC and generated the Spring 1990 crisis in the wake of nuclearisation of South Asia. The nuclear tests of 1998 further cast their shadow on Kashmir as both sides tested each other’s nerves in Kashmir and there was talk of a ‘fourth round’ with Pakistan in New Delhi. During the post Cold War period the focus was more on ‘crisis management’ than conflict resolution, thus several CBMs(20) were negotiated and the Lahore Declaration envisaged more CBMs and intensifying of efforts for the resolution of “all disputes including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir”.(21) But it did not work and soon the Kargil conflict (1999) overtook the Lahore process. The outside mediation, particularly by the US, was also mainly restricted to ‘crisis management.’

As Kashmir was facing pressures from trends emerging from the post-Cold War aftermath — globalisation, liberalisation, democratisation, redefinition of sovereignty — it was overtaken by the events of 9/11 which shifted US focus to fighting terrorism, extremism and Muslim fundamentalism, mostly all three linked together. This shift again impinged on the Kashmir dispute as India stepped up its tirade to malign the freedom struggle as a ‘terrorist activity’ by Islamic fundamentalists and extremists sponsored by Pakistan and thereby liable to be included in the second phase of US campaign against terrorism. The 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament only provided New Delhi a golden opportunity to snap Pakistan’s support to the Kashmir freedom struggle and also put Kashmiris on the spot. By mobilising massive military build-up on Pakistan’s border and the LoC, it tried to use coercive diplomacy as a tool to extract maximum gains on the issue of cross-border terrorism into IHK. President Musharraf in his 12 January 2002 speech did ban two of the outfits that India alleged were behind terrorists attacks in India and Kashmir. Although India remained dissatisfied, yet the strategy of coercion could not produce the desired results.

It seems all sides are under intense pressure to seek a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The conflict transformation in Kashmir is quite perceptible. There is a ‘mutually hurting stalemate,’ evident in the Kargil crisis (1999) and the 10-month military stand-off (2001-2002) between India and Pakistan. On both occasions, the two parties came close to a nuclear catastrophe, but could not achieve the desired results. It seems that the two have realised that a unilateral or military solution of Kashmir is not possible and thereby a more plausible solution acceptable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris should be explored. They are all seeking a way out. This, however, needs to be boosted by ‘mutually enticing opportunities’ (MEOs). Whether the Irish model offers some help along these lines would be discussed in the comparative analysis that follows.

Understanding the nature and parameters of a conflict could be useful for resolving the conflicts. Thereby a comparative perspective on the Northern Ireland and the Kashmir conflicts is attempted to help in drawing lessons from the Irish peace process.

Northern Ireland has been Western Europe’s most intractable ethnic/sectarian dispute since WWII. Between 1966 and 1999 a total of 3,636 people were killed and 36,000 injured as the conflict spread beyond Northern Ireland's borders onto the British mainland and elsewhere.(22) Most of the victims were innocent civilians.

The Island of Ireland is divided into the independent Republic of Ireland and the province of Northern Ireland, or Ulster, which is part of the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland had originally nine counties of which six comprise the present day-Northern Ireland. The other three, predominantly Catholic, became part of Ireland on its partition in 1920. The southern region subsequently cut all ties with Britain, becoming the independent Republic of Ireland in 1949. However, the six counties of Northern Ireland remained a part of the United Kingdom. Ulster’s partition from the remaining 26 counties of Ireland in 1921 has caused conflict throughout the history of the region.

The area of Northern Ireland is just over 14,000 square km, with a population of over 1.6 million and is only 20 miles at the nearest point from Britain. Over 50 per cent of the population is comprised of Protestants who wish to remain part of the United Kingdom and just under 50 per cent are Roman Catholics(23) who wish to join the predominantly Catholic 3.5 million in the Republic of Ireland.

During the reign of Henry VIII (1509-49), Catholic Ireland was brought under the rule of Protestant England initiating bitter sectarian tension. During the reign of James I (1603-25) large numbers of Protestants were settled in the north of Ireland, creating a Protestant majority in the region that exists to this day. Following the defeat of the Catholic James II (1685-88) by the Protestant William of Orange (1689-1702) at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, most of the land in Ireland was handed over to Protestant control.

After the Easter rising of 1916, Irish nationalists decided to set up their own state. By the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, Britain recognised it and Parliament enacted the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922. The northern part of Ireland, the Ulster province, however, remained part of Britain under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. This partition of Ireland led to a civil war. From 1920, Northern Ireland had its own regional government and also elected members to the British House of Commons. It is the political division compounding centuries of religious animosity that lies at the heart of the Northern Ireland conflict.

