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SPOTLIGHT ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS |
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| Vol. XXX No. 9 |
September 2011 |
INDUS WATERS ACROSS 50 YEARS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN
This paper attempts to look into the achievements and failures of India and Pakistan in utilising their respective share of water from the Indus Basin. Studies show that India and Pakistan share lot of similarities and fewer differences in the management of the Indus Basin waters. Comparing notes identifies the need for Pakistan to learn from India in increasing water productivity and developing hydroprojects’ potential on the one hand; while on the other, it points to the need for Pakistan to take serious policy steps against India’s drive to build numerous hydropower projects on its eastern tributaries of the Indus Basin, which can cumulatively increase flood level in wet seasons and decrease water volume in dry seasons downstream Pakistan. The present and future challenge for both the countries is efficient utilisation of existing water resources. While India needs to focus on the maintenance of existing water-infrastructure and follow water-efficient practices, Pakistan must embark on major investments in building water infrastructure besides maintaining the existing one and adopting sustainable practices for water conservation.
Arising from the Tibetan Plateau in western China, the Indus River travels northwest through the Himalayan valleys and after crossing into the Kashmir region and traversing Pakistan, flows out into the Arabian Sea. The principal rivers of the Indus system are snow-fed and their flow varies seasonally and spatially.(1) Most of the Indus Basin lies in India and Pakistan, and only about 13 per cent of its total catchment in Afghanistan and in China’s autonomous region of Tibet.(2)
The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank in 1960, divides the Indus Basin system between India and Pakistan by allocating three eastern rivers of the basin, namely the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India and the three western rivers — the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum — to Pakistan. The Treaty obliges both India and Pakistan to not interfere in the waters of the rivers allocated to the other side except for the limit specified(3) for Agricultural Use, Domestic Use and Non-Consumptive Use. India was also given the right to generate hydroelectricity on waters of the western rivers through run-of-the river projects, i.e. without altering the flow of water. The same right has, however, not been given to Pakistan on the eastern rivers.(4)
Table 1.1
Statistics for the Indus Basin
|
India |
Pakistan |
|
|
Length |
1,114 km |
1, 708 miles |
|
Basin area |
321289 sq. km |
252,638 miles2 |
|
Average annual flow |
73.31 BCM |
173.63 BCM |
|
Live storage capacity |
6.57 BCM |
15 MAF |
|
Utilizable surface water |
46.0 BCM |
— |
|
Basin Population in 2010 |
58.42 million |
172 million |
|
Per capita availability of water 2010 |
1255 CM |
1038 CM |
Sources (India): Central Water Commission, 2010(5)
Sources (Pakistan): WAPDA 2011,(6) Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-2011,(7) Planning Commission.(8)
Note: BCM = Billion Cubic Meters, CM = Cubic Meters, MAF=Million Acres Feet
Having a catchment area of 321289 sq km up to border, the Indus Basin is one of the six major river basins of India.(9) It lies in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and the disputed area of Jammu & Kashmir.
Although water is a state subject in India and states have the exclusive power to regulate their water supplies, irrigation and hydropower infrastructure, the central government under the provision of “economic and social planning” of the concurrent list has been proposing various reforms such as the introduction of participatory management in irrigation and sponsoring projects to utilize surface and groundwater more efficiently. A Model Bill to regulate and control the development and management of ground water was formulated in 2005, which led to the establishment of a groundwater authority under the direct control of the government. In the recent past, the Indian Government embarked upon major reforms in the water sector,(10) which are largely focused on improving water efficiency in agriculture and building new power projects. These reforms however lack aspects on maintenance of old and existing infrastructure.
The present section deals with past achievements and failures of India in managing its share of waters in the Indus Basin within two selected study areas: irrigation and hydropower.
Immediately after independence from colonial rule and in the pre-Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) period, India embarked upon various schemes to provide irrigation to those areas previously uncovered by the British. This included enlarging the capacity of the Sirhind Canal, and Upper Bari Doab Canal System as well as construction of the Bist Doab Canal System on the Sutlej.(11) The Ferozepur Feeder and head regulator of Rajasthan Feeder was completed during 1947-1960 along with the remodelling of the pre-1947 barrages of Ropar and Madhopur. The Bhakra-Beas system was conceived as early as the late 1950s. It consists of the Bhakra Dam constructed on the Sutlej River in the state of Himachel Pradesh, Nangal Barrage constructed on the same river downstream of Bhakra Dam in the state of Punjab and its canal system. Major part of the canal system was operational before 1960 with the Bhakra Dam being completed in 1963. This new system of Indus canals led to the growth of irrigated area in the Indian part of the Indus Basin from 22.0 million hectares (ha) in 1947 to 55.0 million ha in 2000.(12) The Bhakra Dam alone added an irrigated area of 6.8 million hectares over 35 years. The production of rice and wheat in the Bhakra command area in 1996-97 was eight times the 1960-61 figure.(13)
One of the biggest landmarks in Indus Basin irrigation achievements is the Indira Gandhi Canal Project. Conceived as early as 1940 and previously known as the Rajasthan Canal Project, it was reviewed in the post-IWT years. The main objective of the project was to convert arid and semi-arid lands of Rajasthan into cultivable area and to provide water for drinking and industrial uses to the local people. Construction began in 1958 to provide 9.36 BCM of water per year to the Indira Gandhi Canal (IGC) by building links between the main canal starting from the Sutlej River in Punjab and a feeder canal on Harike Barrage constructed at a point downstream the confluence of the Beas and Sutlej rivers. The IGC project with a cultivable command area of 1.55m ha is India’s largest irrigation and drinking water project to cater for the needs of five districts in north-western Rajasthan.(14) The project is still under construction creating further irrigation potential in the command areas.
In the immediate post-IWT period, the Indian government embarked upon interlinking the eastern rivers — the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, through canal networking and diversion projects. The idea to transfer surplus water of the Beas into the Sutlej led to the conception of Beas-Sutlej Link Project, the largest tunnelling project in the country.(15)
Since 1960, three important storage dams have been built on the eastern rivers of the Indus basin, namely the Bhakra dam on the Sutlej, the Beas (Pong) dam on the Beas and the Thein (Ranjit Sagar) dam on the Ravi, with respective gross storage capacities of 9340 million cum, 8570 million cum. and 3280 million cum.(16) Besides building these massive reservoirs, the Indian government embarked upon modernization of canal systems and command area development programme to enhance agriculture production in areas fed by the Indus waters.
Some of the prominent achievements of India in the irrigation sector of the Indus-fed areas are:
· In the past decades, India has achieved a steady increase in irrigation development through various major, medium and small irrigation projects. Over the years, states in the Indus region became the food baskets for other areas in India. Major area under food grain in Haryana and Punjab is irrigated and these are the highest water productivity states in India contributing to 72 per cent and 75 per cent of consumptive water use, respectively.(17)
· Huge investments in canal networking and inter-basin transfer projects resulted in the popular green revolution which transformed India from a nation facing frequent famines in the 1950s and 60s to a self-sufficient and food exporting country.
· Irrigation development in poor rainfall areas especially in Punjab and Haryana is supported by the vast network of power supply and distribution networks. This allows farmers to use groundwater in addition to canal water to grow crops throughout the year.(18) Installation of diesel pumpsets and energised tubewells remained the largest for these two states in the Indus Basin. Moreover, Indian Punjab received 100 per cent rural electrification which gave farmers reliable and fast access to groundwater resources.(19)
· Indian experiences with Water User Associations (WUAs) are a good example in participatory watershed management. Within Rajasthan alone, there are 800 WUAs. Although these WUAs are less effective in influencing equitable water distribution and demand management, their positive role in cost recovery, system maintenance and service quality cannot be denied.(20
However, India today has achieved the limits of developing its water resources for irrigation purposes. Reliability on surface water in the Indus region is difficult due to its dependency on seasonal rainfall and snowmelt. With regard to groundwater resources, the scenario is bleak in the face of reports of overexploitation by the agriculture sector of the region states. India is the world’s largest user of groundwater in agriculture.(21) Haryana and Punjab have exploited about 94 per cent of their ground water resources. This water stress situation combined with low rainfall in the Indus basin region of India ranging from 300 mm in Rajasthan to 800 mm in Haryana and falling water tables by less than one metre to several metres/per year,(22) pose alarming threats to future irrigation in the region. With reduced rainfall levels in the past years, there has been a sharp rise in tubewell uses for irrigation across the Indus region, exhausting the groundwater resources and putting the high-cost incurred canal system in jeopardy.
Some of the major failures of the Indian government in irrigation water management in the Indus Basin are listed below:
· As the country witnessed a swift increase in irrigation potential across the years, a gap can be identified between the potential created and utilised (Table 1.2) in the Basin states. Moreover, wide discrepancies exist between huge water withdrawals (96%) and actual water used for crop production (37%) in the region (Table 1.3). The table shows that the irrigation sector accounts for 96% of total water withdrawal and the actual consumptive use for the crops is only 37%. This leaves a balance of 59%, which could otherwise be saved by adopting water-efficient practices at farm level. Unconcerned about this variance, the Indian government plans to create additional irrigation potential in the Eleventh Plan through major and medium irrigation projects(23) rather than focusing on increasing the efficient utilisation of existing water supply and irrigation potential created under the previous five-year plans.
· Waterlogging and salinity issues have also been arising out of mismanagement of water resources. For example, the command areas irrigated under the famously thriving Indira Gandhi Canal Project have witnessed an average rise of groundwater of 0.42 m/annum during the two-decade period observed from 1952 to 1972. Cultivation in about 4.4% of the area has been abandoned due to waterlogging and salinity. One of the major reasons for high rise in soil salinity and waterlogging is the absence of drainage system in the IGCP region. Moreover, inconsistency between large water releases and low irrigation usage is also leading to water seepages and subsequent waterlogging.(24)
· Lack of enforcement of energy regulations is one of the leading causes of the inconsistency pattern in water supply and demand resulting in subsequent inefficient use of water. The Indian government has failed to restrain farmers from digging more bore-wells in spite of the existing laws.(25) Almost 75% of all irrigated areas in Indian Punjab depend upon well and tubewell irrigation.(26) According to V.R. Reddy, “since water rates are charged in terms of area, crop and season (or combinations thereof), they fail to create enough incentive for water use efficiency. While water rates in groundwater areas are relatively higher, they are also related to average pump costs rather than to water productivity or economic value.”(27)
· The cropping pattern in the Basin states is largely responsible for the current water depletion scenario. Over the past decades, the pre-dominance of rice-wheat production in the Indus basin of India, Punjab and Haryana in particular, has led to a reduction in area under low-water requiring crops, resulting in high demand for groundwater resources.(28) The overdrawal of water beyond the recharge capacity of the aquifers is resulting in rapid fall of subsoil water to dangerous levels.