Grave unrest known as "The Troubles" began in Northern Ireland from 1969 in the wake of a civil rights campaign, demanding the removal of grievances of the Catholic minority. This escalated into serious rioting and sectarian violence involving the Irish Republic Army (IRA) that wanted to unify Northern Ireland with the Republican of Ireland and loyalist paramilitaries that wanted it to remain part of the United Kingdom. The Northern Ireland government resigned and direct rule by the government began in 1972. In 1973 Britain abolished the regional Parliament in Belfast and began to rule directly from Westminster.

Throughout 1970-1980 Northern Ireland was torn by the destruction of riots, bombings and terrorist activities. There were several cease-fires called between the two sides, but eventually the violence would begin again. The violence was spearheaded by IRA formed in 1969. The Sinn Fein has been the political arm of the IRA, and is led by Gerry Adams. There is the moderate Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), formed in 1973. Its leader John Hume is a highly respected political figure.

At the other end of the spectrum were "loyalist" paramilitary organizations — the Ulster Volunteer Force (founded in 1966), the Ulster Freedom Fighters, and the Ulster Defence Association. The two mainly Protestant political parties are the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) led by David Trimble and Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The latter is an extremist party and has rejected the 1998 accord. The Sinn Fein has accepted the accord.

Kashmir is bounded in the north and east by China (its autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet), in the south by the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab and in the west by Pakistan. The total area of the state is 222,236 sq. km. India holds about two-thirds (100,569 sq. km) of the disputed territory, which it calls Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan controls about one-third (11,639 sq. km) which it calls Azad (free) Kashmir. The Northern Areas, comprising 75,520 sq. km, is directly administered by Pakistan. The total population of the State is over 16 million (estimated): 9.45 million in IHK (2001 censes); 3.10 million (1990) in AJK; and 1.10 million in Northern Areas; while expatriates number over 2 million. It is a Muslim-majority state with Muslims accounting for 74.9% of the total population; Hindus constitute 22.6% and Buddhist 0.8%. In terms of regional break-up, in IHK Muslims constitute 64.2% (95% in Kashmir; 29.6% in Jammu and 46.1% in Ladakh); Hindus 32.2% (4% in Kashmir; 66.3% in Jammu, and 2.6% in Ladakh); and Buddhist 1.2% (50.9% in the Ladakh region) of the population. In AJK and the Northern Areas, Muslims number 99.8%. Besides, there are 2.23% Sikhs, settled mainly in Jammu.(24)

The Kashmir conflict falls in the category of complex disputes which involve differences regarding territory, ideology, right of self-determination, security and sovereignty. The dispute has become more intractable over the years and has defied mediation efforts.(25) In Pakistan, it is usually referred to as the unfinished agenda of the partition plan. It is described as the shahrug (jugular vein) by Pakistan and atoot ang (integral part) by India. It has characterised and shaped Pakistan-India hostility ever since partition in 1947. The two went twice to war over Kashmir in 1948 and 1965 and the third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 resulted in the conversion of the UN effected (27 July 1949) cease-fire line (CFL) into the line of control (LoC). The Tashkent Declaration, signed after the 1965 war, underscored the need to “settle the issue through peaceful means”, while the Simla Accord, signed in the wake of the 1971 war, called for the “final settlement of the dispute through negotiations.” Besides, the two sides plunged into war-like crises several times, starting in 1987 with Brasstacks during their covert nuclear phase. Another crisis followed in 1990 over Kashmir, and yet another — the Kargil conflict (1999) — after their overt nuclearisation in 1998. The latest was the military standoff in 2001-02. Threats of a ‘fourth round’ are exchanged every now and then and the source is the Kashmir dispute. Any crisis between the two nuclear-armed powers has the potential of developing into a full-scale nuclear war, wrecking the peace and well-being of the whole subcontinent.

From the Pakistani perspective, Kashmir is the ‘core’ or central issue and the root cause of the tension with India. The dispute goes back to partition. Pakistan maintains that Kashmir is a disputed territory and its accession to India in 1947 was invalid as it took place after Indian occupation of the state or at best it could be termed provisional, as recognised in the UNSC resolutions of 1948 and 1949. It also maintains that the future status of the territory should be determined by allowing its people to exercise their right of self-determination in accordance with the UN resolutions. Pakistan regards Kashmiris’ freedom struggle as ‘indigenous movement’ and strongly supports it. It pledges moral, political, and diplomatic support to the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris.(26)

Nevertheless, for the past few years a certain amount of flexibility is evident in Pakistan’s position on the issue.(27) President Pervez Musharraf has taken lead in demonstrating ‘flexibility’ on the part of Pakistan and talked about going “beyond the stated positions.” He has, even offered to drop the 50-year-old demand for a UN-mandated plebiscite and meet India ‘halfway’ to resolve the dispute. He has however, stressed ‘flexibility’ on both sides. President Musharraf has been advancing a four-stage plan towards a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The first stage requires India and Pakistan to start talking. Second stage is to accept the centrality of resolving the Kashmir issue for better relations. Third stage involves elimination of all that was unacceptable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris. And the final stage is to focus on finding a solution that will be a win-win situation for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris. At no stage is US involved in a mediatory role as the exercise would have to be undertaken by both sides. However, encouragement from Washington for any effort aimed at a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute is not ruled out.