Table 1.2
Achievements of Total Irrigation Potential Created and Utilised (Cumulative) by State [Taking Major, Medium and Minor Irrigation Schemes into consideration]
(Unit: '000 Hectare)
|
Sr. No. |
State |
Haryana |
Himachal Pradesh |
J & K |
Punjab |
Rajasthan |
|
|
1. |
Ultimate Potential |
4512 |
353 |
1358 |
5967 |
5128 |
|
|
2. |
At the end of Sixth Plan 1980 - 85 |
Irrigation Potential created |
3310.0 |
123.0 |
490.0 |
5426.0 |
3699.0 |
|
Irrigation Potential Utilised |
3106.0 |
110.0 |
439.0 |
5373.0 |
3488.0 |
||
|
3. |
At the end of Seventh Plan 1985-90 |
Irrigation Potential created |
3509.0 |
134.6 |
514.3 |
5596.7 |
4176.1 |
|
Irrigation Potential Utilised |
3245.9 |
118.7 |
463.2 |
5505.4 |
3943.3 |
||
|
4. |
At the end of Annual Plan 1990-92 |
Irrigation Potential created |
3559.5 |
149.6 |
521.6 |
5657.5 |
4387.7 |
|
Irrigation Potential Utilised |
3274.7 |
126.5 |
488.3 |
5547.2 |
4203.6 |
||
|
5. |
At the end of VIII Plan 1992-97 |
Irrigation Potential created |
4392.2 |
209.1 |
539.3 |
9390.4 |
6545.5 |
|
Irrigation Potential Utilised |
4023.4 |
178.2 |
490.5 |
8700.1 |
5832.8 |
||
|
6. |
At the end of IX Plan 1997-2002 |
Irrigation Potential created |
4539.1 |
230.1 |
620.1 |
8885.6 |
8678.1 |
|
Irrigation Potential Utilised |
4130.3 |
190.8 |
533.1 |
8286.8 |
6372.7 |
||
|
7. |
At the end of 2002-07 |
Irrigation Potential created |
4669.2 |
263.1 |
770.0 |
9130.4 |
9235.6 |
|
Irrigation Potential Utilised |
4220.5 |
214.7 |
616.8 |
8505.3 |
6817.6 |
||
Source: Central Water Commission, India, 2010.(29)
Table 1.3
Water
withdrawal and Usage Discrepancies
for irrigation in Indus Basin (India)
|
Water withdrawal |
Total¹ (BCM) |
98 BCM |
|
|
As % of potentially utilizable resources² |
135 % |
|
|
|
Share of irrigation |
96 % |
|
|
|
NET³ as % of irrigation withdrawal |
37 % |
|
|
|
Total (Mha) |
11.6 Mha |
|
|
|
Gross irrigated area |
Ground water share |
58 % |
|
|
Ground water abstraction ratio4 |
67 % |
||
Source: R. M. Saleth, 2009.(30)
Notes:
¹Total includes withdrawals for irrigation, domestic and industrial sectors
²This also includes recycling
³NET is the net evapotranspiration of all irrigated crops
4It relates total groundwater withdrawals to the total groundwater availability through natural recharge and return flows
The hydroelectric potential of the Indus Basin in the country as assessed by the Central Electricity Authority of India is 19988.00 Megawatt (MW) with a probable installed capacity of 33382.00 MW. The total number of identified schemes in the Basin is 190, out of which 79 (see Annex 1) have been graded under categories A, B, and C for priority purposes.(31)
India has achieved phenomenal progress in developing its hydropower resources although huge gaps exist between demand and supply of power across the country. The five rivers of the Indus Basin — the Ravi, Beas, Sutlej, Chenab and Jhelum — provide large hydropower resources to India while for the latter two rivers, limits and conditions have been specified in the IWT. The Sutlej River with an identified hydropower potential of 9443.75 MW is the largest hydropower resource in the Indian part of Indus Basin. Five schemes on the Sutlej are already in operation with a total installed capacity of 3150.25 MW. Projects under execution or likely to be commissioned in the near future will add another 1880.50 MW to the installed capacity. The remaining 4296 MW potential is yet to be developed.(32) Similar is the case with other rivers in the basin where a large number of major and medium hydropower schemes are already in operation, some are under study and others awaiting approval for execution (Table 1.4).
Table 1.4
Existing Hydropower projects in the Indus Basin (India)
|
Name of |
Existing Hydropower Stations |
Total Installed Capacity (MW) |
|
Sutlej River |
Bhakra, Ganguwal, Kotla, AP Sahib, Sanjay Bhaba, Baspa, Naptha Jhakri and Ghanvi |
3556.8 |
|
Beas River |
Pong, Dehar, Shannan, Mukerian, Malana, Gaj, Bassi, Larji, Baner, Binwa and Kahuli |
2015.5 |
|
Ravi River |
Chamera I, Chamera II, Baira Siul, Sewa I, Ranjit Sagar and Upper Bari Doab Canal hydropower project |
1738.35 |
|
Chenab River |
Baglihar, Salal, Dul Hasti, Chenani and Thirot |
1565.14 |
|
Jhelum River |
Mohara, Gandharbal, Uri, Lower Jhelum and Upper Sindh Hydropower Projects |
736.6 |
Source: Adapted from South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People.(33)
The development of hydropower potential in the Indus Basin has become a priority for the Indian government over the past few decades as seen from reports of large number of proposed schemes. In fact, the valleys of Ravi, Beas and Sutlej have been saturated with hydel projects.(34) The large number of proposed and installed hydropower stations in the Basin are, however, generating below the installed capacities. According to South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People “a downward trend (Figure 1.1) can be witnessed in hydropower generation across the Basin tributaries including Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum.”(35)
Figure 1.1 Hydro Power Performance in Sutluj, Bias, Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum Basin
Source: South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, 2010.(36)
The viability of under-construction and proposed hydropower projects is, therefore, a big question mark in view of the diminishing performance of existing hydropower projects in the Basin. This also nullifies Indian arguments for the need to explore the untapped hydropower potential in the occupied Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) region. The Indian government has long been arguing that due to the limitations of the IWT regarding the Indian use of waters of the Jhelum and Chenab, the occupied state of J&K has to suffer energy shortages. Whereas the reality is that the performance of big hydropower projects in India does not match with the energy demands. For example, the two big hydropower projects in J&K – Salal 690 MW on the Chenab and Uri 480 MW on the Jhelum — have been generating much less power than existing demand.(37) According to Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, the Naptha Jhakri project (1500 MW) on the Sutlej River was not generating peaking power while it could.(38)
Like irrigation, the hydropower projects of India in the Indus Basin suffer from lack of maintenance. New developments in the hydropower sector can only lead to success with an integrated policy formulation. At present, the pace to build new hydropower projects in the Indus Basin seems to be driven by environmental changes and altered river flows in the region. The feasibility of these projects is, however, questionable in the long run, particularly for the large ones. Furthermore, downstream environmental aspects of these projects will only add to riparian tensions in South Asia. Pakistan has been raising serious objections to India’s massive designs of control infrastructures on the Jhelum and Chenab which may reduce the level of water for Pakistan’s own hydropower projects and irrigation schemes.
According to a US Senate report, “India has 33 projects at various stages of completion on the Indus River tributaries. While studies show that no single dam can affect Pakistan’s waters but cumulative effects of these projects could give India the ability to store enough water to limit the supply to Pakistan at crucial moments in the growing season.”(39)
The Indus River system is the single major water resource for Pakistan. Depending heavily on seasonal rainfall and glacial melt for its average flow, the Indus Basin system is the backbone of agrarian economy of Pakistan.
With 56% drainage area(40) of the Indus Basin within its boundaries, Pakistan has been facing the challenge of water management with the hydrological changes induced by infrastructure investments and climate variations in the basin. Pakistan’s water resources are under serious stress from population pressure, lack of storage capacities and inefficient water management practices at the public level. The government of Pakistan has increasingly been paying attention to various problems in the water sector over the recent years. For example, increases in electricity tariffs and diesel prices during recent years have discouraged farmers from high groundwater mining through electric and diesel tubewells. However, there is a greater need to improve and modernise the existing canal infrastructure in order to encourage conjunctive use of surface and groundwater for agriculture.
Existing water resources can generate more than the required energy but this requires infrastructure investment and technological applications. The present challenge for Pakistan is to increase water sector efficiency at the public level besides developing new projects.
The following section deals with the achievements and failures of Pakistan in managing its share of waters in the Indus Basin within two selected study areas: irrigation and hydropower.
The process of water development for irrigation was given great attention in the post-independence period. Besides other large-scale schemes to interlink canal irrigation in the country, three major storage reservoirs, namely Tarbela on the Indus, Mangla on the Jhelum and Chashma on the Indus, were built (Table 1.5) to meet the requirements for those areas earlier irrigated from supplies of the rivers that went to India under the Indus Waters Treaty (1960). This vast irrigation system feeds more than 40 million acres of irrigated land in Pakistan, a country with the highest irrigated and rain-fed land ratio in the world.(41) The same system provides fresh water supply to a population of 172 million besides sharing aggregate energy at 33.07 per cent.(42)
Table 1.5
Salient Features of Irrigation Network on the Indus Basin (Pakistan)
Source: Shams ul Mulk, 2009.(43)
Some of the major achievements of Pakistan in the Indus Basin irrigation system are reviewed:
· The Indus Basin infrastructure created in the latter half of the past century is a valuable asset for Pakistan as it generates production that accounts for 25 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), 47 per cent of total employment, and more than 60 per cent of annual national foreign exchange earnings.(44) The most vibrant and result-producing era of agriculture was the introduction and widespread adoption of green revolution technologies with increased canal supplies after completion of the Mangla Dam and IBP works, giving an average growth rate of 6.3% during 1965-70.(45)
· Massive investment in surface water infrastructure during the post-independence period has resulted in positive economic growth commonly known as green revolution of the 1960s. The actual power and irrigation benefits from Tarbela only (1975-1998) were 25 per cent higher than the appraisal estimates.(46)
· Agriculture is the largest user of water (97%) in Pakistan. In order to achieve high production targets, the water sector has increasingly been gaining government attention during the past decades. A number of new projects financed by the government are in the process of completion (Table 1.6), which will add to government’s control over surface water supply to the command areas.
· In order to control land salinisation, the government introduced groundwater pumps in the 1960s installing 16,700 tubewells to supply water to an area of 2.6 million ha under the Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARPs). Besides reducing the risk of soil salinity, the SCARP programme increased irrigation supplies to the existing public canal system through groundwater discharge.(47)
· Other water management efforts include massive projects of National Drainage Programme (NDP), left- and right-bank outfall drains (LBOD and RBOD), National Watercourse Improvement Programme, On-farm Water Management (OFWM) programme for controlling seepage and improving water delivery to the lower reaches, rehabilitation and modernization programme of barrages and irrigation systems by the provinces, creation of provincial irrigation and drainage authorities, water-user associations (WUAs), farmer organizations (FOs) and area water boards (AWBs). Water conservation technologies like bed-furrow, raised beds, zero-tillage, laser land levelling and dry-seeding of rice have been introduced but are going at a very limited scale.(48)
Table 1.6
Major Water Sector Projects under Completion
* Date of completion for all three canals is for phase-I, whereas cost is reflected for total project.
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-2011.(49)
Some of the major failures of the Pakistan government in irrigation water management in the Indus Basin are listed below:
· Throughout the post-independence period, massive attention has been given to the engineering aspects of the irrigation system in Pakistan with no concern for management and conservation of water resources. Receiving only 250 millimetres (mm) of rainfall per year—far less than the world average,(50) Pakistan is totally dependent on the Indus Basin waters for irrigation and other requirements. Lack of adaptation to seasonal variations in basin flows is the major reason for the present water crisis in the country. The problem gets further exacerbated with irregular Indian withdrawal and release of water in the shared river bodies. This happened in August-September 2008 when India withdrew water from the Chenab to fill its Baglihar hydroelectric dam reducing the river flows to as low as 25,000 cusecs on 4 September 2008.(51) This also happened recently when Indian releases of excess Sutlej water during the monsoon rains have inundated a large number of Pakistani villages and destroyed hundreds of hectares of ready cropped area.
· The present irrigation system supplies about 11% less water than actual crop requirements.(52) At the time of independence, Pakistan had about 67 million acre feet (MAF) water available for diversion, this figure increased to about 85 MAF by 1960. The recent statistical data shows that the Indus and its tributaries provide about 147 MAF during flood season, out of which nearly 106 MAF is diverted into canals and is available for irrigating 14.6 million hectares of land, while about 39 MAF of water outflows into sea annually, whereas over 8.6 MAF is considered evaporation and seepage losses in the river system. The storage capacity of Pakistan’s major reservoirs — Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma — has already declined to 12.6 MAF.(53)
· Official estimates for present irrigation efficiency range from 40 to 45 per cent only About 11 million hectares of arable land in Pakistan is affected by waterlogging while over 3 million hectares are affected by salinity.(54)
· In spite of the fact that total water availability has increased within the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) over the past 15 years, the average water availability is continuously falling in Pakistan due to limited storage capacity and water leakages from canals. During the monsoon season of July-September 2010, Pakistan received an increase of 81.6 per cent in actual rainfall but the canal head withdrawals in Kharif (April-September 2010) decreased by 21 per cent.(55)
· The government is all in favour of increasing the cultivated area by building more storage reservoirs. The target set for 2025 is to increase the cropped area to 31.83 million hectares.(56) Although the focus should be on increasing water productivity per irrigated unit.
· Pakistan’s irrigation system is suffering from major water losses (Table 1.7) owing to lack of canal system maintenance, siltation in the reservoirs, saline water areas and traditional cropping patterns. Water seepages are one of the major reasons for low crop yields against per unit of water withdrawal.
· Lack of demand management has led to the overexploitation of water resources resulting in falling water tables, degraded groundwater quality and poor yields. The area irrigated by groundwater alone has increased from 2.7 million to 3.4 million ha whereas the area irrigated by canal water alone has decreased from 7.9 million to 6.9 million ha.(57) The declining use of surface water across the country is challenging the efficacy of world’s largest contiguous irrigated network.
Table 1.7
Seepage losses in Indus Basin Irrigation System
Source: Medium Term Development Framework 2005-2010.(58)
Hydropower (11 %) after gas (50%) and oil (30%) is the third largest source of energy supply in the country.(59) Pakistan is endowed with hydropower resources of about 60000 MW, almost all of which lie in the provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Gilgit-Baltistan, Punjab, besides Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K). The total installed capacity of hydropower projects in the country up till 2010 is 6720 MW, out of which 3849 MW is in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 1699 MW in Punjab, and 133 MW in the Gilgit-Baltistan, besides 1039 MW in AJ&K. (Table 1.8).(60)
Table 1.8
Hydropower Resources of Pakistan
Source: Annual Report of Private Power and Infrastructure Board, 2011, Government of Pakistan.
At the time of partition in 1947, Pakistan inherited only 60 MWs hydropower capacity for its 31.5 million people. By 1958, this capacity was increased to 119 MW. During the post-Indus Waters Treaty period, the 1000-MW Mangla and 3478-MW Tarbela Hydropower Projects were completed to meet the rising demand of the growing population.(61) At present, 35 major and medium hydropower stations are operating in Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Gilgit-Baltistan and AJ&K. Within Gilgit-Baltistan alone, there are 84 small hydel projects with less than 2 MW capacity (see, Annex II).
The development of hydropower in the country has really helped in increasing the rural electrification network in the country. Pakistan has installed 538 micro hydelpower plants (5-50 KW capacity) with a total capacity of 7.8 MWs resulting in electrification of 700,000 houses.(62) The Tarbela and Mangla dams are a big success story in hydropower development of the country. These dams are paying back three times their original cost by generating hydroelectricity at less than Re1 per unit.(63) The Tarbela Dam has in fact exceeded the predicted levels of power generation than the actual installed capacity.(64)
A number of new hydropower projects have been under investigation while others are in the process of construction. According to WAPDA reports, there are more than 150 projects of 30039 MWs which are in the process of implementation in the provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Gilgit-Baltistan, and AJ&K by public and private entities.(65)
Nearly all the operational projects in Pakistan are generating 2-30 MWs hydropower except for three large (Mangla, Tarbela and Ghazi Barotha) and three medium hydel stations (Warsak, Chashma and Malakand). These projects are only providing 35% of current power generation.(66) It is in this scenario that the country has not only been facing severe power shortages but the power rates are getting higher day by day. The full development of country’s hydropower potential requires huge infrastructure investment which depends upon effective planning as well as external help.
Many of the existing hydropower projects are generating below their installed capacity either owing to siltation problem in the reservoirs or due to old canal infrastructure. The two operating hydropower stations – Nandipur and Chichoki located at Upper Chenab Canal system — are reportedly generating power less than their installed capacity.(67) Learning from these experiences, the government is now building run-of-the-river projects to generate electricity without any fear of sedimentation. The Chashma Hydelpower Station on the Indus has already set the precedent for such projects in Pakistan.
Lots of problems regarding low level of hydropower generation than the actual potential of the country can be identified at the top of which are the financial constraints and administrative delays in commissioning the projects. Most under-construction projects are reportedly behind their scheduled time of completion. The feasibility studies and engineering design of the Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) were completed in 1997 for a 969-MW project by a Norwegian company.(68) Approved in 2002, the project was supposed to be completed in eight years time but the unnecessary delays in commissioning the project have not only increased the project cost but also provided India good enough time to start the construction of its Kishanganga Hydropower Project on the same river tributary. The NJHP has achieved only 13 per cent physical progress,(69) whereas the Indian project is in its advanced stages.
Many other projects are also facing similar delays including the Khan Khwar and the Duber Khwar in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and Chakothi-Hattian and Kohala power projects in AJ&K.(70)
In the post-IWT period, both India and Pakistan embarked upon projects for interlinking rivers in their respective water bodies. They share lot of similarities and fewer differences in the management of the Indus Basin waters (Table 1.9). India built the gigantic Indira Gandhi Canal Project besides many other reservoirs and Pakistan built numerous canals and barrages to interlink its three western rivers. Massive investments in building water infrastructure led to the growth of irrigated areas in the Indus Basin (Table 1.10) which subsequently provided a boost to the agricultural economies of the two countries. Introduction of tubewells and rural electrification encouraged the development of groundwater resources in both the countries. This has accelerated crop outputs in both India and Pakistan, the latter achieving high growth in terms of agricultural produce but low water productivity as compared to India. The overall water productivity was reported to be 0.5 kg/m3 for Pakistani Punjab and 1.0 kg/m3 for the Bhakra system of the Indian Punjab.(71)
Table 1.9
Comparison of irrigation and hydropower development in the Indus Basin
|
Randomly selected areas |
Pakistan |
India |
|
Agriculture growth rates 1947-2002 |
3.58 % per year |
2.8 % per year |
|
Maintenance of water distribution network |
Low |
Low |
|
Water productivity* |
Low |
High |
|
Exploitation of groundwater resources |
High |
High |
|
Nutrient-exhaustive cropping pattern |
High |
High |
|
Environmental degradation in canal command areas |
High |
High |
|
Pricing of groundwater(72) (diesel pumps, electric tube-wells) |
High |
High |
|
Private-public participation in energy development projects |
Low |
High |
|
Inequity in water distribution |
High |
High |
|
Seepage losses |
High |
Low |
*crop yields per cubic meter of water
Sources: World Bank,(73) V.R. Reddy,(74) Tushaar, et al,(75) R.S. Sidhu, and A.S. Bhullar(76)
Table 1.10
Growth of irrigated area in the Indus Basin in million ha
|
Year |
India |
Pakistan |
|
1947 |
22.0 (70)* |
10.75 (68) |
|
1950 |
22.0 (70) |
9.45 (68) |
|
1955 |
23.45 (70) |
10.60 (68) |
|
1960 |
26. 52 (70) |
12.04(67) |
|
1965 |
31.25 (70) |
12.95 (56) |
|
1970 |
32.30 (70) |
14.30 (56) |
|
1975 |
39.35 (69.7) |
13.83 (54) |
|
1985 |
41.77 (68.1) |
15.76 (52) |
|
1990 |
43.05 (65) |
16.30 (69.7) |
|
1995 |
53.0 (61.9) |
17.20 (49.4) |
|
2000 |
55.0 (60) |
18.00 (47) |
|
* Figures in parenthesis show the percentage of population engaged in agriculture. |
||
Source: H. Fahlbusch et al.(77)
There has been a shift in both India and Pakistan from surface water uses to groundwater uses during the recent decades. In spite of massive investments by India and Pakistan in canal networking, irrigation at present in both the countries relies heavily on tubewell and other water supply sources. Pure canal irrigation is on decline whereas groundwater irrigation is increasing in both. During the seven-year period between 1994 and 2001, India and Pakistan together lost over 5.5 million ha of canal irrigated areas despite massive investments in rehabilitation and new projects.(78) Reports show an overexploitation of groundwater resources not only for irrigation but also for domestic and industrial uses. Huge estimates exist for underground drilling and tubewells by the population living in the Indus Basin. According to a study by the University of Colorado, “the most intensively irrigated areas in northern India, eastern Pakistan and parts of Bangladesh are losing groundwater at an overall rate of 54 cubic kilometres per year.”(79) In future, therefore, water could be a major limiting factor in sustaining agriculture production in India and Pakistan.
Water productivity of the Indus region varies geographically and seasonally. Past massive investments in infrastructure development by India is one of the major reasons for comparatively better water productivity of irrigated crops. The existing live storage capacity of Pakistan is only 9 per cent of its average annual flow as compare to India which has 35 per cent (Table 1.11). Similar is the case for the development of hydropower resources in India and Pakistan as the former is performing better with regard to the existing power generation capacity (Table 1.12). In recent decades, Pakistan has embarked upon huge investments in water infrastructure development which will increase water storage capacity besides generating cheap hydelpower. Sustained institutional support is required in the hydropower sector of Pakistan to encourage rapid development of hydelpower resources besides taking serious policy steps against India’s drive to build numerous hydropower projects on the eastern tributaries of Indus Basin, which can cumulatively increase flood level in wet seasons and decrease water volume in dry seasons downstream Pakistan. The present day challenge for both India and Pakistan is the proper utilisation of existing water resources by adopting water conservation practices and efficient irrigation methods.
Table 1.11
Average annual flow and storage
capacity of Indus
Basin rivers in
India and
Pakistan
|
|
River Basin |
Catchment Area (1000 sq. km) |
Length (km) |
Average Annual Flow (MAF) |
No. of Dams |
Storage Capacity (MAF) |
% age Storage |
|
India* |
Sutlej-Beas |
- |
1,440 |
32 |
5 |
11.32 |
35 |
|
Pakistan** |
Indus and tributaries |
1,166 |
2,880 |
145 |
3 |
13.64 |
9 |
Sources: *Central Electricity Authority, India 2011.(80)
**Medium-Term Development Framework 2005-2010.(81)
Table 1.12
Status of hydroelectric potential development in Indus Basin
|
Identified capacity as per assessment |
Capacity developed |
Capacity under construction |
Capacity developed + under construction |
Balance potential |
|||||
|
|
MW |
MW |
% |
MW
|
% |
MW |
% |
MW |
% |
|
Indus* (India) |
33832 |
9929.3 |
29.34 |
5431.0
|
16.5 |
15360.3 |
46.51 |
18471.7 |
54.60 |
|
Indus** (Pakistan) |
59796 |
6720 |
11.23 |
30039 |
50.23 |
36759 |
61.47 |
23037 |
38.53 |
Sources: *Central Electricity Authority, Government of India.(82)
** Private Power and Infrastructure Board, Government of Pakistan.(83)
This research study shows that during the past 50 years, Indus Basin development has achieved substantial progress in both India and Pakistan within the sectors of irrigation and hydropower generation. The two countries share few differences and more similarities in the management of their respective share of Indus Basin waters. Massive investments in building surface water infrastructure and exploring groundwater development have resulted in high production rates in India and Pakistan. However, the management of Basin waters at present is posing a number of challenges including population pressures, climate-induced changes in water flows, groundwater depletion and old inefficient infrastructure for surface water supply. In the background of growing water insecurity in the region, past achievements in water management in the Basin cannot be called sustainable. Both countries need to adopt water-efficient practices at the public level besides maintaining existing water infrastructure.