After 9/11, Pakistan also condemned acts of terrorism in Kashmir, i.e. the 1st October 2001 attack on the Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar and various attacks on the Hindu Pandits. In his 12 January 2002 speech, President Musharraf banned five extremist outfits. Two of them — Lashkar-e-Tayba and Jaish-e-Mohammad — were accused by India of conducting terrorist activities in Kashmir. However, Pakistan has reaffirmed its pledge to extend political, moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris.

India’s official position is that Kashmir, including Azad Kashmir, is an ‘Integral part’ of the Indian Union and its ‘accession’ to India is ‘final.’ A resolution in the Indian parliament in 1994 has endorsed this position. India has pursued a status quo approach. It has progressively withdrawn from the implementation of the UN resolutions(28) on Kashmir and after the Simla Accord of July 1972 insists that the problem should be resolved through bilateral negotiations. There are indications that New Delhi would be satisfied with a solution based on the existing Line of Control (LoC), which is unacceptable to Pakistan. India describes the Kashmir freedom struggle as a terrorist activity ‘sponsored’ by Pakistan. After 9/11 India has made ‘cross-border terrorism’ the central issue determining its relationship with Pakistan and after an attack on its parliament by militants in December 2001, it concentrated its troops on its border with Pakistan. This menacing build-up continued for 10 months. Even after the withdrawal of the troops New Delhi continued to accuse Pakistan of continuous ‘infiltration’ of militants across the LoC. Pakistan denied all these charges. So far India has not demonstrated any flexibility in moving away from its rigid stance on Kashmir.

Kashmiris assert that they are fighting for their right of self-determination, which has been denied them for the past 56 years. The political struggle is led by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) comprising 26 political parties while the military struggle is waged by a large number of armed guerrilla groups. Most of them are a part of the umbrella outfit, Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC), which includes at last 14 militant outfits. MJC is led by Syed Salahuddin, who also heads Hizbul Mujahideen — the biggest and the most formidable indigenous Kashmiri organisation fighting against the Indian occupation. The Indian government has banned several groups fighting in Kashmir including JKLF, JI, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayba, Jaish-e-Mohammadi and Al-Badr.

The continued unrest in Kashmir has acted as a catalyst to the India-Pakistan tensions. Kashmiris have a long history of freedom struggle against the alien rulers, especially the Hindu Dogra rulers. As partition of the subcontinent was approaching, Kashmiris were fighting for freedom from the Dogra rule, and continued their struggle against the Indian occupation in October 1947. There was widespread unrest in Kashmir in 1963 against the Indian rule, sparked by the disappearance of the holy relic from the shrine of Hazratbal.

The most recent Kashmiri uprising against the Indian occupation was culmination of years of injustice, repression and denial of democratic right of self-determination to the Kashmiris in the Indian-occupied state. It was triggered by massive boycott of the 1989 Lok Sabha elections by the Kashmiris and subsequent kidnapping of Dr Rubiya Sayeed, daughter of the newly appointed home minister Mufti Sayeed, in December 1989. India in response imposed governor’s rule and unleashed massive state repression which continues till this day. Over the last 14 years, India has progressively inducted over 700,000 troops in Kashmir. Various repressive laws — Armed Forces (J&K) Special Powers Act 1990; The J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, (amended in 1990); J&K Disturbed Areas Act, 1990; TADA(29) and Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2001, (POTA) — indemnifying state repression are in place in IHK. The state terrorism in the name of ‘counter-insurgency’ has left a trail of violence manifested in the killings of 80,000-90,000 people as per Kashmiri sources and 38,500 according to independent sources. The J&K police puts the death toll from January 1990 to December 2002 at 94,000 (the union home ministry insists that it is 34,709) . Besides, 3921 persons have gone ‘missing’; tens of thousands were tortured/injured; nearly 36,000 incarcerated in the past 13 years; more than 20,000 women widowed; and 30,000-40,000 children orphaned. (30)

There are some similarities and some dissimilarities between the two conflict situations. The similarities include ingovernability of the territory; alienation of the population; rigged polls; question of sovereignty; discriminatory practices followed by the state; and use of oppressive laws allowing use of force with impunity.

§ First and foremost basic feature common to both Northern Ireland and Kashmir is in the words of Prof. Richard Rose: Northern Ireland is an insubordinate part of the UK — governed without consensus when it is governed at all. (31) Noorani argues, “that is also heart of the Kashmir problem”.(32) He cites Prof Hiren Mukherjee, a highly respected leader of the Communist Party of India, who on February 25, 1994, said, “Even today, perhaps the best of us do not quite realise the depth of Kashmiri alienation and are unready to ponder ways and means of overcoming it.”

§ The second common feature is that rigged polls are a consistent feature in both places, though the techniques differ. “Gerrymandering [in Northern-Ireland] ensured that the symbolic unionist integrity of the six counties was maintained. In British eyes at least, a nominal unionist majority in Northern Ireland would be much discounted if Derry City, Fermanagh, and Tyrone fell into nationalist hands.” In Kashmir also the elections have been rigged invariably through techniques varying over time with the objective to induct puppet regimes. In fact, New Delhi tried to prevent pro-independence elements from participating in the elections. In 1971, Indira Gandhi externed Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg lest they should contest the Lok Sabha and state assembly polls. She feared a pro-independence vote by the assembly. They were allowed to contest the polls only after the 1975 accord was imposed on them.(33)

· The third commonality between the two conflicts is that like Ireland, the issue of accession/sovereignty is not settled in Kashmir and the two sides have constitutional provisions in that regard. Ireland did not accept partition. The Constitution of Ireland/Irish Republic adopted in 1937 in Article 2 defined the national territory of the republic as consisting of “the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the (territorial) seas”. While Article 3 said: “Pending the reintegration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application…” Article 2 and 3 were deleted pursuant to the 1998 Agreement. Similarly, the constitutions of India, Pakistan and the respective parts of Kashmir under their control have specific articles delineating their position on sovereignty over Kashmir. Pakistan and the AJK have constitutional provisions contesting the validity/legitimacy of the instrument of accession of Kashmir to India, while India and occupied Kashmir have constitutional provisions that provide basis for Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. Article 1 (2) d of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, describing and defining the territorial limits of Pakistan refers to “states and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise.” However, the specific provision concerning AJK is Article 257 which subjects the extension of sovereignty over Kashmir to “accession” and the will of the people. It says: “When the people of the State of J&K decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that state shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State.”

Ø The AJK Interim Constitution Act of 1974, (Act VIII) takes a similar line. It says: “a part of the territories of the state of J&K is yet to be determined in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people of the state through democratic method of free and fair plebiscite under the auspices of the UN as envisaged in the UNCIP resolutions adopted from time to time.” Article 2 (1) of the Act specifies: “AJK means the territories of J&K which have been liberated by the people of that State and are for the time being under the administration of the government and such other territories as may thereafter come under its administration.” Further, under Article 31 (3) the government of Azad Kashmir lays down the following functions to the government of Pakistan:

Ø AJK has a separate president, prime minister, a separate flag, parliament and supreme court. The Ministry of Kashmir affairs and Northern affairs provides a linkage between the GOP and AJK. There are 12 seats in the state assembly reserved for Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan.

Ø Similarly. Article (1) 3 of the Indian constitution defining territories of India applies to J&K as specified in the First Schedule which says: “The territory which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution was composed in the Indian State of J&K.” Further, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution incorporating “instrument of accession” gives “Special Status” to J&K and defines the constitutional relationship between India and the State of J&K. The Article had originally restricted the powers of the Indian Parliament only to the subjects conceded in the “instrument of accession” — “defence, communications and external affairs. Further, the concurrence of the state government was made a prerequisite for the application of any law to the state. Under the provision, the state has a separate flag and a separate constitution. It had originally a sadar-i-riyasat (president) for J&K and prime minister, which was abolished under the 6th Amendment in 1965 in the constitution of J&K. It was replaced with the governor and chief minister, respectively.

Ø The scope and powers of Article 370 have been massively undermined by India over the last 56 years through amendments in Article 370 and application of various ‘central laws’. extending powers and jurisdiction of India to the state. Twenty-eight ‘Constitutional (Application to J&K) Orders ‘were issued from 1954 to 1977, each extending more and more provisions in the Indian Constitution for the state.(34) Article 370 is a ‘provisional’ Article and can be abolished by the president of India by a public notification.

Ø Article 3 and 4 of the J&K constitution of 1954 define the state’s relationship with India and its territory. Article 3 says that “the State of J&K is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India”. Article 4 says: “the territory of the State shall comprise all the territories which on the 15th August 1947, were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Ruler of the State.” Article 370 of the Indian Constitution has also been incorporated in the constitution of Jammu & Kashmir. The J&K constitution initially kept 25 seats for ‘Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir’ but after the 12th amendment to the J&K constitution, the figure was changed to 24.