Notes and References
1. “Indus River,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2011. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/286872/Indus-River>, (accessed 29 June 2011).
2. “History of Multipurpose River Valley Project Development in Indus Basin”, Bhakra Beas Management Board, Government of India. <http://bbmb.gov.in/english/menu2.asp>, (accessed 30 June 2011).
3. “Annexure B and Annexure C”, Indus Waters Treaty, World Bank. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf>, (accessed 7 July 2011).
4. See Articles II, III and IV, Text of Indus Waters Treaty, World Bank, Ibid.
5. “Water and Related Statistics”, Water Planning and Project Wing, Central Water Commission, Government of India, December 2010. <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/water%20and%20related%20statistics.pdf>, (accessed 8 July 2011).
6. “Projects for Friends of Democratic Pakistan”, Water and Power Development Authority, Government of Pakistan, March 2011, p.2. <http://www.wapda.gov.pk/pdf/BrochureFODPMarch2011.pdf>, (accessed 11 August 2011).
7. Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-2011, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. <http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1011.html>, (accessed 10 August 2011).
8. “Medium-Term Development Framework, 2005-2010,” Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, 2005. <http://www.planningcommission.gov.pk/mtdf/27-Water%20Sector/27-Water%20Sector.pdf>, (accessed 10 August 2011).
9. “Water and Related Statistics”, op.cit., (ref.5).
10. Philippe Cullet and Joyeeta Gupta, “India: Evolution of Water Law and Policy”, in Joseph W. Dellapenna and Joyeeta Gupta (eds.), The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water, (USA: Springer Academic Publishers, 2009), pp.166, 169-171.
11. H. Fahlbusch, Bart Schultz, and C.D. Thatte, (eds) The Indus Basin: History of Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Management, (New Delhi: International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage; New Delhi, 2004), p.25.
12. Ibid., pp.25-27, 132.
13. “Report on Economic Impact of Interlinking of Rivers Programme,” National Council of Applied Economic Research, India, April 2008, p. xiii. <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/99.pdf>, (accessed 11 July 2011).
14. “Water Resources Development Projects in Indus Basin,” Hydrology and Water Resources Information System for India, National Institute of Hydrology, Roorkee, India. <http://www.nih.ernet.in/rbis/india_ information/iNDUS_PROJECTS.htm>, (accessed 12 July 2011).
15. Water Resources Department, Government of Rajasthan, India. <http://waterresources.rajasthan.gov.in/4bhakhra.htm#link>, (accessed 12 July 2011).
16. Ibid.
17. Bharat R. Sharma, Upali Amarasinghe and Cai Xueliang, “Assessing and Improving Water Productivity in Conservation Agriculture Systems in the Indus-Gangetic Basin,” paper presented at the 4th World Congress on Conservation Agriculture-Innovations for Improving efficiency, Equity and Environment, New Delhi, India, 4-7 February 2009. <http://cpwfbfp.pbworks.com/f/WCCA-Paper_BRS_.pdf>, (accessed 20 July 2011).
18. G. Narendranath, Uma Shankari and Rajendra K. Reddy, “To Free or Not to Free Power: Understanding the Context of Free Power to Agriculture”, Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai, 31 December 2005, p.5561.
19. Nirvikar Singh and Deepali S. Kohli, “The Green Revolution in Punjab, India: The Economics of Technological Change”, Journal of Punjab Studies, Special Number on Agriculture and Rural Economy of Indian Punjab, Volume 12, Number 2, Fall 2005, pp.285-302.
20. R. M. Saleth and U.A. Amarasinghe, “Promoting Irrigation Demand Management in India: Policy Options and Institutional Requirements”, in R.M. Saleth, (ed.), Strategic Analyses of the National River Linking Project (NRLP) of India, Series 3. Promoting Irrigation Demand Management in India: Potentials, Problems and Prospects, (Colombo: International Water Management Institute, 2009), pp. 14-15. <http://nrlp.iwmi.org/PDocs/workshops/IWMI%20NRLP-Series%203-Latest-final%20(27-03-2009).pdf>, (accessed 20 July 2011).
21. Tushaar Shah, “Indian Irrigation in transition”, paper presented at a Workshop on Water Resources Management – Economic Instruments, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, 23-24 January 2009. <http://www.igidr.ac.in/conf/water/Indian% 20Irrigation%20in%20Transition-Tushaar%20Shah.pdf>, (accessed 20 July 2011).
22. World Bank and the Government of India, Initiating and Sustaining Water Sector Reforms: A Synthesis, (Washington and New Delhi: World Bank publications and Allied Publishers, 1999), p.95.
23. “Annual Report 2009-2010”, Central Water Commission, Government of India, p.11. <http://www.cwc.gov.in/main/downloads/Final% 20Annual%20Report%202009_10.pdf>, (accessed 20 July 2011).
24. Bharat R. Sharma, K.V.G.K. Rao and Govind Sharma, “Groundwater Externalities of Large Surface Irrigation Transfers: Lessons from Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana, Rajasthan, India”, in R.M. Saleth, (ed.), Strategic Analyses of the National River Linking Project (NRLP) of India Series 5, op.cit., pp.107-122, (ref.20).
25. Narendranath et al., op.cit., (ref. 18), pp.5565-5566.
26. Tushaar Shah et al., “Is Irrigation water free: A Reality Check in the Indo-Gangetic Basin,” World Development, Vol.37, Issue 2, February 2009, p.4.
27. V.R. Reddy, “Water pricing as a demand management option”, in Saleth, (ed.), op.cit., (ref.20), p.146.
28. A. K. Jain, and Raj Kumar, “Water Management Issues – Punjab, North-West India”, presented at Indo-US Workshop on Innovative E-technologies for Distance Education and Extension/Outreach for Efficient Water Management, 5-9 March 2007, ICRISAT, Patancheru/Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India, p.1. <http://akicb.ifas.ufl.edu/upload/proceedings/jainak_water_management.pdf>, (accessed 20 July 2011).
29. “Water and Related Statistics”, op.cit., (ref.9), p.134.
30. Saleth, op.cit., (ref.20).
31. “Hydro development Plan for 12th Five-Year Plan (2012-2017)”, Central Electricity Authority- Hydro Planning and Investigation Division, Government of India, September 2008, New Delhi. <http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/hydro/hydro_develop_12th_plan.pdf>, (accessed 2 July 2011).
32. “Tidong-II Hydroelectric Project (70 MW) Himachal Pradesh, Preliminary Feasibility Report”, Ministry of Power, Government of India. <www.powermin.nic.in/whats_new/PFR/HP/Tidong-II.pdf>, (accessed 3 July 2011).
33. “Declining Generation of Big Hydropower Projects”, Dams, Rivers and People, April-May 2010, Vol. 8, Issue 3-4, p. 7, South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), New Delhi. <http://www.sandrp.in/drp/DRP_Apr_May-2010.pdf>, (accessed 2 August 2011).
34. “In the Name of Clean Energy – A report on Asian Development Bank Financed Hydropower Projects in Himachal Pradesh”, May 2011, South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), Delhi, p.21. <http://www.sandrp.in/hydropower>, (accessed 2 August 2011).
35. “Declining Generation of Big Hydropower Projects”, op.cit., (ref.33).
36. Ibid.
37. “Baglihar HEP: Some Crucial Facts”, South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), Delhi, May-June 2005, p. 2. <www.sandrp.in/hydropower>, (accessed 3 July 2011).
38. Quoted in “Diminishing Performance of Big Hydro Projects in India”, South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), Delhi, 1 May, 2010. <www.sandrp.in/hydropower>, (accessed 3 July 2011).
39. “Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, A Majority Staff Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, 112th Congress, First Session, 22 February 2011.
40. “Report of National Seminar on Public Private Partnership (PPP) Mode of Financing & Implementation of Water Sector & Hydro Power Sector Projects,” Project Management and Policy Implementation Unit (PMPIU), Ministry of Water & Power, Islamabad, 5 January 2009.
41. Aijaz Nizamani, Fauzia Rauf and Abdul Hakeem Khoso, “Case Study: Pakistan - Population and Water Resources”, in Alex de Sherbinin and Victoria Dompka (eds.), Water and Population Dynamics: Case Studies and Policy Implications, (Washington DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1998).
42. “Power Generation”, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Government of Pakistan. <http://www.wapda.gov.pk/ htmls/pgeneration-hydelpower.asp>, (accessed 15 June 2011).
43. Shams ul Mulk, “Pakistan’s Water Economy, the Indus River System and its Development Infrastructure, and the Relentless Struggle for Sustainability”, in Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway (eds.), Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis, (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009), p. 64.
44. Ibid.
45. Dr. Shahid Ahmed, National Seminar on “Water Conservation, Present Situation and Future Strategy”, organized by Project Management & Policy Implementation Unit (PMPIU) of the Ministry of Water & Power, Government of Pakistan, p.50.
46. “Pakistan Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy Water Economy: Running Dry”, 14 November 2005, World Bank Report. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/PWCAS-Full.pdf>, (accessed 10 August 2011).
47. Asad Sarwar Qureshi, Peter G. McCornick, A. Sarwar, Bharat R. Sharma, “Challenges and Prospects of Sustainable Groundwater Management in the Indus Basin, Pakistan”, Water Resource Management online, Spring, 2009. <http://cpwfbfp.pbworks.com/f/Sutainable+ GW+Mgt_Indus_Pak.pdf>, (accessed 11 August 2011).
48. The Punjab province of Pakistan has introduced a crash programme of providing 2500 laser land levellers at 50 per cent subsidy to farmers in order to have at least one unit in each union council of the province. Abdul Hakeem Khan, Peter McCornick and Asim Rauf Khan, “Evolution of Managing Water for Agriculture in the Indus River Basin”, Proceedings of the second International Forum on Water and Food, (Volume 3), Addis Ababa, 10-14 November 2008, CPWF, Colombo, p.3. <http://cpwfbfp.pbworks.com/f/Evolution+of+ agrl+water+mgt+in+IB.pdf>, (accessed 11 August 2011).
49. “Agriculture,” Pakistan Economic Survey, 2010-2011, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, p.25.
50. Kaiser Bengali, “Water Management under Constraints: The Need for a Paradigm Shift”, in Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway (ed.), op.cit., (ref.43), p.45.
51. Under the Indus Waters Treaty 1960, the minimum flow of the Chenab River has to be 55,000 cubic feet per second. Kaiser Bengali, ibid., pp.48-49.
52. “Pakistan Water Sector Strategy”, National Water Sector Profile, Volume 5, October 2002, Ministry of Water and Power Office of the Chief Engineering Advisor/Chairman Federal Flood Commission, Islamabad. <http://cms.waterinfo.net.pk/pdf/vol5.pdf>, (accessed 15 June 2011).