§ The fourth similarity between the two conflicts is discrimination against the aggrieved population, though with a difference. While in Northern Ireland, it was discrimination perpetrated by the majority Protestant community against the Catholic minority community, in case of Kashmir, it is the majority Kashmiri Muslims who profoundly resent the discrimination perpetrated by New Delhi in giving them their political, economic and identity rights protected by Article 370 on the one hand, and denying them their basic democratic right of self-determination pledged to them by no less a person than prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru on the other. In addition they also resent that for the last over five decades the “growth of regionalism, both in Jammu and Ladakh, has been discernibly encouraged and used by the Centre to contain any move for the reassertion of internal autonomy by the Kashmiri Muslim leadership of the Valley”.(35) In fact there is sustained attempt to encourage minority rights, without giving the majority its due right. This is reflected in the outright rejection of the State Autonomy Committee report by the Indian cabinet while tacitly supporting the Regional Autonomy Committee’s report.

§ Fifth, a deep sense of alienation and utter distrust marks both conflict situations. In the case of Ireland, the Catholic nationalist minority was intensely alienated from the Protestant ruling majority, while the latter harboured deep distrust against the former. In the case of Kashmir, there is the only difference that such alienation/distrust is not directed against anybody within Kashmir; but the Kashmiri Muslim population is completely alienated from India and on the other hand, India does not trust them at all and brands them as ‘terrorists’, ‘anti-national’ and ‘Pakistan-sponsored elements.’

§ Sixth, in both cases oppressive laws have been applied in the name of curbing ‘terrorism’ and militias raised to back up counter-insurgency operations. In the case of Ireland ‘loyalist’ paramilitary outfits were raised and sustained to counter IRA insurgency while in the case of Kashmir ‘counter-insurgent’ groups, known as ‘friendlies’, were raised to assist paramilitary forces in ‘counter-insurgency operations’. Such operations have resulted in massive human rights violations in both cases, the scale of violations is much higher in Kashmir, though. In the case of Ireland 3,636 people were killed between 1996-1999, in a population of 1.6 million, that comes to 0.22% of the population, while in the case of Kashmir, 94,000 have been killed in a population of 4.7 million — that of Kashmir Valley, the most affected region of Kashmir — which comes to 2% of the population. Even if the number of killings is divided by the total population of Indian Occupied Kashmir (9.45 million) the percentage of those killed is still higher with 0.99% compared to Northern Ireland.

§ First and foremost point of divergence is that while the Irish conflict is essentially an “internal conflict”, the Kashmir conflict is primarily an “international conflict.” The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) categorises Irish conflict as an “internal armed conflict” and Kashmir as an “international armed conflict.”(36) According to IISS definition, “internal armed conflicts” take place ”between government forces and organised groups which control sufficient territory to sustain concerted military operations. These conflicts sometimes spill across international borders without being considered international conflict between state parties.” On the other hand, “international armed conflicts” involve “governments in armed conflict over sovereignty and territory.” As a corollary, the very characterisation of the Irish conflict as an internal conflict puts limits on the relevance and utility of the ‘Irish model’ for the Kashmir conflict, especially in terms of solution.

§ Secondly, the Northern Ireland conflict was characterised as a “sectarian strife” and the ensuing “discrimination” against the minority Catholic community became the central issue in the conflict. Kashmir is an opposite case as discussed earlier. It is a problem centring on the aspirations of the majority community comprising Kashmiri Muslims against New Delhi and not against minority communities comprising Hindus and Buddhists of Kashmir. What Kashmiri Muslims are demanding is the exercise of the “right of self-determination” and not just an end to the discriminative policies of New Delhi, which no doubt did contribute to the eruption of the current uprising against the Indian rule in Kashmir. Moreover, there was and is no communal strife going on in Kashmir; rather, Kashmir, for centuries, has been known for its overwhelming communal harmony described as Kashmiriyat. In fact, there has been an attempt by the ultra-Hindu right-wing outfits supported by the BJP to communalise the issue and malign the Kashmiris struggle for freedom as an expression of Muslim fundamentalism. The massacres of the Hindu minority community by unidentified elements — which the Indians allege are Muslim militants while the latter term such killings an attempt to tarnish their image — has only complicated the situation.

§ Thirdly, in the case of Northern Ireland as the years of violence dragged on there was a steady convergence of “London and Dublin opinions and interests, despite disagreement on objectives and policies.” Both governments loathed violence, recognised that a dispute existed and sought an accord.(37) Their prime ministers became friends. In fact, the relations between the Irish Republic and the British government always remained cordial. “The former never supported the terrorist acts of the IRA, nor supplied arms to it.”(38) In Kashmir, however, the two parties to the conflict went to war three times, twice on Kashmir — in 1948 and 1965. Besides, “India refuses to recognize what is obvious to the whole world — the existence of an international dispute on Kashmir and consequently, the need to negotiate.”(39) All United Nations maps state that "The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been determined, "but India refuses to recognise it as a dispute. Ironically, besides UN resolutions, India did accept Kashmir as a dispute and source of tension that requires “final settlement” in all its major accords with Pakistan, i.e. the Tashkent Declaration (1996); Simla Accord (1972); Lahore Declaration (1999) and the recent Joint Statement (5 January 2004).

§ Fourthly, unlike Northern Ireland which did not figure on UN fora, Kashmir is one of the oldest pending items on UN agenda. In fact India has retracted from its pledges to the people of Kashmir, to the international community and to Pakistan — to abide by the people's wishes in Kashmir, as enshrined in the UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru addressing a meeting in Srinagar in June 1951 said: “We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. The pledge we have given not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it”.(40)

§ Fifthly, unlike in Northern Ireland where “both governments loathed violence,” in the case of Kashmir though both sides condemn violence, yet their interpretation of violence and who is responsible for it diametrically opposite. While Pakistan regards Kashmiri resistance a freedom struggle. and terms the excesses committed by the Indian security forces as state terrorism, India terms the movement as ‘Pakistan sponsored’ and accuses Pakistan of ‘cross-border terrorism.’

§ Sixthly, the strategic interest of the warring parties in the Kashmir conflict varies hugely from that of those involved in the Irish conflict. A statement by Peter Brooke, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, on 9 November 1990 greatly impressed the IRA: "The British government has no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland, our role is to help, enable and encourage. Britain's purpose... is not to occupy, oppress or exploit, but to ensure democratic debate and free democratic choice." Its main concern was to fulfil its pledge to Northern Ireland's Protestants that they would not be forced into a union with Catholic Ireland. Contrarily, both India and Pakistan claim legitimate strategic, political, economic, moral and ideological interests in Kashmir. In fact, the conflict has become a symbol of conflicting national ideologies — Islamic identity vs secularism which in turn are considered to be very raison deter of the two nations. In addition, time and again references are made to extra-regional strategic interests in Kashmir, an allusion to the US strategic interest in the area. This may compound the already complex strategic matrix of Kashmir.

§ Seventhly, though there were human rights violations in both cases, but in the case of the Irish conflict Amnesty international and Human Rights Watch were granted easy access to Northern Ireland. In contrast, in Kashmir, neither AI, HRW nor the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture nor the UN Working Group on Disappearances have ever been allowed visits to check up on human rights violations.

§ Eighthly, the Irish militants were much more sophisticated and far better armed than the militants in Kashmir. Further, apart from political support of the Irish Republic, a very strong segment of Irish-American population supported the Irish insurgency. Kashmiris though enjoying Pakistan’s support do not have any matching support base in the US. Besides, the very character and contours of insurgency in Ireland and Kashmir are different. The Irish insurgency was much more organised and the military wing — the IRA — was strongly under the control of the political command of Sinn Fein. Though splinter groups like the Real IRA and Continuity IRA did cause some trouble after the accord was signed, yet it was not very formidable, and thereby did not pose much threat to GFA. On the other hand, the armed and political struggles in Kashmir are neither as closely knitted nor as united. The APHC does not have much control over the armed groups except moral pressure. Further, the APHC is an umbrella group, facing problems from within and is lately divided vertically into Gilani and Ansari factions. The armed groups, though united under the Muthahida Jehad Council (MJC), pose equally confronting challenges from within. The lack of organisation and unity within political and armed ranks of the struggle makes the task of peace more complex and demands a different modus operandi which could provide them a chance to work out operational details of the dialogue as there is a complete consensus on what they demand and what they are fighting for.

§ Ninthly, while London had demonstrated political will to settle the Irish conflict, New Delhi has so far exhibited utmost intransigence, seeking to perpetuate the status quo and avoid negotiating on the Kashmir issue. The lack of political will on the part of India has led to failure of previous attempts like UN mediation, bilateral talks, and the Tashkent and Simla agreements to solve the issue. In contrast, London showed tremendous political will and got engaged in sustained negotiations with Dublin and Belfast from 1984 to 1998 in which back-channel diplomacy also played an important role. The 1998 accord was in fact culmination of several sub-accords spread over 25 years. These included:

The Good Friday Agreement was the product of 22 months of intense multi-party talks that started in June 1996. The Irish Agreement as discussed earlier is based on the Three Strands formula which envisages democratic institutions in Northern Ireland and three separate bodies to deal with the increasingly complex, overlapping relationships between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The North-South Ministerial Council deals with the totality of relationships within the island of Ireland. The British-Irish Council provides a forum for the representatives of the London and Dublin governments, the devolved institutions in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh as well as the crown dependencies of the Channel Isles and the Isle of Man. Finally, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference brings together the two governments to promote bilateral co-operation.