53. Dr. S.M. Alam and Dr. M H. Naqvi, “Water scenario and Pakistan”, Pakistan Economist, 19-25 May 2003. <http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/pagesearch/Search-Engine2003/ S.E180.asp>, (accessed 15 June 2011).
54. Pakistan Economic Survey, 2010-2011, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, pp.23, 213.
55. Ibid., p. 24.
56. “Pakistan Water Sector Strategy”, op.cit., (ref.52), p.71.
57. Qureshi et al., op.cit., (ref.47).
58. “Upgrading Physical Infrastructure,” Medium-Term Development Framework 2005-2010, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan. <http://www.pc.gov.pk/mtdf.html>, (accessed 16 June 2011).
59. Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future,” May 2011, Asia Society, Pakistan 2020 Study Group Report. <http://asiasociety.org/Pakistan2020>, (accessed 4 July 2011).
60. “Hydropower Resources of Pakistan”, Annual Report of Private Power and Infrastructure Board, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, February 2011, pp.1-2.
61. Ibid., p. 1.
62. “Success Story”, Pakistan Council for Renewable Energy Technologies, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of Pakistan. <http://www.pcret.gov.pk/>, (accessed 12 August 2011).
63. Arshad H. Abbasi, “Hydropower — clean energy”, Dawn, Islamabad, 4 March 2010.
64. “Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making,” Report of the World Commission on Dams, (United Kingdom: World Commission on Dams, 2000), p.52. <http://www.unep.org/dams/ WCD/report/WCD_DAMS%20report.pdf>, (accessed 12 August 2011).
65. “Hydropower Resources of Pakistan,” op.cit., (ref.60).
66. Rest of the 65% power generation is from thermal, nuclear and rental power sources, –“Projects for Friends of Democratic Pakistan,” Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Government of Pakistan, March 2011. <http://www.wapda.gov.pk/pdf/ BrochureFODPMarch2011.pdf>, (accessed 11 August 2011).
67. Z. Majeed, Z. U. Hasan and A. Piracha, “Developing Hydropower Schemes on Existing Irrigation Network: A Case Study of Upper Chenab Canal System,” International River Basin Management Congress Book, Chapter 2, No. 70, (Turkey: International Congress on River Basin Management, 22-24 March 2007), p.884. <http://www.dsi.gov.tr/ check English version>, (accessed 11 August 2011).
68. WAPDA Annual Report 2009-2010, Water and Power Development Authority, Government of Pakistan, p.74.
69. Ibid.
70. Arshad H. Abbasi, op cit., (ref.63).
71. Bharat R. Sharma, Upali A. Amarasinghe and Alok Sikka, “Indo-Gangetic River Basins: Summary Situation Analysis”, International Water Management Institute (IWMI), New Delhi Office, New Delhi, India, 25 July 2008, p.4. <http://cpwfbfp.pbworks.com/f/ IGB_situation_analysis.PDF>, (accessed 15 July 2011).
72. While both countries have increased the power tariffs as an approach to groundwater management, diesel pumps in operation in the Indus region outstrip the electric ones.
73. “Better Management of Indus Basin Waters Strategic Issues and Challenges”, The World Bank: Pakistan, 2006. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Data%20and%20Reference/20805819/Brief-Indus-Basin-Water.pdf>.
74. V.R. Reddy, “Water pricing as a demand management option,” in Strategic Analyses of the National River Linking Project (NRLP) of India, Series 3. Promoting irrigation demand management in India: Potentials, problems and prospects (Colombo: International Water Management Institute, 2009). <http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/Other/PDF/ NRLP%20Proceeding-3.pdf>, (accessed 14 July 2011).
75. Tushaar Shah, Intizar Hussain, and Saeed ur Rehman, “Irrigation Management in Pakistan and India: Comparing Notes on Institutions and Policies”, Working Paper 4, Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI), 2000. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/iwt/ worppr/h027088.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011).
76. R.S. Sidhu and A. Bhullar, “Patterns and Determinants of Agricultural Growth in the Two Punjabs”, Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai, 31 December 2005, Vol. XL No 53, pp.5620-5627.
77. H. Fahlbusch et al., op.cit, p.27, (ref.11).
78. Tushaar Shah, Taming the Anarchy: Groundwater Governance in South Asia, (Washington D.C: The RFF Press, 2008). <http://waterknowledgehub.iwmi.org/PDF/REFORM_OR_MORPH.pdf>, (accessed 16 August 2011).
79. Quoted in M Rodell, I. Velicogna and J.S. Famiglietti, “Satellite-based estimates of groundwater depletion in India”, Nature, Volume 460, Issue 7257, 13 August 2009. <http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090812/ pdf/460789a.pdf>, (accessed 16 August 2011).
80. “Status of hydroelectric potential development — Basin wise,” Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India. <http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/hydro/he_potentialstatus_basin.pdf>, (accessed 30 June 2011).
81. “Upgrading Physical Infrastructure,” Medium Term Development Framework, op.cit., (ref.58).
82. “Status of hydroelectric potential development — Basin wise”, op.cit., (ref.80).
83. “Hydropower Resources of Pakistan”, op.cit., (ref.60).
Annex I
Proposed Hydropower Projects of India on Indus Basin
Source: Central Electricity Authority, Government of India
Annex II
Existing Hydropower Projects in Pakistan
Source: Annual Report – Private Power and Infrastructure Board, Government of Pakistan, February 2011.
Asma Yaqoob is Research Analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies.
|
Vol. XXX No. 8 |
August 2011 |
GOOD
GOVERNANCE: THE ACHILLES’
HEEL OF SOUTH ASIA — IS THERE
A WAY FORWARD?
The paper discusses the concept of governance and issues related to it from South Asian perspective. Governance has presently gained immense importance in development discourse and is considered a crucial element in formulating any development strategy. Apart from its universal acceptance, theory of governance is still passing through a development phase, as its concept defined by different scholars more or less varies.(1) Similarly, in the media and public discourse the concept remains underdeveloped, hence open to diversity of interpretations. According to the World Bank, governance refers to the manner in which power is exercised in managing a country's social and economic resources to provide public goods and services. The key dimensions of governance the Bank explores are: public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development and information and transparency.(2) The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as a neutral concept encompassing the mechanisms, processes relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences.(3) However, governance is a simple concept at heart: good governance is good government. The concept is related to the quality of the relationship between government and the citizens whom it exits to serve and protect.(4) Governance is not about the study of the institutions, organs and actors involved; it is about the assessment of quality and performance expressed through accountability, transparency, efficiency, empowerment, participation, sustainability equity and justice.(5)
South Asian countries have had democratic governments installed but the state of governance has become a matter of serious concern nowadays. The region, home to over one-fifth of the world population, is the region with about 437 million people living below one dollar a day and 80 per cent of the population survives below two dollar a day. South Asia’s share in the global income is only 7 per cent while its share of global poverty is about 43 per cent.(6) In the field of education, South Asia has shown a little progress; the literacy rate has increased from 47 per cent to 58 per cent. However, the pace is slower compared to other developing countries including Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, 212 million people are without access to safe water and the number of people without access to basic sanitation has even increased from 830 million to 897 million. South Asia still has the highest proportion of malnourished children in the world.(7) According to the Human Development Commission (HDC) Report, South Asia is one of the most poorly governed regions of the world, with the exclusion of a voiceless majority, unstable political regimes and poor economic management. The system of governance has become unresponsive and irrelevant to the needs and concerns of the people.
Decades of political instability, rise and the fall of military options, rampant corruption, lawlessness and insecurity has left the region behind in many fields. However, all these are just the symptoms of one greater disease — poor governance. The problems in South Asia are so huge that they present a defining challenge not only to the region itself but also to the international community. What happens in South Asia will affect the global community in the decades ahead.(8) These challenges call for immediate steps on the part of the governments of the region to devise a comprehensive system based on transparency and accountability. In simplest terms, South Asia needs to implement a system of good governance at grass-roots level. What is the system of good governance and how to implement it in South Asia? Will South Asia be able to deal with the governance-related issues? To discuss this, the paper is divided into three sections. The first section defines the concept of governance and explains how to judge a country’s progress on the basis of governance principles? The second presents an overview of governance-related issues confronting South Asia, and the third section concludes the discussion with suggesting a way forward to overcome the perennial governance crisis.
The notion of good governance first appeared in a 1989 World Bank Report on Africa, which defines it as the “exercise of political power to manage nations’ affairs. Good governance includes some or all of the following features: an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press.” In 1992, the World Bank reconfirmed its initial managerial approach described in Governance and Development which treats good governance as “synonymous with sound development management.” Later, World Bank’s annual report for 1998, Governance in Asia: From crisis to Opportunity, presented a more cogent concept of good governance. It defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s social and economic resources for development. The report elaborates four key components of good governance: accountability, transparency, predictability and participation. Accountability is the capacity to call officials to account for their actions. Transparency entails low-cost access to relevant information. Predictability results primarily from laws and regulations that are clear, known in advance and enforced uniformly and effectively. The fourth component, participation, is indeed reliable information and to serve as a reality check and watchdog for government actions.
The European Union (EU) on the other hand defines “good governance” as the management of affairs in a transparent, accountable, participative and equitable manner, showing due regard for human rights and the rule of law.(9)
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as a neutral concept encompassing the mechanisms, processes relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences. Good governance according to Martin Minogue, is both a broad reform strategy, and particular set of initiatives to strengthen the institutions of civil society with the task of making government more accountable, more open, transparent and more democratic.(10)
The SAARC Human Resource Development Centre’s report on good governance defines certain major characteristics of good governance. It is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law.
Figure 1
Characteristics of Good Governance
|
Accountable
|
Consensus Oriented |
Participatory |
|
Responsive
|
GOOD GOVERNANCE |
Transparent |
|
Follows the Rule of Law
|
Effective and Efficient |
Equitable and Inclusive |
Source: Report on Good Governance, SAARC Human Resource Development Centre (SHRDC), Islamabad, 2004
According to the report, participation is the cornerstone of good governance. It ensures freedom of association and expression. Besides this, the report makes the following points rule of law: fair legal framework and its impartial enforcement results in credibility. It builds confidence into the system. Transparency: availability of information and direct access helps in acceptable decisions and their enforcement. Responsiveness: institutions and processes should serve all stakeholders. Consensus Orientation: good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group. Equity: all men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. Effective and efficient: processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources. Accountability: decisions-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations are accountable to the public as well as to the institutional stakeholders.
Despite the variety of interpretations, a common underlying assumption of good governance has been thought of comprising three main components, or levels: systemic, political and administrative. From systemic perspective, the concept of good governance signifies more than its institutional or decision-making interpretation to include both internal and external political and economic power and inter-relationship between the two to indicate the rules by which the productive and distributive life of a society is governed. From political point of view, it implies a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority derived from a democratic mandate and would normally involve a pluralist polity with representative government and a commitment to protect human rights. From administrative perspective, good governance means an efficient, open, accountable and audited public service which has the bureaucratic component to help design and implement appropriate public policies and with an independent judicial system to uphold the law.(11)
Apart from definitions, evaluation of good or poor governance in any country is indeed important. In this regard, Rehman Sobhan suggests five major measures to evaluate the state of governance:
§ The extent of deprivation
§ The representative nature of institutions
§ The level of decentralization of governing bodies
§ The realization of fundamental and basic rights
§ The protection of security of life and liberty
Furthermore, the recent World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) is a more refined form of assessment criteria. It measures the governance of any country on the basis of voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Having discussed the interpretational part of good governance, the following section shall present an overview of governance in South Asia.