The agreement stipulated disarmament of all paramilitary groups within two years. The British government agreed to make progress towards “reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces deployed in Northern Ireland,” “removal of security installations”, and “removal of emergency powers” in Northern Ireland.

The agreement envisaged “mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for the release of prisoners” within a fixed timeframe and taking of “measures to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community.” It also provided for making the composition of police more balanced as it was 92% Protestants(46) at the time of signing of the agreement. It also proposed establishing an independent commission on policing (ICP) to propose reforms in policing structures and arrangements which was to submit its report within two years. The ICP was set up on 3 June 1998 under the chairmanship of the former governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten. The establishment of a commission for police reforms was a major step towards allaying Irish Catholic fears of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

The agreement also addresses the grievances of the Catholic minority regarding equality, justice, human rights, economic, social and cultural rights and ensures safeguards against their harassment. The Agreement established new independent commissions relating to human rights and equality and a separate commission to review criminal justice system.

The GFA was approved in simultaneous referendums on 22 May 1998 in Northern Ireland (by 71%) and the Irish Republic (by 94%).(47) It should be pointed out that a significant section of the population, predominantly Protestant, are at best lukewarm in their support of the peace process. In the May 1998 referendum, an estimated 96 per cent of the Catholic community supported it as opposed to only 52 per cent of Protestants.(48) The agreement soon started facing problems of implementation and its support base began to shrink further. A Belfast Telegraph survey, published early February 1999, indicated that support for the Agreement had shrunk by 6% since the May 1998 referendum.(49)

The referendum in the North and the South ratified the Agreement and in the Republic of Ireland it also served to endorse the amendment to the Irish Constitution. These changes only became operative on 2 December 1999 when the Irish government got satisfied that the other elements of the Good Friday Agreement were being implemented.

The GFA provides for a 108-member Assembly elected by proportional representation and a 14-member executive body in Northern Ireland in which both Catholic and Protestant political representatives sit together in government. This is only the second time such power-sharing has occurred since 1920 (the first was the short-lived Sunningdale Agreement of 1973-74).

The Assembly is capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, in the areas of finance, education, environment, health, social services, economic development and agriculture and is subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of both communities. The Agreement also established a consultative Civic Forum to support the work of the Assembly. The power-sharing executive body, composed of 10 ministers drawn from four political parties plus the First and Deputy First Ministers, is effectively the government.

Following a referendum, the Northern Ireland Assembly was constituted under the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998. On 25 June 1998, 108 members were elected to the new Assembly. None of the UUP candidates who opposed the Good Friday Agreement was elected. Moreover, the DUP and other anti-agreement parties failed to secure the 30 seats necessary to impede the work of the Assembly.(50) However, the Northern Ireland government was not constituted until a year later, and brought to a standstill over the issue of IRA decommissioning.

On 12 February 2000 the Assembly and its associated institutions were suspended, but were restored on 30 May. They were again suspended for 24 hours on 11 August 2001 and 22 September 2001, and finally on 14 October 2002. The British government suspended Northern Ireland’s power-sharing Assembly/government amid allegations that Sinn Fein were involved in the IRA spy ring which was gathering intelligence inside British government offices in Belfast while the Unionists insisted that the IRA was breaking its commitment to disarm. Elections to the Assembly were held on 26 November 2003 which returned hardline DUP with 30 seats — more than any of its rivals. The pro-accord UUP finished behind DUP with 27 seats.(51) DUP’s leader Ian Paisely has declared that he would never agree to form a government with Sinn Fein. The emergence of Paisely and DUP has added a new hurdle to the peace process. However, the Sinn Fein, which has captured 24 seats, is ready to share power with DUP and wants a swift end to direct British rule. The emergence of hardliners on both sides at the expense of moderates has virtually scuttled the 1998 Accord. However, the Northern Secretary, Paul Murphy, has said the Belfast Agreement will remain "fundamentally unchanged" because the majority of the electorate supported it. He said nothing could alter the principles of power-sharing, North-South relationships or consent which were central to politics in Northern Ireland. The DUP has insisted that the Belfast Agreement must be renegotiated to create a new settlement acceptable to unionists.(50)

Strand One when applied to Kashmir conflict needs some modification as unlike Northern Ireland where the conflict was mainly over power-sharing between unionist (majority) and nationalists (minority) — two sectarian communities — in Kashmir the two parts of the state, divided by LoC are under sovereign control of India and Pakistan and have their own administrative structures. Secondly, power-sharing is not the central issue in either zone. In the case of Kashmir there is a need for twin-track approach at the Strand One level. Track one may focus on the institutionalisation of intra-Kashmiri dialogue within IHK and AJK and between the Indian and Pakistani zones of Kashmir. This would act as an institutionalised consultation mechanism which would greatly help in eventual determination of the wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people.

While Track Two may devote itself to drawing up new structures and arrangements that would give way to the existing political, administrative and constitutional structures as a result of permanent solution of Kashmir. In the case of Pakistani zone of Kashmir, Azad Kashmir’s relationship with Pakistan, which is subjected to the final status of Kashmir, would entail constitutional and institutional changes, which may emerge as a result of an overall settlement of the Kashmir. Since AJK is largely a homogeneous unit, especially culturally, linguistically and religiously, and there is no strong urge to look for options outside Pakistan, its status would not change radically, though it would become more autonomous in its affairs with Pakistan and other Kashmir zone now under the Indian control. Similarly, Northern Areas directly under Pakistan’s administration does not face any major agitation for either opting out of Pakistan or merging with any other unit of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. So a greater degree of autonomy would suffice whether the region is merged with Pakistan or remains autonomous.

On the other hand, the existing political-administrative and constitutional structures of the Indian zone of Kashmir would be radically changed for two reasons. One, the Kashmir Valley is completely alienated from New Delhi, especially after the sufferings of the last 14 years at the hands of the Indian army and the paramilitary forces. The Valley has always looked for a status outside the Indian Constitution which satisfies their right of self-determination. The autonomy given under Article 370 has neither satisfied Kashmiris nor has been respected by New Delhi. Both sides have always pulled in opposite directions, while New Delhi ever trying to integrate Kashmir, the Kashmiris kept on pressing for the right of self-determination. So restoration of Article 370 is unlikely to work again, as it has already been tried but failed. Thereby, it has to be going beyond autonomy to some kind of self-rule — a quasi-sovereign status — which can satisfy the aspirations of the Kashmiris.

Secondly, demographically, the Indian-controlled zone of Kashmir is much more complex in at least two ways. First, it has reasonable size of Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist majority inhabiting Jammu (Jammu, Udhumpur and Kathua districts) and Ladakh (Leh district),(53) respectively, who would like to seek some regional autonomy in the event of any permanent solution of Kashmir. For various reasons there have been voices for local autonomy in these regions from time to time which have become louder in the wake of the freedom struggle and are likely to increase as the Valley moves towards a new arrangement. Secondly, the two regions have substantial Muslim populations (Poonch, Doda and Rajouri districts in Jammu and Kargil in Ladakh region) which would turn into minority if the Valley is separated from the other regions. In that event these districts would certainly like to be a part of the Valley and not treated as minority ‘subject’ as they have had awful memories of the Dogra rule which had earlier forced them to revolt. Also, the Muslim populations in these regions would not like to be left at the mercy of regional majorities while their brethren in the Valley exercise their right to determine their final status. Thus given the demographic faultlines, a reconstitution of the Kashmir Valley would be a fait accompli which would imply merger of the Muslim majority areas of Jammu and Ladakh with the Valley.

The dialogue on ‘devising new structures in reconstituted Kashmir’ can go along New Delhi-Srinagar and Islamabad-Muzaffarabad axes, while intra-Kashmiri dialogue could take place along Srinagar-Muzaffarabad axis.

Sumantra Bose, who has tried to draw a parallel between the Irish Three Strands formula and a formula for a Kashmir settlement, has proposed ‘3 Dimensions of Peace in Kashmir.’ The proposed Dimension 2, is roughly equivalent to Strand One. It is The New Delhi-Srinagar and Islamabad-Muzaffarabad axes. According to Sumantra, the objective of the process would be “the gradual, incremental normalization of politics within Kashmir in both Indian- and Pakistani-controlled zones, and devising and implementation of political frameworks which can foster a working degree of internal accommodation and cooperation between the representatives of communities holding radically different basic political allegiances.” (54) He observes that this process would “logically lead eventually to a re-institutionalization of a multi-tiered political structure autonomous of New Delhi in Indian-controlled Kashmir. While the restoration of substantial self-rule to Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir would be crucial, any such autonomous government must be multi-tiered, according the Jammu and Ladakh regions — where political dynamics differ from those in the Valley — a fair degree of control over their own affairs within any self-rule structures, thereby offsetting the risk of a new form of centralized domination from Srinagar.”(55) It should be noted that though Kashmir is a diverse region, its diversity is at peace with itself which would make the working of the new arrangements much easier.

The Belfast Agreement established a North-South Ministerial Council that deals with the totality of relationships within the island of Ireland. The Council