To begin with, good governance entirely depends on effective and representative democratic institutions. Such institutions require independent and autonomous functioning of the legislature, judiciary and executive. These three pillars of governance must work in harmony to ensure that the entire system is functioning on the principles of accountability and transparency. The democratic process in the region has always been the victim of intemperate exchanges, horse-trading, periodic walks-outs by the opposition and even resort to violence on the floor of the House. In Sri Lanka, the presidential system undermined the ability of the parliament to control the executive. In February 2004, as a result of power struggle between the president and the prime minister, the former dissolved the parliament four years before the end its term. Similarly, in Nepal, parliament was dismissed by the king and the prime minister several times in the 1999s. In Bangladesh, since the nation’s transition to democracy in 1990, state of governance remained poor. Practically all the organs of the state have been politicised even in the times of Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government with a two-thirds majority. The government is accused of amending the Constitution to suit their political interests. Similarly, President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka made changes in the Constitution under the 18th Amendment, which according to the International Crisis Group gives him a very real chance to remain in power indefinitely.(12) This Prolonged practice of such tactics has led to the degeneration of democratic institutions in South Asia.
The executive branch, which is composed of prime minister, cabinet and civil servants, plays an important role in running the administrative affairs of the state. In every South Asian country, the balance of power has always been in favour of the executive. In the case of Pakistan, it is evident from the tenures of successive prime ministers from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif. Prime minister Nawaz Sharif prior to his overthrow in 1999 possessed absolute power under the guise of the Sharia Bill. In the case of Bangladesh, all governments from Mujibur Rahman to, though to a lesser extent, the two successive regimes under Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajid had considerable de facto powers.(13)
Concentration of absolute power in one hand points to the weakness of political parties and ministers who prefer to hold office less on the basis of their own political legitimacy and performance and more owing to the patronage of the chief executive.(14) Their purpose primarily is to safeguard the interests of those in power. This political malaise has crippled the government institutions. Political parties in South Asia have never adopted any uniform pattern of evolution or development on the basis of their ideologies/philosophies, policies and programmes. Instead, there is a culture of personal loyalty and opportunism. Almost half the parliamentarians in India and Pakistan are landlords. Once in power, they lose touch with the people, some of them do not even care to utilise the special budget allocations for the socio-economic development of their constituencies.(15)
The culture of power politics in South Asia has gradually undermined the legitimacy of governments which is considered a fundamental aspect of good governance. The South Asian countries have somehow managed to establish democratic dispensations, though there are numerous challenges ahead. For instance, in India, a parliamentary federation, there have been secessionist movements in states like Nagaland, Tripura, Mezoram, Assam, and Punjab.(16) Moreover, India has been facing problems of extreme marginalization of disadvantaged sections of society such as Dalits. Pakistan, on the other hand, is struggling for a legitimate political order to counter centrifugal pressures from within, sectarian and ethnic tensions and religious extremism. It has been under military rules for long periods of time and has only recently emerged as a republican democracy. Similarly, Nepal’s short-lived democracy, beginning in the early 1950s as constitutional monarchy, was interrupted by monarchical intervention with the help of the army. The country has suffered great political turmoil and instability in the last few years and is now ultimately emerging as a nascent democratic republic.(17) In the recent past, towards the close of the country, Maoist rebels gained control in many rural districts during an armed uprising from 1996 to 2006 before they finally captured power through the ballot. Bangladesh, too, has been grappling with political instability, growing religious extremism and ethnic tensions. It has had democracy interrupted by periods of military rule. The situation varies in other countries but the problems of legitimacy continue to exist.
If we look at the state of democracy in South Asia, we find that though democracy is getting strengthened in the region, yet the state of political rights and civil liberties remains depressing. The following table shows that apart from Maldives, Bhutan and India, the rankings of Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka went down over the past ten years in terms of civil and political liberties.
Table 1
|
Ranking in terms of Civil Liberties and Political
Rights |
||||||
|
1999 |
2007 |
|||||
|
Country |
Political rights rank |
Civil liberties rank |
Freedom |
Political rights rank |
Civil liberties rank |
Freedom |
|
Pakistan India Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal Maldives Bhutan |
5 4 4 4 4 6 7 |
4 2 2 3 3 6 7 |
Partly free Partly free Partly free Partly free Partly free Not free Not free |
5 3 4 4 4 5 5 |
6 2 4 4 5 6 6 |
Not free Free Partly free Partly free Partly free Not free Not free |
Source: Human Development in South Asia 2007: A Ten-Year Review, HDC Report, 2008
Note: Rank 1 means most free and 7 means least free
There is widespread support for the promotion of democracy; however, there is no matching commitment towards or satisfaction with the institutional form of representative democracy. Constitutions provide equality of political citizenship, but fail to deliver on the promise of democracy that most people want. Political parties remain unable to act in a democratic and transparent manner or offer meaningful choices to voters. This has resulted in a low level of trust.(18)
Transparency is the second fundamental aspect of good governance. In relation to South Asia, lack of transparency and absence of effective monitoring of public spending is a major factor contributing to the poor governance. Corruption in South Asia is persistently on the rise. Transparency International ranks Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan and Nepal among the highest in corruption perception index (see table below).
Table 2
South Asian Countries Rank in Corruption Perception Index 2010
|
Country Ranking |
Country |
Score |
|
36 |
Bhutan |
5.7 |
|
87 |
India |
3.3 |
|
91 |
Sri Lanka |
3.2 |
|
134 |
Bangladesh |
2.4 |
|
143 |
Maldives |
2.3 |
|
143 |
Pakistan |
2.3 |
|
146 |
Nepal |
2.2 |
Source: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2010, Transparency International (www.transparency.org)
Note: The ranking is based on a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to have low levels of corruption)
Earlier, India was ranked 84th in CPI with a score of 3.4 in 2009. But the recent corruption charges in the Commonwealth Games has led it down to 87th position. This decline indicates that the country continues to be perceived as more corrupt than in the past. However, India seems more honest in comparison with other countries’ ranking in the region. According to Transparency international estimates, corruption has cost Pakistan more than Rs. 3 trillion during the last three years — more than a trillion rupees per annum with 15-20 per cent annual increase. In 2008, the CPI ranked Sri Lanka at 92nd position out of 180 countries with a score of 3.2. In 2010, the score remained static at 3.2 with a position of 91st. and clubbed with countries such as Bosnia, Guatemala and Zambia. The score remained stagnant due to the absence of independent institutions in the country to address corruption-related issues even the Bribery Commission is not functional. Bangladesh is the third most corrupt country in the region with a score of only 2.4 out of 10. It keeps on scoring low and is clubbed with countries such as Nigeria, Togo, Sierra Leon and Zimbabwe. Last but not least, Nepal got the top position with a score of 2.2 in the region. It falls in the range of “highly corrupt” countries with Iran, Yemen, Libya, Cameroon, Haiti, Paraguay and Ivory Coast sharing the same score. Comparatively, results from 2009 and 2010 indicate a downward movement.
The rule of law is a basic tenet of modern democratic state and central to delivering on good governance. It requires a stable political system including independent legislature, strong executive, free judiciary and good policing. Unfortunately, a weak tradition of rule of law is a major barrier in South Asia’s path towards good governance. Years of political instability and autocratic governance has compromised the independence of both the upper and lower judiciary. The appointment of judges in the upper judiciary has not been without executive influence. All countries have sought to insulate appointments; however, it has not prevented the executives from trying to hire particular judges on loyalty basis.(19) Similarly, the lower judiciary is suffering from inadequate separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. A basic deficiency of the judicial system has been the lack of effective access to justice for a large section of population. Justice is also delayed for reasons such as bribery, inadequate facilities in the courts and lack of moral sense in the judicial authorities.
The malfunctioning of the legal system has led to the accumulation of a backlog of cases. According to HDC Governance Report, South Asian countries had a huge number of pending cases in the courts: India 22.0 million, Nepal 0.08 million, Bangladesh 6.5 million, and Pakistan 0.75 million.(20) The situation is no more different in jails. A large number of prisoners awaiting trial, mostly belong to the poor class, and often serve long sentences without ever being convicted.(21) Pakistan’s high courts and district courts are suffering from severe shortage of judges and court staff. There is a lack of training for judges and effective judicial administration is missing. Similarly, there is widespread judicial corruption in India. In Bangladesh, the independence of the judiciary is still vulnerable to government interventions.
However, there are signs of increasing judicial activism in many South Asian countries, particularly in Pakistan following the successful ‘lawyer’s movement’. In 2006, for the first time a serving cabinet minister of India, who was also a key ally of the Congress party, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. In 2005, King Gyanendra of Nepal ordered creation of a Royal Commission for Corruption Control (RCCC) which was a roadblock for the anti-corruption movement. The Supreme Court took action and ruled the RCCC unconstitutional and ordered its abolition. Despite these developments, the common man’s life has not changed. The lower courts are largely inaccessible to the poor. Law in South Asia from a common man’s perspective ‘is a rich man’s resource to be used, along with the police, as instruments to oppress the poor, undermine their democratic rights and perpetuate an unjust and inequitable social order.’(22) The police, which has a vital role in maintaining internal law and order and establishing the rule of law in a country, is now increasingly becoming a negotiable commodity all over South Asia.
The system of good governance cannot be complete without the accountability of the elected representative. Government institutions, private sectors and civil society organizations, all must be accountable to the public and their respective institutional stakeholders.(23) Unfortunately, South Asia continues to carry its imperial legacy where the government was not answerable to the people but to the colonial power.(24)
In a framework of good governance, the maximum participation by the people must be ensured. In this regard, decentralization of power is one tool among the others. It can shift real power — legislative, financial and administrative — from the bureaucracy and narrow-interest groups to the people.(25) Quality of governance can be improved if governance is brought closer to the governed. In South Asia, despite advances both in terms of devolution and delegation, the local government system is generally weak. Its effectiveness from district to the village level is compromised due to its dependence on the province, even the centre, for resources. The local government system lacks managerial expertise, appropriate knowledge and information and resources to perform within its domain. Approaches to decentralization usually consist only in the delegation of some administrative functions, which often tend to be declaratory in nature or are implemented with no great determination. Apart from reluctance regarding delegation of power, governments in South Asia, given the nature of ethnic, religious and regional variety of their countries, fear that decentralization may pave the way for centrifugal forces or secessionist movements.(26) The problem lies in dealing with these forces not in the system.
In order to assess the state of governance, Dr Mahbub ul Haq Development Centre, Islamabad, in 1999 worked out governance assessment of 58 countries using the Humane Governance Index (HGI), later published in its annual report. According to the report, South Asia was one of the most poorly governed regions in the world with lowest HGI values. Out of 58 countries, India was ranked 42, while Pakistan 52, Sri Lanka 53 and Bangladesh 54. In 2002, a pilot testing of 16 countries was conducted under the new governance indicators by the World Governance Assessment (WGA) Project. Only two countries, India and Pakistan, were taken from South Asia. On a scale of 7 points, India scored 3.27 and Pakistan got only 2.17. There was no sharp difference observed in these two findings; from 1999 and 2002. The progress remained poor. The recent World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) is a more refined form of assessment criteria. It measures the governance of any country on the basis of voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. WGI analyses voice and accountability by capturing the perception of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in electing governments, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of the media. Political stability and absence of violence is measured through the perception of the likelihood that government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. The third indicator, government effectiveness, analyses through perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of government. Regulatory quality is measured from perceptions of the quality of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of law in any country is measured by capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The last indicator, control of corruption, is judged by capturing the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. In all of the above mentioned indicators, the region South Asia is lagging behind. Following table adapted from the WGI shows ranking for the year 2009.
Table 3
World Governance Indicators
|
Country |
Ranking |
||||||
|
|
Voice and Accountability |
Political Stability & Absence of Violence |
Government Effectiveness
|
Regulatory Quality
|
Rule of law
|
Control of Corruption
|
Average |
|
Bangladesh |
35.1 |
7.5 |
16.7 |
23.3 |
27.8 |
16.7 |
21.1 |
|
Bhutan |
29.4 |
71.2 |
64.8 |
13.8 |
59.4 |
75.2 |
52.3 |
|
India |
60.2 |
13.2 |
54.3 |
44.3 |
55.7 |
46.7 |
45.7 |
|
Maldives |
44.1 |
39.2 |
42.4 |
37.1 |
52.8 |
29.5 |
40.8 |
|
Nepal |
30.8 |
5.2 |
18.1 |
23.8 |
17.9 |
25.2 |
20.1 |
|
Pakistan |
20.9 |
0.5 |
19 |
33.3 |
19.3 |
13.3 |
17.7 |
|
Sri Lanka |
32.2 |
11.8 |
49 |
43.3 |
53.3 |
44.8 |
39 |
Source: World Governance Indicators (WGI), 2009
Any country’s progress in delivering good governance can also be judged by its ability to reduce poverty. Unfortunately, misgovernance in the region has resulted in failure to alleviate poverty, which is widely considered a breeding ground of terrorism and extremism. South Asia’s share in the global income is only 7 per cent while its share of global poverty is about 43 per cent and share in the world population is 22 per cent. Per capita income is $594, which is the lowest in comparison with any other region in the world — even Sub-Saharan Africa has a bit higher figure ($ 601) than South Asia. South Asian countries, which have the largest concentration of the poor in the world, have little to no safety net. Human development balance sheet for this region, 1993-95 to 2004, shows that South Asia’s share in world population remains the same 22 per cent as it was in 1993-1995, but its share in world’s absolute poor has increased from 40 per cent in 1993-95 to 47 per cent in the year 2004. In education, South Asia has shown a little progress though; the literacy rate has increased from 47 per cent to 58 per cent. However, the pace is slower compared to other developing countries including Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, 212 million people are without access to safe water and the number of people without access to basic sanitation has even increased from 830 million to 897 million. And though the percentage of malnourished children has declined to 46 from 52 per cent, South Asia still has the highest proportion of malnourished children in the world. Maternal mortality ratio rose to 510 per 100,000 in 2004 from 430 per 100,000 in 1993-94.
Figure 2

Number of the poor rose in South Asia from 1993 to 2002
Source: World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, The World Bank
Country-wise statistics (1993-95 to 2004) show that
In India:
§ The level of inequality is rising; the income share of the richest 20 per cent to the poorest 20 per cent has increased from 4.7 to 4.9 per cent.
§ 33.5 per cent of the total population is living below a dollar a day.
§ 292 million adults are illiterate, the same as in 1995.
§ 4.5 million children are out of school (third highest in world ranking).
§ 47 per cent of children below age 5 are malnourished. The UN children's agency, UNICEF, says India has the highest rate of child malnutrition in the world. And at 46 per cent, it is higher than Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, estimates are that a further 1.5 million Indian children could now suffer increased levels of malnutrition.
§ 5.7 million people with HIV/AIDS live in India, which accounts for 97 per cent of the total South Asian AIDS patients.
§ 152.2 million people have no access to safe water.
§ 67 per cent of the total population is without access to sanitation.
§ The share of females in the total labour force declined from 32 per cent to 28.3 per cent.
In Pakistan:
§ 73.6 per cent of the population is still living below two dollars a day.
§ The level of inequality has declined as the income share of the richest 20 per cent to the poorest 20 per cent has declined from 4.7 to 4.3.
§ Half the adult population is still illiterate; 76 per cent of the female adult population is illiterate.
§ percentage of the rural poor has increased to 35.9 from 31 per cent.
§ 15.5 million people have no access to safe water.
§ 41 per cent (72 million) of the total population is without access to sanitation.
§ 6.5 million children are out of school (second highest in world ranking)
§ 9 million (38 per cent) children under the age of 5 are malnourished.
§ 85 thousand people are with HIV/AIDS.
§ The share of females in the labour force is 26.5 per cent.
In Bangladesh:
§ 82.8 per cent of the population is living below two dollars a day.
§ The level of inequality has worsened as the income share of the richest 20 per cent to the poorest 20 per cent has increased from 4.0 to 4.6 per cent.
§ 11 thousand people are with HIV/AIDS.
§ 34.8 million people have no access to safe water.
§ 61 per cent of the total population is without access to sanitation.
§ 48 per cent of children under the age of 5 are malnourished.
§ 59 per cent of the total adult population is illiterate.
§ The share of females in the total labour force declined from 35 per cent to 12 per cent.
In Nepal:
§ 68.5 per cent of the population is living below two dollars a day.
§ The level of inequality has worsened as the income share of the richest 20 per cent to the poorest 20 per cent increased to 9.1 per cent in 2000 from 4.3 per cent in 1981-93.
§ 4.3 million people have no access to safe water.
§ 65 per cent of the population is without access to sanitation.
§ 51 per cent of the adult population is illiterate.
§ 45 per cent of children under the age of 5 are malnourished.
§ 75,000 people with HIV/AIDS live in Nepal. (The percentage has gone up to 0.5 per cent from 0.24 in 1997).
§ The share of females in the national labour force has declined to 63 per cent in 2004 from 68 per cent in 1994.
In Sri Lanka:
§ 41.6 per cent of the population is living below two dollars a day.
§ The level of inequality has worsened as the income share of the richest 20 per cent to the poorest 20 per cent has increased to 5.1 per cent from 4.4 per cent.
§ 4.6 million people (21 per cent of the total population) have no access to safe water.
§ 9 per cent of the total population is without access to sanitation.
§ School enrolment rate has worsened to 63 per cent in 2004 from 66 per cent in 1993.
§ 1.5 million adults (about 9.3 per cent) are illiterate.
§ 29 per cent of children under the age of 5 are malnourished.
§ The share of females in economic activities has gone down to 45 per cent in 2004 from 54 per cent in 1995.
The region is evidently faced with inadequate nutrition and food insecurity that is reflected in declining per capita calorie consumption. The number of undernourished in the developing countries is estimated at 815 million (20 per cent of the population) for the three-year average 1990-92. This was the base year used by the 1996 World Food System in setting the target of halving the numbers undernourished in the developing countries by 2015 at the latest.
Table 4
Incidence of Under-nourishment in Developing Countries
|
|
1990/91 |
1997/99 |
2015 |
2030 |
1990/92 |
1997/99 |
2015 |
2030 |
|
Percentage of population |
Million persons |
|||||||
|
Developing countries |
20 |
17 |
11 |
6 |
815 |
776 |
610 |
443 |
|
Sub-Saharan Africa |
35 |
34 |
23 |
15 |
168 |
194 |
205 |
183 |
|
excl. Nigeria |
40 |
40 |
28 |
18 |
156 |
186 |
197 |
178 |
|
Near East/North Africa |
8 |
9 |
7 |
5 |
25 |
32 |
37 |
34 |
|
Latin America and Caribbean |
13 |
11 |
6 |
4 |
59 |
54 |
40 |
25 |
|
South Asia |
26 |
24 |
12 |
6 |
289 |
303 |
195 |
119 |
|
East Asia |
16 |
11 |
6 |
4 |
275 |
193 |
135 |
82 |
Source: World Agriculture: Towards 2015-2030, An FAO Perspective.
The above table shows that only East Asia has made progress and is on track in achieving the target of halving the numbers of the undernourished in developing countries by 2015. While two other regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, are with highest incidence in relative terms. Both registered increases in absolute numbers affected. If these trends continue, the halving target will certainly not be achieved and whatever reductions take place in other sectors will further accentuate the differences among regions and countries.
Similarly, the health profile of South Asia is not satisfactory. However, there is progress in terms of key health indicators as life expectancy has increased from 62 to 64 years; infant mortality rate is showing a downward trend from 80 to 62 per 1,000 live births; adult mortality rate has also declined to 197 from 214 per 1,000 persons. Despite the improvements, the infant mortality rate remains one of the highest in the world. About 185,000 women die annually due to pregnancy — and childbirth-related complications. The region continues to be the most malnourished in the world, with a rate higher than even that of Sub-Saharan Africa. Like the education sector, South Asia’s spending on health is less than one per cent of GDP as compared to other developing countries’ 2.8 per cent on average. Ironically, the poverty-stricken region is one of the most militarised regions in the world.
It is widely acknowledged that good governance is a vital adjunct to successful development efforts and economic prosperity of a country. However, each nation’s path towards good governance may differ depending on geography, culture, physical and administrative traditions and economic conditions. Despite contrasting values, they share more or less the same responsibilities to provide goods and services, protect and administer the rule of law and advance social equity.(27) The role of the state in governance remains pivotal. For instance, strong and stable governments with clear roles have been a feature of East Asia’s development over the past half century. They have set the economic targets, pushed businesses towards achieving them and work with other governments to spread economic growth across the region.(28)
The situation is somewhat different as compared to East Asian countries. South Asia has had to contend with violent conflicts that have necessarily reduced the priority given by societies to day-to-day governance issues. Furthermore, frequent changes in political regimes have caused disastrous consequences for political, economic and social governance. The governments in power whether they come through the democratic way or a military coup, discontinued or slowed down the implementation of policies and projects of previous governments. This practice has gravely hampered the progress of institutions, resultantly; it takes a very long time for the institutions to become mature. Markets, which have stakes in the governments and government-led institutions, gradually lose the confidence. Stakeholders with a sound profile start shifting their businesses out and some of them with a low or medium profile succumb to the prevalent instability in the markets. To sum up, the institutional problems are more entrenched in the region as compared to other regions in the world.
To promote good governance in South Asia, the focus should primarily be on institutional and administrative reforms that include: judicial reforms to bring an independent and effective system of judiciary; constitutional reforms to ensure state’s foundations and structures respect human rights and the rule of law; administrative decentralization at the grass-roots level to promote democratic structures, encouraging the development of a free and independent media, and measures to prevent fraud, corruption and favouritism and strengthening civil society. The political process must be inclusive in which people are able to raise their concerns and participate in the overall decision-making process. Every state must identify the areas of weaknesses and then work out the strategies accordingly, under the guidelines provided by good governance mechanism given below. In line with this thinking, for instance, Dr. Ishrat Hussain has proposed the agenda for governance and institutional reforms in Pakistan such as improving the quality and performance of civil services; restructuring the organization of federal, provincial and district governments; revamping the mechanism for delivery of basic public goods and services; strengthening key institutions engaged in economic governance and introducing checks and balances in the system by building up the capacity and authority of certain institutions of restraint.(29)
There is a dire need to establish performance-based criteria regarding the delivery of public goods and services. The judiciaries and parliaments must be examined both individually and in relation to other pillars of the state. It is a fairly established fact that parliaments are the ultimate source to force the governments to remain transparent in dealing with the people of their countries. Despite increasing levels of openness in parliaments’ proceedings the working of parliamentary committees is an area where secrecy continues. South Asian countries can enhance their capacity to serve the people better by strengthening government accountability through active parliamentary committees, improving parliamentary research and information services, and increasing media coverage of proceedings. Parliamentarians on their part must exercise the legislative powers with greater responsibility. To enhance accountability and transparency, laws need to be adopted to ensure that all parliamentarians have declared their financial and criminal antecedents. These declarations must be accessible to all. There must be attendance record of every MP. They are supposed to play their role in holding the executive accountable for its policies and actions by raising questions. The details of the question hour must be made public. To make the system more participatory, citizens should be allowed to attend the parliamentary discussions except in extraordinary situations. The media has become a strong instrument in promoting transparency. The civil society is using the access to information to expose corruption and secure the rights of the poor. Bureaucrats have become more cautious. However, the excessive misuse of the freedom by some sections of the media in assassinating the character of political leaders or public servants without evidence may damage the cause of transparency and accountability.(30) The media is required to play a more responsible role by doing its homework before highlighting any report or information.
The judiciary can be progressive by enforcing higher penalties to mitigate corruption within the courts and by educating people about their rights under the law. The law must be clear and accessible to all and must protect fundamental human rights. Ministries and public officers must exercise the power conferred on them in good faith. South Asia has accomplished the task of separating the judiciary from the executive, though there are numerous challenges ahead. In Pakistan, there is an inadequacy of judges and courts staff in high courts and district courts. A large-scale induction of judges and court personnel is required to make justice available to all within a short period of time. Civil judges lack experience in dealing with the criminal cases; hence they need regular and comprehensive training that can improve their competence and professionalism.(31) In India, efforts must be made to address the widespread judicial corruption. South Asia should develop a system of regular monitoring, inspection and evaluation of courts.
There is an urgent need for an accountable, transparent and efficient police service that ensures the safety and well-being of the citizens. They need regular training for getting equipped with the modern techniques to counter present-day challenges. It will help enhance the professional competence of police. In order to bring accountability in the system and to minimise external influence an independent commission needs to be established to oversee police functioning. Community policing has gained immense importance across the world and is becoming a norm in many democratic countries. It is entirely different from traditional policing system. (See the appendix). It not only supports building confidence in the police but also ensures that the police is accountable before the law and the community it serves. In community policing, law-enforcement agency, the police and the law-abiding citizens work together to prevent crime, arrest offenders, solve ongoing problems and improve the overall quality of life.(32) The objective behind this idea is to minimise the gap between police and citizens through ensuring community participations in policing. There are two examples of successful community policing initiatives: the Janamaithri Project of India, and the Citizen-Police Liaison Committee of Pakistan. Unfortunately, these and other initiatives such as Town Defence Party of Bangladesh and Citizen’s Committees in Sri Lanka, lack governments’ support and consequently the system has not yet been developed in an organized way. The governments of South Asia need to take the matter seriously and strengthen ‘community policing.’ That would ensure the initiative makes its contribution to good governance.
The quality of governance can improve if governance is brought closer to the governed. Decentralization, if it is implemented in a true sense, can serve as one of the chief instruments of people’s participation for advancing good governance. Governments of South Asia need to pay more attention towards the function and purpose of the local government system rather than its structure and administrative control. The local government system must be capable enough to address the changes in immediate needs and demands at the grassroots level. The developed countries spend 25 per cent or more of the total government spending at the local level. Unfortunately, in South Asia the system is much more centralized, with the governments delegating below 10 per cent of budgetary spending. What is needed is enhancing budgetary allocation to empower local government system. This increase must be bound with accountability of funds and annual audit through independent auditors. Local bodies, on their part, instead of relying exclusively on the state for finance, must explore multiple resources.
In order to eradicate poverty, which is not only a cost of misgovernance but also a constraint in good governance, a multidimensional holistic approach is needed most. The following measures can help in strengthening good governance for poverty alleviation in South Asia.
Firstly, there is a dire need to strengthen the agriculture sector by increasing investment. The focus should be on increasing agriculture production; Introduce a more knowledge-based agriculture system; Adopt proper mechanism to halt the decline in the agriculture sector’s labour force; Support small farmers, providing them maximum incentives and opportunities; Support the poor in their small businesses with funds and interest-free loans. Currently, governments have actually cut down investment in agriculture by cutting back spending on infrastructure, on agricultural research, and in rural areas. This lack of investment, especially in rural infrastructure and in the development of new agricultural technologies, hampers the ability of producers to respond to the market and, therefore, affects the prospects of overall agricultural growth. The downward trends in public investment by governments and development agencies in smallholder agriculture over the past decade have not been matched by a concomitant rise in private investment. Similarly, there is little private research and development — and fewer incentives for it — relating to food crops, livestock, fisheries and aquaculture systems important for food security and poverty alleviation in rural South Asia.
Governments of South Asia should take the responsibility of ensuring social safety net for the poor; the task should not be left to the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community organisations. In this regard governments need to identify sections of population that are marginalised and face discrimination on grounds of gender, economic status, and vulnerability as single parents or widows heading households, disability and illness. They must have the protection of food security. In this regard there is a need to establish and strengthen public distribution systems that target food support to these segments of society.
Governments should initiate or support public employment guarantee schemes, such as “food for work” or “cash for work” schemes; ensure well-functioning health systems with maximum availability of essential quality medicines and vaccines to the poor free of cost; ensure access to basic sanitation. Increase the share of spending on education; ensure a well-functioning uniform education system, with maximum attention being given to the rural areas and maximum enrolment of both genders at the primary level at least. Last but not least; continuity in development programmes is essential. It should not be disturbed with the change of governments. In this matter strong commitment from institutions is required.
The global community can play an important role in implementing good governance in South Asia through increasing the level of surveillance on issues related to governance. This task can be done through human intelligence network, academics, scholars, research cooperation and interaction with civil society think tanks. Trade or aid should be bound to certain compliance requirements particularly in aid; the donors must adopt people-centric approach and remain aware of deception and diversion tactics of governments.(33) To sum up, the table below presents the path towards good governance for South Asia. It highlights areas where reforms are needed most and sets targets accordingly.
Notes and References
1. Hasnat Adbul Hye, “Good Governance: A Social Contract for the New Millennium”, in Hasnat Abdul Haye (ed), Governance: South Asian Perspective, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.1.
2. “Governance and Development,” The World Bank, (1992), (available at: www.worldbank.org )
3. “Report on Good Governance,” SAARC Human Resource Development Centre (SHRDC), Islamabad, 2004. (The SHRDC in 2004 organized three training courses. The “Report on Good Governance” for the training course during the period 30 August to 12 September was the second of the series.)
4. “Governance in Asia: From Crisis to Opportunity,” Annual Report 1998, the World Bank, (available at: www.worldbank.org).
5. Adbul Hye, op.cit., (ref.1), p.7.
6. Poverty in South Asia: Challenges and Responses , Human Development Report 2006, the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre (HDC), (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.20
7. Syed Imran Sardar, “Poverty in South Asia: Towards a Holistic Approach,” Regional Studies, winter 2009-10, (Islamabad: The Institute of Regional Studies), p.33-34
8. Dr. Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, “Issues of Governance in South Asia: Legitimacy, Transparency, and Accountability,” the paper was presented at an international seminar “Non-Traditional and Human Security” organized jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) and National Commission for Human Development, in Islamabad on 31 October-1 November 2006. (Copy right IRS 2006), p.21.
9. Quoted by Judit Balazs in Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), “Problems of Good Governance in South Asian Countries: Learning from European Political Models,” (University of Karachi: B.C.C & T Press, 1999), p.290.
10. Quoted by Syedur Rahman in Hasnat Abdul Haye (ed.), op cit, (ref. 1), p.233.
11. Dr. R.B. Jain, “Towards Good Governance: A South Asian Perspective,” the paper presented at international conference on “Challenges of Governance in South Asia” in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 15-16 December 2008. (available at www.pactu.edu.np).
12. M. Shahidul Islam, “The Crisis of Governance in South Asia,” (accessed from www.nus.edu.sg).
13. Rehman Sobhan, “South Asia’s Crisis of Governance: Avoiding False Solutions,” in Khadija Haq (ed.), The South Asian Challenge, the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre (HDC), Islamabad. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.151.
14. Ibid.
15. Crisis of Governance, the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre HDC, (Oxford University Press Karachi, 2000).
16. Suddle, op cit, (ref 8), p.23.
17. Jain, op.cit., (ref.11).
18. “State of Democracy in South Asia”, the report is prepared by New Delhi-based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in collaboration with International IDEA and the Department of Sociology, Oxford University and published by Oxford University Press. Key findings of this report are available at <http://www.idea.int/asia_ pacific/sod_south_asia.cfm>.
19. Sobhan, op cit (ref 13), p.159.
20. “Crisis of Governance,” op cit (ref 15).
21. Sobhan, op cit (ref 13), p.160-161.
22. Ibid.
23. Suddle, op cit (ref 8), p.30-33.
24. Human Development in South Asia 2007: A Ten-Year Review, the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre HDC, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter 11, p.227.
25. Richard Ponzio, “The Crisis of Governance in South Asia: Solutions”, in Naveed Ahmad Tahir (ed.), op.cit., (ref.9), p.248.
26. Jochen Kenneweg, “Statehood and Governance: Challenges in South Asia,” German Development Institute, Briefing Paper 2/2008, (accessed at <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/DIE_ StatehoodGovernance_SouthAsia.pdf>.
27. Dr. Ishrat Husain, ‘Retooling Institutions’, in Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.150.
28. David Bloom, David Steven and Mark Weston, “Governance Matters: The role of Governance in Asian Economic Development,” World Economics, Vol.5, No.4, October-December 2004, p.70.
29. Ishrat Hussain, op cit (ref 27).
30. Ibid.
31. Justice Shafiur Rahman, “Strengthening the Judiciary of Pakistan” in Strengthening the Criminal Justice System, Asian Development Bank 2006, chapter 14-18.
32. Abu Syed M. Shahjahan, “Police Reforms in Bangladesh” in Strengthening the Criminal Justice System, op cit, chapter 3, pp.38-51
33. Syed Iftekhar Masud and Shamsul Muktadir, “Supporting Good Governance in South Asia for a Peaceful World,” accessed at <http://fr.pekea-fr.org/T.Syed.doc>.
Appendix
Table 5
Way to Good Governance
|
Area |
Targets |
Strategies |
|
Delivery of public goods and services |
Efficient system for delivery of public goods and services |
Through computerization and establishing performance-based criteria for delivery of basic public goods and services
|
|
Parliaments |
Openness
Transparency
Participatory
|
Through increasing media coverage;
Proceedings must be made public and easily accessible to all;
People must be allowed to attend except in extraordinary circumstances
|
|
Judiciary |
Mitigating corruption within courts
Educating people about laws Improving competence of judges
|
Through enforcing higher penalties
Through the media Through regular training |
|
Police |
Improving professional competence
Bringing accountability in the system and minimise external influence
Bringing change in traditional policing system
|
Through modern training to counter present-day challenges
An independent commission should be established to oversee police functioning
Strengthen community policing system |
|
Local Government |
Improvement in functioning
|
Through maximising people’s participation Laws must be made to minimise administrative control of the state.
Through increasing budgetary allocation Search for the multiple sources of income instead of relying exclusively on the state Accountability over funds and annual auditing through independent auditors
|
|
Participation |
Maximising people participation at all levels both for men and for women |
Through public awareness about the system and their role and importance in it. The task can be done well by the media.
|
|
Continuity |